

NO. 50708-1-II

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ESTATE OF SANDRA WESTALL, Deceased.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Claude Paul Westall (“Paul”)¹ appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to approve the sale of the Estate of Sandra L. Westall’s (the “Estate”) interest in real property and directing the appointment of a listing agent to list for sale assets not before the trial court. Sandra Westall, Paul’s wife, passed away testate, leaving her one-half community property interest in the couple’s home (the “Property”) to an Irrevocable Testamentary Special Needs Trust (the “Trust”) created by her Last Will and Testament (the “Will”) for their disabled adult daughter, Destiny. Paul was appointed the community property personal representative of the Estate with powers of non-intervention.

The Litigation Guardian ad Litem (“LGAL”) rejected Paul’s offer to have Destiny live with him at the Property and declared that the Estate’s one-half interest in the Property needed to be sold. Paul then made two offers to buy the Estate’s one-half interest in his home, one based on the LGAL’s comparative market analysis and the other based on the Trustee’s appraisal. Although not required to do so, Paul, in an abundance of caution due to the contentious nature of the LGAL’s and Trustee’s attacks against him, petitioned the trial court to approve the Estate’s sale of its one-half

¹ This Brief refers to the various parties by their first names for clarity and intends no disrespect.

interest to himself. The trial court denied this motion and, at the urging of the LGAL and without proper notice to Paul, directed the entire Property, not just the Estate's one-half interest, be listed for sale. Selling the Estate's one-half interest in the Property is in the Estate's best interest given the ongoing costs escalating as multiple parties and counsel fight over the Estate's limited resources. Without any legal authority, the LGAL is attempting to force the sale of Paul's separate one-half interest in the Property, even though Paul is the community property personal representative with nonintervention powers and his separate one-half interest in the Property is not an Estate asset.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in denying Paul's motion to approve the sale of the Estate's one-half interest in the Property.
2. The trial court erred in ordering that the Property be listed for sale.

III. ISSUE STATEMENTS

1. The trial court should approve the sale of an estate asset when sale of the asset is in the estate's best interest. Estates must be managed efficiently and swiftly. Did the trial court err when it denied Paul's motion to approve the sale of the Estate's one-half interest in the Property when the sale is in the Estate's best interest and waiting an

undetermined amount of time for speculative offers that would be conditioned on the hopes that the City of Gig Harbor would amend its Comprehensive Plan and rezone the Property? (Assignment of Error No. 1).

2. Did the trial court err when it ordered that the Property be listed for sale when (1) Paul is the community property personal representative with nonintervention powers; (2) Paul's one-half interest in the Property is not an Estate asset; and (3) Paul has the authority, as the community property personal representative, to distribute the community property Estate's assets, which includes the Estate's one-half interest in the Property. (Assignment of Error No. 2).

3. Did the trial court err when it ordered that the Property be listed for sale when there was not a proper petition noted for hearing on the issue? (Assignment of Error No. 2).

IV. FACTS

Paul and Sandra Westall, husband and wife, jointly owned a home located at 9017 Peacock Hill Avenue, Gig Harbor, Washington (the "Property").² During Sandra's life, the Property served as the couple's home and they operated a salon out of it as well.³ Prior to her death, Sandra

² See Clerk's Papers (CP) at 251, 515.

³ See CP at 362.

and Paul separated, but did not divorce, and Sandra moved out of the Property, though she and Paul continued to operate the business there.⁴ For all relevant time periods, Paul has lived at the Property and it is his only home.⁵

Sandra Westall died testate on March 19, 2015.⁶ In her Will, Sandra left the bulk of her separate property and her one-half of the community property to the Special Needs Trust created for her and Paul's adult daughter, Destiny.⁷ Sandra's community property included her one-half interest in the Property.⁸

Sandra's Will appointed her brother, Bill Preacher, as personal representative.⁹ Paul petitioned to be appointed as personal representative over Sandra's community property pursuant to RCW 11.28.030.¹⁰ The trial court appointed Paul as personal representative over Sandra's community property and Mr. Preacher personal representative over Sandra's separate property.¹¹

On July 15, 2015, a LGAL was appointed over Destiny to investigate the need for a guardianship, look into a durable power of

⁴ CP at 9.

⁵ CP at 515.

⁶ CP at 1.

⁷ CP at 9 – 10.

⁸ CP at 251.

⁹ CP at 1, 17.

¹⁰ CP at 1.

¹¹ CP at 20 – 22.

attorney executed in 2014, and make other recommendations as to Destiny's best interests.¹²

On November 18, 2016, Paul filed a Notice of Mediation.¹³ On December 2, 2016, the LGAL filed an untimely objection to the Notice of Mediation, but Mr. Preacher did not file any objection.¹⁴ The LGAL did not note a hearing on her objection as mandated by RCW 11.96A.200(2)(c).¹⁵ Instead, Paul had to file a Motion to Compel Mediation.¹⁶ Ultimately, the trial court denied the Motion to Compel Mediation due to unresolved discovery issues even though the Court had not and did not authorize discovery.¹⁷

In February 2017, after the matter stalled, Paul moved for an order authorizing discovery pursuant to RCW 11.96A.115(1) and (2).¹⁸ In March, the LGAL filed a Petition to Sell Real Estate, Determine Payment of Rent, Transfer Vehicles, and Determine Division of Family Home Sale Proceeds.¹⁹ In her motion, the LGAL requested that the trial court allow her to "obtain an appraisal and list the property for sale."²⁰ The LGAL also

¹² CP at 25.

¹³ CP at 48 – 49.

¹⁴ CP at 51 – 52, 60.

¹⁵ CP at 62.

¹⁶ CP at 62.

¹⁷ See VRP (February 10, 2017); CP at 232 – 33.

¹⁸ CP at 234 – 40.

¹⁹ CP at 242 – 49.

²⁰ CP at 246, 249.

wanted the Court to order Paul to provide a series of information to the LGAL, but opposed the request for formal discovery.²¹ The trial court granted Paul's motion for discovery on a limited basis.²²

In his administration of the Estate, Paul initially offered to co-own the Property with the Trust, but the Trustee rejected that offer.²³ Paul did not make the initial offer to buy the Trust's interest in the Property for fear of being falsely accused of breaching his fiduciary duties.²⁴ Instead, Paul asked for the Trustee to let Paul know a price the Trustee thought was fair for Paul to purchase the Property.²⁵ The Trustee instead asked to buy out Paul's interest in the Property and offered a value of \$760,000 for the Property, less transaction costs. The Trustee used the value suggested in a comparative market analysis ("CMA") previously obtained by the LGAL.²⁶ Paul declined to sell his interest in his home and offered to buy the Trust's interest in the Property at the price proposed by the Trustee.²⁷ The Trustee then declined to agree to Paul's offer to buy the Trust's interest in the

²¹ CP at 249.

²² CP at 335 – 36.

²³ CP at 363.

²⁴ CP at 364.

²⁵ CP at 364.

²⁶ CP at 364. In a prior hearing, the LGAL admitted that her market analysis was valid. VRP (Feb. 10, 2017) at 20. The LGAL submitted a declaration regarding a CMA of the Property that identified a number of "safety issues or major concerns" and additional items that needed repair. CP at 75 – 78. The LGAL's CMA showed that the Property was worth between \$700,000 and \$720,000, not taking into account the poor state of the existing building, the likelihood a developer would demolish the building and start over, or the difficulty developing real property in Gig Harbor. CP at 80; *see also* CP at 81 – 117.

²⁷ *See* CP at 355 – 56.

Property at the Trustee's proposed price, and demanded that an appraisal be performed and that any sale of the Property be part of a global resolution of the Estate.²⁸

In April 2017, Paul submitted a formal offer to purchase the Trust's interest in the Property.²⁹ Paul offered to buy the Trust's 50% interest in Property for \$380,000, which is one-half of the LGAL's CMA, minus 50% of transaction costs, 50% of the real property taxes Paul has paid since Sandra's passing, 50% of homeowners' insurance Paul has paid since Sandra's passing, and 50% of maintenance/improvements Paul made since Sandra's passing.³⁰ A few days later, the parties agreed that the Trust would obtain and pay for an appraisal on the Property and that they would continue working together to resolve what to do with the sale of the Property.³¹ The LGAL has taken the position that it's in Destiny's best interests to sell the Property so her trust can have the money.³²

The Trustee ultimately obtained an appraisal of the Property that came back below the CMA, valuing the Property at \$700,000.³³ On July 7, 2017, Paul then submitted a second offer to purchase the Property, offering 50% of the appraised value, in addition to the same terms he previously

²⁸ CP at 355 – 56.

²⁹ CP at 363 – 65.

³⁰ CP at 364 – 65.

³¹ CP at 367 – 71.

³² CP at 538.

³³ CP at 375.

offered.³⁴ On July 20, 2017, after receiving no response from the Trustee or LGAL to his offer and in an abundance of caution, Paul moved the trial court to approve the sale of the Estate's 50% interest in the Property to Paul at the terms outlined in his second offer.³⁵ Because Paul is both the community property personal representative, and the offeror, he sought the court's approval of the offer with appropriate notice to the LGAL and Trustee, even though it was in line with the appraised value of the Property.³⁶

The LGAL opposed the motion, and this time insisted on placing the Property on the market for sale to "test" the market.³⁷ The LGAL also opposed the offsets offered by Paul, such as the cost of maintenance/improvements.³⁸ Citing absolutely no legal authority for her position, the LGAL claimed that in cases of disputes over the sale of real property during a probate, the normal course is to sell the real property.³⁹ The LGAL suggested putting the Property on the market and, if an offer higher than Paul's was obtained, then the personal representatives could get court approval of the purchase and sale agreement offered.⁴⁰ The LGAL

³⁴ CP at 375 – 76.

³⁵ CP at 378 – 91.

³⁶ CP at 378.

³⁷ CP at 481 – 82.

³⁸ CP at 482.

³⁹ CP at 482 – 83.

⁴⁰ CP at 483.

offered no authority for why or how the trial court could side-step Paul's powers of non-intervention, including the power to handle the Estate's interest in the Property, or how the trial court could order Paul's one-half interest in the Property to be listed for sale. The LGAL proposed that if the trial court approved Paul's proposed purchase, it add a "caveat that if Mr. Westall sells the property to a third party within the next five years, then Destiny will receive an equal share of the difference between Mr. Westall's purchase price and the later purchase price."⁴¹ The parties referred to this caveat as the "five-year lookback" proposal.

In opposing Paul's motion, the Trustee disavowed his own appraisal, claiming that the Property must be worth much more because Paul and Sandra unsuccessfully tried to sell the Property for \$1.995 million in 2014.⁴² The Trustee offered a declaration from the prior real estate broker who listed the Property in 2014 who opined that the Property could be developed into a better commercial use, such as a 7,000 square foot high-end restaurant, and sold for around \$1.3 million.⁴³ However, he offered no evidence that the City of Gig Harbor would approve any rezoning or development of the Property necessary for such a plan, or the timeline on

⁴¹ CP at 482.

⁴² CP at 488.

⁴³ CP at 490 – 91.

which to expect approval.⁴⁴ The Trustee also took the position that the Trust already owned the 50% interest in the Property and that the Estate owned no interest that could be sold to Paul.⁴⁵

The Trustee's appraiser also submitted a letter explaining that due to "current zoning limitations, only 50% of the site can be redeveloped and restaurant use is limited to 800 square feet."⁴⁶ The letter also expresses doubt that the City would approve the rezoning required for a larger, high-end restaurant.⁴⁷ The rezone would require amending Gig Harbor's Comprehensive Plan.⁴⁸

Paul expressed willingness to consider the LGAL's proposed five-year lookback caveat, and by the hearing, the LGAL had walked back this proposal.⁴⁹ The LGAL reiterated her position that "it is in Destiny's best interests to sell the property, she is better off with cash."⁵⁰

The trial court denied Paul's motion approving his purchase of the Estate's interest in the Property without prejudice, and ordered a local attorney to instead be empowered to enter into a listing agreement with a real estate agent to list the Property for sale. No portion of the order directed

⁴⁴ CP at 490 – 91.

⁴⁵ CP at 488 – 89.

⁴⁶ CP at 498.

⁴⁷ CP at 498.

⁴⁸ CP at 522.

⁴⁹ CP at 538.

⁵⁰ CP at 538.

what the real estate commission would be or what the listing price would be. If no “bona fide written purchase and sale agreement is received within four (4) months of the listing date,” the parties were directed to return to the court for further consideration of Paul’s offer to purchase the Property.⁵¹ The trial court found that “pursuant to CR 54(b),” the order was a final order.⁵²

Paul timely appealed.⁵³

V. ANALYSIS

A. **Standard of review.**

“Courts have . . . recognized that probate proceedings are equitable in nature and reviewed de novo on the entire record.”⁵⁴

B. **Paul has authority to approve sale.**

1. Paul is the community property personal representative with non-intervention powers and has responsibility to settle the community property Estate and fund the Trust.

As the community property personal representative, Paul has non-intervention powers and does not need court approval to sell the community property assets.

⁵¹ CP at 539.

⁵² CP at 545.

⁵³ CP at 541 – 45.

⁵⁴ *In re Estate of Bowers*, 132 Wn. App. 334, 339, 131 P.3d 916 (2006).

A superior court has limited jurisdiction over nonintervention probate proceedings.⁵⁵ Once the superior court declares a nonintervention estate solvent, it loses jurisdiction unless the executor or another person with statutorily conferred authority properly invokes jurisdiction again.⁵⁶

Any personal representative acting under nonintervention powers may . . . mortgage, encumber, lease, sell, exchange, [and] convey . . . assets of the estate, both real and personal, all without an order of court and without notice, approval, or confirmation, and in all other respects administer and settle the estate of the decedent without intervention of court.⁵⁷

“It’s the duty of every personal representative to settle the estate . . . as quickly as possible.”⁵⁸ Assets bequeathed to a trust by a will remain within the personal representative’s control until proof of payment of all estate liabilities.⁵⁹

Paul has a duty to swiftly administer the community property estate. The trial court awarded him non-intervention powers. The LGAL has already declared that Destiny’s interest in the Property must be sold and rejected co-ownership with Paul. Paul, as the community property personal

⁵⁵ *In re Estate of Harder*, 185 Wn. App. 378, 382, 341 P.3d 342 (2015).

⁵⁶ *Estate of Harder*, 185 Wn. App. at 382.

⁵⁷ RCW 11.68.090(1).

⁵⁸ RCW 11.48.010.

⁵⁹ *Waddoups v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.*, 192 Wn. App. 1078, *11, 2016 WL 1019074 (2016). Pursuant to GR 14.1, “unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals filed on or after March 1, 2013, may be cited as non-binding authorities, if identified as such by the citing party, and may be accorded such persuasive value as the court deems appropriate.”

representative, has sole responsibility to sell the Property, not the Trustee or the separate property personal representative.

2. *Sandra's one-half interest in the Property is an Estate asset that the community property personal representative must dispose of.*

Contrary to arguments below, selling the Estate's one-half interest in the Property is Paul's responsibility. The Property remains with the Estate for the community property personal representative to distribute until the Estate is finalized.

All of the community and the separate property of Decedent is subject to administration.⁶⁰ Title to real estate vests immediately upon death in the heirs,⁶¹ though it may be divested if need be to administer the Estate or for payment of debts and for payment of the expenses and costs of administration of the Estate.⁶²

“Although title vests immediately in the heirs, they are not entitled to treat the property as their own until after the probate proceeding is closed.”⁶³ “The personal representative of the estate has the right to the possession of the property during the probate proceeding to the exclusion

⁶⁰ RCW 11.02.070.

⁶¹ RCW 11.04.250.

⁶² RCW 11.04.250.

⁶³ 19 Horenstein, WASH. PRAC., Fam. And Community Prop. L. § 13:2 (2016) (citing *In re Peterson's Estate*, 12 Wn.2d 686, 123 P.2d 733 (1942)).

of the heirs and is entitled to maintain a proceeding to quiet title to the land and to recover possession of it even against the heirs.”⁶⁴

Even property bequeathed to a trust remains subject to Estate debts and administration by the personal representative.⁶⁵

The Estate’s one-half interest remains with the Estate subject to administration by Paul as the community property personal representative with non-intervention powers. The Estate has not been closed, the community debts have not been satisfied in full, and the Estate’s assets have not been distributed to the beneficiaries, including to the Trust. Until such time, the Estate’s one-half interest in the Property remains with Paul as the community property personal representative. It is not for the LGAL, the Trustee, or the separate property personal representative to direct how the community property Estate is administered.

C. The trial court erred in not approving the sale of the Estate’s one-half interest in the Property.

The trial court erred in not approving the sale of the Estate’s one-half interest in the Property. The probate has been pending for two years, and Paul has offered to pay fair market value, including the possibility of paying

⁶⁴ 19 Horenstein, WASH. PRAC., Fam. And Community Prop. L. § 13:2 (2016) (citing *Wendler v. Woodward*, 93 Wash. 684, 161 P. 1043 (1916)).

⁶⁵ *Waddoups v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.*, 192 Wash. App. 1078, *11, 2016 WL 1019074 (2016). Pursuant to GR 14.1, “unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals filed on or after March 1, 2013, may be cited as non-binding authorities, if identified as such by the citing party, and may be accorded such persuasive value as the court deems appropriate.”

the Trust one-half of proceeds made from the sale in the next five years. Allowing the Property to be listed for sale to “test the market” is an inappropriate intervention in a non-intervention Estate.

A non-intervention personal representative has authority to “mortgage, encumber, lease, sell, exchange, [and] convey” real and personal property of the Estate without an order of the court.⁶⁶ Paul sought court approval of his offer to buy the Estate’s one-half interest in the Property due to the contentious nature of this matter. Even if the Estate had been full intervention, the trial court erred in denying Paul’s motion.

Under a full intervention Estate,

[w]henver it shall appear upon the petition of the personal representative or of any person interested in the estate to be the best interests of the estate to exchange any real or personal property of the estate for other property, the court may authorize the exchange upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, which include the payment or receipt of part cash by the personal representative.⁶⁷

RCW 11.84.010 requires personal representatives to administer the decedent’s estate as quickly as possible without sacrifice to the estate. Chapter 11.96A RCW gives “full and ample power and authority” to the trial court to administer and settle all estate and trust matters, “all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered and settled by the court.”⁶⁸

⁶⁶ RCW 11.68.090(1).

⁶⁷ RCW 11.56.005.

⁶⁸ RCW 11.96A.020(1), (2).

The Estate has received a CMA and an appraisal on the Property's full value. Paul has made an offer for one-half each value, including adding a provision for a five-year "lookback" period as first proposed by the LGAL. The "lookback" provision would allow the Trust to benefit from a fair market value purchase of its one-half interest while allowing it to benefit if a later sale at a better price can be made. As the LGAL has repeatedly admitted, "it is in Destiny's best interests to sell the property, she is better off with cash."⁶⁹

The probate has been pending for two years despite Paul's ongoing efforts to resolve this matter efficiently for his daughter. In the interim, the Trustee's attorney and the LGAL are incurring fees and costs, as are the Estate and Mr. Westall. The LGAL and the Trustee want to "test the market" for an extended time, entertaining hypothetical offers, offers which had not been made, that will then require rezoning and amendments to the Gig Harbor Comprehensive Plan. It is in the Estate's best interest to accept the offers made by Paul, particularly when he has offered to agree to the five-year lookback suggested by the LGAL. Allowing the probate to go on for potentially years on end while the LGAL and Trustee attempt to interfere in the administration of a non-intervention Estate is not in the Estate's best interests. The Estate and the Trust will continue to incur attorney fees and

⁶⁹ CP at 538.

related costs. Additionally, although the Trust has yet to pay for any taxes, expenses, or repairs to the Property, the longer the Trust retains an interest in the Property, the higher those costs will accrue against the Trust. The LGAL and Trustee are gambling with the Trust's money at Destiny's expense. It is in the Estate's best interest to accept Paul's offer and sell its one-half interest in the Property. The trial court erred in denying Paul's motion to approve the sale of the Property.

D. The trial court lacks jurisdiction over Paul's half of the Property.

The probate court has no jurisdiction over Paul's one-half of the Property. It cannot require him to submit his one-half interest in the Property to be listed for sale by someone else. No party has brought a partition action, and the sale of Paul's one-half interest in the Property is not being sought to satisfy community debts. There is no legal basis on which to list Paul's one-half of the Property for sale.

Except as provided in RCW 41.04.273 and 11.84.025, upon the death of a decedent, a one-half share of the community property shall be confirmed to the surviving spouse or surviving domestic partner, and the other one-half share shall be subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent, or shall descend as provided in chapter 11.04 RCW. The whole of the community property shall be subject to probate administration for all purposes of this title, including the payment of obligations and debts of the community, the award in lieu of homestead, the allowance for family support, and any other matter for which the

community property would be responsible or liable if the decedent were living.⁷⁰

“The probate court has no jurisdiction to try title to real estate as between the executor of an estate and the husband of the deceased.”⁷¹ “The superior court sitting in probate has no jurisdiction to try the title to property.”⁷²

The LGAL and Trustee justified the effort to list Paul’s one-half of the Property for sale as a way to maximize the Estate’s interest in the Property. However, that is not a proper basis on which to claim a right to force Paul to list his one-half interest in the Property for sale. Paul’s one-half interest in the Property would be before the Estate only if it were needed to settle community property debts.⁷³ However, that is not the case. The LGAL and Trustee are simply trying to gain strategic leverage by forcing Paul to list his home for sale. The Estate is entitled to the maximum benefit of Decedent’s assets, but not to more than that.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ RCW 11.02.070.

⁷¹ *Tucker v. Brown*, 20 Wn.2d 740, 805, 150 P.2d 604 (1944).

⁷² *Tucker*, 20 Wn.2d at 807.

⁷³ The LGAL has not brought a partition action or any other legal action to divide the Property. See ch. 7.52 RCW; *Hamilton v. Huggins*, 70 Wn. App. 842, 846, 855 P.2d 1216 (1993). Such action would be appropriate only after the Estate distributed the Estate’s interest in the Property to the Trust since the Trust’s interest in the Property is still subject to the personal representative’s administration. RCW 11.02.070.

⁷⁴ In reality, if the Estate were marketing any interest in the Property, it should be no more than the one-half interest that the Estate actually owns. Although Paul has offered to purchase the Estate’s interest in the Property for one-half of the full value, that is not actually what the Estate is owed. The Estate is owed the value of its one-half interest in the Property. If the Estate were to list for sale a one-half interest in the Property, it would undoubtedly receive bids significantly lower than Paul is offering.

By the plain language of RCW 11.02.070, Paul's one-half of the Property is not subject to Estate administration. His one-half is not being used to settle community debts and is therefore not an asset that the Estate can offer for sale. The trial court lacked jurisdiction over Paul's one-half interest in the Property and erred in ordering it be listed for sale.

E. The trial court erred by requiring the Property to be listed for sale in the absence of a properly noted Petition.

There was no petition or motion before the trial court invoking the court's jurisdiction to list the Property for sale.

As stated above, the trial court's jurisdiction in a non-intervention estate is limited, and even under a full intervention estate, there must be a petition from either the personal representative or any person interested in the estate asking the court to approve and set the terms of any sale.⁷⁵ Here, no Petition had been filed by any interested party or the Estate seeking approval to list the Property for sale. The closest the LGAL and Trustee came was in opposition to Paul's motion, which was filed two days prior to the hearing. Under PCLR 7, this was insufficient notice for a motion.

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the Property listed for sale, particularly as to Paul's one-half interest in the Property. There was no petition filed invoking the trial court's jurisdiction, which denied Paul

⁷⁵ RCW 11.56.005.

the ability to properly respond to the effort to force him to sell his interest in his home.

F. Paul asks for an award of his attorney fees from the Estate.


The aggressive and unnecessary litigation tactics undertaken by the LGAL and Trustee have unnecessarily driven up the cost of the Estate's administration. Under RCW 11.96A.150, this Court has authority to award Paul his attorney fees and costs against the Estate. Given the inappropriate efforts by the LGAL and Trustee to deprive Paul of his one-half ownership interest in his own home, Paul asks that this Court award Paul his attorney fees and costs related to this appeal from the Estate.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Paul asks that this Court vacate the trial court's Order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of October, 2017.

LEDGER SQUARE LAW, P.S.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I am now and at all times herein mentioned a resident of the State of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party to or interested in the above-entitled action, and competent to be a witness herein.

On the date given below, I caused to be served the foregoing document on the following persons and in the manner listed below:

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DATED this 24th day of October 2017, at Tacoma, Washington.


Amy Jean Shackelford, PP, PLS
Legal Assistant to Chrystina R. Solum

LEDGER SQUARE LAW, P.S.

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Transmittal Information

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