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No. 71422-8-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION III

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STATE OF WASHINGTON
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VITO DeGRANDIS, an individual,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.

JAMES STANFORD and JANE DOE STANFORD, in their individual capacities and as a marital community; and STANFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Washington corporation,

Defendants,

JANE DOE (KRISTENE) STANFORD, an individual,

Appellant.

APPELLANT KRISTENE STANFORD'S OPENING BRIEF

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Trial Court incorrectly entered Judgment against Appellant Kristene Stanford individually for a business debt her husband owed to Respondent Vito DeGrandis ("DeGrandis"). The debt was incurred solely and separately by Kristene Stanford's husband. Kristene Stanford took no part in the business transaction, she was not identified anywhere in the allegations or pleadings in the lawsuit stemming from her husband, James Stanford's, failure to pay back the debt, and she was not served with any of the pleadings related to the summary judgment and writ of attachment ultimately issued against her. Indeed, the extent of Kristene Stanford's involvement in the underlying lawsuit was being named individually as "*Jane Doe Stanford*" in the caption.

When DeGrandis filed the underlying lawsuit, the Summons and Complaint were served to the Stanfords' home. James Stanford accepted service on behalf of himself, Kristene Stanford, and Stanford Development, Inc. However, DeGrandis then delivered all subsequent pleadings to James Stanford's business address only. Kristene Stanford, despite being named as an individual party, was

not served with any further pleadings in this matter, including all pleadings and notices related to DeGrandis' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Upon learning that judgment had been issued against her individually without being afforded due process, Kristene Stanford filed a Motion with the Trial Court to vacate the judgment against her. Rather than addressing her individual liability, the Trial Court merely affirmed that the Stanford **marital community** could be liable for James Stanford's business debt – an issue Kristene Stanford never refuted. Consequently, the following issues were never addressed: (1) that Kristene Stanford was included in the judgment in her individual capacity contrary to Washington law; (2) that her inclusion was likely a mere clerical error; and (3) that she was denied her right to due process as an individually named party.

Thus, the Trial Court erred not only in issuing Summary Judgment and a Writ of Attachment against Kristene Stanford individually, but it committed error by failing to grant Kristene

Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment with regard to her individual liability.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment and issuing a Writ of Attachment against Kristene Stanford individually, because Kristene Stanford was not a party to her husband's separate business debt.

2. The Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment and issuing a Writ of Attachment against Kristene Stanford individually, since DeGrandis failed to serve all pleadings to Kristene Stanford at her known address.

3. The Trial Court erred in denying Kristene Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment against her individually on the basis that the Judgment intended to hold the **community** liable.

4. The Trial Court erred in denying Kristene Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment against her individually under CR 60(a) by failing to recognize her individual inclusion on the Judgment was a clerical error.

5. The Trial Court erred in denying Kristene Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment under CR 60(b)(11), since DeGrandis incorrectly served James Stanford, a non-attorney, with pleadings on behalf of Kristene Stanford.

6. The Trial Court erred in denying Kristene Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment against her individually under CR 60(b)(11), because DeGrandis failed to serve the summary judgment pleadings, including the notice of hearing, to Kristene Stanford at her known address.

III. ISSUES

1. Is it improper to hold a non-acting spouse individually liable for the separate business debt of an acting spouse?

2. Did the Trial Court commit reversible error in ruling that the Judgment intended to hold the community liable resulted in individual liability for Kristene Stanford?

3. Was it a clerical error to include Kristene Stanford in her individual capacity where the pleadings did not allege she acted individually and she was not otherwise named or included anywhere in the record?

4. Are the regularity of the proceedings called into question because DeGrandis served James Stanford, a non-attorney, as Kristene Stanford's legal counsel?

5. Are the regularity of the proceedings called into question where Kristene Stanford was denied her right to due process by DeGrandis' failure to serve all pleadings to Kristene Stanford, an individually named party, to her known address?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 4, 2008, James Stanford dba Stanford Development signed a $40,000 Promissory Note for a loan from DeGrandis ("Promissory Note"). CP 13. Kristene Stanford, James Stanford's wife, was unaware of the business transaction between James Stanford and DeGrandis. CP 52, ¶ 4. Kristene Stanford was not present for any of the negotiations that occurred between James

Stanford and DeGrandis, and James Stanford did not discuss the loan he obtained from DeGrandis with his wife. CP 52, ¶ 4. Kristene Stanford was not named, referenced, or otherwise included anywhere in the Promissory Note. CP 13, 52. The Promissory Note only included two signatures: James Stanford dba Stanford Development and Vito DeGrandis. CP 13.

James Stanford failed to pay back the loan as agreed, and DeGrandis filed a lawsuit in the Whatcom County Superior Court for breach of the Promissory Note. CP 9-12. In the caption of the Complaint, DeGrandis listed as parties "*James Stanford and Jane Doe Stanford in their individual capacities and as a marital community; and Stanford Development Inc., a Washington corporation.*" CP 9. However, the Complaint does not allege any involvement in the breach by Kristene Stanford, and the Prayer for Relief sought "*judgment against Stanford for recovery by DeGrandis of all damages allowed under the Promissory Note....*" CP 9-12. A Summons and Complaint was served to "*Jane Doe Stanford*" at her address, 414 Clark Court, Lynden, Washington 98264, on December 4, 2010. CP 14. James Stanford was the only

one home at the time and accepted service of the Summons and Complaint on behalf of "*Jane Doe Stanford.*" CP 14, 52. James Stanford did not inform Kristene Stanford that he had accepted service on her behalf, nor did he inform her of the lawsuit or that she was a party. CP 52, ¶ 6. Subsequent to accepting service, James Stanford responded to the Complaint *pro se*. CP 17-20.

Around the time James Stanford was served with this lawsuit, the Stanfords were experiencing marital problems, which impeded their communication with each other. CP 18; CP 88, ¶ 3. On December 8, 2010, Kristene Stanford filed for legal separation from James Stanford and a temporary restraining order was entered that same day. CP 84, l. 24-CP 85, l. 1. When James Stanford filed his *Pro Se* Answer to DeGrandis' Complaint on December 27, 2010, he and Kristene Stanford were legally separated. CP 18; CP 88, ¶ 3. James Stanford made this fact clear in the first paragraph of his Answer to DeGrandis' Complaint, stating, "*[t]his is my response to the complaint filed against me and my Washington Corporation STANFORD DEVELOPMENT INC by Vito DeGrandis. I am legally separated.*" CP 18.

Despite being notified of the Stanfords' separation, and due to the fact that James Stanford's *Pro Se* Answer was written on Stanford Development, Inc., letterhead, DeGrandis served all pleadings subsequent to the Summons and Complaint **solely** to James Stanford's business address, 1841 Front Street, Suite B, Lynden, Washington 98264. CP 71, l. 18–CP 72, l. 3. Indeed, no pleadings other than the initial Summons and Complaint were served to Kristene Stanford, an individually named party, nor were any further attempts made to serve her at her known address. CP 21-22; CP 52, ¶ 8. No request for a default against Kristene Stanford was ever filed or served (which would have put her on notice of the suit).

On June 10, 2011, DeGrandis filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Issuance of Writ of Attachment. CP 31-35. Not a single pleading that was filed relating to that motion, including notice of the hearing, was served to Kristene Stanford. See CP 21-22; CP 52, ¶ 8. Nevertheless, on July 8, 2011, the Trial Court granted DeGrandis' Motions for Summary Judgment and Writ of Attachment and entered judgment that same day. CP 42-47.

Kristene Stanford was not referenced anywhere in the Order granting the Motion or in the Judgment, other than being listed in the caption.

In October 2012, Kristene Stanford moved to Alaska and James Stanford lived in Arizona. CP 89, ¶¶ 4-5. In June 2013, the Stanfords attempted to sell their house in Lynden, Washington, and Kristene Stanford became aware for the first time that a Judgment and Writ of Attachment had been issued against her individually. CP 89, ¶ 6. Upon learning of the Judgment and Writ of Attachment against her, Kristene Stanford immediately sought legal representation. CP 89, ¶¶ 7-8. On October 2, 2013, Kristene Stanford requested that DeGrandis stipulate to amending the Judgment to remove Kristene Stanford individually. The request was refused, necessitating Kristene Stanford to file a Motion to Vacate the Judgment against her.

On December 13, 2013, the Trial Court denied Kristene Stanford's motion at a hearing in which it did not allow oral argument. CP 104-105; see VRP 3-7. In explaining its decision to deny the motion, the Trial Court stated:

> *Unfortunately I must deny the motion to vacate the judgment as well, however, I've reviewed the*

> *paperwork and frankly, Mr. Chambers, your client is in a sympathetic position and I'm sorry that she is in that position, but it seems to me that really this was not a clerical error,* ***the inclusion of her name in my view is a clear indication that relief was sought against the community****. I don't see any impropriety in the entry of the judgment in this case.*

The Trial Court apparently misunderstood the narrow issue before it. Kristene Stanford never argued or otherwise raised the issue that the marital community should not be liable for James Stanford's breach of the Promissory Note. See CP 60-62, 82-85. The sole issue raised in Kristene Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment was the fact that, under Washington law, Kristene Stanford cannot **individually** be liable for the judgment resulting from her husband's separate business debt. The Trial Court failed to address this issue.

Accordingly, the Trial Court's decision should be reversed, and the Summary Judgment and Writ of Attachment should be vacated against Kristene Stanford in her individual capacity.

V. ARGUMENT

A. Standard Of Review.

"*A trial court's decision whether to vacate a judgment or order under CR 60 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.*" Shaw v.

City of Des Moines, 109 Wn. App. 896, 900 (2002). Accordingly, the trial court's decision should be overturned if "*it plainly appears that the trial court exercised its discretion on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.*" Id. at 901.

Here, the record shows that the Trial Court did not even address the issue that was raised by Kristene Stanford. The resulting decision was contrary to Washington law. Thus, the Trial Court's decision was based on untenable grounds and should be reversed.

B. Summary Judgment And A Writ Of Attachment Should Not Have Been Granted Against Kristene Stanford Individually.

When an obligation is undertaken by either spouse during marriage, there is a presumption that the obligation is for the benefit of the community, thereby subjecting the marital community to liability. Brubaker v. Hovde, 45 Wn. App. 44, 47 (1986). However, "*a spouse's act creating both community liability and* ***separate liability in the acting spouse ordinarily does not create separate liability in the non-acting spouse who has not participated in the transaction****, that is, it ordinarily does not create three-way liability.*" Max L. Wells Trust v. Grand Central Sauna & Hot Tub Co., 62 Wn.

App. 593, 604 (1991) (citing RCW 26.16.010-030) (emphasis added). In other words, when one spouse incurs separate liability through a business transaction, it may bind the marital community and that spouse individually, but it does not create individual liability on behalf of the non-acting spouse. Id. The only exception occurs where spouses jointly own a business and expressly agree that one spouse is authorized to manage all business transactions and bind the non-acting spouse. RCW 26.16.030(6); Dizzard & Getty v. Darnson, 63 Wn.2d 526, 530 (1964). James and Kristene Stanford had no such agreement. CP 52, ¶ 5.

Here, the Trial Court denied Kristene Stanford's motion to vacate the judgment entered against her individually. CP 104-105. However, rather than addressing whether judgment was improperly entered against Kristene Stanford individually for James Stanford's business transaction, the Trial Court merely considered whether judgment was properly entered against the Stanford **marital community**. The Trial Court stated: "*the inclusion of [Kristene Stanford's] name in my view is a clear indication that relief was sought against the* ***community****. I don't see any impropriety in the*

entry of the judgment in this case." VRP 5. Kristene Stanford acknowledges under Washington law the actions of James Stanford could bind the Stanford marital community – that was never in question, nor was that issue argued. The issue presented to the Trial Court was narrower: whether Kristene Stanford can be held **individually** liable for James Stanford's actions.

This Court provided clear guidance on this exact issue in Wells Trust. There, the Court held that judgments were improperly entered individually against the wives of two business partners. Wells Trust, 62 Wn. App at 604. The judgments at issue in Wells Trust resulted from a failed business transaction entered into solely by the business partners; the wives had no involvement in the deal. Id. The court determined that "*[t]here was no pleading that these women were partners themselves, nor that they signed the [agreement] as a partner. There was no evidence at trial to create individual liability in either of these women.*" Id. Consequently, the "*[t]rial court erred in entering individual judgments against the spouses of [the partners].*" Id.

Just as in Wells Trust, James Stanford entered into a business transaction without his wife's involvement. Just as in Wells Trust, there was no evidence presented to suggest Kristene Stanford was involved with the failed business transaction. Just as in Wells Trust, the Trial Court erred in holding Kristene Stanford individually liable for her husband's business debt, when Washington law only permits James Stanford and the Stanford marital community to be liable for the debt. Accordingly, just as in Wells Trust, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's decision and vacate the judgment issued against Kristene Stanford individually.

C. Kristene Stanford Should Be Relieved From Individual Liability Of The Judgment Under CR 60(a).

CR 60(a) provides that "*[c]lerical mistakes in judgments... arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time... on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.*" A clerical error is determined by asking "*whether the judgment, as amended, embodies the trial court's intention, as expressed in the record....*" Presidential Estates Apartment Associates v. Barrett, 129 Wn.2d 320, 326 (1996). If amending the judgment does not affect the intention of the trial

court, "*that error is clerical in that the amended judgment merely corrects language that did not correctly convey the intention of the trial court.*" Id. Corrections under CR 60(a) are not subject to the one-year time limit found in other sections of CR 60. Clerical mistakes can be corrected at any time. See CR 60(a). A correction after the passage of six years was allowed in In re Kramer's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 829 (1957).

Although the application of CR 60(a) generally applies to superior courts, this Court "*may reverse, affirm, or modify the decision being reviewed and take any other action as the merits of the case and the interest of justice may require.*" RAP 12.2. This Court has held that such authority permits amending a judgment entered below to correct clerical errors, such as the misidentification of parties. Entranco Engineers v. Envirodyne, Inc., 34 Wn. App. 503, 507-08 (1983) (citing RCW 2.06.030 and Foster v. Knutson, 10 Wn. App. 175, 177 (1973)).

The improper inclusion of a spouse in an individual capacity is a clerical error rather than a judicial one. See Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn.2d 306, 311 (1969). Thus, action under CR 60(a) would be

appropriate here. The facts in Malotte are nearly identical to the facts in the instant case: Dr. Gorton signed a promissory note for a loan and failed to pay as agreed; Dr. Gorton's wife did not have any knowledge of the transaction, nor was she a party to the Promissory Note; the Trial Court entered judgment against "*the defendants S. Gorton and Laura R. Gorton and the marital community composed thereof.*" Id. at 307-311.

The Gortons appealed the judgment as entered, claiming neither the Gorton marital community, nor Mrs. Gorton individually, could be liable for the debt. Id. at 307. The court found that the marital community presumption applied to Dr. Gorton's debt, but it held that Mrs. Gorton "*obviously*" was not individually liable for the judgment because the Plaintiffs did not assert any claims against her individually. Id. at 310-311. Accordingly, the court issued "*instructions to correct the form of the judgment so that is clear that it is a judgment against S.H. Gorton individually and S.H. and Laura R Gorton as a Marital Community.*" Id. at 311. The court further determined that the issue of eliminating Mrs. Gorton's individual liability "*was not a matter which required an appeal to*

correct; a request to counsel and the trial court would have sufficed." Id.

The court viewed the improper judgment against Mrs. Gorton individually as nothing more than a clerical mistake that could be corrected through a request to opposing counsel and the court; it was therefore not considered a judicial error. This conclusion is further supported by this Court's ruling in Entranco, which found the misidentification of a party to be a clerical error for which CR 60(a) applied. Entranco, 34 Wn. App. at 507 ("*[T]he commissioner intended to enter a default judgment against the party* ***whose activities were described in the complaint*** *[rather than the misidentified party]. Consequently, this is not a "judicial error" beyond correction pursuant to CR 60(a).*").

Similar to Malotte, the record here is devoid of any intention by the Trial Court to enter judgment individually against Kristene Stanford. The Trial Court expressly stated in the Order granting Summary Judgment and Writ of Attachment that its decision was entirely based on: "*(1) Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Writ of Attachment; (2) Memorandum of Law in Support of*

Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Issuance of Writ of Attachment; (3) Affidavit of Mark J. Lee in Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Issuance of Writ of Attachment; and (4) Declaration of Vito DeGrandis in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment."

None of these referenced documents even mention Ms. Stanford, let alone contain allegations of any wrongdoing by her. The only activities described in the Complaint are those of James Stanford dba Stanford Development. Neither the Order nor the Judgment specify that Kristene Stanford was to be individually liable. Furthermore, when DeGrandis allegedly caused the summary judgment and writ of attachment pleadings to be served to "*all Defendants,*" he sent them only to James Stanford at his business address. CP 21-22. Apparently, even DeGrandis' own counsel did not consider Kristene Stanford as an individual party to whom service must be sent.

Kristene Stanford's absence from the pleadings, coupled with the fact that Washington law expressly precludes a non-acting spouse from incurring individual liability of an acting spouse's

separate business debt, prevents any implication that the Trial Court intended to hold Kristene Stanford individually liable. There can be no such presumption, as doing so would require creating an exception to Washington's well-established, statutory law regarding spousal liability. See RCW 26.16.010-030. Accordingly, the only conclusion that can be reached based on the record is that entering judgment individually against Kristene Stanford was a clerical mistake "*arising from oversight or omission*". CR 60(a). Thus, Kristene Stanford should be relieved from individual liability on the judgment pursuant to CR 60(a).

D. Alternatively, The Judgment Entered Against Kristene Stanford Individually Should be Vacated Under CR 60(b)(11) Due To Procedural Irregularities.

Even if the Court determines it was not a clerical mistake to include Kristene Stanford in her individual capacity, the Judgment against her should be vacated pursuant to CR 60(b)(11). CR 60(b)(11) provides that a court may relieve a party from liability for "*any... reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment.*" Relief from judgment under CR 60(b)(11) must be sought within a "*reasonable time.*" CR 60(b). Whether a party acted within a

reasonable time is "*determined by examining the case facts and circumstances; the critical period is the time between when the party becomes aware of the order and when he or she filed the motion to vacate it.*" Topliff v. Chicago Ins. Co., 130 Wn. App. 135, 140 (1982).

In order to be valid, the reason for vacating judgment "*must relate to irregularities which are extraneous to the action of the court or go to the question of the regularity of its proceedings.*" Id. at 141. Here, DeGrandis' determination that James Stanford's *pro se* appearance included representation of Kristene Stanford calls into question the regularity of these proceedings. Additionally, DeGrandis' failure to serve Kristene Stanford with all pleadings in this matter, as required by the Civil Rules, was an improper denial of Kristene Stanford's right to due process.

Washington law prohibits a person without a law license from appearing on behalf of or representing another individual. RCW 2.48.170-190. "*Non-attorney litigants may not represent other litigants.*" Advocates for Responsible Development v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Bd., 155 Wn.

App. 479, review granted, reversed 170 Wn.2d 577 (2010). With few exceptions, only active members of the Washington State Bar Association may practice law, which includes representing another in court or in legal proceedings. *Pro se* exceptions are limited and apply only if the lay person is acting **solely** on his own behalf. Id. The "*practice of law*" includes the doing or performing of services in the courts of justice as well as the giving of legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments by which legal rights and obligations are established. Bennion,Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443 (1981).

Washington's prohibition of a non-attorney representing another person extends to a non-attorney husband's attempt to represent his wife. City of Seattle v. Shaver, 23 Wn. App. 601, 604-05 (1979) ("*The defendant's husband is not a member of the Washington State Bar or any state bar. Absent these qualifications, he is not qualified to represent [his wife]....*"). James Stanford is not an attorney. He is not a member of the Washington State Bar or any other state bar. James Stanford made explicitly clear to DeGrandis' counsel that he was not representing Kristene Stanford. In James

Stanford's Answer he stated: "*Be advised that any funds that I could allocate for legal advice on this matter would be paid to Mr. Degrandis. As these funds are not available to me* ***I must represent myself.***"

James Stanford therefore did not intend, nor was he legally permitted, to represent Kristene Stanford in these proceedings. He could not answer DeGrandis' Complaint on behalf of Kristene Stanford, and he could not accept service at his business address for Kristene Stanford, who had a separate, known address. Regardless of this fact, DeGrandis treated James Stanford as if he represented Kristene Stanford, providing service for all parties only to James Stanford at his business address. This was improper under Washington law and caused irregularity in these proceedings.

Indeed, Kristene Stanford was entitled to receive all pleadings at her last known address until she or her legal representative stated otherwise. CR 5(a) mandates:

> ***every pleading subsequent to the original complaint*** *unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice,*

> *appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper* ***shall be served upon each of the parties***.

(Emphasis added). The rule further states that unless a party authorizes an attorney to accept service on their behalf, service upon a party "*shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address or, if no address is known, filing with the clerk of the court an affidavit of attempt to serve.*" CR 5(b).

Kristene Stanford did not authorize an attorney to represent her or accept service on her behalf. Therefore, DeGrandis was required to send all pleadings to Kristene Stanford individually at her last known address, or at the very least, DeGrandis was required to file an affidavit of attempted service on Kristene Stanford at her address. Neither of these requirements were satisfied. In contravention of Washington law, DeGrandis served all pleadings subsequent to the Summons and Complaint, including all summary judgment pleadings and notice of the hearing, solely to James Stanford's business address and considered "*all Defendants*" served thereby. CP 21-22.

Kristene Stanford's address did not change from the time the initial Summons and Complaint were accepted at her abode, and Kristene Stanford did not waive her rights to service of the pleadings to which she was entitled. DeGrandis had no reason to believe otherwise. Kristene Stanford was therefore entitled to service of all pleadings in this matter at her address, 414 Clark Court, Lynden, Washington 98264. Such service was not provided. Consequently, Kristene Stanford was not afforded due process as required by Washington law and the Civil Rules. Accordingly, the regularity of these proceedings are called into question and the Court should vacate the Judgment against Kristene Stanford individually pursuant to CR 60(b)(11).

VI. RAP 18.1 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

A prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal if a private agreement, statute, or recognized ground of equity so provides. RAP 18.1; Buck Mountain Owner's Ass'n v. Prestwich, 174 Wn. App. 702, 731 (2013). The Washington Supreme Court has held that "*in wrongful attachment or garnishment actions...attorney fees are a 'necessary expense incurred*'" by the party subject to the

wrongful attachment. Rorvig v. Douglas, 123 Wn.2d 854, 862 (1994). Attorney fees are therefore recoverable in such instances. Id.

Here, DeGrandis improperly obtained a Writ of Attachment against Kristene Stanford by failing to serve her with the pleadings in this matter. Consequently, Kristene Stanford was not afforded due process prior to a Writ of Attachment being issued against her individually. Kristene Stanford asked DeGrandis to agree to amend or otherwise stipulate to vacating the Judgment and Writ of Attachment entered against Kristene Stanford individually; DeGrandis refused to do so. Kristene Stanford was therefore required to file a Motion to Vacate Judgment and this appeal to be relieved of the wrongful attachment. Accordingly, based on RAP 18.1 and a specific ground of equity delineated by the Washington Supreme Court, Kristene Stanfod respectfully requests an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

VII. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Appellant Kristene Stanford respectfully requests that the Trial Court's denial of Kristene

Stanford's Motion to Vacate Judgment against her individually be reversed, and that Appellant Kristene Stanford be awarded her reasonable costs and attorney fees on appeal.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2014.

DUNN BLACK & ROBERTS, P.S.

ADAM J. CHAMBERS, WSBA #46631
KEVIN W. ROBERTS, WSBA #29473
Attorneys for Appellant Kristene Stanford

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following:

☐	HAND DELIVERY	Mark J. Lee
☒	U.S. MAIL	Brownlie Evans Wolf & Lee, LLP
☐	OVERNIGHT MAIL	230 E. Champion Street
☐	FAX TRANSMISSION	Bellingham, WA 98225
☐	EMAIL	

☐	HAND DELIVERY	James Stanford
☒	U.S. MAIL	5072 E. Bit Circle
☐	OVERNIGHT MAIL	Wasilla, AK 99654
☐	FAX TRANSMISSION	
☐	EMAIL	

ADAM J. CHAMBERS