Supreme Court Issues

Cases Not Yet Set

• Consumer Protection—Action for Damages—Unfair or Deceptive Conduct—Right of Action—Scope—Out of State Plaintiff—Washington Corporate Defendant—Out-of-State Corporate Principal of Washington Corporate Defendant
• Criminal Law—Former Jeopardy—Judgment—Collateral Estoppel—Prosecution for First Degree Murder While Armed With Firearm—Previous Acquittal on Charge of Unlawful Possession of Firearm—Effect
• Criminal Law—Trial—Presence of Defendant—Right to Be Present—Waiver—Voluntariness—Determination—Presumption Against Waiver—Application—Necessity
• Mental Health—Involuntary Commitment—Inflicting or Attempting to Inflict Serious Physical Harm—180-Day Commitment Period—Renewal—Statute—Constitutionality
• Personal Restraint—Petition—Timeliness—Statutory Limits—Exceptions—Significant Change in Law—Appellate Decision—Mulholland Case
• Witnesses—Privileges—Attorney-Client Privilege—Scope—School District Client—Former Nonparty Employees

Consumer Protection—Action for Damages—Unfair or Deceptive Conduct—Right of Action—Scope—Out of State Plaintiff—Washington Corporate Defendant—Out-of-State Corporate Principal of Washington Corporate Defendant

Whether a plaintiff who is not a Washington resident may sue a Washington corporation under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010 et seq., for allegedly deceptive acts committed by the corporation as the in-state agent of an out-of-state corporation and, if so, whether the plaintiff may also sue the out-of-state corporation under the Act.

No. 91393-5, Thornell (plaintiff) v. Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc., et al. (defendants).

2015 WL 1000426 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2015)

Certified Question from U.S. District Court, for the Western District of Washington

Criminal Law—Former Jeopardy—Judgment—Collateral Estoppel—Prosecution for First Degree Murder While Armed With Firearm—Previous Acquittal on Charge of Unlawful Possession of Firearm—Effect

Whether under collateral estoppel principles as embodied in the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, the defendant’s prosecution for first degree murder while armed with a firearm violated double jeopardy principles when in a previous bench trial the court found the defendant not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm based on the same incident.

No. 89706-9, In re Pers. Restraint of Moi, Mathew W. Moi (petitioner); State (respondent).

Criminal Law—Trial—Presence of Defendant—Right to Be Present—Waiver—Voluntariness—Determination—Presumption Against Waiver—Application—Necessity

Whether in a criminal prosecution in which the court proceeded with trial in the defendant’s absence after making a preliminary finding that she had voluntarily waived her right to be present by failing to appear, the court upon the defendant’s appearance was required to expressly consider on the record the defendant’s explanation for her absence in light of the presumption against waiver when making its final ruling on whether the defendant waived her right to be present.

No. 91220-3, State (respondent) v. Thurlby (petitioner).

184 Wn. App. 918 (2014)

Mental Health—Involuntary Commitment—Inflicting or Attempting to Inflict Serious Physical Harm—180-Day Commitment Period—Renewal—Statute—Constitutionality

Whether RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provides for a 180-day extension of an involuntary civil commitment of a person incompetent to stand trial for violent offenses if the State presents prima facie evidence that the person continues to suffer from a mental disorder or developmental disability that results in a substantial likelihood of acts similar to the charged criminal behavior, violates the United States or Washington constitutions.

No. 90570-3, In re Detention of M.W. & W.D. (respondents); DSHS (petitioner).

Personal Restraint—Petition—Timeliness—Statutory Limits—Exceptions—Significant Change in Law—Appellate Decision—Mulholland Case

Whether the decision in In re Personal Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322, 166 P.3d 677 (2007), holding that sentencing courts may impose concurrent sentences for multiple serious violent felonies as a form of exceptional sentence below the standard range, constitutes a “significant change in the law” exempting a collateral challenge to a criminal judgment from the one-year time limit on collateral relief pursuant to RCW 10.73.100(6).

No. 91065-1, State (petitioner) v. Miller (respondent).

181 Wn. App. 201 (2014)

Witnesses—Privileges—Attorney-Client Privilege—Scope—School District Client—Former Nonparty Employees

Whether in a personal injury action brought by a former high school football player against a school district, defense counsel’s communications with former district coaches not named as defendants are protected by the attorney-client privilege.

No. 90194-5, Newman, et al. (respondents) v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203 (petitioner).