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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION II

IN RE THE PERSONAL RESTRAINT  
PETITION OF:

CORY RANDON LEWIS,  
  
Petitioner.

NO. 49006-4-II (Consolidated)

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PERSONAL  
RESTRAINT PETITION

A. ISSUES PERTAINING TO PERSONAL RESTRAINT PETITION:

1. Should this petition be dismissed where petitioner has presented no affidavits, declarations, or other evidence to support his grounds for relief, and where he has not shown (1) constitutional error resulting in actual and substantial prejudice, or (2) non-constitutional error amounting to a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice?

2. Was a Class C felony properly included in petitioner's offender score when he committed his current offense within five years of his last release from incarceration?

B. STATUS OF PETITIONER:

Petitioner is restrained pursuant to a judgment made final on April 28, 2016. CP 27-40<sup>1</sup>. He was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree, with a firearm enhancement,

<sup>1</sup> Because this Personal Restraint Petition is consolidated with petitioner's direct appeal, the State uses the same designations for the Clerk's Papers (CP) and verbatim reports of proceedings (RP) as was done for direct appeal.

1 and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree. CP 51-60. At trial, petitioner  
2 asserted that he was justified in killing his roommate, Cory Page, as he was acting in self-  
3 defense. 3/17/16RP 28. However, during the interview where he confessed to murdering  
4 Page, petitioner did not claim that he acted in self-defense. 3/9/16RP 121. Rather, it was  
5 the detectives interviewing him who first broached the subject. *Id.* The trial court did not  
6 find petitioner's testimony that he was acting in self-defense credible and determined that  
7 petitioner did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of harm, injury, or death  
8 and hence, was not acting in self-defense. CP 51-60 (FoF 6, 19)<sup>2</sup>.

9         Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. CP 50. Petitioner's Brief on Direct Appeal was  
10 filed on January 5, 2017 and his reply brief was filed on March 28, 2017. *See* Court of  
11 Appeals Case Number 49006-4. He subsequently filed this personal restraint petition on  
12 April 4, 2017. Appendix A. Per petitioner's motion, this Court consolidated his direct  
13 appeal and personal restraint petition on April 5, 2017. Appendix B.

14         The facts of this case are related in full detail in Respondent's Brief on Direct  
15 Appeal and are incorporated into this response by reference. Based upon the facts  
16 presented at trial, the court was able to determine that petitioner did not have a reasonable  
17 belief of imminent danger of harm, injury, or death and hence, was not acting in self-  
18 defense. CP 51-60 (FoF 19). The court further found petitioner's testimony on having a  
19 reasonable belief of imminent danger of harm, injury, or death not credible. CP 51-60 (FoF  
20 6).

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<sup>2</sup> (FoF #) refers to the trial court's Findings of Fact and the specific finding number for the bench trial.

1 C. ARGUMENT:

- 2 1. THIS PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE  
3 PETITIONER HAS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT  
4 HIS CLAIMS AND WHERE HE HAS NOT SHOWN (1)  
5 CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR RESULTING IN ACTUAL AND  
6 SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE, OR (2) NON-CONSTITUTIONAL  
7 ERROR AMOUNTING TO A FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT THAT  
8 INHERENTLY RESULTS IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.

9 A personal restraint petition is not a substitute for direct relief and the availability  
10 of collateral relief is limited. *In re Personal Restraint of Phelps*, 97 Wn. App. 653, 674,  
11 389 P.3d 758 (2017). Personal restraint procedure came from the State's habeas corpus  
12 remedy, which is guaranteed by Article 4, § 4 of the Washington Constitution. *In re*  
13 *Personal Restraint of Hagler*, 97 Wn.2d 818, 823, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982), *In re Personal*  
14 *Restraint of Meirhofer*, 182 Wn.2d 632, 648, 343 P.3d 731(2015) (“Personal restraint  
15 petitions are modern version of ancient writs, most prominently habeas corpus, that allow  
16 petitioners to challenge the lawfulness of confinement.”) quoting *In re Personal Restraint*  
17 *of Coats*, 173 Wn.2d 123, 128, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). Fundamental to the nature of habeas  
18 corpus relief is the principle that the writ will not serve as a substitute for appeal. *In re*  
19 *Hagler*, 97 Wn.2d at 823-24. A personal restraint petition, like a petition for a writ of  
20 habeas corpus, is not a substitute for an appeal. *In re Hagler*, 97 Wn.2d at 824.  
21 “Collateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the  
22 prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted  
23 offenders.” *Id.* citing *Engle v. Issac*, 456 U.S. 107, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783, 102 S. Ct. 1558  
24 (1982). These costs are significant and require that collateral relief be limited in state as  
25 well as federal courts. *Id.*, *Matter of Cook*, 114 Wn.2d 802, 809, 792 P.2d 506 (1990).

To obtain relief in a personal restraint petition challenging a judgment and sentence, petitioner must show (1) actual and substantial prejudice resulting from alleged constitutional errors, or, (2) a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of

1 justice in case of alleged non-constitutional error. *Matter of Cook*, 114 Wn.2d 802, 813,  
2 792 P.2d 506 (1990). “After establishing the appropriateness of collateral review, a  
3 petitioner will be entitled to relief only if he can meet his ultimate burden of proof, which,  
4 on collateral review, requires that he establish error by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
5 *Id.* at 814, citing *In re Personal Restraint of Hews*, 99 Wn.2d 80, 89, 660 P.2d 263 (1983).  
6 *In re Personal Restraint of Borrero*, 161 Wn.2d 532, 536, 167 P. 3d 1106 (2007).

7 “Bald assertions and conclusory allegations will not support the holding of a  
8 [reference] hearing.” *Id.* *Matter of Cook*, 114 Wn.2d 802, 813–14, 792 P.2d 506 (1990)  
9 (“We emphasize that the quoted principle from *Williams*, is mandatory; compliance with  
10 that threshold burden is an absolute necessity to enable the appellate court to make an  
11 informed review. Lack of such compliance will necessarily result in a refusal to reach the  
12 merits.”) (citing *In re Personal Restraint of Williams*, 111 Wn.2d 353, 364–65, 759 P.2d  
13 436 (1988)).

14 The petition before the Court may accurately be characterized as based on bald  
15 assertions and conclusory allegations, already argued at trial and rejected by the trial court  
16 as not being credible.

- 17 a. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt  
18 that petitioner intended to cause the death of Cory Page.

19 Petitioner here essentially argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove  
20 beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of Murder in the Second Degree.  
21 *See* Brf. of Pet. at 10. Due process requires that the State bear the burden of proving each  
22 and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. McCullum*,  
23 98 Wn.2d 484, 488, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); *see also Seattle v. Gellein*, 112 Wn.2d 58, 61,  
24 768 P.2d 470 (1989); *State v. Mabry*, 51 Wn. App. 24, 25, 751 P.2d 882 (1988). The  
25 sufficiency of the evidence is determined by whether any rational trier of fact could find  
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most

1 favorable to the State. *State v. Salinas*, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992) (citing  
2 *State v. Green*, 94 Wn.2d 216, 220-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980)).

3 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State's  
4 evidence. *Id.* at 201. "All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the State and  
5 interpreted most strongly against the defendant" when the sufficiency of the evidence is  
6 challenged. *Id.* at 201 (citing *State v. Partin*, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136  
7 (1977)). Criminal intent may be inferred from the conduct where "it is plainly indicated as  
8 a matter of logical probability." *State v. Goodman*, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410  
9 (2004). The weight of the evidence is determined by the fact finder and not the appellate  
10 court. *Id.* at 783. Therefore, when the State has produced evidence of all the elements of a  
11 crime, the decision of the trier of fact should be upheld. Sufficiency of the evidence is  
12 reviewed de novo. *State v. Berg*, 181 Wn.2d 857, 867, 337 P.3d 310 (2014).

13 When reviewing a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court  
14 determines whether substantial evidence supports any challenged findings and whether the  
15 findings support the conclusions of law. *State v. Hovig*, 149 Wn. App. 1, 8, 202 P.3d 318  
16 (2009). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities of appeal. *Id.* Credibility determinations  
17 are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review. *State v. Thomas*, 150 Wn.2d 821,  
18 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). Conclusions of law are reviewed *de novo*. *State v. Homan*, 181  
19 Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014)

20 To prove that an individual committed the crime of Murder in the Second Degree,  
21 the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, with the intent to cause the death of  
22 another person, petitioner caused the death of such a person and did so without  
23 premeditation. RCW 9A.32.050, WPIC 27.01. Here, petitioner admitted that he shot Page.  
24 3/17/16RP 28. The facts support his admission and prove that he intended to cause Page's  
25 death.

1 On December 7, 2014, petitioner and Page had a verbal argument. CP 51-60 (FoF  
2 4). The argument subsided when Page retrieved his clothing from petitioner and left  
3 petitioner's room, returning to his own bedroom. *Id.* Petitioner was left alone in his room.  
4 *Id.* When Page left petitioner's room, Page did not have a firearm in his hands. CP 51-60  
5 (FoF 5). After Page left petitioner's room, he did not interact any further with petitioner  
6 and left him alone. CP 51-60 (FoF 6). Page was not in petitioner's face, was not pointing a  
7 gun at petitioner or waving a gun around, and was not physically threatening petitioner. *Id.*  
8 At that point, any threat to petitioner, if one even existed, had subsided. *Id.*

9 After Page left petitioner's room, petitioner retrieved his loaded .45 caliber Intratec  
10 firearm from a basket in his bedroom closet. CP 51-60 (FoF 7). He then proceeded to leave  
11 his room and enter the shared hallway. *Id.* Petitioner then walked up to the threshold of  
12 Page's bedroom. CP 51-60 (FoF 8). Page had his back to petitioner. *Id.* When Page began  
13 to turn towards petitioner, petitioner raised his pistol, aimed at Page and fired two shots at  
14 him. *Id.* Petitioner was within six feet of Page at the time he fired the shots. CP 51-60 (FoF  
15 12). Petitioner's view of Page was unobstructed when he shot Page. *Id.*

16 As the first shot was fired, Page's hand was up in the upper portion of his torso and  
17 the bullet went through his wrist, fracturing it. CP 51-60 (FoF 9). The bullet passed  
18 through Page's wrist and entered into his upper chest, lacerating the pulmonary vein and  
19 ultimately causing his death. *Id.* This bullet came from Page's right side. *Id.* At the time he  
20 was shot, Page was not facing petitioner. *Id.* After the first shot was fired, Page pled with  
21 petitioner to "stop playing" or "chill Peso (petitioner's nickname)." CP 51-60 (FoF 13).  
22 Petitioner then fired a second shot. *Id.* The second shot struck Page in the deltoid region of  
23 the right arm, fracturing his arm. CP 51-60 (FoF 14). Dr. Thomas Clark, the Pierce County  
24 Medical Examiner, determined that the shots fired by petitioner struck Page in critical  
25 portions of his anatomy and were thus fatal. CP 51-60 (FoF 15).

1           When petitioner fired the rounds at Page, Page was not holding a firearm in his  
2 hand. CP 51-60 (FoF 10). The gunshot wound which fractured Page’s wrist would have  
3 prevented him from even gripping a firearm. *Id.* Immediately prior to murdering Page,  
4 petitioner did not make any statements to Page or warn him. CP 51-60 (FoF 11).

5           After shooting Page twice, petitioner attempted to shoot him a third time. CP 51-60  
6 (FoF 16). However, the weapon jammed and petitioner was unsuccessful in shooting Page  
7 during this third attempt. *Id.* When the firearm failed, petitioner fled the scene. *Id.* All of  
8 this evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner intended to cause the death  
9 of Page. As such, this Court should deny his claim.

10                   b.     There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable  
11                   doubt that petitioner was not acting in self-defense when he  
12                   killed Page.

13           Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s determination that he was not justified in  
14 killing Page is based on untenable grounds. *See* Brf. of Pet. at 5. His assertion is wrong.  
15 Petitioner is simply attempting to relitigate before this Court claims that the trial court did  
16 not find credible. The trial court did not find petitioner’s testimony credible that he was  
17 fearful of Page causing him great harm or death after Page left petitioner’s room. CP 51-60  
18 (FoF 6). “Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and cannot be reviewed upon  
19 appeal.” *State v. Camarillo*, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990) (citing *State v.*  
20 *Casbeer*, 48 Wn. App. 539, 542, 740 P.2d 335, *review denied*, 109 Wn.2d 1008 (1987)).  
21 Here, petitioner is using a personal restraint petition to attack the trial court’s determination  
22 of his credibility. A credibility determination does not inherently result in a miscarriage of  
23 justice. As this alleged error is non-constitutional, petitioner must prove that such a  
24 miscarriage of justice occurred. Since petitioner cannot do so, this Court should deny his  
25 petition.

1 Even if he could challenge that the trial court's determination was based on  
2 untenable grounds, there is insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion. Rather, the  
3 evidence shows that petitioner intended to kill Page. As discussed previously, petitioner  
4 shot Page twice. CP 51-60 (FoF 13). He would have shot Page a third time if the gun had  
5 not jammed. CP 51-60 (FoF 16). When he fired the first shot, Page was not facing  
6 petitioner. CP 51-60 (FoF 9). Page was not holding a firearm when he was shot. CP 51-60  
7 (FoF 10).

8 After killing Page, petitioner engaged in conduct in an attempt to deflect attention  
9 from himself. CP 51-60 (FoF 17). After visiting his children, petitioner disposed of the  
10 firearm and the clip he used to kill Page by tossing both into Snake Lake. CP 51-60 (FoF  
11 18); 3/17/16RP 31. Petitioner did not return to the apartment until December 11, 2016, four  
12 days after murdering Page. 3/17/16RP 33. Upon returning to the apartment, petitioner  
13 checked on Page and determined he was dead. 3/17/16RP 33-34. In order to further deflect  
14 attention from himself, petitioner then picked up the shell casings from the shooting, got  
15 into his car, began to drive, and, while driving, threw the casings out of the car window.  
16 3/17/16RP 34. All of this is sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that  
17 petitioner was not acting in self-defense when he shot and killed Page. As the trial court's  
18 determination that petitioner was not acting in self-defense is based on tenable grounds,  
19 this Court should deny the petition.

20 2. PETITIONER CANNOT SHOW THAT THERE WAS A  
21 FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT IN THE SENTENCING COURT'S  
22 CALCULATION OF HIS OFFENDER SCORE RESULTING IN  
23 AN INHERENT MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.

23 Petitioner claims that the sentencing court erred by including a washed out  
24 conviction in his offender score. *See* Brf. or Pet. at 3. However, petitioner is wrong.

25 It is a well-established rule that absurd results are to be avoided. *State v. Burke*, 92  
Wn.2d 474, 478, 598 P.2d 395 (1979). Petitioner's argument would result in an absurd

1 result if adopted. RCW 9.94A.525, in relevant part, provides that a previous conviction for  
2 a Class C felony is included in one's offender score if they have spent less than five  
3 consecutive years in the community prior to committing any crime that subsequently  
4 results in a conviction. RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). *State v. Gauthier*, 189 Wn. App. 30, 354  
5 P.3d 900 (2015), analyzed this specific provision in a situation where the crime occurred  
6 within the five year period, but conviction itself did not occur until after the five year  
7 period had expired. The court there held that the five year period is interrupted by the time  
8 the defendant spent in jail awaiting the resolution of their felony charge. *State v. Gauthier*,  
9 189 Wn. App. at 42. The court found that if the time one was awaiting the resolution of a  
10 felony charge was included in the wash out provision, then an absurd result would be  
11 created. *Id.* In that scenario, a defendant's offender score could actually decrease while in  
12 custody pending trial or sentencing. A defendant could use this to their advantage by  
13 strategically delaying trial or sentencing to lower their offender score. *State v. Gauthier*,  
14 189 Wn. App. at 42 fn. 3.

15  
16 By his own admission, prior to this murder and subsequent conviction, petitioner  
17 was last released from confinement on February 10, 2010. Appendix C. *See also* Brf. of  
18 Pet. at 4; *see also* 4/28/16RP 4 (discussion of defendant's last release from confinement  
19 during sentencing). Petitioner murdered Page on December 7, 2014. CP 51-60 (FoF 1). He  
20 was charged by Information for the murder on January 27, 2015. CP 1-2. Both the date of  
21 offense and the Information are within the five year period for the inclusion of a prior  
22 Class C felony conviction in an offender score calculation. As such, petitioner cannot  
23 show that the offender score as calculated by the sentencing court would cause a  
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1 fundamental defect resulting in an inherent miscarriage of justice. Thus, this Court should  
2 deny the petition.

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4 D. CONCLUSIONS:


5 For the foregoing reasons, the State urges the Court to dismiss the petition as being  
6 without merit.

7 DATED: Monday, July 03, 2017.

8  
9 MARK LINDQUIST  
Pierce County  
Prosecuting Attorney

10 

11 MICHELLE HYER For  
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 44108  
WSB #32724

12 

13 NATHANIEL BLOCK  
14 Rule 9 Intern  
15

16  
17 Certificate of Service:

The undersigned certifies that on this day she delivered by U.S. mail or *Petitioner*  
ABC-LMI delivery to the attorney of record for the appellant and appellant  
18 c/o his or her attorney or to the attorney of record for respondent and respondent  
19 c/o his or her attorney true and correct copies of the document to which this certificate  
is attached. This statement is certified to be true and correct under penalty of perjury  
of the laws of the State of Washington. Signed at Tacoma, Washington, on the date below.

20 7-3-17 Theresa Ker  
Date Signature

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**APPENDIX “A”**  
Letter from Court of Appeals on Personal Restraint Petition



Washington State Court of Appeals  
Division Two

950 Broadway, Suite 300, Tacoma, Washington 98402-4454  
Derek Byrne, Clerk/Administrator (253) 593-2970 (253) 593-2806 (Fax)

General Orders, Calendar Dates, and General Information at <http://www.courts.wa.gov/courts>

APPELLATE DIVISION  
COPY RECEIVED

APR 05 2017

PIERCE COUNTY  
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

April 4, 2017

Michelle Hyer  
Pierce Co Dep Pros Atty  
930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946  
Tacoma, WA 98402-2102

Cory Randon Lewis  
#890418  
Coyote Ridge Corrections Center  
PO Box 769  
Connell, WA 99326-0769

**CASE #: 50076-1-II/Personal Restraint Petition of Cory Randon Lewis**

Dear Counsel and Mr. Lewis:

We have received the Personal Restraint Petition for post-conviction relief noted above. Since this petition is in proper form, we have filed it. RAP 16.3 et seq.

As RAP 16.9 requires, the respondent must, within 60 days of receiving this letter and the attached copy of the petition, file and serve a response to the petition on petitioner or petitioner's counsel and this court. If referring to the record of another proceeding answers the petition, include a copy of the relevant parts of that record. If a brief supports the petition, we have attached a copy, and the respondent's answering brief is likewise due within 60 days. RAP 16.10. If the respondent determines that the relief sought is appropriate, he should so stipulate. Petitioner may file a reply brief if done so within 30 days of receiving service of the respondent's brief. See RAP 16.10(a)(2).

This court has initially waived petitioner's filing fee based on his affidavit stating that he is indigent. Please include in the response any information you possess with regard to indigency and state whether you will contest petitioner's indigency claim. Additionally, please include in the response or in a motion to this court any information you possess with regard to whether the filing fee waiver is proper under RCW 4.24.430.

When the time for filing briefs has expired, the Chief Judge will consider the petition and enter appropriate orders. **The court will defer any decisions on motions for appointment of counsel and/or motions for production of the record at public expense, if any, until we submit your petition to the Chief Judge for consideration. RAP 16.11(a). Any request limited solely to the status of the petition will be placed in the file without further action.** You will be notified if the court decides to call for additional briefs or portions of the record other than what the parties filed or decides that oral argument will be scheduled. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Counsel must comply with GR 31(e) and omit personal identifiers from all documents filed in this court. This rule provides that "parties shall not include, and if present shall redact" social security numbers, financial account numbers, and driver's license numbers. The rule specifies that the parties have this responsibility and the court will not review filed documents for compliance with this rule.

50076-1  
15-1-00348-0/49006-4\*

Because unsealed briefs and other documents are made available to the public on the court's website and at our office, counsel must ensure that personal identifiers are removed or redacted.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Derek M. Byrne', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Derek M. Byrne,  
Court Clerk

DMB:s

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**APPENDIX “B”**  
Letter from Court of Appeals Consolidating Cases



Washington State Court of Appeals  
Division Two

950 Broadway, Suite 300, Tacoma, Washington 98402-4454  
Derek Byrne, Clerk/Administrator (253) 593-2970 (253) 593-2806 (Fax)

General Orders, Calendar Dates, and General Information at <http://www.courts.wa.gov/courts> **OFFICE HOURS: 9-12, 1-4.**

APPELLATE DIVISION  
RECEIVED

APR 05 2017

PIERCE COUNTY  
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

April 5, 2017

Jennifer L Dobson (via email)  
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Dana M Nelson (via email)  
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Pierce Co Dep Pros Atty  
930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946  
Tacoma, WA 98402-2171

Cory R. Lewis (via USPS)  
#890418  
Coyote Ridge Corr Cntr  
P.O. Box 769  
Connell, WA 99326

**CASE #: 49006-4-II/State of Washington v. Cory Randon Lewis**

**CASE #: 50076-1-II/Personal Restraint Petition of Cory Randon Lewis**

Counsel:

On the above date, this court entered the following notation ruling:

**A RULING BY COMMISSIONER SCHMIDT:**

Petitioner has moved to consolidate this petition to his direct appeal. State v Lewis, No. 49006-4-II. This motion is granted. All future correspondence should refer to the direct appeal case No. 49006-4-II.

Very truly yours,

Derek M. Byrne  
Court Clerk

DMB:s

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# **APPENDIX “C”**

Felony Offender Reporting System Report of Petitioner’s  
Incarceration and Declaration

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

CORY LEWIS,

Appellant.

NO. 49006-4-II

DECLARATION OF SHAWN SMITH

I, Shawn Smith, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, the following is true and correct:


1. That I am a legal assistant for the Homicide Division of the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office.

2. On June 30, 2017, I accessed the Felony Offender Reporting System for the Department of Corrections.

3. I conducted a search for the offender movement history for Cory Lewis, DOC inmate #890418, which is attached to this declaration.

Dated: June 30, 2017.

Signed at Tacoma, WA.

  
SHAWN SMITH



**FORS**

**PRISON: LEWIS, Cory**



Home

DOC Number: SID Number: Current Status: Current Location:

Search For An Offender

890418 WA18816921 PRISON Coyote Ridge Corrections Center

**Offender**

**Offender Movement History**

General Information

CCO: CCO Telephone: CCO Location:

Confidential Offender Information

Conviction Information (Law Enforcement Only)

Latest Projected Release Date: Last Release From:

Board, Court and DOC Imposed Conditions

1/24/2038

Offender Movement History

**Movement History**

DOC Sex / Kidnap Offender Registration Information

Status	Date	Status	Date	Status	Date
PRISON	5/03/2016 - PRESENT	SUPERVISED	5/23/2006 - 8/09/2006		
NO WA DOC	7/29/2010 -	JAIL	4/12/2006 -		
JURIS	5/03/2016		5/23/2006		
SUPERVISED	6/11/2010 - 7/29/2010	SUPERVISED	2/28/2006 - 4/12/2006		
WORK	2/10/2010 -	UNAVAILABLE	1/09/2006 -		
RELEASE	6/11/2010		2/28/2006		
PRISON	2/03/2010 - 2/10/2010				
WORK	2/03/2010 -				
RELEASE	2/03/2010				
PRISON	10/08/2009 - 2/03/2010				
SUPERVISED	3/09/2009 - 10/08/2009				
PRISON	2/25/2009 - 3/09/2009				
SUPERVISED	2/10/2009 - 2/25/2009				
PRISON	1/27/2009 - 2/10/2009				
SUPERVISED	10/30/2008 - 1/27/2009				
PRISON	1/18/2007 - 10/30/2008				
JAIL	8/09/2006 - 1/18/2007				

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FORS User's Guide (.pdf)

**PIERCE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY**

**July 03, 2017 - 1:46 PM**

**Transmittal Information**

**Filed with Court:** Court of Appeals Division II  
**Appellate Court Case Number:** 49006-4  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** State of Washington, Respondent v. Cory Randon Lewis, Appellant  
**Superior Court Case Number:** 15-1-00348-0

**The following documents have been uploaded:**

- 4-490064\_Personal\_Restraint\_Petition\_20170703134612D2428600\_1315.pdf  
This File Contains:  
Personal Restraint Petition - Response to PRP/PSP  
*The Original File Name was lewis prp response.pdf*

**A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:**

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