

**No. 49504-0-II**

---

---

**COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II**  
**STATE OF WASHINGTON**

STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT

V.

CANDACE L. RALSTON, APPELLANT

---

Appeal from the Superior Court of Mason County  
The Honorable Toni. A. Sheldon, Judge

No. 11-1-00126-1

---

**BRIEF OF RESPONDENT**

---

MICHAEL DORCY  
Mason County Prosecuting Attorney

By  
TIM HIGGS  
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney  
WSBA #25919

521 N. Fourth Street  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
PH: (360) 427-9670 ext. 417

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	Page
A. <u>STATE’S COUNTER-STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR</u> .....	1
B. <u>FACTS AND STATEMENT OF CASE</u> .....	1
C. <u>ARGUMENT</u> .....	1
1. In the first appeal of this case, the Washington Supreme Court in case No. 92731-6 ordered the trial court to reconsider the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) and to apply the requirements of RCW 10.01.160(3) and <i>State v. Blazina</i> , 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), by conducting an inquiry on the record into the defendant’s ability to pay. The trial court conducted the required inquiry on the record before reimposing LFOs; therefore, this Court should sustain the trial court’s order.....	1
2. Ralston has not shown that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and she has not shown that any deficient performance that she alleges caused her any prejudice; therefore, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be denied.....	11
D. <u>CONCLUSION</u> .....	15

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Table of Cases

	Page
<b><u>State Cases</u></b>	
<i>City of Richland v. Wakefield</i> , 186 Wn.2d 596, 380 P.3d 459 (2016).....	8
<i>Humphrey Industries, Ltd. V. Clay Street Associates, LLC</i> , 176 Wn.2d 662, 295 P.3d 231 (2013).....	2
<i>In re Per. Restraint of Dove</i> , 196 Wn. App. 148, 381 P.3d 1280 (2016).....	3
<i>Schryvers v. Coulee Cmty. Hosp.</i> , 138 Wn. App. 648, 158 P.3d 113 (2007).....	3, 11
<i>State v. Baldwin</i> , 63 Wn. App. 303, 818 P.2d 1116 (1991).....	4, 5
<i>State v. Bertrand</i> , 165 Wn. App. 393, 267 P.3d 511 (2011).....	3, 11
<i>State v. Blazina</i> , 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015).....	passim
<i>State V. Gonzales</i> , 198 Wn. App. 151, 392 P.3d 1158 (2017).....	5
<i>State v. Grier</i> , 171 Wn.2d 17, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).....	12, 15
<i>State v. Johnson</i> , 96 Wn. App. 813, 981 P.2d 25 (1999).....	3
<i>State v. Kyлло</i> , 166 Wn.2d 856, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).....	12

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

*State v. Lundy*,  
176 Wn. App. 96, 308 P.3d 755 (2013).....3, 5, 11

*State v. Mathers*,  
193 Wn. App. 913, 376 P.3d 1163 .....3

*State v. Worl*,  
129 Wn.2d 416, 918 P.2d 905 (1996).....2

**Federal Cases**

*Kraft v. United States*,  
991 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1993) .....8

*Strickland v. Washington*,  
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).....11, 15

**Statutes**

RCW 10.01.160 .....5

RCW 10.01.160(3) .....passim

RCW 10.82.090(1) .....6

RCW 10.82.090(2) .....6

RCW 19.52.020(1) .....6

RCW 36.18.020(2)(h).....5

RCW 4.56.110(4) .....6

RCW 43.43.7541 .....5

RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) .....5

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

RCW 9.94A.753 .....5

RCW 9.94A.760 .....5

**Rules**

RAP 10.3(b).....1

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

A. STATE'S COUNTER-STATEMENTS OF ISSUES  
PERTAINING TO APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. In the first appeal of this case, the Washington Supreme Court in case No. 92731-6 ordered the trial court to reconsider the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) and to apply the requirements of RCW 10.01.160(3) and *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), by conducting an inquiry on the record into the defendant's ability to pay. The trial court conducted the required inquiry on the record before reimposing LFOs; therefore, this Court should sustain the trial court's order.
2. Ralston has not shown that her trial counsel's performance was deficient, and she has not shown that any deficient performance that she alleges caused her any prejudice; therefore, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be denied.

B. FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

For the purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, the State accepts Ralston's statement of facts, except where the State offers additional facts or contrary facts as appropriate to correct minor mistakes or to complete the record in support of the State's arguments, below. RAP 10.3(b).

C. ARGUMENT

1. In the first appeal of this case, the Washington Supreme Court in case No. 92731-6 ordered the trial court to reconsider the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) and to apply the requirements of RCW 10.01.160(3) and *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), by

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

conducting an inquiry on the record into the defendant's ability to pay. The trial court conducted the required inquiry on the record before reimposing LFOs; therefore, this Court should sustain the trial court's order.

Because this case was remanded to the trial court following a prior appeal to the Supreme Court, under the law of the case doctrine the parties, the trial court, and this Court are all bound by the holdings of the Supreme Court. *Humphrey Industries, Ltd. V. Clay Street Associates, LLC*, 176 Wn.2d 662, 669-70, 295 P.3d 231 (2013); *State v. Worl*, 129 Wn.2d 416, 424, 918 P.2d 905 (1996). In the prior appeal of this case, the Supreme Court in Case No. 92731-6 (Court of Appeals No. 45883-7-II) remanded this case to the trial court and ordered the trial court to reconsider the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations. CP 20-23. Specifically, the Supreme Court cited the requirements of RCW 10.01.160(3) and directed the trial court to apply the Supreme Court's holding in the case of *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). CP 20-23.

RCW 10.01.160(3) mandates as follows:

The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that the payment of costs will impose.

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

*Id.* This requirement applies only to the imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations. *State v. Mathers*, 193 Wn. App. 913, 918 – 24, 376 P.3d 1163, *review denied*, 186 Wn.2d 1015 (2016). Under the plain language of RCW 10.01.160(3), the sentencing court lacks the authority to impose discretionary costs if the defendant will be unable to pay them. *In re Per. Restraint of Dove*, 196 Wn. App. 148, 158, 381 P.3d 1280 (2016), *review denied* 188 Wn.2d 1008 (2017).

A trial court’s finding that a defendant has the ability to pay LFOs is a factual finding that the reviewing court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard. *State v. Bertrand*, 165 Wn. App. 393, 404 n.13, 267 P.3d 511 (2011). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, “although there is some evidence to support it, review of all the evidence leads to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” *State v. Lundy*, 176 Wn. App. 96, 105, 308 P.3d 755 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Schryvers v. Coulee Cmty. Hosp.*, 138 Wn. App. 648, 654, 158 P.3d 113 (2007)).

A reviewing court will generally review a lower court’s compliance with a statute de novo. *State v. Johnson*, 96 Wn. App. 813, 816, 981 P.2d 25 (1999). If there is compliance with the statute, the reviewing court then reviews the trial court’s decision to impose the LFOs

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Baldwin*, 63 Wn. App. 303, 312, 818 P.2d 1116 (1991).

In the instant case, the trial court found that, other than prison deductions from her prison account, Ralston did not have the present ability to pay LFOs while she is incarcerated. RP 6. So, the court allowed for some time after release before Ralston would be required to pay a minimum of \$25 per month toward her LFO obligations. RP 7; CP 33.

The trial court found that Ralston would be employable upon her release from prison, although the court noted that she would probably not be employable in her last line of work in her chosen profession due to her conviction for embezzlement from her employer. RP 7. There was no discussion and no finding as to what kind of work Ralston could do or what her expected income might be. *Id.* However, the court noted that it had “not been made aware of any physical limitation or any limitation on her general skills and intelligence and ability to work.” *Id.* There was no discussion and no finding as to what Ralston’s skills are or what her intelligence is. *Id.* With the limited information it had, the trial court found “that, even though she may not be able to work in her chosen profession, which was in some way to handle other people’s money, she

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

does have the ability to obtain employment and work, therefore pay towards the legal financial obligations.” *Id.*

The trial court ordered Ralston to pay the following mandatory costs: a \$500.00 victim assessment (RCW 7.68.035(1)(a)); a \$200.00 filing fee (RCW 36.18.020(2)(h)); a \$100.00 DNA fee (RCW 43.43.7541); and, restitution in the amount of \$294,115.73 (RCW 9.94A.753). CP 24-25, 32. “For victim restitution, victim assessments, DNA fees, and criminal filing fees, the legislature has directed expressly that a defendant’s ability to pay should not be taken into account.” *State v. Lundy*, 176 Wn. App. 96, 102, 308 P.3d 755 (2013); *see also, State V. Gonzales*, 198 Wn. App. 151, 392 P.3d 1158 (2017) (the filing fee is a mandatory fee under RCW 36.18.020(2)(h)). The total of the mandatory costs, which are not at issue in this case other than for determining Ralston’s ability to pay the discretionary costs, is \$294,915.73.

The remaining costs represent the discretionary costs that are at issue in this case, as follows: \$4,878.50 for Sheriff’s service fees (RCW 10.01.160), a \$26,424.62 court-appointed attorney fee (RCW 9.94A.760), and \$7,709.23 for court-appointed expert witness fees (RCW 9.94A.760). CP 32, 146. The total of the discretionary costs at issue is \$39,012.35.

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

At sentencing on January 21, 2014, the court imposed a total of 96 months in custody. CP 30. The current record does not contain information about any credit for time served or early release calculations, and because of the lack of a record the following assumptions are offered for illustration purposes only. So, only for the sake of calculating the possible effect of the compounding interest on her mandatory LFOs while she is in prison, it may be assumed, for illustration purposes only, that Ralston may be released from prison after serving half of her 96 month sentence, and that if she had no credit for any time served prior to sentencing, her release date would be approximately February 21, 2018.

Ralston's LFOs will bear 12% interest while she is in prison. RCW 10.82.090(1); RCW 4.56.110(4); RCW 19.52.020(1). However, all but the interest on restitution may later be waived by the court. RCW 10.82.090(2). Therefore, for ease of calculation, only the restitution interest is considered here. The current restitution order is for \$294,115.73. CP 24. The accrued interest and principle after 48 months in prison at 12% interest will be \$474,181.05, or  $P(1+i)^{48}$  where P is the principle amount of \$294,115.73,  $i = .01$  (the annual interest of 12% divided by 12 to find the monthly interest), and 48 is the number of months that the interest will accrue.

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

If Ralston were released from prison on 21 February 2018, she would at that time be 48 years and approximately 10 months old. CP 26 (showing Ralston's date of birth). If she were to make her first payment on her restitution debt two months after release and to then begin to make equal monthly payments for the next 20 years until her restitution debt were paid in full, she would be 69 years old when she made the final payment. To fully pay off the restitution debt in 20 years, each monthly payment would need to be \$5,221.14, or  $P(1 + i)^{240} \times (i / ((1+i)^{240} - 1))$ , where  $i$  equals the monthly interest rate of 0.01 (12% annual interest divided by 12, the number of months in each year), and where the total months in 20 years equals 240 months.

We don't know from the record of the trial court whether Ralston paid federal income taxes on the money she embezzled. Therefore, we do not know whether her restitution payments would be tax deductible for her. Assuming that she did not pay federal income taxes on the money she embezzled, it then follows that possibly her restitution payments will not be tax deductible, which would mean that she would need gross income of about \$8,000.00 per month (when accounting for other mandatory deductions, in addition to federal income taxes), which would be in addition to any income she will need for routine living expenses, in order

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

to make her \$5,221.14 monthly payment to retire her restitution debt. *See, e.g., Kraft v. United States*, 991 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing whether restitution payments for repayment of embezzled funds is tax deductible). The record of the trial court contains no information about this, but for the sake of the analysis it is safe to assume that Ralston will need gross income of about \$10,000.00 per month, not counting medical expenses (if any, as she approaches geriatric age), for her basic subsistence and restitution payments when she gets out of prison. Payments toward other mandatory costs and toward discretionary costs are in addition to the \$10,000.00 per month already needed.

The Washington Supreme Court has disapproved of imposing discretionary LFOs if the defendant will be unable to pay off the principle amount. *See City of Richland v. Wakefield*, 186 Wn.2d 596, 601, 380 P.3d 459 (2016). Both RCW 10.01.160(3) and *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), prohibit the trial court from imposing discretionary LFOs unless the court first undergoes an individualized inquiry into the defendant's present and future ability to pay. Specifically, *Blazina* sets forth the following requirement:

The record must reflect that the trial court made an individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future ability to pay. Within this inquiry, the court must also consider important factors

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

... such as incarceration and a defendant's other debts, including restitution, when determining a defendant's ability to pay.

*Blazina* at 838.

The State contends that, in general, the opposite of *ability* is *disability*. The record of the instant case does not suggest that Ralston suffers from any physical or mental disability that would hinder her ability to earn income. RP 1-12. However, the *Blazina* Court's use of the word "ability" refers to the "ability to pay" the specific discretionary LFOs at issue rather than to refer to a mere, generalized ability to earn an income. *Blazina* at 838. It follows, therefore, that under *Blazina* the trial court must make a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay the specific amount of discretionary LFOs at issue rather than to merely find that the defendant does not suffer from a disability and that he or she, therefore, has some unmeasured ability to pay some partial, but undetermined, amount of the discretionary LFOs. It also appears unlikely under *Blazina* that the mere possibility of some future, unforeseen windfall – such as an inheritance, lottery winnings, or the discovery of a hidden talent – would count as an ability to pay, because if such were the case, then RCW 10.01.160(3) would be pointless and would never apply because every

State's Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

human being always has at least the prospect of some unforeseen future windfall.

In the instant case, the trial court found that upon her release from prison, Ralston “will be employable, albeit likely in a different line of work[.]” CP 19. The trial court based its ruling on its further finding, that “the court has been presented with no information that she is not otherwise able to find and engage in gainful employment[.]” *Id.* The trial court record supports the court’s findings. RP 1-12. At the LFO hearing, the court noted that it had “not been made aware of any physical limitation or any limitation on [Ralston’s] general skills and intelligence and ability to work.” RP 7.

The record shows that the trial court conducted an individualized inquiry, considered Ralston’s ability to pay, and found that she had sufficient ability to pay the LFOs ordered by the court. RP 1-12. Thus, the trial court satisfied the requirements of RCW 10.01.160(3) and *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), as the Supreme Court directed it to do in its ruling of the prior appeal of this case in case No. 92731-6.

Accordingly, this Court should sustain the trial court’s ruling unless this Court finds that the trial court’s finding that the defendant has

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

the ability to pay discretionary LFOs is clearly erroneous because “although there is some evidence to support it, review of all the evidence leads to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” *State v. Lundy*, 176 Wn. App. 96, 105, 308 P.3d 755 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Schryvers v. Coulee Cmty. Hosp.*, 138 Wn. App. 648, 654, 158 P.3d 113 (2007)); *see also*, *State v. Bertrand*, 165 Wn. App. 393, 404 n.13, 267 P.3d 511 (2011) (a trial court’s finding that a defendant has the ability to pay LFOs is a factual finding that the reviewing court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard).

2. Ralston has not shown that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and she has not shown that any deficient performance that she alleges caused her any prejudice; therefore, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be denied.

Ralston contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the court’s imposition of discretionary legal financial obligations because, she contends, her attorney was “ill-prepared for the hearing, as he was unfamiliar with both the applicable law and the relevant facts of Ms. Ralston’s case.” Br. of Appellant at 18. To prevail on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ralston bears the burden of showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. *Strickland v.*

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

*Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); *State v. Grier*, 171 Wn.2d 17, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). To show prejudice, a defendant must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” *Grier* at 34 (quoting *State v. Kylo*, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009)).

To support her contention, Ralston avers that when the trial court judge asked whether “the award of attorney’s fees had been reduced,” her “defense counsel erroneously suggested that it had.” Br of Appellant at 19. But the court’s actual question was an incomplete question, as follows: “And with respect to the attorney’s fees, was that ever reduced to an amount of a – [?]” RP 9. It is not clear from this question that the court was asking whether the amount had been reduced from some greater amount; instead, it appears that the court may have been asking whether the aggregate amount had been calculated, expressed in a final figure, and memorialized in a document. Still more, the court answered its own question, as follows: “I located it, and it is document 264 [CP 145], Order Regarding Costs.” This exchange does not show deficient performance by defense counsel, and no prejudice resulted to Ralston from it.

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

Ralston further contends that defense counsel was ineffective because, Ralston contends, “[a]t no point did defense counsel direct the court’s attention to the fact that Ms. Ralston was required to pay \$294,115.73 in restitution.” Br. of Appellant at 19. But the trial court judge did not need defense counsel to point out this fact, because the trial court judge knew that she had signed a restitution order, and the judge said so on the record when she noted that “one was entered on July 28<sup>th</sup> of 2014, ordering that restitution be paid in the total amount of \$294,115.73.” RP 9.

Ralston also contends that her attorney was ineffective because “[h]e also never alerted the trial court to the fact that its order regarding ‘all previously ordered LFOs’ included discretionary appellate costs in the amount of \$4,244.52.” Br. of Appellant at 19. But Ralston does not provide any citation to show that these appellate costs were, in fact, ever included in any judgment of the trial court. These appellate costs were ordered by the Supreme Court on July 15, 2016 – a date that was about six weeks before the superior court hearing at issue in this case. CP 6-7; RP 1-12. These costs then appeared in a “Supplemental Judgment” that issued from the Supreme Court on October 21, 2016, which was about seven weeks after the cost hearing in the trial court. CP 4-5; RP 1-12.

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

Ralston has not provided any citation to any authority to support a contention that the trial court had any authority to waive or modify the Supreme Court order for costs; nor has she shown that she suffered any prejudice because her attorney did not discuss these costs on the record.

Finally, Ralston contends that her attorney was ineffective because “[h]e failed to direct the trial court to the controlling statute, RCW 10.01.160(3).” Br. of Appellant at 20. However, the Supreme Court order that remanded the case to the trial court clearly ordered the trial court “to reconsider the imposition of the discretionary legal financial obligations” and directed the trial court to do so “as required by RCW 10.01.160(3)” and the Supreme Court’s “decision in *State of Washington v. Nicholas Peter Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015).” CP 4-8. Ralston has not shown that her attorney was ineffective for not informing the court of what it already knew (RP 2); nor has she shown that the result would have been different had counsel done so.

In summary, on these facts Ralston has not shown that her attorney was deficient, and she has not shown that she suffered any prejudice due to any deficiency that she alleges. To prevail on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ralston must make both showings, and if she fails to make either showing, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must

State’s Response Brief  
Case No. 49504-0-II

Mason County Prosecutor  
PO Box 639  
Shelton, WA 98584  
360-427-9670 ext. 417

fail. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); *State v. Grier*, 171 Wn.2d 17, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).

D. CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments above, the State asks that this Court deny Ralston's appeal and to sustain the trial court's LFO order in this case.

DATED: July 24, 2017.

MICHAEL DORCY  
Mason County  
Prosecuting Attorney



---

Tim Higgs  
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney  
WSBA #25919

**MASON CO PROS ATY OFFICE**

**July 24, 2017 - 12:59 PM**

**Transmittal Information**

**Filed with Court:** Court of Appeals Division II  
**Appellate Court Case Number:** 49504-0  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** State of Washington, Respondent v. Candace L. Ralston, Appellant  
**Superior Court Case Number:** 11-1-00126-1

**The following documents have been uploaded:**

- 1-495040\_Briefs\_20170724125816D2210949\_3237.pdf  
This File Contains:  
Briefs - Respondents  
*The Original File Name was 49504-0-II -- State v. Ralston -- Brief of Respondent.pdf*

**A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:**

- kate@washapp.org
- wapofficemail@washapp.org

**Comments:**

---

Sender Name: Timothy Higgs - Email: timh@co.mason.wa.us

Address:

PO BOX 639

SHELTON, WA, 98584-0639

Phone: 360-427-9670 - Extension 417

**Note: The Filing Id is 20170724125816D2210949**