

74357-1

FILED
August 22, 2016
Court of Appeals
Division I
State of Washington

74357-1

NO. 74357-1-I

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

LESLIE VERONIKA BOWLAN,

Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR SNOHOMISH COUNTY

APPELLANT'S **CORRECTED** OPENING BRIEF

Marla L. Zink
Attorney for Appellant

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT
1511 Third Avenue, Suite 701
Seattle, Washington 98101
(206) 587-2711

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1

B. ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE..... 2

D. ARGUMENT..... 4

 1. Because the court applied the wrong standard range, the
 matter must be remanded for resentencing 4

 2. The offenses committed while the State affirmatively
 neglected to exercise its power to extradite Ms. Bowlan
 should not be included in the offender score 6

 3. The legal financial obligations imposed without
 consideration of Ms. Bowlan’s ability to pay should be
 stricken 9

E. CONCLUSION 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Washington Supreme Court Decisions

<i>In re Pers. Restraint of Call</i> , 144 Wn.2d 315, 28 P.3d 709 (2001).....	5
<i>In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin</i> , 146 Wn.2d 861, 50 P.3d 618 (2002).....	5
<i>Jafar v. Webb</i> , 177 Wn.2d 520, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013)	13, 14
<i>Kramarevcky v. Dep’t of Social & Health Servs.</i> , 122 Wn.2d 738, 863 P.2d 535 (1993)	7
<i>State v. Blank</i> , 131 Wn.2d 230, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997)	16
<i>State v. Blazina</i> , 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015).....	passim
<i>State v. Conover</i> , 183 Wn.2d 706, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015)	12
<i>State v. Curry</i> , 118 Wn.2d 911, 829 P.2d 166 (1992)	12
<i>State v. Duncan</i> , 185 Wn.2d 430, 374 P.3d 83 (2016)	10
<i>State v. McCorkle</i> , 137 Wn.2d 490, 973 P.2d 461 (1999).....	4
<i>State v. Parker</i> , 132 Wn.2d 182, 937 P.2d 575 (1997).....	4
<i>State v. Wilson</i> , 170 Wn.2d 682, 244 P.3d 950 (2010).....	5
<i>Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.</i> , 85 Wn.2d 78, 530 P.2d 298 (1975)	7

Washington Court of Appeals Decisions

<i>Nielsen v. Washington State Dep’t of Licensing</i> , 177 Wn. App. 45, 5309 P.3d 1221 (2013)	15
<i>State v. Lewis</i> , No. 72637-4-I, slip op. (June 27, 2016)	10
<i>State v. Lundy</i> , 176 Wn. App. 96, 308 P.3d 755 (2013).....	11
<i>State v. Mathers</i> , 193 Wn. App. 913, __ P.3d __ (2016).....	10

<i>State v. Shelton</i> , 72848-2-I, slip op. (June 20, 2016).....	10
--	----

United States Supreme Court Decisions

<i>Fuller v. Oregon</i> , 417 U.S. 40, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974).....	14
--	----

<i>James v. Strange</i> , 407 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2027, 32 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1972).....	14
---	----

<i>Saenz v. Roe</i> , 526 U.S. 489, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 143 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1999).....	14
---	----

Constitutional Provisions

Const. art. I, § 3	13
--------------------------	----

U.S. Const. amend. XIV	13
------------------------------	----

Statutes

RCW 7.68.035	11
--------------------	----

RCW 9.94A.010	15
---------------------	----

RCW 9.94A.510	4, 5
---------------------	------

RCW 9.94A.515	4
---------------------	---

RCW 9.94A.530	4, 5
---------------------	------

RCW 9.94A.753	11
---------------------	----

RCW 10.01.160	passim
---------------------	--------

Ch. 10.88 RCW.....	6
--------------------	---

RCW 36.18.020	11, 13
---------------------	--------

RCW 43.43.7541	12
----------------------	----

RCW 69.50.401	4
---------------------	---

Rules

GR 34..... 13

RAP 15.2..... 10

Other Authorities

Katherine A. Beckett, Alexes M. Harris, & Heather Evans, Wash.
State Minority & Justice Comm’n, The Assessment and
Consequences of Legal Financial Obligations in Washington
State (2008)..... 16

Laws of 2008, ch. 231, § 1..... 4

A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The sentencing court applied the incorrect standard range.
2. The sentencing court exceeded its authority by sentencing Leslie Bowlan above the applicable standard range without any basis for an exceptional sentence.
3. It is inequitable to include in the offender score offenses committed while the State had the authority to recall Ms. Bowlan to Washington but delayed exercising that authority for 13 years.
4. The trial court erred in imposing \$1200 in legal financial obligations (LFOs) without conducting an individualized inquiry into Ms. Bowlan's ability to pay.

B. ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. A sentencing court errs when it calculates the incorrect standard range. The sentencing court used a higher standard range than was applicable to Ms. Bowlan's purported offender score and offense seriousness level. The court then sentenced Ms. Bowlan within that incorrect standard range. Must the matter be remanded to the sentencing court for resentencing under the correct standard range?
2. Equitable estoppel bars the government from asserting inconsistent positions where a third-party relies on the government's

initial assertion to her detriment. Where the State waited 13 years to exercise its extradition authority over Ms. Bowlan, should it be equitably estopped from increasing her offender score with California convictions accrued during those 13 years, for which Ms. Bowlan has already been held accountable in California?

3. RCW 10.01.160 mandates the waiver of costs and fees for indigent defendants. “[A] trial court has a statutory obligation to make an individualized inquiry into a defendant’s current and future ability to pay before the court imposes LFOs.” *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 830, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). While the trial court recognized Ms. Bowlan’s indigency, the court imposed \$1200 in LFOs without considering Ms. Bowlan’s inability to pay. Should this Court remand with instructions to strike the LFOs?

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Leslie Bowlan was charged with delivery of cocaine in September 2002. CP 32. At the time, her standard range sentence would have been 15-20 months with an offender score of zero, but she entered into drug treatment court. CP 21-23.

In December 2002, a warrant was issued for Ms. Bowlan's failure to appear for drug court. CP __ (Sub no. 29).¹ The warrant specifically limits the authority to extradite Ms. Bowlan to within the State of Washington. *Id.* at 3.

Ms. Bowlan apparently spent time in California where she was prosecuted for offenses between 2003 and 2013. *See* CP 7-8.

In 2015, the State changed the extradition boundaries to all western states, and Ms. Bowlan was extradited from Arizona to Washington. CP __ (Sub. nos. 31, 32); 8/7/15 RP 4.

The trial court terminated her from drug court, and the matter proceeded to sentencing. CP 19-20. The court included in Ms. Bowlan's offender score four convictions from California committed while Ms. Bowlan was on warrant status but had not yet been extradited. CP 7-8. With an offender score of six and a seriousness level of seven, the sentencing court calculated a standard range of 67 to 89 months and sentenced Ms. Bowlan to a prison-based DOSA sentence totaling 78 months. CP 8-9. The court also imposed \$1200 in LFOs. CP 11.

¹ A supplemental designation of clerk's papers has been filed for all documents referred to by subfolder number.

D. ARGUMENT

1. Because the court applied the wrong standard range, the matter must be remanded for resentencing.

This Court reviews de novo the sentencing court's calculation of the standard range. *State v. Parker*, 132 Wn.2d 182, 189, 937 P.2d 575 (1997). The sentencing court acts without authority, committing legal error, when it applies an incorrect standard range. *Id.* at 188-89; *State v. McCorkle*, 137 Wn.2d 490, 496, 973 P.2d 461 (1999), *superseded by statute on other grounds* Laws of 2008, ch. 231, § 1.

Standard range sentences are set forth in the sentencing grid at RCW 9.94A.510. The applicable range sits at the “intersection of the column defined by the offender score and the row defined by the offense seriousness score.” RCW 9.94A.530(1).

Ms. Bowlan was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), which carries a seriousness level of VII. RCW 69.50.401(a); RCW 9.94A.515; CP 6, 8. At sentencing, her offender score was calculated as a six. CP 7-8.²

² Ms. Bowlan does not contest the calculation of her offender score in this appeal other than as set forth in section two below. However, on remand, she reserves the right to present and contest evidence and argument regarding her criminal history. *See* RCW 9.94A.530.

The intersection of these offender score and seriousness level columns produces a standard range of 57 to 75 months. RCW 9.94A.510. However, the sentencing court applied the improper, higher standard range of 67 to 89 months, which applies to an offender score of seven. CP 8. Based on this incorrect standard range, the court sentenced Ms. Bowlan to a prison-based DOSA sentence of 78 months. CP 9. This sentence exceeds the actual standard range of 57 to 75 months. *See* RCW 9.94A.510.

This sentence, based on an improperly calculated offender score, lacks statutory authority and is a “fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice.” *State v. Wilson*, 170 Wn.2d 682, 688-89, 244 P.3d 950 (2010) (quoting *In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin*, 146 Wn.2d 861, 867-68, 50 P.3d 618 (2002)). A court has both the duty and power to correct an incorrect sentence. *In re Pers. Restraint of Call*, 144 Wn.2d 315, 332, 28 P.3d 709 (2001).

This Court should remand for imposition of a sentence within the correct standard range. At the resentencing hearing, “the parties shall have the opportunity to present and the court to consider all relevant evidence regarding criminal history, including criminal history not previously presented.” RCW 9.94A.530.

2. The offenses committed while the State affirmatively neglected to exercise its power to extradite Ms. Bowlan should not be included in the offender score.

The State has authority to extradite from anywhere in the United States individuals with an outstanding warrant. *See* Ch. 10.88 RCW. Washington chose not to extradite Ms. Bowlan while she was outside the state. CP __ (Sub no. 29, 32). Thirteen years later, however, the State amended the warrant to allow for extradition from any western state, and extradited Ms. Bowlan from Arizona. CP __ (Sub no. 31, 32).

While the State chose not to execute its warrant against her, Ms. Bowlan incurred four convictions in California. *See* CP 7-8. The State should not be permitted to seek a windfall from its decision not to extradite Ms. Bowlan at an earlier time. If the State had exercised its authority to extradite Ms. Bowlan when she was first arrested in California, her offender score would have been significantly lower. Yet, the State waited until Ms. Bowlan had accumulated additional convictions in other states before hailing her back to Washington for sentencing in this case. *Compare* CP 7-8 (offender score of 6) *with* CP 21 (offender score of zero).

The State should be estopped from adding the intervening convictions to Ms. Bowlan's offender score. "Equitable estoppel is based on the principle that: 'a party should be held to a representation made or position assumed where inequitable consequences would otherwise result to another party who has justifiably and in good faith relied thereon.'" *Kramarevcky v. Dep't of Social & Health Servs.*, 122 Wn.2d 738, 743, 863 P.2d 535 (1993) (quoting *Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.*, 85 Wn.2d 78, 81, 530 P.2d 298 (1975)). Equitable estoppel applies where there is (1) an act or admission by the first party that is inconsistent with a later assertion; (2) an act by another party in reliance upon the first party's act or admission; and (3) an injury that would result to the relying party if the first party were not estopped from repudiating the original act or admission. *Kramarevcky*, 122 Wn.2d at 743. The doctrine applies against the government if necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, and that the exercise of government functions will not be impaired as a result of the estoppel. *Id.*

The State acted inconsistently here by first only authorizing extradition within Washington, then 13 years later changing the extradition boundaries to all western states. CP __ (Sub nos. 31, 32).

Ms. Bowlan relied on the State's lack of exercise of extradition authority by living freely outside Washington State. She was subject to the laws of California, and paid penalties there. *See* CP 7-8 (showing California convictions for 2003, 2005, and 2012). By changing the parameters of extradition 13 years later, the State seeks to penalize Ms. Bowlan for the underlying offense here as well as for the offenses committed in California while Washington turned a blind eye. It works manifest injustice on Ms. Bowlan to hail her into Washington 13 years later and increase her sentence substantially due to four offenses committed while the State chose not to extradite her back to Washington.

Finally, no government function will be impaired by the application of equitable estoppel here. The State will still be authorized to extradite individuals with outstanding warrants. It can do so promptly, or it can wait. But if the State chooses to wait, it cannot seek gains in the form of increased imprisonment from that choice. The State will simply not be allowed to delay extradition and increase an individual's standard range sentence when the State finally exercises its authority.

Ms. Bowlan has been held accountable in California.

Washington should not be permitted to lie in the weeds and then impose an increased sentence upon individuals like Ms. Bowlan.

3. The legal financial obligations imposed without consideration of Ms. Bowlan's ability to pay should be stricken.

Ms. Bowlan was indigent and represented by appointed counsel at the trial court level. CP __ (Sub no. 8). Counsel was also appointed on appeal due to her indigency. CP __ (Sub nos. 58, 59). At sentencing, the court did not consider Ms. Bowlan's ability to pay fees and costs. 11/6/15 RP 1-13. Yet, the judgment and sentence reflects a boilerplate finding that Ms. Bowlan has the ability to pay LFOs and imposes \$1200 in LFOs plus interest and collection fees. CP 8, 11 (imposing \$500 victim assessment fee, \$100 DNA fee, and \$600 drug court costs).

A sentencing court "shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them." RCW 10.01.160(3). This means "a trial court has a statutory obligation to make an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay before the court imposes LFOs." *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 830, 344 P.3d 680 (2015); *accord, e.g., State v. Duncan*,

185 Wn.2d 430, 374 P.3d 83 (2016) (remanding to trial court for resentencing with “proper consideration” of defendant’s ability to pay).

The sentencing transcript reflects the court made no inquiry into Ms. Bowlan’s ability to pay costs. 11/6/15 RP 1-13. The court therefore failed to conduct the individualized inquiry required by statute. Moreover, the boilerplate finding is inconsistent with Ms. Bowlan’s indigency. CP __ (Sub nos. 8, 58, 59); RAP 15.2(f) (continuing presumption of indigency). Accordingly, the court should remand with instructions to strike the LFOs.

The State may argue that the \$500 victim assessment fee and the \$100 biological sample fee are “mandatory.” In fact, this Court recently held that despite the equal hardships imposed by “mandatory” and “discretionary” LFOs, the above statutory interpretation and constitutional grounds were insufficient to reverse the imposition of “mandatory fees.” *State v. Mathers*, 193 Wn. App. 913, __ P.3d __ (2016); *State v. Lewis*, No. 72637-4-I, slip op. at 4-10 (June 27, 2016); *State v. Shelton*, 72848-2-I, slip op. at 1 (June 20, 2016). These decisions were incorrectly decided, however.

The appearance of mandatory language in the statutes authorizing the costs imposed here does not override the requirement

that the costs be imposed only if the defendant has the ability to pay. See RCW 7.68.035 (penalty assessment “shall be imposed”); RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) (convicted criminal defendants “shall be liable” for a \$200 fee); *State v. Lundy*, 176 Wn. App. 96, 102-03, 308 P.3d 755 (2013). These statutes must be read in tandem with RCW 10.01.160, which requires courts to inquire about a defendant’s financial status and refrain from imposing costs on those who cannot pay. RCW 10.01.160(3); *Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 830, 838. Read together, these statutes mandate imposition of the above fees upon those who can pay, and require that they not be ordered for indigent defendants.

When the Legislature means to depart from this presumptive process, it makes the departure clear. The restitution statute, for example, not only states that restitution “shall be ordered” for injury or damage absent extraordinary circumstances, but also states that “the court *may not* reduce the total amount of restitution ordered because the offender may lack the ability to pay the total amount.” RCW 9.94A.753 (emphasis added). This clause is absent from other LFO statutes, indicating that sentencing courts are to consider ability to pay in those contexts. See *State v. Conover*, 183 Wn.2d 706, 355 P.3d

1093, 1097 (2015) (the legislature’s choice of different language in different provisions indicates a different legislative intent).³

State v. Curry, 118 Wn.2d 911, 829 P.2d 166 (1992) does not hold otherwise because that case considered a defense argument that the VPA was *unconstitutional*. The Court simply assumed that the statute mandated imposition of the penalty on indigent and non-indigent defendants alike: “The penalty is mandatory. In contrast to RCW 10.01.160, no provision is made in the statute to waive the penalty for indigent defendants.” *Id.* at 917 (citation omitted). That portion of the opinion is arguable dictum because it does not appear petitioners argued that RCW 10.01.160(3) applies to the VPA, but simply assumed it did not.

Blazina supersedes *Curry* to the extent they are inconsistent. The Court in *Blazina* repeatedly described its holding as applying to “LFOs,” not just to a particular cost. *See Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 830 (“we reach the merits and hold that a trial court has a statutory obligation to make an individualized inquiry into a defendant’s current

³ The Legislature did amend the DNA statute to remove consideration of “hardship” at the time the fee is imposed. *Compare* RCW 43.43.7541 (2002) *with* RCW 43.43.7541 (2008). But it did not add a clause precluding waiver of the fee for those who cannot pay it at all. In other words, the legislature did not explicitly exempt this statute from the requirements of RCW 10.01.160(3).

and future ability to pay before the court imposes LFOs.”); *id.* at 839 (“We hold that RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the record to reflect that the sentencing judge made an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s current and future ability to pay before the court imposes LFOs.”).

Likewise, in *Jafar v. Webb*, 177 Wn.2d 520, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013), the Supreme Court held the trial court was required to waive all fees for indigent litigants under General Rule 34 despite the appearance of mandatory language (“shall”) in applicable statutes. *See* RCW 36.18.020. The Court noted that both the plain meaning and history of GR 34, as well as principles of due process and equal protection, required trial courts to waive all fees for indigent litigants. *Jafar*, 177 Wn.2d at 527-30. Given Jafar’s indigence, the Court reasoned, “We fail to understand how, as a practical matter, Jafar could make the \$50 payment now, within 90 days, or ever.” *Id.* at 529. That conclusion is even more inescapable for criminal defendants, who face barriers to employment beyond those others endure. *See Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 837; CP 49.

Finally, to construe the relevant statutes as precluding consideration of ability to pay would raise constitutional concerns. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. art. I, § 3. Specifically, to hold that

mandatory costs and fees must be waived for indigent civil litigants but may not be waived for indigent criminal litigants would run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. *See James v. Strange*, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2027, 32 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1972) (holding Kansas statute violated Equal Protection Clause because it stripped indigent criminal defendants of the protective exemptions applicable to civil judgment debtors). Equal Protection problems also arise from the arbitrarily disparate handling of the “criminal filing fee” across counties. *See Jafar*, 177 Wn.2d at 528-29; *Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 857.⁴

Treating the costs at issue here as non-waivable would also be constitutionally suspect under *Fuller v. Oregon*, 417 U.S. 40, 45-46, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974). There, the Supreme Court upheld

⁴ The fact that some counties view statewide statutes as requiring waiver of the fee for indigent defendants and others view the statutes as requiring imposition regardless of indigency is not a fair basis for discriminating against defendants in the latter type of county. *See Jafar*, 177 Wn.2d at 528-29 (noting that “principles of due process or equal protection” guided the court’s analysis and recognizing that failure to require waiver of fees for indigent litigants “could lead to inconsistent results and disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals”). Indeed, such disparate application across counties not only offends equal protection, but also implicates the fundamental constitutional right to travel. *Cf. Saenz v. Roe*, 526 U.S. 489, 505, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 143 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1999) (striking down California statute mandating different welfare benefits for long-term residents and those who had been in the state for less than a year, as well as different benefits for those in the latter category depending on their state of origin).

an Oregon costs statute that is similar to RCW 10.01.160, noting that it required consideration of ability to pay before imposing costs, and that costs could not be imposed upon those who would never be able to repay them. *See id.* Thus, under *Fuller*, the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied if courts read RCW 10.01.160(3) in tandem with the more specific cost and fee statutes, and consider ability to pay before imposing LFOs.

Imposing LFOs on indigent defendants also violates substantive due process because such a practice is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. *See Nielsen v. Washington State Dep't of Licensing*, 177 Wn. App. 45, 52-53, 309 P.3d 1221 (2013) (citing test). Ms. Bowlan concedes that the government has a legitimate interest in collecting the costs and fees at issue. But imposing costs and fees on impoverished people like her is not rationally related to the goal, because “the state cannot collect money from defendants who cannot pay.” *Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 837. Moreover, imposing LFOs on impoverished defendants runs counter to the legislature’s stated goals of encouraging rehabilitation and preventing recidivism. *See* RCW 9.94A.010; *Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 837.

Although the Court in *Blank* rejected an argument that the Constitution requires consideration of ability to pay at the time appellate costs are imposed, subsequent developments have undercut its analysis. *See State v. Blank*, 131 Wn.2d 230, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997). The *Blank* Court noted that due process prohibits *imprisoning* people for inability to pay fines, but assumed that LFOs could still be *imposed* on poor people because “incarceration would result only if failure to pay was willful” and not due to indigence. *Id.* at 241. This assumption was not borne out.⁵

The Court should remand with instructions to strike the LFOs imposed without an individualized inquiry of Ms. Bowlan’s ability to pay.

E. CONCLUSION

Because the sentencing court used the wrong standard range, the sentence imposed is outside the correct standard range and without authority. The Court should remand for resentencing.

⁵ *See, e.g.*, Katherine A. Beckett, Alexes M. Harris, & Heather Evans, Wash. State Minority & Justice Comm’n, *The Assessment and Consequences of Legal Financial Obligations in Washington State*, 49-55 (2008), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf; *Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d at 836 (discussing report by Beckett et al. with approval).

The Court should also hold that on remand the four out-of-state convictions accrued from 2003 to 2015 cannot be included in Ms. Bowlan's offender score under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

In the alternative, the Court should remand with instructions to strike LFOs imposed without an individualized inquiry into Ms. Bowlan's ability to pay.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Marla L. Zink
Marla L. Zink – WSBA 39042
Washington Appellate Project
Attorney for Appellant

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION I**

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	
)	
Respondent,)	
)	NO. 74357-1-I
)	
LESLIE BOWLAN,)	
)	
Appellant.)	

DECLARATION OF DOCUMENT FILING AND SERVICE

I, MARIA ARRANZA RILEY, STATE THAT ON THE 16TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2016, I CAUSED THE ORIGINAL **CORRECTED OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT** TO BE FILED IN THE **COURT OF APPEALS – DIVISION ONE** AND A TRUE COPY OF THE SAME TO BE SERVED ON THE FOLLOWING IN THE MANNER INDICATED BELOW:

- | | | |
|--|-------------------|--|
| [X] SETH FINE, DPA
[sfine@snoco.org]
SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
3000 ROCKEFELLER
EVERETT, WA 98201 | ()
()
(X) | U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
AGREED E-SERVICE
VIA COA PORTAL |
| [X] LESLIE BOWLAN
385492
MISSION CREEK CORRECTIONS CENTER
3420 NE SAND HILL RD
BELFAIR, WA 98528 | (X)
()
() | U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
_____ |

SIGNED IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, THIS 16TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2016.



X _____

Washington Appellate Project
701 Melbourne Tower
1511 Third Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98101
☎(206) 587-2711