

NO. 44906-4-II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,

v.


ROBERT E. JAMES,
Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON FOR GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY

THE HONORABLE F. MARK MCCAULEY, JUDGE

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 30, 2012, S.J.C. was living with Marvin Gregory. 3/26 RP at 23. The two met in 2009, and Gregory helped S.J.C. in her efforts to get sober. 3/26 RP at 23. On that day, S.J.C. wanted to drink, but Gregory told her no, so S.J.C. left the apartment and went to downtown Aberdeen. 3/26 RP at 24. Later, Gregory was at a Jack in the Box when he saw S.J.C. at the transit mall getting into a car with someone he didn't know. 3/26 RP at 24. Gregory wrote down the license plate number and as much information about the car as he could. 3/26 RP at 24.

Gregory didn't speak to S.J.C. at this time, but saw she was yelling out the window and figured "well, she's drinking." 3/26 RP at 25. Gregory described the male driver as being "American Native with long – well, long hair..." 3/26 RP at 25 and 28.

Mr. Kim is the front desk clerk at the Thunderbird Motel. 3/26 RP at 31. On June 30, 2012, he rented Room 129 to the appellant and saw him drinking from a whiskey bottle in his car with a woman. 3/26 RP at 31-33. The next day, Mr. Kim saw a woman in the door of Room 129, and she was nude and "had blood." 3/26 RP at 27. Mr. Kim asked if she needed help and she replied with something like "Rape, rape. I'm hurt, hurt. Call the police, call the police." 3/26 RP at 36.

On June 30, 2012, Helen Biggs was living in Room 101 of the Thunderbird Motel; this is across the parking lot from Room 129. 3/26 RP at 44. At approximately six in the morning of July 1, 2012 Biggs got up and went outside to smoke. While outside, she saw a male going to a car matching the appellant's and leaving the motel. 3/26 RP at 44 and 47.

On June 30, 2012, Wendy Taylor was staying in Room 107 at the Thunderbird Motel. 3/26 RP at 53. Around midnight, Taylor heard screaming that she described as "like crying, screaming real bad, somebody got hurt." 3/26 RP at 54 and 55. This was out of the ordinary for the motel. 3/26 RP at 57.

On June 30, 2012, Christa Anderson was staying in Room 231 of the Thunderbird Motel. 3/25 RP at 61-62. On the morning of July 1, 2012, Anderson was leaving for the store when she was stopped by the manager, Mr. Kim to help the woman in 129. 3/26 RP at 62. Anderson saw S.J.C. standing naked, so she took her into the room and helped her dress. 3/26 RP at 62. Anderson observed that the room was "trashed" and S.J.C. had blood and feces on the back of her leg. 3/26 RP at 62. Anderson knows S.J.C. and described that she "kind of acts kind of droggy...but she was way drowsy and droggier than normal." 3/26 RP at 63.

When asked if she was okay, the woman told Anderson that she had been raped. 3/26 RP at 62. Anderson asked where she had been raped, and S.J.C. said from her back side. 3/26 RP at 63. Anderson helped to call police. 3/26 RP at 62-63.

The appellant admitted to running into S.J.C. on June 30, 2012 in Aberdeen, WA. The appellant agreed to let S.J.C. ride in his car, and he was drinking with her. 3/27 RP at 94 and 96. The appellant stopped and bought a six pack of Budweiser beer and “three or four cans of the high gravity type beer that [S.J.C.] was wanting...” 3/27 RP at 113. The appellant drank four beers in the car, and S.J.C. drank most, if not all, of the beer he bought for her. 3/27 RP at 113.

At some point, the appellant realized he was too intoxicated to drive, so he rented Room 129 at the Thunderbird Motel in Aberdeen. 3/27 RP at 97. The appellant claimed that he and S.J.C. were kissing and “being affectionate.” 3/27 RP at 97. In fact, the appellant told S.J.C. that they would be “F’ing like bunnies” if they got a room. 3/27 RP at 98.

Prior to getting the room, the appellant bought a fifth of whiskey, another six pack of Budweiser and “maybe two more cans for [S.J.C.]” 3/27 RP at 98 and 117. S.J.C. drank two of these, “[b]ut those were quite a bit bigger beers, so in content it was a lot more than just two beers.” 3/27

RP at 117. In the room, the two “got obviously a little too drunk and passed out.” 3/27 RP at 99. Later in the night, they woke and “drank some more beer.” 3/27 RP at 99.

On July 1, 2012, Aberdeen officers were dispatched to Room 129 of the Thunderbird Motel. 3/26 RP at 73-74. Upon arrival, Officer Capps saw the door to 129 was “slightly open” and a female was lying on the bed. 3/26 RP at 74. In the room, Capps found “underwear with soiled stuff in them and bloodstains, and towels in the bathroom with what appeared to be blood on them.” 3/26 RP at 77.

Upon contacting S.J.C., Capps found her to be in pain and not talking much. S.J.C. seemed a little upset and stated that “she had been raped.” 3/26 RP at 77.

Detective Snodgrass contacted S.J.C. in the room. He observed that she “was obviously in a lot of pain” and lying on her side. Detective Snodgrass also saw that S.J.C. had some scrapes and abrasions and what appeared to be fecal matter or blood down her legs. 3/27 RP at 8. S.J.C. stated that “she thought it was a guy that she might have grown up with...maybe...the last name of ‘Pluff’” 3/27 RP at 9. When Detective Snodgrass entered the address from the motel receipt into the police department’s database, it returned with a photograph of the appellant. 3/27

RP at 10-11. Based on this information, Detective Snodgrass created a photo lineup containing the appellant's photograph in the lower right-hand corner (#6). This was shown to S.J.C. and she "was 100%" certain that the person in the lower right-hand corner (#6) was her assailant. 3/27 RP at 11-15. The clerk at the Thunderbird Motel, Mr. Kim, also identified the appellant as the man with S.J.C. on the night of the assault. 3/27 RP at 15-17.

During a search of Room 129, Detective Snodgrass found "alcohol containers strewn about the room...a bag of some empty alcohol cans...various articles of clothing on the ground, and [what] appeared to be droplets of some body fluid, possibly blood." 3/27 RP at 18. In the bathroom bloody tissues and a bloody washcloth were found. 3/26 RP at 80; 3/27 RP at 18. A white washcloth with possible blood or feces was in the sink, and the same type of body fluid was in the sink. 3/26 RP at 81; 3/27 RP at 23. The comforter from the bed in the room had a large spot of apparent fresh blood on it. 3/27 RP at 23-24.

Officer Capps went to the hospital and took a statement from S.J.C. and photographed injuries that he observed. These included a scrape on her bicep and bruising on both sides of her neck. 3/26 RP 86-87. During this contact, S.J.C. was coherent and cooperative. 3/26 RP at 82.

After writing the statement, Officer Capps reviewed it with S.J.C. and asked if anything needed to be changed or taken out. No changes were made. 3/26 RP at 82. S.J.C. voluntarily signed the statement, and the officer did not tell her that she had to sign it. 3/26 RP at 83. Pursuant to ER 803(5), Officer Capps read this statement to the jury. It is as follows:

I got to the Thunderbird last night around dark. I went to Room 129 with Pluff, don't know first name. Pluff is 10 to 15 years older than me. Pluff is Native American and grew up with my older brother. Pluff has black hair with some being gray. He was wearing a red and black shirt. He is about 6' 3" or 4".

He rented the room last night. We arrived in a gray silver sedan I think was his girlfriend's car. I went into the room and sat on the bed to watch TV. I said, "Get out of the way I'm trying to watch TV." Pluff said, "You [re] not here to watch TV, you're going to give me what you're really here for."

I said, "I'm going home" and went to the door. He grabbed my arm and threw me on the bed and tried to take me from the front. I said, "No," and he turned me around and he took me from my back side. The whole time I was yelling at him to stop.

I was pulling his hair and scraping him with my fingernails to try and get him off of me. He was too strong, I could not move him off of me. After Pluff was done raping me he took off out of the room. I screamed and screamed when he was raping me wanting for him to stop. He left when he was done.

I stayed the night in the bed in the room. I could not move because my bottom area hurt too bad. I got up a couple times to go to the door to holler for help but no one was outside. I didn't have clothes on when I was trying to get help. I don't remember calling 911.

I used to date Pluff's...I used to date Pluff's nephew. Pluff might have gotten out of jail recently. I had Officer Capps write this statement for me.

3/26 RP at 103-105.

On July 3, 2014, Detective Snodgrass re-contacted S.J.C. at the hospital. He observed her to remain in a lot of pain, and she had been admitted to the hospital for surgery. S.J.C. had a colostomy bag at that point. 3/27 RP at 26. The detective showed S.J.C. a photograph of the appellant and she again verified that he was the man that sexually assaulted her. 3/27 RP at 27.

Detective Snodgrass requested that the Department of Licensing (DOL) provide information on any vehicles registered to the appellant. 3/27 RP at 34. DOL tied the appellant to a light blue four-door Honda with a license plate that was one letter off from the one provided by Mr. Gregory. 3/27 RP at 34.

Miriam Thompson is a qualified Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE). 3/27 RP at 46-49. On July 1, 2014 Thompson examined S.J.C. Thompson observed “a couple small marks, little red marks on her neck, on each side of her neck.” S.J.C. complained about a couple of bruises on her left knee and pain in her anus. 3/27 RP at 59-60. Thompson observed “some milky white liquid between [S.J.C.’s] buttocks cheeks, along with what appeared to be menses blood.” 3/27 RP at 60. Further testing revealed that S.J.C. had an anal tear. 3/27 RP at 61. S.J.C. was

hospitalized for 10 days, and she had the colostomy bag for two months. 3/26 RP at 11-12. She required three surgeries to repair the damage. 3/26 RP at 12.

During this examination, S.J.C. stated that she got into a car with a friend of her brother and they were drinking. 3/27 RP at 49. S.J.C. drank until she was “three sheets to the wind.” 3/27 RP at 59. The man drove her to his hotel room and penetrated her anally with his penis, and that S.J.C. struggled to get him off of her. 3/27 RP at 50 and 58. The man “held her down with his hands around her neck and his body weight on top of her.” 3/27 RP at 59.

S.J.C. told Thompson that she had three personalities; however, Thompson didn't recognize any “odd personality” during the examination. S.J.C. presented as irritable and intoxicated. 3/27 RP at 69-70.

Thompson took swabs of S.J.C.'s vaginal area, peroneal area and anus. 3/27 RP at 60. A DNA sample was also obtained from the appellant. 3/27 RP at 37-38. P30, a protein commonly found in semen, was detected in the anal swab taken from S.J.C. 3/27 RP at 79. A swab from S.J.C.'s neck revealed a mixed DNA profile; this profile was consistent as coming from S.J.C. and the appellant. 3/17 RP at 80. It is seven quadrillion times more likely that the mixture occurred as a result of S.J.C. and the

appellant's DNA versus a mixture of S.J.C. and a random individual. 3/27 RP at 80 and 82.

S.J.C.'s underwear from the scene had staining consistent with blood. 3/26 RP at 79; 3/27 RP at 81. Male underwear found at the scene had staining consistent with blood and the unstained portion provided a DNA profile consistent with the appellant. 3/26 RP at 79; 3/27 RP at 82.

Victim's Testimony

On the day of trial, S.J.C. remembered the following:

On June 30, 2012, S.J.C. was drinking when she got into a fight with her boyfriend, Marvin Gregory and left their apartment. 3/26 RP at 5-6. S.J.C. had consumed about 24 ounces of "high gravity beer." She is five feet tall and weighs approximately 115 pounds. 3/26 RP at 6-7. S.J.C. was "stumbling down the road" and "inebriated" when someone asked if she needed a ride. 3/26 RP 6.

She got into the car, and, the next thing she knew, she was sitting on a bed in a motel room watching TV. 3/26 RP at 7. She doesn't remember anything until she was in the room by herself "hurting really bad, and...trying to get to the phone..." 3/26 RP at 8. S.J.C. couldn't make it to the phone because she was too hurt to walk. She had pain in her

“behind” and her stomach. 3/26 RP at 9. S.J.C. couldn’t remember how she had been injured. 3/26 RP at 8.

S.J.C. “was so upset [she] couldn’t even make the phone work, she was able to roll off the bed and crawl over to the door. 3/26 RP at 9. S.J.C. didn’t have any clothes on when she woke up. 3/26 RP at 9. She just “hollered and hollered” at the door until someone came to help. 3/26 RP at 9.

S.J.C. remained sure that the appellant was the one that had picked her up on June 30. 3/26 RP at 10. She had no recollection of agreeing to have sex, or having sex. 3/26 RP at 11.

S.J.C. described that she started drinking at the age of 11, and that she drinks “every single day” from the time she wakes up to the time she goes to sleep. 3/26 RP at 13. She admitted that she was having trouble fully remembering what happened the night of June 30, 2012 to the morning of July 1, 2012. 3/26 RP at 13.

S.J.C. was familiar with the written statement she gave Officer Capps on July 1, 2012, and identified her signature at the bottom of the statement. However, she stated that she didn’t have a real recollection of making the statement. 3/26 RP at 14. She said that if an officer told her to sign it, she would have signed it. 3/26 RP at 14-15. Reading the statement

did not help refresh her memory. 3/26 RP at 16. However, S.J.C. testified that it would be her normal habit to tell the truth to a police officer. 3/26 RP at 16. She later affirmed that if an officer gave her a statement that had errors, she would have corrected it. 3/26 RP at 18. She also answered “No” when asked if she “would sign a statement for the police that was untruthful or incorrect.” 3/26 RP at 18.

RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

There was sufficient evidence to support rape in the second degree under either of the alternative means.

Due process requires that the State bear the burden of proving each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. McCollum*, 98 Wn.2d 484, 488, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983). The applicable standard of review is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Joy*, 121 Wn.2d 333, 338, 851 P.2d 654 (1993). Also, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s evidence and any reasonable inferences from it. *State v. Barrington*, 52 Wn.App. 478, 484, 761 P.2d 632 (1987) rev. den., 11 Wn.2d 1033 (1988). All

reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted more strongly against the defendant. *State v. Salinas*, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). In considering this evidence, “credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and cannot be reviewed on appeal.” *State v. Carmillo*, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).

Washington law requires a unanimous jury conclusion that the defendant committed the crime charged in the information. *State v. Mak*, 105 Wash.2d 692, 735, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied., 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986). When a crime can be committed by two alternative means, a specific unanimity finding is not required where constitutionally sufficient evidence supports both charged alternatives. *State v. Whitney*, 108 Wash. 2d 506, 511-12, 739 P.2d 1150, 1153 (1987).

In this case, the jury found the appellant guilty of rape in the second degree. The court instructed the jury that, to convict the appellant of rape in the second degree, they had to find that the sexual intercourse occurred "(a) “by forcible compulsion, or (b) when S.J.C. was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated...” CP at 158-159. There was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction based on either of these alternative means.

To prove forcible compulsion the State presented the evidence detailed above. Specifically, that S.J.C. told the police that the appellant grabbed her arm and threw her on the bed and tried to “take [her] from the front.” When S.J.C. said, “No,” the appellant turned her around and “took [her] from [her] back side.” The whole time S.J.C. was yelling at him to stop. 3/26 RP at 103-105. S.J.C. further stated she was pulling the appellant’s hair and scraping him with her fingernails to try and get him off, but he was too strong. 3/26 RP at 103-105. The victim was hospitalized and required surgery after the assault. 3/26 RP at 12.

S.J.C. told the SANE that the appellant drove her to his hotel room and penetrated her anally with his penis, and that S.J.C. struggled to get him off of her. 3/27 RP at 50 and 58. The appellant “held her down with his hands around her neck and his body weight on top of her.” 3/27 RP at 59. 3/27 RP at 59.

The State also presented ample evidence that S.J.C. was not capable of consent due to being mentally incapacitated by alcohol. On the night of the assault, S.J.C. was drinking when she got into a fight with her boyfriend, Marvin Gregory and left their apartment. 3/26 RP at 5-6. S.J.C. had consumed about 24 ounces of “high gravity beer.” She is five feet tall and weighs approximately 115 pounds. 3/26 RP at 6-7. S.J.C. was

“stumbling down the road” and “inebriated” when someone asked if she needed a ride. 3/26 RP 6.

S.J.C. told the SANE that she drank until she was “three sheets to the wind.” 3/27 RP at 59. During the examination, S.J.C. presented as irritable and intoxicated. 3/27 RP at 69-70. She had no recollection of agreeing to have sex, or having sex. 3/26 RP at 11.

The appellant testified that he stopped and bought a six pack of Budweiser beer and “three or four cans of the high gravity type beer that [S.J.C.] was wanting...” 3/27 RP at 113. The appellant drank four beers in the car, and S.J.C. drank most, if not all, of the beer he bought for her. 3/27 RP at 113. Prior to getting the room, the appellant bought a fifth of whiskey, another six pack of Budweiser and “maybe two more cans for [S.J.C.]” 3/27 RP at 98 and 117. S.J.C. drank two of these, “[b]ut those were quite a bit bigger beers, so in content it was a lot more than just two beers.” 3/27 RP at 117. In the room, the two “got obviously a little too drunk and passed out.” 3/27 RP at 99. Later in the night, they woke and “drank some more beer.” 3/27 RP at 99.

At the time of trial, S.J.C. had little or no memory of the night and what had occurred.

The jury was properly instructed in this case.

Upon an indictment or information for an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the indictment or information, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an attempt to commit the offense. RCW 10.61.003. To benefit from this statute, the proponent of an instruction must satisfy both a legal requirement and a factual requirement. To satisfy the legal requirement, the proponent must show that the proposed instruction describes an offense that is an inferior degree of the charged offense, or, alternatively, that the proposed instruction describes an offense each element of which is included within the charged offense. To satisfy the factual requirement, the proponent must show that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to him, the jury could find that even though the defendant is not guilty of the charged offense, he is guilty of the inferior or lesser offense embodied in the proposed instruction. *State v. McDonald*, 123 Wash. App. 85, 88-89, 96 P.3d 468, 469-70 (2004).

In *Grier*, the appellant was charged with murder in the first degree, specifically by poison. The argument on appeal was that “murder in the first degree by the administration of poison is a distinct statutory offense complete in itself, and without any crime lesser than the principal one being included therein.”

The court reasoned that:

If the definition of this crime stood by itself, and had no connection with murder in the first degree, as otherwise defined, there would be force in this contention. But murder in the first degree, however it may be committed, is the crime which is defined in the section, which provides that one of the methods by which it may be committed is by causing the death of a person by the administration of poison. Such being the fact, there is no distinction between the crime of murder in the first degree when so committed and the crime of murder in the first degree when committed by other means. The language of the statute is that every person who shall kill another under certain circumstances shall be guilty of murder in the first degree, and there is no distinction as to the crime growing out of the means employed for its commission. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the crime set out in the statute is a single one, and that, by whatever means it may have been committed, it includes the crime of murder in the second degree, and manslaughter as thereafter defined in the statute.

State v. Grier, 11 Wash. 244, 246-47, 39 P. 874 (1895).

The State was clearly entitled to an instruction on all lesser degrees of rape supported by the evidence at trial. The trial court properly instructed the jury in this case.

“Consent Instruction”

The appellant claims that there was an instruction given on the statutory defense provided in RCW 9A.44.030(1). However, this is simply not true. The jury instructions contain no such instruction, and the appellant does not reference a specific instruction number. CP at 155-161.

Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, “an appellant’s brief must include arguments supporting the issues presented for review and citations to legal authority.” *Bercier v. Kiga*, 127 Wash.App. 809, 824, 103 P.3d 232 (2004), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1015, 124 P.3d 304 (2005); see RAP 10.3(a)(6). Without supporting argument or authority, “an appellant waives an assignment of error,” *Bercier*, 127 Wash.App. at 824, 103 P.3d 232 (citing *Smith v. King*, 106 Wash.2d 443, 451–52, 722 P.2d 796 (1986)); and the Court “need not consider arguments that are not developed in the briefs for which a party has not cited authority.” *Bercier*, 127 Wash.App. at 824, 103 P.3d 232 (citing *State v. Dennison*, 115 Wash.2d 609, 629, 801 P.2d 193 (1990)). Thus, because the appellant failed to develop or to support their argument on this point, the Court need not consider it further.

Effectiveness of Counsel

The only ground that the appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective on is the failure to object to the “consent instruction.” As this instruction was not given by the trial court, this assignment of error should also be disregarded, for the reasons given above.

The admission of evidence pursuant to ER 803(5) was proper in this case.

During trial, S.J.C. had considerable difficulty remembering the events in question. Further, she testified that she has been an alcoholic for over 25 years and that she was drinking heavily on the night of the assault. While S.J.C. has some memory of what happened, this memory was insufficient to allow her to testify fully and accurately. Therefore, her written statement to Officer Capps was properly admitted in this case.

Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify full and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’ memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.

ER 803(a)(5).

Under Rule 803(a)(5), the proponent of the writing must make a foundation showing that:

- (a) the record pertains to a matter about which the witness once had personal knowledge,

(b) the witness now has an insufficient recollection about the matter to testify fully and accurately,

(c) the record was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory, and

(d) the record reflects the witness's prior knowledge accurately.

Tegland's Courtroom Handbook on Washington Evidence, Washington Practice 5D, p. 426 (2009-2010); citing *State v. Mathes*, 47 Wn.App. 863, 737 P.2d 700 (1987).

“The fourth requirement, that the record accurately reflect the witness's prior knowledge, may be satisfied by the witness's testimony that she remembers recording the facts accurately, or that the witness recognizes the writing as accurate. Short of this ideal foundation, it is sufficient...that the witness recognizes her signature and that the witness would not have signed an inaccurate memorandum.” *Tegland's Courtroom Handbook on Washington Evidence*, Washington Practice 5D, p. 426 (2009-2010); citing *State v. Mathes*, 47 Wn.App. 863, 737 P.2d 700 (1987).

The trial court ruled correctly by admitting this evidence. The trial court found that S.J.C. had personal knowledge of the events detailed in the statement. 3/26 RP at 99-100. That “she obviously does not have a

good recollection of the event” due to “her long history of drinking regularly which...affects her memory, especially incidents of the past.” 3/26 RP at 100. The statement at issue was taken shortly after S.J.C. arrived at the hospital and was less than 24 hours after the events in question. 3/26 RP at 100. The court also found that the fourth requirement was met as Officer Capps testified that he had taken down the statement accurately, he read it back to S.J.C. and she agreed that that’s what she recalled. 3/26 RP at 101.


As presented by the appellant, these foundational elements only have to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and should only be overturned for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Benn*, 120 Wn.2d 631, 653, 845 P.2d 289 (1993); *State v. Young*, 160 Wn.2d 799, 806 161 P.3d 967 (2007). The trial court was in the best position to judge the evidence and assess the foundation for admission. There was certainly a preponderance of evidence for each of the requirements, and the appellant cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion in this matter.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons above, the State respectfully asks that the appeal be denied on all grounds, and that the Court affirm the verdict of the jury.

DATED this 29th day of March, 2014.

Respectfully Submitted,

By: 

Katherine L. Svoboda
Chief Criminal Deputy
WSBA #34097

GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY PROSECUTOR

March 29, 2014 - 11:53 AM

Transmittal Letter

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Statement of Additional Authorities

Cost Bill

Objection to Cost Bill

Affidavit

Letter

Copy of Verbatim Report of Proceedings - No. of Volumes: ____

Hearing Date(s): _____

Personal Restraint Petition (PRP)

Response to Personal Restraint Petition

Reply to Response to Personal Restraint Petition

Petition for Review (PRV)

Other: _____

Comments:

No Comments were entered.

Sender Name: Katherine L Svoboda - Email: ksvoboda@co.grays-harbor.wa.us

A copy of this document has been emailed to the following addresses:

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