 73696-5

NO. 73696-5-1

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION I

TED J. GRIMES

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Respondent.

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
2015 JUN 15 PM 2: 16

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY
THE HONORABLE SEAN P. O'DONNELL

REVISED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
TED J. GRIMES

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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

1. IDENTITY OF APPELLANT

The appellant is Ted J. Grimes.

2. STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Appellant Grimes is appealing the King County Superior Court's 2015 ORDER MODIFYING THE COURT'S 2009 ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS. This Superior Court's ORDER extends the life of a civil lien judgment past the statutory 20 year life of a civil lien judgment, when properly extended, to a 26 year life-span in violation of both statute and case law. Grimes requests the ORDER MODIFYING THE COURT'S 2009 ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS be stricken and/or removed from the base civil lien judgment from which it does not belong.

3. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In July 1999, Appellant Grimes was convicted in King County Superior Court of seven counts of First Degree Theft and one count of

Second Degree Theft. The criminal judgment was entered on September 10, 1999. Grimes was released on bond after conviction pending his appeal of the criminal judgment. On September 20, 1999 a civil lien judgment was filed in King County in favor of the State against Appellant Grimes in the amount of $616,202.00, together with interest, costs and attorneys' fees in and as security of the criminal restitution judgment.

There are two types of judgment addressed in this brief. One is the criminal judgment issued by the Court upon conviction and the other is a civil financial lien judgment, sometimes also issued by the Court immediately upon conviction to prevent the offender from disposing of any assets prior to and after a restitution hearing.

The civil lien judgment begins immediately upon its' delivery to the clerk of the court and runs for a statutory ten year period and can be extended for one, and only one, additional ten year period.

The criminal **jurisdiction**, (not judgment), for collection of restitution also runs for a ten year period beginning upon conviction or upon release from total confinement, whichever comes later. It too can be extended for one additional ten year period.

In March, 2003, upon expiration of all appeals, Grimes began his incarceration and was released from total confinement in August, 2005. The Court's ten year period of **jurisdiction** over Grimes for purposes of

collecting restitution began on August 28, 2005.

In August, 2009, the court entered an ORDER EXTENDING COURT'S CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATION for an additional ten years under RCW 6.17.020(4) and included the criminal statutes 9.94A.753(4) and 9.94A760(4) relating to the extension of **jurisdiction** for collection of restitution. This was the one allowable 10 year civil lien judgment extension on the civil lien begun in September, 1999.

In June, 2015 the court entered an ORDER MODIFYING THE COURT'S 2009 ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, extending the *2009 civil lien judgments'* effective period to an additional ten years from August 1, 2015 to 2025.

The court's 2015 **Jurisdiction** Order is not a civil lien judgment extension but a criminal jurisdiction extension. It is a stand alone action that has no bearing on the 2009 civil lien judgment extension. It's intended effect is to create an extension of the 1999 civil lien judgment past the statutory 20 year lifespan from 2019 into 2025, some six years past the required expiration date of the civil lien judgment.

The unusual and deceptive wording in the body of the 2015 ORDER, which is different from the intention and purpose of the filed MOTION, is confusing to the civilian legal and financial community to the point that the State has effectively extended the civil lien judgment an additional six

(6) years past the statutory twenty (20) year time period. This sets a dangerous legal precident for civil lien judgment cases in the future. It also casts doubt on the effective 10 year time period of the extension of court jurisdiction for purposes of collecting restitution as the civil lien judgment expires by law in 2019 along with all remedies thereunder.

4. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF AND ARGUMENT

A judgment and a judgment lien are two separate entities. A "judgment" is defined as a court's final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case. The term "judgment" includes an equitable decree and any order from which an appeal lies. In contrast, a lien is a legal right or interest that a creditor has in another's property, lasting usually until the debt or duty it secures is satisfied. A statute creating a lien right for a definite period of time is something that is in addition to the cause of action or substantive right in question and is not a statute of limitation because it does not exist outside the period of time during which it is conferred. A judgment lien therefore is a limited creature of statute that is distinct from the underlying judgment for purposes of time limits on judicial enforcement of the judgment. Krueger v Tippett, 155 WnApp 216 (2010)

[A] judgment of a superior court is entered when it is delivered to the clerk's office for filing. RCW 6.01.020. [civil lien judgment, clarification added] No suit, action or other proceeding shall ever be had on any

judgment rendered in this state by which the lien shall be extended or continued in force for any greater or longer period than ten years. RCW 4.56.210(1).

The ten year period comprising the life span of a judgment commences upon entry of the judgment, regardless of when the lien is filed. Hazel v Van Beck, (1998) 135 Wn2d 45.

A judgment lien is born by statute and dies by statute. Grub v Fogle's Garage, Inc., (1971) 5 Wn.App. 840. (civil lien judgment)

A judgment lien is a creature of statute, and terminates when a statute says it does. In re Marriage of Wintermute, (1993) 70 Wn.App. 741.

Expiration of the 10 year period to execute on a judgment extinguishes not only a remedy, but also the right of action on the judgment. American Discount Corp. v Shepherd, (2005) 129 Wn.App. 345.

Prior to the expiration of the initial ten-year period, the superior court may extend **jurisdiction** under the criminal judgment an additional ten years for payment of restitution. RCW 9.94A.753(4), RCW 9.94A.760(4). (emphasis added)

A lien based upon an underlying judgment continues in force for an additional ten-year period if the period of execution for the underlying judgment is extended under RCW 6.17.020. RCW 4.56.210(3).

The state or victim **may** enforce the court-ordered restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action. (emphasis added) RCW 9.94A.753(9).

Upon a judgment for fine and costs, and for all adjudged costs, execution shall be issued against the property of the defendant, **and returned in the same manner as in civil actions.** (again, emphasis added). RCW 10.82.010.

For the purposes of this [restitution] section, for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2000, the offender shall remain under the court's **jurisdiction** for a term of ten years following the offender's release from total confinement . . . (emphasis added) RCW 9.94A753(4). Prior to the expiration of the initial ten-year period, the superior court may extend the criminal judgment an additional ten years for payment of legal financial obligations including crime victims' assessments. RCW 9.94A.753(4).

. . . [n]o judgment is enforceable for a period exceeding twenty years from the date of entry in the originating court. RCW 6.17.020(7).

The right to a lien ceases to exist when the designated period is over. Hutton, et.al. v. State of Washington, 25 Wn2d 402, 407 (1946).

A judgment lien is born by statute and dies by statute. Mueller v. Miller, 82 WnApp 236 (1996).

If a court's jurisdiction over a restitution order lapses pursuant to statute under which court's jurisdiction over restitution lasts for ten years,

that restitution order becomes void, and it cannot be revived simply because a separate statute extends the period of supervision over the defendant by the Department of Corrections. In re Sappenfield (1999) 138 Wn.2d 588.

A statute creating a lien right for a definite length of time only, is something that is in addition to the cause of action or substantive right in question and is not a statute of limitations, because it does not exist outside of the period during which it is conferred. The lien here in question may not be invoked outside of the period during which it is conferred by the statute. This is not because of a statute of limitations that would be overcome by Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 167, but because outside of the terms of the statute creating the lien, no lien exists. Hutton, et.al. v State of Washington (1946) 25 Wn.2d 402.

5. CONCLUSION

The statutes are plain on their face. A civil lien judgment begins when it is entered by the clerk. A judgment is born by statute and dies by statute. A ten year period comprises the life-span of a judgment. Prior to the expiration of the initial ten year period, the judgment may be extended for an additional ten year period. No judgment is enforceable for a period exceeding twenty years from the date of entry. Appellant Grimes' Judgment and Sentence is dated September 10, 1999. Grimes was released from total confinement on August 28, 2005.

Grimes' civil lien judgment was entered in September, 1999, beginning its' ten year life-span. Grimes' civil lien judgment was extended for an additional ten year period in August, 2009. Grimes' civil lien judgment dies by statute in September, 2019 as it is not enforceable for any period exceeding twenty years.

There is no "oops" clause in these statutes. There is no "yes, but" exceptions in case law relating to these judgments. The Superior Court's 2015 ORDER is attached to a civil judgment that expires in 2019, whose remedies are not enforceable after that date.

The 2015 ORDER MODIFYING THE COURT'S 2009 ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS cannot be attached to and extend the effective 20 year life of Grimes' civil lien judgment to 26 years.

Grimes requests this Court require the 2015 ORDER MODIFYING THE COURT'S 2009 ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS be rescinded and/or removed from the civil lien judgment as it is a stand alone action improperly attached to that 1999 civil lien judgment. As it stands, the 2015 modifying order could establish a dangerous precident for future legal proceedings by creating a way to circumvent the statutes and the 20 year life span of a judgment.

The 2015ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS must be modified to reflect that this order addresses only the jurisdiction over legal financial obligations and is not an extension of the already extended 2009 10 year extension of the civil lien judgment.

DATED this 6th day of June, 2016.



Ted J. Grimes, pro se

APPENDIX A

Grimes' 1999 Judgment & Sentence

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON Plaintiff, v. TED J. GRIMES Defendant.	)	No. 98-1-03246-1 SEA **JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE**

I. HEARING

1.1 The defendant, the defendant's lawyers, William Salen & Richard Levidow, and the deputy prosecuting attorney were present at the sentencing hearing conducted today. Others present were: Chuck Cross, Department of Financial Institutions, Stelli Roine, Sherrane Grimes

1.2 The state has moved for dismissal of count(s) N/A

II. FINDINGS

Based on the testimony heard, statements by defendant and/or victims, argument of counsel, the presentence report(s) and case record to date, and there being no reason why judgment should not be pronounced, the court finds:

2.1 CURRENT OFFENSE(S): The defendant was found guilty on (date): July 7, 1999 by jury verdict of:

Count No.: II Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02506
Date of Crime 01/03/94 - 05/05/95 Incident No. -

Count No.: III Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02506
Date of Crime 04/27/95 - 05/17/95 Incident No. -

Count No.: IV Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02506
Date of Crime 07/13/95 - 10/23/95 Incident No. -
☒ Additional current offenses are attached in **Appendix A.**

2.2 **OTHER CURRENT CONVICTION(S):** Other current convictions listed under different cause numbers used in calculating the offender score are (list offense and cause number): N/A

2.3 **CRIMINAL HISTORY:** Prior convictions constituting criminal history for purposes of calculating the offender score are (RCW 9.94A.360):

	Crime	Sentencing Date	Adult or Juv. Crime	Cause Number	Location
(a)	N/A				
(b)					

RECEIVED
SEP 21 1999
THE DEFENDER ASSOC.

.4 **SENTENCING DATA:**

SENTENCING DATA	OFFENDER SCORE	SERIOUSNESS LEVEL	STANDARD RANGE	MAXIMUM TERM
Count II	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years
Count III	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years
Count IV	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years

☒ Additional current offense sentencing data is attached in **Appendix C**.

2.5 **EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE:**
☒ Substantial and compelling reasons exist which justify a sentence above/~~below~~ the standard range for Count(s) II through IX. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached in Appendix D. The State ☐ did ☐ did not recommend a similiar sentence.

III. JUDGMENT

IT IS ADJUDGED that defendant is guilty of the current offenses set forth in Section 2.1 above and Appendix A.
☒ The Court DISMISSES Count(s) I

IV. ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant serve the determinate sentence and abide by the other terms set forth below.

4.1 **RESTITUTION AND VICTIM ASSESSMENT:**
☐ Defendant shall pay restitution to the Clerk of this Court as set forth in attached **Appendix E.**
☐ Defendant shall **not** pay restitution because the Court finds that extraordinary circumstances exist, and the court, pursuant to RCW 9.94A.142(2), sets forth those circumstances in attached **Appendix E.**
☒ Restitution to be determined at future hearing on (Date) October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. ☐ Date to be set.
☐ Defendant waives presence at future restitution hearing(s).
[X] Defendant shall pay Victim Penalty Assessments pursuant to RCW 7.68.035 in the amount of $100 if all crime(s) date prior to 6-6-96 and $500 if any crime date in the Judgment is after 6-5-96.

4.2 **OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS**: Having considered the defendant's present and likely future financial resources, the Court concludes that the defendant has the present or likely future ability to pay the financial obligations imposed. The Court waives financial obligation(s) that are checked below because the defendant lacks the present and future ability to pay them. Defendant shall pay the following to the Clerk of this Court:
(a) ~~☐ $_____~~; Court costs; ☒ Court costs are waived;
(b) ~~☐ $_____~~; Recoupment for attorney's fees to King County Public Defense Programs, 2015 Smith Tower, Seattle, WA 98104; ☒ Recoupment is waived (RCW 10.01.160);
(c) ☐ $_____; Incarceration costs; ☐ Incarceration costs waived (9.94A.145(2));
(d) ~~☐ $_____~~; Other cost for: Witness fees and expenses paid by KC Prosecutor's Office.

4.3 **PAYMENT SCHEDULE:** Defendant's **TOTAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATION** is: $ _____ . The payments shall be made to the King County Superior Court Clerk according to the rules of the Clerk and the following terms:
☐ Not less than $ _____ per month; ☐ On a schedule established by the defendant's Community Corrections Officer. ☐ : While incarcerated, defendant shall pay toward restitution not less than 50% of his gross monthly income, which includes any funds received in his inmate account. While not incarcerated, defendant shall pay not less than the following percentages of his monthly gross income toward restitution, unless modified by court order:
(i) 10% if defendant earns less than $1,000 per month; or
(ii) 15% if defendant earns $1,000 per month or more, but less than $3,000 per month; or
(iii) 20% if defendant earns $3,000 per month or more, but less than $4,500 per month; or
(iv) 25% if defendant earns $4,500 a month or more.

The Defendant shall remain under the Court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for up ten years from date of sentence or release from confinement to assure payment of financial obligations.

4.4 **CONFINEMENT OVER ONE YEAR:** Defendant is sentenced to a term of total confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections as follows, commencing: ☐ Immediately; ☒ (Date): October 8, 1999 by 12:00 Noon .m.

60 months on Count II	60 months on Count III	60 months on Count IV
60 months on Count V	60 months on Count VI	60 months on Count VII
60 months on Count VIII	37 months on Count IX	~~months on Count~~

The terms in Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX are concurrent/consecutive.
The sentence herein shall run consecutive to any other cause not referred to in this Judgment.

Credit is given for ☒ one (1) day(s) served/☐ days served as determined by the King County Jail solely for conviction under this cause number pursuant to RCW 9.94A.120(15).

4.5 **OTHER:** [X] Defendant shall have no direct or indirect contact with the victims of Counts II through VIII for ten (10) years, and no contact with the victim of Count IX for five (5) years.

☒ Pursuant to RCW 9.94A.142 (5), defendant shall be required to inform any employer, in writing, or his convictions in this case during the ten year period of financial supervision, and defendant shall be required to inform the members of the Escrow Association of Washington of his convictions in this case, by placing an advertisement in their newletter within 30 days of the sentencing date. The prosecutor shall devise the notice, and the defense shall review it. It shall include the convictions and the sentence imposed by the court.

☒ For the ten year period of financial supervision, defendant shall not work at a paid or volunteer position which permits him access to or control over any funds, real estate or credit belonging to another, or negotiable instrume without notifying his employer and CCO and the court. (SA)

The defendant shall report to an assigned Community Corrections Officer upon release from confinement for monitoring of the remaining terms of this sentence.

Date: September 10, 1999

Judge Sharon A. Armstrong
THE HONORABLE SHARON ARMSTRONG

Presented by:

Lynn S. Prunhuber
LYNN S. PRUNHUBER, WSBA #10704
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Approved as to form only:

William Salen
WILLIAM SALEN, WSBA # 15138
Attorney for Defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON Plaintiff, v. TED J. GRIMES Defendant.	)	No. 98-1-03246-1 SEA (FELONY) - APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL CURRENT OFFENSES

2.1 The defendant is also convicted of these additional current offenses:

Count No.: V Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02524
Date of Crime 09/12/95 - 10/31/95 Incident No. -

Count No.: VI Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02524
Date of Crime 10/05/95 - 10/31/95 Incident No. -

Count No.: VII Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02524
Date of Crime 09/07/95 - 10/31/95 Incident No. -

Count No.: VIII Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02524
Date of Crime 10/23/95 - 11/03/95 Incident No. -

Count No.: IX Crime: Theft 1
RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a) and 9A.56.020(1)(a) Crime Code 02524
Date of Crime 09/18/95 - 11/02/95 Incident No. -

Date: September 10, 1999 [signature]
JUDGE, King County Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON Plaintiff, v. TED J. GRIMES Defendant.	)))))))))	No. 98-1-03246-1 SEA (FELONY) - APPENDIX C ADDITIONAL CURRENT OFF SENTENCING DATA

2.4 **SENTENCING DATA**: Additional current offense(s) sentencing information is as follows:

COUNT NO.	OFFENDER SCORE	SERIOUSNESS LEVEL	STANDARD RANGE	MAXIMUM TERM
V	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years
VI	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years
VII	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years
VIII	7	II	22 - 29 mo.	10 years
IX	7	I	14 - 18 mo.	5 years

Date: September 10, 1999

Adam J. Armstrong
JUDGE, King County Superior Court

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	No. 98-1-03246-1 SEA
	)	
v.	)	JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
	)	(FELONY) - APPENDIX D,
TED J. GRIMES,	)	FINDINGS OF FACT AND
	)	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR
Defendant.	)	EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCES
	)	

2.4 An exceptional sentence above the standard range should be imposed based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant Ted J. Grimes was an escrow officer, and the president and manager of Pacific Coast Escrow (PCE). In that capacity, Grimes exerted unauthorized control over escrow funds and §1031 funds belonging to others which had been entrusted to him for safekeeping. Grimes used these funds to make loans to third parties, to pay for his own expenses in building a new house, and for his other personal and business expenses. Grimes used false entries in the computerized accounting system of the pooled escrow account to cover up and avoid detection of his thefts, which in turn allowed him to commit additional thefts.

2. The thefts in Counts II through IX were committed between January 1, 1994 and the end of October, 1995. The total direct loss to the eight victims of these counts was over **$614,900.** Including taxes and other consequential damages, their losses are over **$780,000.** Some of the victims lost their life savings, and some lost their homes.

3. An escrow account is a trust relationship, both legally and psychologically. Because of the large dollar amounts typically placed into escrow, the trust relationship, and the especially devastating nature of a loss to most victims in these transactions, escrow services are highly regulated by the State. Grimes knowingly violated state escrow regulations designed to protect consumers. Grimes, by stealing escrow account funds and §1031 funds which he managed and controlled, abused his high position of trust and fiduciary responsibility.

4. Grimes' thefts caused PCE to declare bankruptcy and go out of business. PCE had a fidelity bond with Safeco Insurance Company, protecting PCE from loss due to dishonesty of an employee. Safeco paid out the full policy limits ($500,000).

5. The amount of money stolen per count (the direct loss) averaged $76.865, which amount is substantially greater than typical for the offense of theft in the first degree. Grimes used a high degree of sophistication and planning to commit and avoid detection of his thefts, which occurred over a lengthy period of time. Grimes abused his position of trust and his fiduciary responsibility to facilitate his thefts.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The current offenses were a major economic series of offenses and involved abuse of a trust relationship. Substantial and compelling reasons exist for an exceptional sentence and the defendant is sentenced to 60 months on Counts II through VIII and 37 months on Count IX, all counts to run concurrently.

Date: September 17, 1999

Shannon S. Armstrong
Judge, Superior Court

Presented By:

Lynn S. Plunkett
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney #10704

Copy Received: only exception taken to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

William Salen #15138
Attorney for Defendant
William Salen

FINGERPRINTS

RIGHT HAND
FINGERPRINTS OF:
ED GRIMES

DATED: SEP 10 1999

JUDGE, KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE:
DEFENDANT'S ADDRESS:
2908-14th AVE S.
SEATTLE WA 98144

ATTESTED BY:
PAUL L. SHERFEY, SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
BY:
DEPUTY CLERK

CERTIFICATE

I, _____
CLERK OF THIS COURT, CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE IN THIS ACTION ON RECORD IN MY OFFICE.
DATED: _____

_____
CLERK

BY: _____
DEPUTY CLERK

OFFENDER IDENTIFICATION

S.I.D. NO. _____

DATE OF BIRTH: 10/09/46

SEX: MALE

RACE: WHITE

APPENDIX B

2009 Order Extending Court's Civil Jurisdiction Over Legal Financial Obligations

FILED

2009 AUG 17 PM 1:58

KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
SEATTLE, WA

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, vs. Defendant. GRIMES, TED JAMES	No. 98-1-03246-1 SEA **MOTION AND ORDER EXTENDING COURT'S CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS** (OREXTJ) **[CLERK'S ACTION REQUIRED]** JUDGMENT NUMBER 999140104

MOTION

The court considered the Plaintiff's motion for an order extending jurisdiction over the legal financial obligations in the above criminal judgment for an additional ten years under RCW §6.17.020(4), 9.94A.753 (4) and 9.94A.760 (4).

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT jurisdiction over the criminal judgment is extended an additional ten-years from the date of this order, during which an execution may be issued for restitution, crime victim's assessment and other legal financial obligations imposed pursuant to the above-entitled cause number.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the defendant shall submit a Financial Declaration to the Clerk's Office within 30 days of receipt of said notice.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this _____ day of AUG 14 2009

JUDGE

Presented by: _____ WSBA# 26016
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

138

ORIGINAL

Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorney
516 Third Ave, W554 King County Courthouse
Seattle, Washington 98104
(206) 296-9000, FAX (206) 296-0955

APPENDIX C

2015 Motion and Order Modifying the Court's 2009 Order Extending

Jurisdiction Over Legal Financial Obligations

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
2016 JUN 15 PM 2:16

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	73696-5 No. 98-1-03246-1 SEA
vs.	
TED JAMES GRIMES, Defendant.	ORDER MODIFYING THE COURT'S 2009 ORDER EXTENDING JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS **[CLERK'S ACTION REQUIRED]**

Proposed

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DEGREED THAT the court's August 17, 2009, order extending jurisdiction is modified to reflect that jurisdiction over the criminal judgment in the above case is extended an additional ten-years from the date of August 1, 2015. During the additional ten-year period an execution may be issued for restitution, crime victim's assessment, and other legal financial obligations imposed pursuant to the above-entitled cause number.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 15th day of June, 2015.

JUDGE Sean P. O'Donnell

Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorney
W554 King County Courthouse
516 Third Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98104
(206) 296-9000, FAX (206) 296-0955

Presented by: _____
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