

FILED
Court of Appeals
Division II
State of Washington
1/28/2019 8:00 AM

No. 51026-0-II
Skamania County 16-1-00060-4

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION TWO

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

RICHARD McLAUGHLIN,

Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
SKAMANIA COUNTY

The Honorable Judge Randall Krog

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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A. SUPPLEMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. This Court should strike the criminal filing fee of \$200, the \$100 DNA collection fee, the \$100 crime lab fee and the interest provisions of the felony judgment and sentence under the new controlling precedent of State v. Ramirez, __ Wn.2d __, __ P.3d __ (No. 95249-3)(2018 WL 4499761) (September 20, 2018).¹
2. Under Ramirez, 2018 changes² to the legal financial obligations statutes apply to appellant who was indigent at the time of sentencing.

B. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTION PRESENTED

2018 legislative changes to the relevant statutory scheme eliminated the bulk of LFOs for indigent defendants. In Ramirez, supra, the Supreme Court held that the 2018 changes applied to all cases pending on first direct appeal, regardless when sentencing occurred.

Is appellant entitled to relief under Ramirez where he was ordered to pay LFOs under statutes which no longer authorize such imposition under the 2018 legislative changes and was found indigent at the time of sentencing?

C. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER RAMIREZ

In his opening brief, Mr. McLaughlin challenged the legal financial obligations the sentencing court imposed. See Brief of Appellant (“BOA”) at 17-22. Since that briefing was filed, the relevant law has changed. In 2018, the Legislature amended the statutory scheme under which most courts have imposed “legal financial obligations” (LFOs) against defendants in state criminal cases. See

¹A copy of the judgment and sentence entered in this case is attached hereto as Appendix A. A copy of the Ramirez decision is attached as Appendix B.

²A copy of Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill 1783 (2018) is attached hereto as Appendix C.

Laws of 2018, ch. 269 (Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill (“Bill”) 1783 (2018)(App. C)). In Ramirez, supra, the state’s highest Court just held that those amendments apply to all cases currently pending on direct review. See App. B. As a result, appellant is entitled to relief.

Before 2018, the relevant statutes allowed and sometimes even required imposition of multiple LFOs on those convicted of a crime. See State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). At the time of the sentencing here, “legal financial obligations” were defined in former RCW 9.94A.030(30)(2012), as “a sum of money that is ordered by a superior court” including

restitution to the victim, statutorily imposed crime victims’ compensation fees as assessed pursuant to RCW 7.68.035, court costs, county or interlocal drug funds, court-appointed attorneys’ fees, and costs of defense, fines, and any other financial obligation that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction[.]

A sentencing court was limited (somewhat) in imposing costs, because former RCW 10.01.160(1)(2013) provided that costs “shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant[.]” Former RCW 10.01.160(3)(2013) further required that a sentencing court “shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them.”

In Blazina, supra, the state’s highest court noted the requirement of former RCW 10.01.160(3)(2013), that a sentencing court “shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them.” 182 Wn.2d at 829-30. Mr. McLaughlin presented an argument about the legal financial obligations based

largely on Blazina argument in his opening brief.

Since Blazina, courts have struggled to determine both what constitutes an adequate inquiry and for which costs, exactly, a Blazina analysis must occur. See e.g., State v. Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. 380, 367 P.3d 612, review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1034 (2016); State v. Stoddard, 192 Wn. App. 222, 686 P.3d 474 (2016); State v. Clark, 191 Wn. App. 369, 362 P.3d 309 (2015). It was expected that Ramirez would provide some needed clarity, as the Supreme Court granted review to “articulate specific inquiries trial courts should make in determining whether an individual has the current and future ability to pay discretionary costs” under Blazina. App. B at 4.

After review was granted in Ramirez, however, the 2018 Legislature significantly amended our LFO system. See Ramirez, App. B at 4-5. More specifically, Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill (“Bill”) 1783 (2018) was passed. See Laws of 2018, ch. 269 (ESSHB 1783 (App. C)).

With the Bill, the Legislature chose to “prohibit[] the imposition of certain LFOs on indigent defendants[.]” Ramirez, App. B at 4-5. Whereas before, under Blazina, former RCW 10.01.160(3)(2013) allowed imposition of “discretionary” LFOs with a proper finding of “ability to pay,” the amendments to RCW 10.01.160(3) now “categorically prohibit” imposition of *any* discretionary LFOs on a defendant who was indigent at the time of sentencing. See Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § (6)(3); Ramirez, App. B at 5.

Other provisions of the bill prohibit imposition of specific

LFOs, such as the \$200 court filing fee and the \$100 crime lab fee if the defendant is indigent, and declining to impose the \$100 DNA testing fee if the defendant has previously given the state DNA. See Ramirez, App. B at 4-5; Laws of 2018, ch. 269 (App. C).

In Ramirez, the Court clarified and set forth in more detail what is required to conduct a proper Blazina analysis. But the Court then did not apply that analysis to the case, because it found the 2018 changes applied. Ramirez, App. B at 10. The Court first noted that the Bill was “concerning attorney fees and costs[.]” Ramirez, App. B at 11-12. The Court then pointed out that the “precipitating event” for such a statute is the end of any direct appeal. App. B at 11-12, citing, State v. Blank, 131 Wn.2d 230, 249, 930 P.2d 1210 (1997). Because the Bill’s provisions “concern the courts’ ability to impose costs on a criminal defendant following conviction,” the Ramirez Court held, the amendments wrought by the Bill applied to defendants like Ramirez whose cases are “on appeal as a matter of right.” Ramirez, App. B at 12.

Put another way, cases still pending on direct review at the time of the statutory changes “not final under RAP 12.7.” Ramirez, App. B at 12. As a result, the Ramirez Court held, the changes to the LFO scheme contained in the 2018 Bill apply to all cases still pending on direct review when those changes were enacted -regardless when sentencing occurred. Id.

Under Ramirez, this Court should grant Mr. McLaughlin relief. First, the changes to RCW 10.01.160(3) now prohibit the sentencing

court from imposing *any* discretionary LFOs on a defendant who was indigent at the time of sentencing. See Ramirez, App. B at 11-13; see Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3) (App. C). The criminal filing fee statute, former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h)(2014), authorized imposition of a fee but now prohibits such fees against those who are indigent. See Ramirez, App. B at 10-11; Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 17. Interest may no longer be charged on nonrestitution LFOs, either, based on the Bill. See former RCW 10.82.090 (2015); Laws of 2018, ch. 269, §§ 1, 5 (App. C). Other statutory changes include amending former RCW 10.46.190 (2005) so that no jury fee can be ordered against a person who is indigent at the time of sentencing. Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 9.

The Bill also eliminated the mandatory nature of the DNA lab “fee,” provided the defendant has previously given the state their DNA - for example where, as here, the defendant has previously given his DNA to the state (for example, with a prior conviction). Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 10; see former RCW 43.43.7541 (2015).

Under Ramirez, appellant is entitled to relief from the bulk of the LFOs imposed. This Court should so hold.

D. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein and in the opening brief, this Court should grant relief.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,



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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY EFILING/MAIL

Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, I hereby declare that I sent a true and correct copy of the attached Brief to opposing counsel VIA this Court's upload service, to Skamania Prosecutor's Office, and by depositing a true and correct copy of the attached in U.S.P.S. First Class mail, to Richard McLaughlin, DOC 837031, Coyote Ridge CC, P.O. Box 769, Connell, WA. 99326.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2019,



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APPENDIX A

SKAMANIA COUNTY
FILED

OCT 12 2017

GRACE D. CROSS
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SKAMANIA

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RICHARD SCOTT MCLAUGHLIN,

SID:
If no SID, use DOB:
3/23/1961
PCN:

Defendant.

No. 16-1-00060-4
Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS)
Prison

Clerk's Action Required, para
2.1, 4.1, 4.3, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5 and 5.7
 Defendant Used Motor Vehicle
 Juvenile Decline Mandatory
 Discretionary

I. Hearing

1.1 The court conducted a sentencing hearing this date; the defendant, the defendant's lawyer and the (deputy) prosecuting attorney were present.

II. Findings

2.1 Current Offense(s): The defendant is guilty of the following offenses, base upon jury-verdict(date) **September 11, 2017:**

COUNT	CRIME	RCW (w/subsection)	DATE OF CRIME	CLASS
I	DELIVERY OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - AMPHETAMINE OR METHAMPHETAMINE	RCW 69.50.401(2b)	AUGUST 10, 2016	FC

Class: FA(Felony-A), FB(Felony-B), FC(Felony-C)
(If the crime is a drug offense, include the type of drug in the second column.)

[] Additional current offenses are attached in Appendix 2.1a.

The jury returned a special verdict or the court made a special finding with regard to the following:

GV [] For the crime(s) charged in Count _____, **domestic violence** was pled and proved. RCW 10.99.020.

[] The defendant used a **firearm** in the commission of the offense in Count _____. RCW 9.94A.602, 9.94A.533.

[] The defendant used a **deadly weapon other than a firearm** in committing the offense in Count _____. RCW 9.94A.602, 9.94A.533.

[] Count _____, **Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA)**, RCW 69.50.401 and RCW 69.50.435, took place in a school, school bus, within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a school grounds or within 1000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district; or in a public park, public transit vehicle, or public transit stop shelter; or in, or within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a civic center designated as a drug-free zone by a local government authority, or in a public housing project designated by a local governing authority as a drug-free zone.

[] The defendant committed a crime involving the manufacture of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, **when a juvenile was present in or upon the premises of manufacture** in Count _____. RCW 9.94A.605, RCW 69.50.401, RCW 69.50.440.

[] Count _____ is a **criminal street gang**-related felony offense in which the defendant compensated, threatened, or solicited a **minor** in order to involve that minor in the commission of the offense. RCW 9.94A.833.

[] Count _____ is the crime of **unlawful possession of a firearm** and the defendant was a **criminal street gang** member or associate when the defendant committed the crime. RCW 9.94A.702, 9.94A_____.

[] The defendant committed [] **vehicular homicide** [] **vehicular assault** proximately caused by driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or by operating a vehicle in a reckless manner. The offense is, therefore, deemed a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030.

GY [] In Count _____, the defendant had (number of) _____ **passenger(s) under the age of 16** in the vehicle. RCW 9.94A.834.

[] Count _____ involves **attempting to elude** a police vehicle and during the commission of the crime the defendant endangered one or more persons other than the defendant or the pursuing law enforcement officer. RCW 9.94A.834.

[] In Count _____ the defendant has been convicted of **assaulting a law enforcement officer** or other employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault, as provided under RCW 9A.36.031, and the defendant intentionally committed the assault with what appeared to be a firearm. RCW 9.94A.831, 9.94A.533.

[] Count _____ is a felony in the commission of which the defendant used a **motor vehicle**. RCW 46.20.285.

[X] **The defendant has a chemical dependency that has contributed to the offense(s)**. RCW 9.94A.607.

[] In Count _____, assault in the 1st degree (RCW 9A.36.011) or assault of a

child in the 1st degree (RCW 9A.36.120), the offender used force or means likely to result in death or intended to kill the victim and shall be subject to a mandatory minimum term of 5 years (RCW 9.94A.540).

- Counts _____ encompass the same criminal conduct and count as one crime in determining the offender score. RCW 9.94A.589.
- Other current convictions listed under different cause numbers used in calculating the offender score are** (list offense and cause number):

Crime	Cause Number	Court (County/State)	DV* Yes
1.			
2.			

*DV: Domestic Violence was pled and proved.

- Additional current convictions listed under different cause numbers used in calculating the offender score are attached in Appendix 2.1b.

2.2 Criminal History (RCW 9.94A.525):

CRIME	DATE OF SENTENCE	SENTENCING COURT (County & State)	DATE OF CRIME	A or J Adult or Juv	TYPE OF CRIME	DV* Yes
FAIL TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER	01/12/2009	SKAMANIA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT WASHINGTON	10/02/2008	A	FC	NO
VUCSA POSSESSION OF METH	02/06/2002	SKAMANIA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT WASHINGTON	11/16/2001	A	FC	NO

*DV: Domestic Violence was pled and proved.

- Additional criminal history is attached in Appendix 2.2.
- The defendant committed a current offense while on community placement/community custody(adds one point to score). RCW 9.94A.525.
- The prior convictions listed as number(s) _____, above, or in appendix 2.2, are one offense for purposes of determining the offender score (RCW 9.94A.525)
- The prior convictions listed as number(s) _____, above, or in appendix 2.2, are not counted as points but as enhancements pursuant to RCW 46.61.520.

2.3 Sentencing Data:

COUNT	OFFENDER SCORE	SERIOUSNESS LEVEL	STANDARD RANGE (not including enhancements)	PLUS ENHANCEMENT (F) FIREARM (D) DEADLY WEAPON (V) VUCSA in a protected zone	TOTAL STANDARD RANGE (including Enhancements)	MAXIMUM TERM
I	-4-	-DG-II-	20+-60 MONTHS	N/A	20+60 MONTHS	10 YEARS PRISON AND \$20,000 FINE

* (F) Firearm, (D) Other deadly weapons, (V) VUCSA in a protected zone, (VH) Veh. Hom, see RCW 46.61.520, (JP) Juvenile present, (CSG) Criminal Street Gang involving minor, (AE) endangerment while attempting to elude, (ALF) assault law enforcement with firearm, RCW 9.94A.533(12), (P16) Passenger(s) under age 16.

[] Additional current offense sentencing data is attached in Appendix 2.3. For violent offenses, most serious offenses, or armed offenders, recommended **sentencing agreements or plea agreements** are [] attached [] as follows: _____.

2.4 [] Exceptional Sentence. The court finds substantial and compelling reasons that justify an exceptional sentence:

[] below the standard range for Count(s) _____.

[] above the standard range for Count(s) _____.

[] The defendant and state stipulate that justice is best served by imposition of the exceptional sentence above the standard range and the court finds the exceptional sentence furthers and is consistent with the interests of justice and the purposes of the sentencing reform act.

[] Aggravating factors were [] stipulated by the defendant, [] found by the court after the defendant waived jury trial, [] found by jury by special interrogatory.

[] within the standard range for Count(s) _____, but served consecutively to Count(s) _____.

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are attached in Appendix 2.4.

[] Jury's special interrogatory is attached. The Prosecuting Attorney

[] did [] did not recommend a similar sentence.

2.5 Legal Financial Obligations/Restitution. The court has considered the total amount owing, the defendant's past, present and future ability to pay legal financial obligations, including the defendant's financial resources and the likelihood that the defendant's status will change. (RCW 10.01.160). The court makes the following specific findings:

[] the following extraordinary circumstances exist that make restitution inappropriate (RCW 9.94A.753): _____.

[] the defendant has the present means to pay costs of incarceration. RCW 9.94A.760.

[] (Name of Agency) _____'s costs for its emergency response are reasonable. RCW 38.52.430 (effective August 1, 2012).

III. Judgment

3.1 The defendant is **Guilty** of the Counts and Charges listed in Paragraph 2.1 and Appendix 2.1.

3.2 [] The court **Dismisses** Counts -N/A- in the charging document.

IV. Sentence and Order

It is Ordered:

4.1 **Confinement.** The court sentences the defendant to total confinement as follows:

a) **Confinement.** RCW 9.94A.589. A term of total confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC):

<u>40</u> months on Count <u>-I-</u>	-----
-----	-----

[] The confinement time on Count(s) -N/A- contain(s) a mandatory minimum term of _____.

[] The confinement time on Count _____ includes _____ months as enhancement for [] firearm [] deadly weapon [] VUCSA in a protected zone [] manufacture of methamphetamine with juvenile present.

Actual number of months of total confinement ordered is: _____.

All counts shall be served concurrently, except for the portion of those counts for which there is an enhancement as set forth above at Section 2.3, and except for the following counts which shall be served consecutively: _____.

This sentence shall run consecutively with the sentence in the following cause number(s) (see RCW 9.94A.589(3)): _____.

but concurrently to any other felony cause not referred to in this Judgment. RCW 9.94A.589.

Confinement shall commence immediately unless otherwise set forth here: _____.

(b) **Credit for Time Served.** The defendant shall receive credit for time served prior to sentencing if that confinement was solely under this cause number. RCW 9.94A.505. The jail shall compute time served.

(c) [] **Work Ethic Program.** RCW 9.94A.690, RCW 72.09.410. The court finds that the defendant is eligible and is likely to qualify for work ethic program. The court recommends that the defendant serve the sentence at a work ethic program. Upon completion of work ethic program, the defendant shall be released on community custody for any remaining

time of total confinement, subject to the conditions in Section 4.2. Violation of the conditions of community custody may result in a return to total confinement for the balance of the defendant's remaining time of confinement.

4.2 Community Custody. (To determine which offenses are eligible for or required for community custody see RCW 9.94A.701)

(A) The defendant shall be on community custody for:

(1) the period imposed by the court, as follows:

Count(s) _____ 36 months for Serious Violent Offenses

Count(s) _____ 18 months for Violent Offenses

Count(s) -I- 12 months (for crimes against a person, drug offenses, or offenses involving the unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member or associate)

Note: combined term of confinement and community custody for any particular offense cannot exceed the statutory maximum. RCW 9.94A.701.

(B) While on community custody, the defendant shall: (1) report to and be available for contact with the assigned community corrections officer as directed; (2) work at DOC approved education, employment and/or community restitution (service); (3) notify DOC of any change in defendant's address or employment; (4) not consume controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions; (5) not unlawfully possess controlled substances while on community custody; (6) not own, use, or possess firearms or ammunition; (7) pay supervision fees as determined by DOC; (8) perform affirmative acts as required by DOC to confirm compliance with the orders of the court; and (9) abide by any additional conditions imposed by DOC under RCW 9.94A.704 and .706. The defendant's residence location and living arrangements are subject to the prior approval of DOC while on community custody.

The court orders that during the period of supervision the defendant shall:

consume no alcohol.

have no contact with:

remain within outside of a specified geographical boundary, to wit: _____

not serve in any paid or volunteer capacity where he or she has control or supervision of minors under 13 years of age.

participate in the following crime related treatment or counseling services: _____

undergo an evaluation for treatment for domestic violence substance abuse mental health anger management, and fully comply with all recommended treatment.

comply with the following crime related prohibitions: _____

Other conditions: _____

Court ordered treatment: If any court orders mental health or chemical dependency treatment, the defendant must notify DOC and the defendant must release treatment information to DOC for the duration of incarceration and supervision. RCW 9.94A.562.

4.3 Legal Financial Obligations: The defendant shall pay to the clerk of this court:

JASS CODE \$ _____ Restitution to: _____
S subject to modification.
RTN/RJN \$ _____ Restitution to: _____
S subject to modification.
\$ _____ Restitution to: _____
Subject to modification.

Name & Address-Address may be withheld and provided confidentially to Clerk's Office.

PCV \$ 500 Victim Assessment
RCW 7.68.035
PDV \$ _____ Domestic Violence assessment
RCW10.99.080
CRC \$ 200 Court costs including RCW 9.94A.760, 9.94A.505, 10.01.160, 10.46.190.

Criminal Filing Fee \$ 200.00 FRC
Witness costs \$ _____ WFR
Sheriff service fees \$ _____ SFR/SFS/SFW/WRF
Jury demand fee \$ _____ JFR
Extradition Cost \$ _____ EXT
Other \$ _____

PUB \$ ~~_____~~ Fees for court appointed attorney RCW 9.94A.760

WFR \$ _____ Court appointed defense expert and other defense costs ... RCW 9.94A.760

FCM/MTH \$ ~~2,000~~ ^{Due} Fine RCW 9A.20.021; [] VUCSA chapter 69.50 RCW
 VUCSA additional fine deferred due to indigency
RCW 69.50.430

CDF/LDI/FCD \$ _____ Drug enforcement fund of:
 NTF/SAD/SDI RCW 9.94A.760
 \$ _____ DUI fines, fees and assessments

 CLF \$ 100 Crime lab fee [] suspended due to indigency
 RCW 43.43.690

 \$ 100 DNA collection fee [] not imposed due to
 hardship . RCW 43.43.7541
 FPV \$ _____ Specialized forest products RCW 76.48.140

 DEF \$ _____ Emergency response costs (\$1,000 maximum, \$2,500max.
 effective Aug. 1, 2012))RCW 38.52.430

 \$ _____ Other fines or costs for: _____

 \$ _____ **TOTAL** RCW 9.94A.760

- The above total does not include all restitution or other legal financial obligations, which may be set by later order of the court. An agreed restitution order may be entered. RCW 9.94A.753. A restitution hearing:
 shall be set by the prosecutor.
 is scheduled for .
 Restitution Schedule attached.
 The defendant waives any right to be present at any restitution hearing (sign initials): _____.
 Restitution ordered above shall be paid jointly and severally with:

Name of other defendant Cause Number (Victim's name) (Amount-\$)

, , ,
 RJN

- The Department of Corrections (DOC) or clerk of the court shall immediately issue a Notice of Payroll Deduction. RCW 9.94A.7602, RCW 9.94A.760(8).
 All payments shall be made in accordance with the policies of the clerk of the court and on a schedule established by DOC or the clerk of the court, commencing immediately, unless the court specifically sets forth the rate here: Not less than \$ 25.⁰⁰ per month commencing 01/01/2018.
 RCW 9.94A.760.

The defendant shall report to the clerk of the court or as directed by the

clerk of the court and provide financial and other information as requested. RCW 9.94A.760(7)(b).

[] The court orders the defendant to pay costs of incarceration at the rate of \$ _____ per day, (actual costs not to exceed \$100 per day). (JLR) RCW 9.94A.760. (This provision does not apply to costs of incarceration collected by DOC under RCW 72.09.111 and 72.09.480.)

The financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments. RCW 10.82.090. An award of costs on appeal against the defendant may be added to the total legal financial obligations. RCW 10.73.160.

4.4 DNA Testing. The defendant shall have a biological sample collected for purposes of DNA identification analysis and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The appropriate agency shall be responsible for obtaining the sample prior to the defendant's release from confinement. This paragraph does not apply if it is established that the Washington State Patrol crime laboratory already has a sample from the defendant for a qualifying offense. RCW 43.43.754.

[] **HIV Testing.** The defendant shall submit to HIV testing. RCW 70.24.340.

4.5 No Contact:

The defendant shall not have contact with _____ including, but not limited to, personal, verbal, telephonic, written or contact through a third party until _____ (which does not exceed the maximum statutory sentence).

[] The defendant is excluded or prohibited from coming within (distance of: []'s [] home/residence [] work place [] school [] (other location(s) _____, or [] other location: _____ until _____ (which does not exceed the maximum statutory sentence).

[] A separate Domestic Violence No-Contact Order or Antiharassment No-Contact Order is filed concurrent with this Judgment and Sentence.

4.6 Other: _____

4.7 Off-Limits Order. (Known drug trafficker). RCW 10.66.020. The following areas are off limits to the defendant while under the supervision of the county jail or Department of Corrections: _____

V. Notices and Signatures

5.1 Collateral Attack on Judgment. If you wish to petition or move for

collateral attack on this Judgment and Sentence, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeas corpus petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment, you must do so within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as provided for in RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090.

5.2 Length of Supervision. If you committed your offense prior to July 1, 2000, you shall remain under the court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a period up to 10 years from the date of sentence or release from confinement, whichever is longer, to assure payment of all legal financial obligations unless the court extends the criminal judgment an additional 10 years. If you committed your offense on or after July 1, 2000, the court shall retain jurisdiction over you, for the purpose of your compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations, until you have completely satisfied your obligation, regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime. RCW 9.94A.760 and RCW 9.94A.505(5). The clerk of the court has authority to collect unpaid legal financial obligations at any time while you remain under the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of your legal financial obligations. RCW 9.94A.760(4) and RCW 9.94A.753(4).

5.3 Notice of Income-Withholding Action. If the court has not ordered an immediate notice of payroll deduction in Section 4.1, you are notified that the Department of Corrections (DOC) or the clerk of the court may issue a notice of payroll deduction without notice to you if you are more than 30 days past due in monthly payments in an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month. RCW 9.94A.7602. Other income-withholding action under RCW 9.94A.760 may be taken without further notice. RCW 9.94A.7606.

5.4 Community Custody Violation.

(a) If you are subject to a first or second violation hearing and DOC finds that you committed the violation, you may receive as a sanction up to 60 days of confinement per violation. RCW 9.94A.633.

(b) If you have not completed your maximum term of total confinement and you are subject to a third violation hearing and DOC finds that you committed the violation, DOC may return you to a state correctional facility to serve up to the remaining portion of your sentence. RCW 9.94A.714.

5.5 Firearms. You may not own, use or possess any firearm, and under federal law any firearm or ammunition, unless your right to do so is restored by the court in which you are convicted or the superior court in Washington State where you live, and by a federal court if required. You must immediately surrender any concealed pistol license. (The clerk

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

SID No. _____ Date of Birth 3/23/1961

(If no SID complete a separate Applicant card form FD-258 for State Patrol)

FBI No. _____ Local ID No. _____

PCN No. _____ Other _____

Alias name, SSN, DOB: _____

Race: Ethnicity: Sex:

[] Asian/Pacific [] Black/African [] Caucasian [] Hispanic [] Male
Islander American

[] Native [] Other: _____ [] Non-hispanic [] Female
American

FINGERPRINTS: I attest that I saw the defendant who appeared in Court affix his or her fingerprints and signature on this document.

Clerk of the Court *[Signature]*, Deputy Clerk.

Dated: 10/12/17

DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE: *[Signature]*

Left 4 fingers taken Left Right Right 4 fingers taken
simultaneously Thumb Thumb simultaneously



Appendix 2.2

State v. Richard S. McLaughlin, 16-1-00060-4

NAME	TYPE	CRIME	DATE	CAUSE	COURT
Richard S. McLaughlin (DOB 03/23/1961)	Defendant	DWLS3	DATE OF ARREST 09/20/2016	CR21884	STEVENSON MUNICIPAL COURT
			DATE OF DISPO 12/22/2016		
		DWLS3	DATE OF ARREST 07/09/2013 DATE OF DISPO 08/08/2013	3Z0619588	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
	1	FAIL TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER	DATE OF ARREST 10/02/2008 DATE OF DISPO 01/12/2009	081001201	SKAMANIA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
		VIOLATION OF DV-NCO	DATE OF ARREST 09/25/2007 DATE OF DISPO 10/04/2007	CR12690	SKAMANIA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
		ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE	DATE OF ARREST 06/07/2007 DATE OF DISPO 06/21/2007	CR11248	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
		VIOLATION OF DV-NCO	DATE OF ARREST 03/28/2006 DATE OF DISPO 04/20/2006	CR11860	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

		VIOLATION OF DV-NCO	DATE OF ARREST 03/27/2006 DATE OF DISPO 04/20/2006	CR11859	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
		DWLS III	DATE OF ARREST 05/08/2005 DATE OF DISPO 10/05/2005	50002099	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
		FAILURE TO OBEY OFFICER	DATE OF ARREST 05/08/2005 DATE OF DISPO 05/08/2005	50002099	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
		NVOL W/OUT ID	DATE OF ARREST 05/08/2005 DATE OF DISPO 05/08/2005	CR10340	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
		DWLS III	DATE OF ARREST 03/11/2002 DATE OF DISPO. 03/11/2002	CR0009113	SKAMANIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
	3	VUCSA POSSESSION METH	DATE OF ARREST 11/16/2001 DATE OF DISPO 02/06/2002	011020269	SKAMANIA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Disputed
by
Release
10/12/17
Hearing
RM

	1 WASH	GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION 2907.05	DATE OF ARREST 07/05/1991 DATE OF DISPO 08/28/1991	91CRA22888	HAMILTON COUNTY COMMON PLEASE COURT OHIO
	3 WASH	POSSESS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE	DATE OF ARREST 03/05/1990 DATE OF DISPO 05/24/1990	CR112614	SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CALIF.

Paul

APPENDIX B

2018 WL 4499761

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Supreme Court of Washington.

STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
David Angel RAMIREZ, Petitioner.

NO. 95249-3

|
Argued June 26, 2018

|
Filed September 20, 2018

Synopsis

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Lewis County, 15-1-00520-5, Richard Lynn Brosey, J., of third-degree assault with sexual motivation. He appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2017 WL 4791011, affirmed. Defendant petitioned for further review, which petition was granted only on issue of discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) imposed at sentencing.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Stephens, J., held that:

de novo standard of review applied to trial court's alleged error in failing to conduct adequate inquiry prior to imposing discretionary LFOs;

trial court failed to conduct adequate individualized inquiry into defendant's ability to pay prior to imposing discretionary LFOs; and

amendments to discretionary LFO statute, enacted after defendant's petition for review was granted, applied prospectively to defendant's appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from Lewis County Superior Court, (No. 15-1-00520-5), Hon. Richard Lynn Brosey, Judge

Attorneys and Law Firms

Kathleen A. Shea, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-3647, for Petitioner.

Jessica L. Blye, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, 345 W. Main Street, Chehalis, WA 98532-4802, for Respondent.

Opinion

STEPHENS, J.

*1 ¶ 1 In *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wash.2d 827, 839, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), we held that under former RCW 10.01.160(3) (2015), trial courts have an obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) at sentencing. This case provides an opportunity to more fully describe the nature of such an inquiry. An adequate inquiry must include consideration of the mandatory factors set forth in *Blazina*, including the defendant's incarceration and other debts, and the court rule GR 34 criteria for indigency. *Id.* at 838, 344 P.3d 680. The trial court should also address what we described in *Blazina* as other "important factors" relating to the defendant's financial circumstances, including employment history, income, assets and other financial resources, monthly living expenses, and other debts. *Id.*

¶ 2 The trial court in David A. Ramirez's case failed to conduct an adequate individualized inquiry before imposing LFOs on Ramirez. While this *Blazina* error would normally entitle Ramirez to a resentencing hearing on his ability to pay discretionary LFOs, such a limited resentencing is unnecessary in this case. Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill 1783, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (House Bill 1783), which amended two statutes at issue and now prohibits the imposition of certain LFOs on indigent defendants, applies prospectively to Ramirez's case on appeal. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to strike the improperly imposed LFOs from Ramirez's judgment and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 A jury convicted Ramirez of third degree assault and possession of a controlled substance, and found by special verdict that he committed the assault with sexual motivation and displayed an egregious lack of remorse. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 63-66.

¶ 4 At sentencing, the State sought an exceptional sentence of 10 years based on Ramirez’s prior record and offender score. 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Mar. 7, 2016) (VRP) at 346. Following the State’s argument for imposing an exceptional sentence, Ramirez took the opportunity to directly address the trial court. Ramirez explained to the court that despite the State’s representations, he “was doing everything right” before his arrest. *Id.* at 360. Ramirez shared that prior to his arrest, he was working a minimum wage job at Weyerhaeuser as part of a “temporary service team” and paying all his household bills, including a DirecTV subscription that included Seattle Seahawks games. *Id.* at 359-60, 362-63. Ramirez had opened a bank account for the first time in his life, was planning on getting his driver’s license, and had moved into his own apartment with the help of his wife. *Id.* at 360, 362. Ramirez discussed these favorable aspects of his life in an effort to show that despite his criminal history, he did not deserve an exceptional sentence. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 3. He lamented that because of his drug relapse and arrest, “I missed out on all of that.” VRP at 363.¹

¹ Ramirez’s full statement was, “I missed out on all of that because I screwed up before even the first Seahawk game. That was the weekend that I screwed up. It was the Saturday before the first Seahawk game.” VRP at 363.

*2 ¶ 5 The trial court sentenced Ramirez to five years for the third degree assault conviction and two years for possession of a controlled substance, to be served consecutively. *Id.* at 372-73. The trial court also imposed \$2,900 in LFOs, including a \$500 victim assessment fee, a \$100 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) collection fee, a \$200 criminal filing fee, and discretionary LFOs of \$2,100 in attorney fees, and set a monthly payment amount of \$25. *Id.* at 375-76. After the court announced the sentence, Ramirez presented a notice of appeal and a motion for an order of indigency, which the court granted. *Id.* at 373; Suppl. CP at 1-4. According to the financial statement in his declaration of indigency, Ramirez had no source of income or assets and no savings, and owed more than \$10,000 at the time of sentencing (apparently previously imposed court costs and fees). Suppl. CP at 2-4.

¶ 6 Prior to imposing LFOs, the trial court asked only two questions relating to Ramirez’s current and future ability to pay, both of which were directed to the State. First, the court asked, “And when he is not in jail, he has the ability to make money to make periodic payments on his LFOs, right?” VRP at 348. The State responded that Ramirez had the ability to pay his LFOs “[w]hen he’s not in jail and when he is in jail,” noting that Ramirez could work while incarcerated. *Id.* The trial court then asked the State to once more confirm that LFOs were appropriate in Ramirez’s case: “But as far as you are concerned, the LFOs should be imposed.” *Id.* The State answered, “Yes.” *Id.*

¶ 7 The trial court did not directly ask Ramirez or his counsel about his ability to pay at any point during sentencing. The only statement made by Ramirez concerning his ability to pay came after the trial court announced its decision to impose discretionary costs. After finding that Ramirez had “the ability to earn money and make small payments on his financial

obligations,” the court listed the specific costs imposed and ordered Ramirez to pay “25 bucks a month starting [in] 60 days.” *Id.* at 375-76. Ramirez then asked, “How am I going to do that from inside?” *Id.* at 376. Ramirez’s counsel responded, “I will explain.” *Id.* The discussion then moved on to a different subject.²

² Ramirez’s counsel made only one mention of LFOs, in correcting the trial court’s original estimate of the amount of attorney fees. The court initially stated that these discretionary costs totaled \$900, but Ramirez’s counsel clarified that \$2,100 was the correct amount. VRP at 375.

¶ 8 On appeal, Ramirez argued that the trial court failed to make an adequate individualized inquiry into his ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs, contrary to *Blazina*, 182 Wash.2d at 837-38, 344 P.3d 680.³ In a 2-1 unpublished opinion, Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the court “conducted an adequate individualized inquiry and did not err in imposing the discretionary LFOs.” *State v. Ramirez*, No. 48705-5-II, slip op. at 13, 2017 WL 4791011 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished), <https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2048705-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf>. In reviewing the trial court’s decision to impose discretionary LFOs on Ramirez, the Court of Appeals majority applied an overall abuse of discretion standard; it cited the information offered by Ramirez in his statement to the trial court as sufficient grounds for finding Ramirez able to pay LFOs. *Id.* at 12-13.

³ Ramirez’s appeal additionally raised several guilt-phase claims of error, which the Court of Appeals rejected. *State v. Ramirez*, No. 48705-5-II, slip op. at 7-11, 13-15, 2017 WL 4791011 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished), <https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2048705-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf>. These issues are not before us.

¶ 9 In dissent, Chief Judge Bjorgen argued that the question of whether a trial court made an adequate inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay discretionary LFOs should be reviewed de novo, not for an abuse of discretion. *Id.* at 16 (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). Applying the de novo standard, Chief Judge Bjorgen concluded that the trial court’s inquiry into Ramirez’s financial status fell short of the *Blazina* standards. *Id.* at 19.

*3 ¶ 10 On March 7, 2018, we granted Ramirez’s petition for review “only on the issue of discretionary [LFOs].” Order Granting Review, No. 95249-3 (Wash. Mar. 7, 2018). On March 27, 2018, just weeks after we granted Ramirez’s petition, House Bill 1783 became law. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269. House Bill 1783’s amendments relate to Washington’s system for imposing and collecting LFOs and are effective as of June 7, 2018. House Bill 1783 is particularly relevant to Ramirez’s case because it amends the discretionary LFO statute to prohibit trial courts from imposing discretionary LFOs on defendants who are indigent at the time of sentencing. *Id.* at § 6(3).

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 This case concerns Washington's system of LFOs, specifically the imposition of discretionary LFOs on individuals who lack the current and future ability to pay them. State law requires that trial courts consider the financial resources of a defendant and the nature of the burden imposed by LFOs before ordering the defendant to pay discretionary costs. See RCW 10.01.160(3).

¶ 12 We addressed former RCW 10.01.160(3) in *Blazina* and held that the statute requires trial courts to conduct an individualized inquiry into the financial circumstances of each offender before levying any discretionary LFOs. 182 Wash.2d at 839, 344 P.3d 680. As Ramirez's case demonstrates, however, costs are often imposed with very little discussion. We granted review in this case to articulate specific inquiries trial courts should make in determining whether an individual has the current and future ability to pay discretionary costs.

¶ 13 After we granted review, the legislature enacted House Bill 1783, which amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) to categorically prohibit the imposition of any discretionary costs on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). House Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) (2015), to prohibit courts from imposing the \$200 filing fee on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17(2)(h). According to Ramirez's motion for an order of indigency, which the trial court granted, Ramirez unquestionably qualified as indigent at the time of sentencing: Ramirez had no source of income or assets and no savings, and owed more than \$10,000 at the time of sentencing. Suppl. CP at 3-4.

¶ 14 This case presents two issues. The primary issue is whether the trial court conducted an adequate individualized inquiry into Ramirez's ability to pay, as required under *Blazina* and former RCW 10.01.160(3). A separate but related issue is whether House Bill 1783's statutory amendments apply to Ramirez's case on appeal.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Conduct an Adequate Individualized Inquiry into Ramirez's Current and Future Ability To Pay LFOs

¶ 15 The threshold issue in this case is whether the trial court performed an adequate inquiry into Ramirez's present and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs. In addressing this issue, we must decide what standard of review applies to a trial court's decision to impose discretionary LFOs. The Court of Appeals was seemingly split on this question, with the majority applying an overall abuse of discretion standard and the

dissenting judge applying de novo review. We address the proper standard of review before turning to the merits of Ramirez’s argument.

A. The Adequacy of the Trial Court’s Individualized Inquiry into a Defendant’s Ability To Pay Discretionary LFOs Should Be Reviewed De Novo

¶ 16 As Ramirez correctly points out, the question of whether the trial court adequately inquired into his ability to pay discretionary LFOs involves both a factual and a legal component. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 16. On the factual side, the reviewing court determines what evidence the trial court actually considered in making the *Blazina* inquiry. Chief Judge Bjorgen aptly observed that the factual determination can be decided by simply examining the record for supporting evidence.⁴ *Ramirez, slip op. at 17* (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). On the legal side, the reviewing court decides whether the trial court’s inquiry complied with the requirements of *Blazina*. Both the majority and dissenting opinions below recognized that this legal inquiry merits de novo review. *See id. at 13 n.4* (“[w]hether or not a trial court makes an individualized inquiry is reviewed de novo”), *17* (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting) (describing this as “an unalloyed legal question”).

⁴ Ramirez criticizes Chief Judge Bjorgen for embracing a “clearly erroneous” standard of review for factual determinations, based on prior appellate decisions. *See* Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 17 & n.6. Ramirez insists that “substantial evidence” is the correct Washington standard, while “clear error” applies in federal courts. *Id.* We believe the distinction is semantic in this context. The very case Ramirez cites as identifying different state and federal standards says, “[W]e review [factual findings] for substantial evidence, which is analogous to the ‘clear error’ test applied by the federal courts.” *Steele v. Lundgren*, 85 Wash. App. 845, 850, 935 P.2d 671 (1997).

*4 ¶ 17 Given their shared recognition that de novo review applies to the question of whether the trial court complied with *Blazina*, the split in the Court of Appeals may be more a difference in emphasis than in substance. *Blazina* establishes what constitutes an adequate inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay under state law, and the standard of review for an issue involving questions of law is de novo. *State v. Hanson*, 151 Wash.2d 783, 784-85, 91 P.3d 888 (2004). Ramirez is correct that the *Blazina* inquiry is similar to other inquiries trial judges make that are subject to de novo review. *See* Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 16-17 (citing *State v. Vicuna*, 119 Wash. App. 26, 30-31, 79 P.3d 1 (2003) (applying de novo review to determination of whether a conflict exists between attorney and client); *State v. Ramirez-Dominguez*, 140 Wash. App. 233, 239, 165 P.3d 391 (2007) (applying de novo review to determination of whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial)).

¶ 18 That said, the trial court’s ultimate decision whether to impose discretionary LFOs is undoubtedly discretionary. The trial court must balance the defendant’s ability to pay against the burden of his obligation, which is an exercise of discretion. *State v. Baldwin*, 63 Wash. App. 303, 312, 818 P.2d 1116 (1991). But, discretion is necessarily abused when it is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. *State v. Stenson*, 132 Wash.2d 668, 701, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). If the trial court fails to conduct an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s financial circumstances, as RCW 10.01.160(3) requires, and nonetheless imposes discretionary LFOs on the defendant, the trial court has per se abused its discretionary power. Stated differently, the court’s exercise of discretion is unreasonable when it is premised on a legal error. The focus of Ramirez’s argument for de novo review is squarely on the trial court’s legal error in failing to conduct an individualized inquiry. Thus, while the State is correct that the abuse of discretion standard of review is relevant to the broad question of whether discretionary LFOs were validly imposed, de novo review applies to the alleged error in this case: the failure to make an adequate inquiry under *Blazina*.

B. The Trial Court’s Inquiry into Ramirez’s Ability To Pay Discretionary LFOs Was Inadequate under Blazina

¶ 19 The legal question before us is whether the trial court’s inquiry into Ramirez’s current and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs was adequate under *Blazina*. In *Blazina*, we held that former RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the trial court to conduct an individualized inquiry on the record concerning a defendant’s current and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs. 182 Wash.2d at 839, 344 P.3d 680. We explained that “the court must do more than sign a judgment and sentence with boilerplate language stating that it engaged in the required inquiry.” *Id.* at 838, 344 P.3d 680. As part of this inquiry, the trial court is required to consider “important factors,” such as incarceration and the defendant’s other debts, when determining a defendant’s ability to pay. *Id.* Additionally, we specifically instructed courts to look for additional guidance in the comment to court rule GR 34, which lists the ways a person may prove indigent status for the purpose of seeking a waiver of filing fees and surcharges. *Id.*; *City of Richland v. Wakefield*, 186 Wash.2d 596, 606-07, 380 P.3d 459 (2016). As we further clarified, “if someone does meet the GR 34 standard for indigency, courts should seriously question that person’s ability to pay LFOs.” *Blazina*, 182 Wash.2d at 839, 344 P.3d 680.

¶ 20 Here, the record shows that the trial court asked only two questions concerning Ramirez’s ability to pay LFOs, both of which were directed to the State. First, the court asked, “And when he is not in jail, he has the ability to make money to make periodic payments on his LFOs, right?” VRP at 348. The State responded, “When he’s not in jail and when he is in jail,” noting that Ramirez could work while incarcerated. *Id.* The court then asked the State for clarification on the LFO issue: “But as far as you are concerned, the LFOs should be imposed.” *Id.* In response, the State simply answered, “Yes.” *Id.* The record reflects that these two questions, directed to the State, are the only questions asked by the trial court relating to Ramirez’s ability to pay discretionary LFOs before ordering him to pay \$25 per month starting in 60 days. When Ramirez asked, “How am I going to do that

from inside?” *id.* at 376, the trial court said nothing. Ramirez’s counsel said, “I will explain,” and the court moved on. *Id.*

*5 ¶ 21 The court made no inquiry into Ramirez’s debts, which his declaration of indigency listed as exceeding \$10,000 at the time of sentencing (apparently previously imposed court costs and fees). Suppl. CP at 4. Nor does the record reflect that the trial court inquired into whether Ramirez met the GR 34 standard for indigency. Had the court looked to GR 34 for guidance, as required under *Blazina*, it would have confirmed that Ramirez was indigent at the time of sentencing—his income fell below 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline. As we explained in *Blazina*, “if someone does meet the GR 34 standard for indigency, courts should seriously question that person’s ability to pay LFOs.” 182 Wash.2d at 839, 344 P.3d 680; Wakefield, 186 Wash.2d at 607, 380 P.3d 459. The record does not reflect that the trial court meaningfully inquired into any of the mandatory *Blazina* factors.

¶ 22 The trial court also failed to consider other “important factors” relating to Ramirez’s current and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs, such as Ramirez’s income, his assets and other financial resources, his monthly living expenses, and his employment history. *Blazina*, 182 Wash.2d at 838, 344 P.3d 680. In *Blazina*, we held that “[t]he record must reflect that the trial court made an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s current and future ability to pay,” which requires the court to consider “important factors,” in addition to the mandatory factors discussed above. *Id.* The only information in the record about Ramirez’s financial situation came during Ramirez’s allocution and was offered to show how he had been putting his life in order prior to his arrest. The court made no inquiry.

¶ 23 Consistent with *Blazina*’s instruction that courts use GR 34 as a guide for determining whether someone has an ability to pay discretionary costs, we believe the financial statement section of Ramirez’s motion for indigency would have provided a reliable framework for the individualized inquiry that *Blazina* and RCW 10.01.160(3) require. In determining a defendant’s indigency status, the financial statement section of the motion for indigency asks the defendant to answer questions relating to five broad categories: (1) employment history, (2) income, (3) assets and other financial resources, (4) monthly living expenses, and (5) other debts. *See* Suppl. CP at 2-4. These categories are equally relevant to determining a defendant’s ability to pay discretionary LFOs.

¶ 24 Regarding employment history, a trial court should inquire into the defendant’s present employment and past work experience. The court should also inquire into the defendant’s income, as well as the defendant’s assets and other financial resources. Finally, the court should ask questions about the defendant’s monthly expenses, and as identified in *Blazina*, the court must ask about the defendant’s other debts, including other LFOs, health care costs, or education loans. To satisfy *Blazina* and RCW 10.01.160(3)’s mandate that the State

cannot collect costs from defendants who are unable to pay, the record must reflect that the trial court inquired into all five of these categories before deciding to impose discretionary costs. That did not happen here.

¶ 25 The State argues, and the Court of Appeals majority agreed, that despite any lack of inquiry by the trial court into Ramirez’s ability to pay, statements by Ramirez during his allocution were adequate to support the imposition of discretionary LFOs. Resp’t’s Br. at 4. In opposing the State’s request for an exceptional sentence, Ramirez told the court he was “doing everything right” prior to his arrest—he was working a minimum wage job at Weyerhaeuser on a “temporary service team,” his wife had helped him get his own apartment, he was paying his household bills, including a DirecTV subscription, and he had opened a bank account for the first time in his life and was hoping to get a driver’s license. VRP at 359-363. Ramirez did not offer this information in the context of assessing his current and future ability to pay LFOs, but rather in an effort to “counter the State’s negative portrayal of him and direct the court’s attention to his accomplishments in order to persuade the court he was deserving of a lesser sentence.” Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 19.

*6 ¶ 26 Notably, while the Court of Appeals majority viewed Ramirez’s statements as supporting imposition of discretionary costs, there is no indication in the record that the trial court actually relied on any of Ramirez’s statements. *See Ramirez, slip op. at 13.*⁵ Nor would reliance on Ramirez’s statements be reasonable, given that Ramirez was describing his circumstances and the positive strides he had made in the months *prior* to his arrest. As his statements at sentencing and his declaration of indigency make clear, all of that changed. Indeed, Ramirez lamented that after being on the right track, he “screwed up” and lost everything. VRP at 363.

⁵ The Court of Appeals inferred that the trial court’s decision was based on Ramirez’s statements:

Here, the court considered that Ramirez had recently been released from custody, was working in a minimum wage job, and had been paying his household bills. Ramirez also told the court that he had opened a bank account for the first time in his life and “was just getting on track[.]” He added that although he was working a minimum wage job “it was fine because it took care of everything.” Thus, we hold that the court conducted an adequate individualized inquiry and did not err in imposing the discretionary LFOs.

Ramirez, slip op. at 13 (citations omitted).

¶ 27 RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the trial court to inquire into a person’s present and future ability to pay LFOs. This inquiry must be made on the record, and courts should be cautious of any after-the-fact attempt to justify the imposition of LFOs based on information offered by a defendant for an entirely different purpose. Judges understand that defendants want to appear in their best light at sentencing. It is precisely for this reason that the judge’s obligation is to engage in an on-the-record individualized inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay discretionary LFOs.

¶ 28 We hold that the trial court failed to make an adequate individualized inquiry into Ramirez’s current and future ability to pay prior to imposing discretionary LFOs. Normally, this *Blazina* error would entitle Ramirez to a full resentencing hearing on his ability to pay LFOs. The timing of Ramirez’s appeal, however, makes this case somewhat unusual. After we granted review, the legislature passed House Bill 1783, which amends two LFO statutes at issue. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269. House Bill 1783 amends the discretionary LFO statute, former ROW 10.01.160, to prohibit courts from imposing discretionary costs on a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a) through (c). LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). House Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former RCW 36.18.020(h), to prohibit courts from imposing the \$200 filing fee on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17(2)(h).

¶ 29 Ramirez argues that House Bill 1783’s amendments apply to his case on appeal because he qualified as indigent at the time of sentencing and his case was not yet final when House Bill 1783 was enacted. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 8-10. As for the remedy, Ramirez asks us to strike the discretionary LFOs and the \$200 criminal filing fee from his judgment and sentence rather than remand his case for resentencing. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that House Bill 1783 applies on appeal to invalidate Ramirez’s discretionary LFOs (and the \$200 criminal filing fee) and that resentencing is unnecessary in this case.

II. House Bill 1783 Applies Prospectively to Ramirez’s Case Because the Statutory Amendments Pertain to Costs and His Case on Direct Review Is Not Yet Final

¶ 30 House Bill 1783’s amendments modify Washington’s system of LFOs, addressing some of the worst facets of the system that prevent offenders from rebuilding their lives after conviction. For example, House Bill 1783 eliminates interest accrual on the nonrestitution portions of LFOs, it establishes that the DNA database fee is no longer mandatory if the offender’s DNA has been collected because of a prior conviction, and it provides that a court may not sanction an offender for failure to pay LFOs unless the failure to pay is willful. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, §§ 1, 18, 7. Relevant here, House Bill 1783 amends the discretionary LFO statute, former RCW 10.01.160, to prohibit courts from imposing discretionary costs on a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). It also prohibits imposing the \$200 filing fee on indigent defendants. *Id.* § 17. Because House Bill 1783 was enacted *after* we granted Ramirez’s petition for review, we must decide whether House Bill 1783’s amendments apply to Ramirez’s case on appeal. We hold that House Bill 1783 applies prospectively to Ramirez because the statutory amendments pertain to costs imposed on criminal defendants following conviction, and Ramirez’s case was pending on direct review and thus not final when the amendments were enacted.

*7 ¶ 31 At the time of Ramirez’s sentencing in 2016, the discretionary cost statute provided that “[t]he court shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be

able to pay them.” Former RCW 10.01.160(3). In making this determination, the statute instructed the trial court to “take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose.” *Id.* The statutory language directs that the trial court must consider a defendant’s current and future ability to pay before deciding to impose discretionary costs on the defendant.

¶ 32 House Bill 1783 amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) to expressly prohibit courts from imposing discretionary costs on defendants who are indigent at the time of sentencing: “The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs if the defendant at the time of sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a) through (c).” LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). Under RCW 10.101.010(3)(a) through (c), a person is “indigent” if the person receives certain types of public assistance, is involuntarily committed to a public mental health facility, or receives an annual income after taxes of 125 percent or less of the current federal poverty level. If the defendant is not indigent, the amendment instructs the court to engage in the same individualized inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay as previously required under former RCW 10.01.160(3), i.e., to assess “the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose.” *Id.* In this case, there is no question that Ramirez satisfied the indigency requirements of RCW 10.101.010(3)(c) at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, if House Bill 1783 applies to Ramirez’s case, the trial court impermissibly imposed discretionary LFOs on Ramirez.

¶ 33 As noted, House Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h), to prohibit charging the \$200 criminal filing fee to defendants who are indigent at the time of sentencing. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17. Thus, if House Bill 1783’s amendments apply to Ramirez’s case on appeal, the trial court improperly imposed both the discretionary costs of \$2,100 and the criminal filing fee.

¶ 34 This is not our first occasion to consider the prospective application of cost statutes to criminal cases on appeal. In State v. Blank, 131 Wash.2d 230, 249, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997), we held that a statute imposing appellate costs applied prospectively to the defendants’ cases on appeal. In Blank, the defendants’ appeals were pending when the legislature enacted a statute providing for recoupment of appellate defense costs from a convicted defendant. *Id.* at 234, 930 P.2d 1213. In determining whether the statute applied to the defendants’ cases, we clarified that “[a] statute operates prospectively when the precipitating event for [its] application ... occurs after the effective date of the statute.” *Id.* at 248, 930 P.2d 1213 (alterations in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wash. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 83 Wash.2d 523, 535, 520 P.2d 162 (1974)). We concluded that the “precipitating event” for a statute “concerning attorney fees and costs of litigation” was the termination of the defendant’s case and held that the statute therefore applied prospectively to cases that were pending on appeal when the costs statute was enacted. *Id.* at 249, 930 P.2d 1213

(citing *Kilpatrick v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 125 Wash.2d 222, 232, 883 P.2d 1370, 915 P.2d 519 (1994) (holding that the right to attorney fees is governed by the statute in force at the termination of the action)).

*8 ¶ 35 Similar to the statute at issue in *Blank*, House Bill 1783's amendments concern the court's ability to impose costs on a criminal defendant following conviction. House Bill 1783 amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) by expressly prohibiting the imposition of discretionary LFOs on defendants like Ramirez who are indigent at the time of sentencing; the amendment conclusively establishes that courts do not have discretion to impose such LFOs. And, like the defendants in *Blank*, Ramirez's case was on appeal as a matter of right and thus was not yet final under RAP 12.7 when House Bill 1783 became effective. Because House Bill 1783's amendments pertain to costs imposed upon conviction and Ramirez's case was not yet final when the amendments were enacted, Ramirez is entitled to benefit from this statutory change.

¶ 36 Applying House Bill 1783 to the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court impermissibly imposed discretionary LFOs of \$2,100, as well as the \$200 criminal filing fee, on Ramirez. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence to strike the improperly imposed LFOs.

CONCLUSION

¶ 37 In *Blazina*, we held that under former RCW 10.73.160(3), trial courts have an obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs before imposing them at sentencing. Today, we articulate specific inquiries trial courts should make in determining whether an individual has the current and future ability to pay discretionary costs. Trial courts must meaningfully inquire into the mandatory factors established by *Blazina*, such as a defendant's incarceration and other debts, or whether a defendant meets the GR 34 standard for indigency. Trial courts must also consider other "important factors" relating to a defendant's financial circumstances, including employment history, income, assets and other financial resources, monthly living expenses, and other debts. Under this framework, trial courts must conduct an on-the-record inquiry into the mandatory *Blazina* factors and other "important factors" before imposing discretionary LFOs.

¶ 38 We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate *Blazina* inquiry into Ramirez's current and future ability to pay. Although this *Blazina* error would normally entitle Ramirez to a resentencing hearing on his ability to pay, resentencing is unnecessary in this case. House Bill 1783, which prohibits the imposition of discretionary LFOs on an indigent defendant, applies on appeal to invalidate Ramirez's

discretionary LFOs (and the \$200 criminal filing fee). We remand for the trial court to strike the \$2,100 discretionary LFOs and the \$200 filing fee from Ramirez's judgment and sentence.

WE CONCUR:

Fairhurst, C.J.

Johnson, J.

Madsen, J.

Owens, J.

Wiggins, J.

González, J.

Gordon McCloud, J.

Yu, J.

All Citations

--- P.3d ----, 2018 WL 4499761

CERTIFICATION OF ENROLLMENT
ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 1783

65th Legislature
2018 Regular Session

Passed by the House March 6, 2018
Yeas 83 Nays 15

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Passed by the Senate February 28, 2018
Yeas 32 Nays 17

President of the Senate

Approved

Governor of the State of Washington

CERTIFICATE

I, Bernard Dean, Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives of the State of Washington, do hereby certify that the attached is **ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 1783** as passed by House of Representatives and the Senate on the dates hereon set forth.

Chief Clerk

FILED

**Secretary of State
State of Washington**

ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 1783

AS AMENDED BY THE SENATE

Passed Legislature - 2018 Regular Session

State of Washington

65th Legislature

2017 Regular Session

By House Appropriations (originally sponsored by Representatives Holy, Goodman, Hansen, Hayes, Stokesbary, Senn, Orwall, Kagi, Appleton, Kilduff, Rodne, Jinkins, Taylor, Shea, Tharinger, Frame, Fitzgibbon, Bergquist, Fey, Macri, Ryu, Doglio, Pellicciotti, Peterson, Santos, Reeves, Kloba, Robinson, Stanford, Hudgins, McBride, Ormsby, and Pollet)

READ FIRST TIME 02/24/17.

1 AN ACT Relating to legal financial obligations; amending RCW
2 10.82.090, 3.50.100, 3.62.040, 35.20.220, 10.01.160, 10.01.170,
3 10.01.180, 10.46.190, 10.64.015, 9.92.070, 10.73.160, 9.94A.6333,
4 9.94A.760, 9.94B.040, 3.62.085, 36.18.020, 43.43.7541, and 7.68.035;
5 reenacting and amending RCW 3.62.020; and creating new sections.

6 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:

7 **Sec. 1.** RCW 10.82.090 and 2015 c 265 s 23 are each amended to
8 read as follows:

9 (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,
10 (~~financial obligations~~) restitution imposed in a judgment shall
11 bear interest from the date of the judgment until payment, at the
12 rate applicable to civil judgments. As of the effective date of this
13 section, no interest shall accrue on nonrestitution legal financial
14 obligations. All nonrestitution interest retained by the court shall
15 be split twenty-five percent to the state treasurer for deposit in
16 the state general fund, twenty-five percent to the state treasurer
17 for deposit in the judicial information system account as provided in
18 RCW 2.68.020, twenty-five percent to the county current expense fund,
19 and twenty-five percent to the county current expense fund to fund
20 local courts.

1 (2) The court may, on motion by the offender, following the
2 offender's release from total confinement, reduce or waive the
3 interest on legal financial obligations levied as a result of a
4 criminal conviction as follows:

5 (a) The court shall waive all interest on the portions of the
6 legal financial obligations that are not restitution that accrued
7 ~~((during the term of total confinement for the conviction giving rise
8 to the financial obligations, provided the offender shows that the
9 interest creates a hardship for the offender or his or her immediate
10 family))~~ prior to the effective date of this section;

11 (b) The court may reduce interest on the restitution portion of
12 the legal financial obligations only if the principal has been paid
13 in full(~~;~~

14 ~~(c) The court may otherwise reduce or waive the interest on the
15 portions of the legal financial obligations that are not restitution
16 if the offender shows that he or she has personally made a good faith
17 effort to pay and that the interest accrual is causing a significant
18 hardship. For purposes of this section, "good faith effort" means
19 that the offender has either (i) paid the principal amount in full;
20 or (ii) made at least fifteen monthly payments within an eighteen-
21 month period, excluding any payments mandatorily deducted by the
22 department of corrections;~~

23 ~~(d) For purposes of (a) through (c) of this subsection, the court
24 may reduce or waive interest on legal financial obligations only))~~
25 and as an incentive for the offender to meet his or her other legal
26 financial obligations. The court may grant the motion, establish a
27 payment schedule, and retain jurisdiction over the offender for
28 purposes of reviewing and revising the reduction or waiver of
29 interest.

30 (3) This section only applies to adult offenders.

31 **Sec. 2.** RCW 3.50.100 and 2012 c 136 s 3 are each amended to read
32 as follows:

33 (1) Costs in civil and criminal actions may be imposed as
34 provided in district court. All fees, costs, fines, forfeitures and
35 other money imposed by any municipal court for the violation of any
36 municipal or town ordinances shall be collected by the court clerk
37 and, together with any other noninterest revenues received by the
38 clerk, shall be deposited with the city or town treasurer as a part
39 of the general fund of the city or town, or deposited in such other

1 fund of the city or town, or deposited in such other funds as may be
2 designated by the laws of the state of Washington.

3 (2) Except as provided in RCW 9A.88.120 and 10.99.080, the city
4 treasurer shall remit monthly thirty-two percent of the noninterest
5 money received under this section, other than for parking
6 infractions, and certain costs to the state treasurer. "Certain
7 costs" as used in this subsection, means those costs awarded to
8 prevailing parties in civil actions under RCW 4.84.010 or 36.18.040,
9 or those costs awarded against convicted defendants in criminal
10 actions under RCW 10.01.160, 10.46.190, or 36.18.040, or other
11 similar statutes if such costs are specifically designated as costs
12 by the court and are awarded for the specific reimbursement of costs
13 incurred by the state, county, city, or town in the prosecution of
14 the case, including the fees of defense counsel. Money remitted under
15 this subsection to the state treasurer shall be deposited in the
16 state general fund.

17 (3) The balance of the noninterest money received under this
18 section shall be retained by the city and deposited as provided by
19 law.

20 (4) (a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, penalties,
21 finances, (~~bail forfeitures,~~) fees, and costs may accrue interest at
22 the rate of twelve percent per annum, upon assignment to a collection
23 agency. Interest may accrue only while the case is in collection
24 status.

25 (b) As of the effective date of this section, penalties, fines,
26 bail forfeitures, fees, and costs imposed against a defendant in a
27 criminal proceeding shall not accrue interest.

28 (5) Interest retained by the court on penalties, fines, bail
29 forfeitures, fees, and costs shall be split twenty-five percent to
30 the state treasurer for deposit in the state general fund, twenty-
31 five percent to the state treasurer for deposit in the judicial
32 information system account as provided in RCW 2.68.020, twenty-five
33 percent to the city general fund, and twenty-five percent to the city
34 general fund to fund local courts.

35 **Sec. 3.** RCW 3.62.020 and 2012 c 262 s 1, 2012 c 136 s 4, and
36 2012 c 134 s 6 are each reenacted and amended to read as follows:

37 (1) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, all
38 costs, fees, fines, forfeitures and penalties assessed and collected
39 in whole or in part by district courts, except costs, fines,

1 forfeitures and penalties assessed and collected, in whole or in
2 part, because of the violation of city ordinances, shall be remitted
3 by the clerk of the district court to the county treasurer at least
4 monthly, together with a financial statement as required by the state
5 auditor, noting the information necessary for crediting of such funds
6 as required by law.

7 (2) Except as provided in RCW 9A.88.120, 10.99.080, 7.84.100(4),
8 and this section, the county treasurer shall remit thirty-two percent
9 of the noninterest money received under subsection (1) of this
10 section except certain costs to the state treasurer. "Certain costs"
11 as used in this subsection, means those costs awarded to prevailing
12 parties in civil actions under RCW 4.84.010 or 36.18.040, or those
13 costs awarded against convicted defendants in criminal actions under
14 RCW 10.01.160, 10.46.190, or 36.18.040, or other similar statutes if
15 such costs are specifically designated as costs by the court and are
16 awarded for the specific reimbursement of costs incurred by the state
17 or county in the prosecution of the case, including the fees of
18 defense counsel. With the exception of funds to be transferred to the
19 judicial stabilization trust account under RCW 3.62.060(2), money
20 remitted under this subsection to the state treasurer shall be
21 deposited in the state general fund.

22 (3) The balance of the noninterest money received by the county
23 treasurer under subsection (1) of this section shall be deposited in
24 the county current expense fund. Funds deposited under this
25 subsection that are attributable to the county's portion of a
26 surcharge imposed under RCW 3.62.060(2) must be used to support local
27 trial court and court-related functions.

28 (4) Except as provided in RCW 7.84.100(4), all money collected
29 for county parking infractions shall be remitted by the clerk of the
30 district court at least monthly, with the information required under
31 subsection (1) of this section, to the county treasurer for deposit
32 in the county current expense fund.

33 (5) (a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, penalties,
34 finances, ((bail forfeitures,)) fees, and costs may accrue interest at
35 the rate of twelve percent per annum, upon assignment to a collection
36 agency. Interest may accrue only while the case is in collection
37 status.

38 (b) As of the effective date of this section, penalties, fines,
39 bail forfeitures, fees, and costs imposed against a defendant in a
40 criminal proceeding shall not accrue interest.

1 (6) Interest retained by the court on penalties, fines, bail
2 forfeitures, fees, and costs shall be split twenty-five percent to
3 the state treasurer for deposit in the state general fund, twenty-
4 five percent to the state treasurer for deposit in the judicial
5 information system account as provided in RCW 2.68.020, twenty-five
6 percent to the county current expense fund, and twenty-five percent
7 to the county current expense fund to fund local courts.

8 **Sec. 4.** RCW 3.62.040 and 2012 c 136 s 5 are each amended to read
9 as follows:

10 (1) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, all
11 costs, fines, forfeitures and penalties assessed and collected, in
12 whole or in part, by district courts because of violations of city
13 ordinances shall be remitted by the clerk of the district court at
14 least monthly directly to the treasurer of the city wherein the
15 violation occurred.

16 (2) Except as provided in RCW 9A.88.120 and 10.99.080, the city
17 treasurer shall remit monthly thirty-two percent of the noninterest
18 money received under this section, other than for parking infractions
19 and certain costs, to the state treasurer. "Certain costs" as used in
20 this subsection, means those costs awarded to prevailing parties in
21 civil actions under RCW 4.84.010 or 36.18.040, or those costs awarded
22 against convicted defendants in criminal actions under RCW 10.01.160,
23 10.46.190, or 36.18.040, or other similar statutes if such costs are
24 specifically designated as costs by the court and are awarded for the
25 specific reimbursement of costs incurred by the state, county, city,
26 or town in the prosecution of the case, including the fees of defense
27 counsel. Money remitted under this subsection to the state treasurer
28 shall be deposited in the state general fund.

29 (3) The balance of the noninterest money received under this
30 section shall be retained by the city and deposited as provided by
31 law.

32 (4) All money collected for city parking infractions shall be
33 remitted by the clerk of the district court at least monthly to the
34 city treasurer for deposit in the city's general fund.

35 (5) (a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, penalties,
36 fines, (~~bail forfeitures,~~) fees, and costs may accrue interest at
37 the rate of twelve percent per annum, upon assignment to a collection
38 agency. Interest may accrue only while the case is in collection
39 status.

1 (b) As of the effective date of this section, penalties, fines,
2 bail forfeitures, fees, and costs imposed against a defendant in a
3 criminal proceeding shall not accrue interest.

4 (6) Interest retained by the court on penalties, fines, bail
5 forfeitures, fees, and costs shall be split twenty-five percent to
6 the state treasurer for deposit in the state general fund, twenty-
7 five percent to the state treasurer for deposit in the judicial
8 information system account as provided in RCW 2.68.020, twenty-five
9 percent to the city general fund, and twenty-five percent to the city
10 general fund to fund local courts.

11 **Sec. 5.** RCW 35.20.220 and 2012 c 136 s 7 are each amended to
12 read as follows:

13 (1) The chief clerk, under the supervision and direction of the
14 court administrator of the municipal court, shall have the custody
15 and care of the books, papers and records of the court. The chief
16 clerk or a deputy shall be present during the session of the court
17 and has the power to swear all witnesses and jurors, administer oaths
18 and affidavits, and take acknowledgments. The chief clerk shall keep
19 the records of the court and shall issue all process under his or her
20 hand and the seal of the court. The chief clerk shall do and perform
21 all things and have the same powers pertaining to the office as the
22 clerks of the superior courts have in their office. He or she shall
23 receive all fines, penalties, and fees of every kind and keep a full,
24 accurate, and detailed account of the same. The chief clerk shall on
25 each day pay into the city treasury all money received for the city
26 during the day previous, with a detailed account of the same, and
27 taking the treasurer's receipt therefor.

28 (2) Except as provided in RCW 9A.88.120 and 10.99.080, the city
29 treasurer shall remit monthly thirty-two percent of the noninterest
30 money received under this section, other than for parking infractions
31 and certain costs to the state treasurer. "Certain costs" as used in
32 this subsection, means those costs awarded to prevailing parties in
33 civil actions under RCW 4.84.010 or 36.18.040, or those costs awarded
34 against convicted defendants in criminal actions under RCW 10.01.160,
35 10.46.190, or 36.18.040, or other similar statutes if such costs are
36 specifically designated as costs by the court and are awarded for the
37 specific reimbursement of costs incurred by the state, county, city,
38 or town in the prosecution of the case, including the fees of defense

1 counsel. Money remitted under this subsection to the state treasurer
2 shall be deposited in the state general fund.

3 (3) The balance of the noninterest money received under this
4 section shall be retained by the city and deposited as provided by
5 law.

6 (4) (a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, penalties,
7 finances, ((bail forfeitures,)) fees, and costs may accrue interest at
8 the rate of twelve percent per annum, upon assignment to a collection
9 agency. Interest may accrue only while the case is in collection
10 status.

11 (b) As of the effective date of this section, penalties, fines,
12 bail forfeitures, fees, and costs imposed against a defendant in a
13 criminal proceeding shall not accrue interest.

14 (5) Interest retained by the court on penalties, fines, bail
15 forfeitures, fees, and costs shall be split twenty-five percent to
16 the state treasurer for deposit in the state general fund, twenty-
17 five percent to the state treasurer for deposit in the judicial
18 information system account as provided in RCW 2.68.020, twenty-five
19 percent to the city general fund, and twenty-five percent to the city
20 general fund to fund local courts.

21 **Sec. 6.** RCW 10.01.160 and 2015 3rd sp.s. c 35 s 1 are each
22 amended to read as follows:

23 (1) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the
24 court may require a defendant to pay costs. Costs may be imposed only
25 upon a convicted defendant, except for costs imposed upon a
26 defendant's entry into a deferred prosecution program, costs imposed
27 upon a defendant for pretrial supervision, or costs imposed upon a
28 defendant for preparing and serving a warrant for failure to appear.

29 (2) Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the
30 state in prosecuting the defendant or in administering the deferred
31 prosecution program under chapter 10.05 RCW or pretrial supervision.
32 They cannot include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally
33 guaranteed jury trial or expenditures in connection with the
34 maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be made by
35 the public irrespective of specific violations of law. Expenses
36 incurred for serving of warrants for failure to appear and jury fees
37 under RCW 10.46.190 may be included in costs the court may require a
38 defendant to pay. Costs for administering a deferred prosecution may
39 not exceed two hundred fifty dollars. Costs for administering a

1 pretrial supervision other than a pretrial electronic alcohol
2 monitoring program, drug monitoring program, or 24/7 sobriety program
3 may not exceed one hundred fifty dollars. Costs for preparing and
4 serving a warrant for failure to appear may not exceed one hundred
5 dollars. Costs of incarceration imposed on a defendant convicted of a
6 misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor may not exceed the actual cost of
7 incarceration. In no case may the court require the offender to pay
8 more than one hundred dollars per day for the cost of incarceration.
9 Payment of other court-ordered financial obligations, including all
10 legal financial obligations and costs of supervision take precedence
11 over the payment of the cost of incarceration ordered by the court.
12 All funds received from defendants for the cost of incarceration in
13 the county or city jail must be remitted for criminal justice
14 purposes to the county or city that is responsible for the
15 defendant's jail costs. Costs imposed constitute a judgment against a
16 defendant and survive a dismissal of the underlying action against
17 the defendant. However, if the defendant is acquitted on the
18 underlying action, the costs for preparing and serving a warrant for
19 failure to appear do not survive the acquittal, and the judgment that
20 such costs would otherwise constitute shall be vacated.

21 (3) The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs (~~(unless)~~)
22 if the defendant ((is or will be able to pay them)) at the time of
23 sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through
24 (c). In determining the amount and method of payment of costs for
25 defendants who are not indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a)
26 through (c), the court shall take account of the financial resources
27 of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs
28 will impose.

29 (4) A defendant who has been ordered to pay costs and who is not
30 in contumacious default in the payment thereof may at any time after
31 release from total confinement petition the sentencing court for
32 remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof.
33 If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the
34 amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or the
35 defendant's immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the
36 amount due in costs, (~~(or)~~) modify the method of payment under RCW
37 10.01.170, or convert the unpaid costs to community restitution
38 hours, if the jurisdiction operates a community restitution program,
39 at the rate of no less than the state minimum wage established in RCW
40 49.46.020 for each hour of community restitution. Manifest hardship

1 exists where the defendant is indigent as defined in RCW
2 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c).

3 (5) Except for direct costs relating to evaluating and reporting
4 to the court, prosecutor, or defense counsel regarding a defendant's
5 competency to stand trial as provided in RCW 10.77.060, this section
6 shall not apply to costs related to medical or mental health
7 treatment or services a defendant receives while in custody of the
8 secretary of the department of social and health services or other
9 governmental units. This section shall not prevent the secretary of
10 the department of social and health services or other governmental
11 units from imposing liability and seeking reimbursement from a
12 defendant committed to an appropriate facility as provided in RCW
13 10.77.084 while criminal proceedings are stayed. This section shall
14 also not prevent governmental units from imposing liability on
15 defendants for costs related to providing medical or mental health
16 treatment while the defendant is in the governmental unit's custody.
17 Medical or mental health treatment and services a defendant receives
18 at a state hospital or other facility are not a cost of prosecution
19 and shall be recoverable under RCW 10.77.250 and 70.48.130, chapter
20 43.20B RCW, and any other applicable statute.

21 **Sec. 7.** RCW 10.01.170 and 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 96 s 2 are each
22 amended to read as follows:

23 (1) When a defendant is sentenced to pay ((a)) fines, penalties,
24 assessments, fees, restitution, or costs, the court may grant
25 permission for payment to be made within a specified period of time
26 or in specified installments. If the court finds that the defendant
27 is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c), the
28 court shall grant permission for payment to be made within a
29 specified period of time or in specified installments. If no such
30 permission is included in the sentence the fine or costs shall be
31 payable forthwith.

32 (2) An offender's monthly payment shall be applied in the
33 following order of priority until satisfied:

34 (a) First, proportionally to restitution to victims that have not
35 been fully compensated from other sources;

36 (b) Second, proportionally to restitution to insurance or other
37 sources with respect to a loss that has provided compensation to
38 victims;

39 (c) Third, proportionally to crime victims' assessments; and

1 (d) Fourth, proportionally to costs, fines, and other assessments
2 required by law.

3 **Sec. 8.** RCW 10.01.180 and 2010 c 8 s 1006 are each amended to
4 read as follows:

5 (1) A defendant sentenced to pay ~~((a))~~ any fine, penalty,
6 assessment, fee, or costs who willfully defaults in the payment
7 thereof or of any installment is in contempt of court as provided in
8 chapter 7.21 RCW. The court may issue a warrant of arrest for his or
9 her appearance.

10 (2) When ~~((a))~~ any fine, penalty, assessment, fee, or assessment
11 of costs is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association,
12 it is the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the
13 assets of the corporation or association to pay the ~~((fine or costs))~~
14 obligation from those assets, and his or her failure to do so may be
15 held to be contempt.

16 (3) (a) The court shall not sanction a defendant for contempt
17 based on failure to pay fines, penalties, assessments, fees, or costs
18 unless the court finds, after a hearing and on the record, that the
19 failure to pay is willful. A failure to pay is willful if the
20 defendant has the current ability to pay but refuses to do so.

21 (b) In determining whether the defendant has the current ability
22 to pay, the court shall inquire into and consider: (i) The
23 defendant's income and assets; (ii) the defendant's basic living
24 costs as defined by RCW 10.101.010 and other liabilities including
25 child support and other legal financial obligations; and (iii) the
26 defendant's bona fide efforts to acquire additional resources. A
27 defendant who is indigent as defined by RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through
28 (c) is presumed to lack the current ability to pay.

29 (c) If the court determines that the defendant is homeless or a
30 person who is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025, failure to
31 pay a legal financial obligation is not willful contempt and shall
32 not subject the defendant to penalties.

33 (4) If a term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment of
34 ~~((a))~~ any fine, penalty, assessment, fee, or costs is ordered, the
35 term of imprisonment shall be set forth in the commitment order, and
36 shall not exceed one day for each twenty-five dollars of the ~~((fine~~
37 ~~or costs))~~ amount ordered, thirty days if the ~~((fine or assessment))~~
38 amount ordered of costs was imposed upon conviction of a violation or
39 misdemeanor, or one year in any other case, whichever is the shorter

1 period. A person committed for nonpayment of ((a)) any fine, penalty,
2 assessment, fee, or costs shall be given credit toward payment for
3 each day of imprisonment at the rate specified in the commitment
4 order.

5 ((4)) (5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that
6 the default in the payment of ((a)) any fine, penalty, assessment,
7 fee, or costs is not willful contempt, the court may, and if the
8 defendant is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through
9 (c), the court shall enter an order: (a) Allowing the defendant
10 additional time for payment((7)); (b) reducing the amount thereof or
11 of each installment ((8)); (c) revoking the fine, penalty,
12 assessment, fee, or costs or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or
13 in part; or (d) converting the unpaid fine, penalty, assessment, fee,
14 or costs to community restitution hours, if the jurisdiction operates
15 a community restitution program, at the rate of no less than the
16 state minimum wage established in RCW 49.46.020 for each hour of
17 community restitution. The crime victim penalty assessment under RCW
18 7.68.035 may not be reduced, revoked, or converted to community
19 restitution hours.

20 ((5)) (6) A default in the payment of ((a)) any fine, penalty,
21 assessment, fee, or costs or any installment thereof may be collected
22 by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The
23 levy of execution for the collection of ((a)) any fine, penalty,
24 assessment, fee, or costs shall not discharge a defendant committed
25 to imprisonment for contempt until the amount ((of the fine or

26 costs)) has actually been collected.

27 **Sec. 9.** RCW 10.46.190 and 2005 c 457 s 12 are each amended to
28 read as follows:

29 Every person convicted of a crime or held to bail to keep the
30 peace ((shall)) may be liable to all the costs of the proceedings
31 against him or her, including, when tried by a jury in the superior
32 court or before a committing magistrate, a jury fee as provided for
33 in civil actions for which judgment shall be rendered and collected.
34 The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs, as described in
35 RCW 10.01.160, if the court finds that the person at the time of
36 sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through
37 (c). The jury fee, when collected for a case tried by the superior
38 court, shall be paid to the clerk and applied as the jury fee in
39 civil cases is applied.

1 **Sec. 10.** RCW 10.64.015 and Code 1881 s 1104 are each amended to
2 read as follows:

3 When the defendant is found guilty, the court shall render
4 judgment accordingly, and the defendant (~~shall~~) may be liable for
5 all costs, unless the court or jury trying the cause expressly find
6 otherwise. The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs, as
7 described in RCW 10.01.160, if the court finds that the person at the
8 time of sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a)
9 through (c).

10 **Sec. 11.** RCW 9.92.070 and 1987 c 3 s 4 are each amended to read
11 as follows:

12 Hereafter whenever any judge of any superior court or a district
13 or municipal judge shall sentence any person to pay any fines,
14 penalties, assessments, fees, and costs, the judge may, in the
15 judge's discretion, provide that such fines, penalties, assessments,
16 fees, and costs may be paid in certain designated installments, or
17 within certain designated period or periods(~~;~~~~and~~). If the court
18 finds that the defendant is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)
19 (a) through (c), the court shall allow for payment in certain
20 designated installments or within certain designated periods. If such
21 fines, penalties, assessments, fees, and costs shall be paid by the
22 defendant in accordance with such order no commitment or imprisonment
23 of the defendant shall be made for failure to pay such fine or costs.
24 PROVIDED, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any
25 sentence given for the violation of any of the liquor laws of this
26 state.

27 **Sec. 12.** RCW 10.73.160 and 2015 c 265 s 22 are each amended to
28 read as follows:

29 (1) The court of appeals, supreme court, and superior courts may
30 require an adult offender convicted of an offense to pay appellate
31 costs.

32 (2) Appellate costs are limited to expenses specifically incurred
33 by the state in prosecuting or defending an appeal or collateral
34 attack from a criminal conviction. Appellate costs shall not include
35 expenditures to maintain and operate government agencies that must be
36 made irrespective of specific violations of the law. Expenses
37 incurred for producing a verbatim report of proceedings and clerk's

1 papers may be included in costs the court may require a convicted
2 defendant to pay.

3 (3) Costs, including recoupment of fees for court-appointed
4 counsel, shall be requested in accordance with the procedures
5 contained in Title 14 of the rules of appellate procedure and in
6 Title 9 of the rules for appeal of decisions of courts of limited
7 jurisdiction. An award of costs shall become part of the trial court
8 judgment and sentence.

9 (4) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is
10 not in contumacious default in the payment may at any time after
11 release from total confinement petition the court that sentenced the
12 defendant or juvenile offender for remission of the payment of costs
13 or of any unpaid portion. If it appears to the satisfaction of the
14 sentencing court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest
15 hardship on the defendant or the defendant's immediate family, the
16 sentencing court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs,
17 ~~((or))~~ modify the method of payment under RCW 10.01.170, or convert
18 the unpaid costs to community restitution hours, if the jurisdiction
19 operates a community restitution program, at the rate of no less than
20 the state minimum wage established in RCW 49.46.020 for each hour of
21 community restitution. Manifest hardship exists where the defendant
22 or juvenile offender is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a)
23 through (c).

24 (5) The parents or another person legally obligated to support a
25 juvenile offender who has been ordered to pay appellate costs and who
26 is not in contumacious default in the payment may at any time
27 petition the court that sentenced the juvenile offender for remission
28 of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion. If it appears to
29 the satisfaction of the sentencing court that payment of the amount
30 due will impose manifest hardship on the parents or another person
31 legally obligated to support a juvenile offender or on their
32 immediate families, the sentencing court may remit all or part of the
33 amount due in costs, or may modify the method of payment.

34 **Sec. 13.** RCW 9.94A.6333 and 2008 c 231 s 19 are each amended to
35 read as follows:

36 (1) If an offender violates any condition or requirement of a
37 sentence, and the offender is not being supervised by the department,
38 the court may modify its order of judgment and sentence and impose
39 further punishment in accordance with this section.

1 (2) If an offender fails to comply with any of the nonfinancial
2 conditions or requirements of a sentence the following provisions
3 apply:

4 (a) The court, upon the motion of the state, or upon its own
5 motion, shall require the offender to show cause why the offender
6 should not be punished for the noncompliance. The court may issue a
7 summons or a warrant of arrest for the offender's appearance;

8 (b) The state has the burden of showing noncompliance by a
9 preponderance of the evidence;

10 (c) If the court finds that a violation has been proved, it may
11 impose the sanctions specified in RCW 9.94A.633(1). Alternatively,
12 the court may:

13 (i) Convert a term of partial confinement to total confinement;
14 or

15 (ii) Convert community restitution obligation to total or partial
16 confinement; (~~or~~

17 ~~(iii) Convert monetary obligations, except restitution and the~~
18 ~~crime victim penalty assessment, to community restitution hours at~~
19 ~~the rate of the state minimum wage as established in RCW 49.46.020~~
20 ~~for each hour of community restitution;))~~

21 (d) If the court finds that the violation was not willful, the
22 court may modify its previous order regarding (~~payment of legal~~
23 ~~financial obligations and regarding~~) community restitution
24 obligations; and

25 (e) If the violation involves a failure to undergo or comply with
26 a mental health status evaluation and/or outpatient mental health
27 treatment, the court shall seek a recommendation from the treatment
28 provider or proposed treatment provider. Enforcement of orders
29 concerning outpatient mental health treatment must reflect the
30 availability of treatment and must pursue the least restrictive means
31 of promoting participation in treatment. If the offender's failure to
32 receive care essential for health and safety presents a risk of
33 serious physical harm or probable harmful consequences, the civil
34 detention and commitment procedures of chapter 71.05 RCW shall be
35 considered in preference to incarceration in a local or state
36 correctional facility.

37 (3) If an offender fails to pay legal financial obligations as a
38 requirement of a sentence the following provisions apply:

39 (a) The court, upon the motion of the state, or upon its own
40 motion, shall require the offender to show cause why the offender

1 should not be punished for the noncompliance. The court may issue a
2 summons or a warrant of arrest for the offender's appearance;

3 (b) The state has the burden of showing noncompliance by a
4 preponderance of the evidence;

5 (c) The court may not sanction the offender for failure to pay
6 legal financial obligations unless the court finds, after a hearing
7 and on the record, that the failure to pay is willful. A failure to
8 pay is willful if the offender has the current ability to pay but
9 refuses to do so. In determining whether the offender has the current
10 ability to pay, the court shall inquire into and consider: (i) The
11 offender's income and assets; (ii) the offender's basic living costs
12 as defined by RCW 10.101.010 and other liabilities including child
13 support and other legal financial obligations; and (iii) the
14 offender's bona fide efforts to acquire additional resources. An
15 offender who is indigent as defined by RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through
16 (c) is presumed to lack the current ability to pay;

17 (d) If the court determines that the offender is homeless or a
18 person who is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025, failure to
19 pay a legal financial obligation is not willful noncompliance and
20 shall not subject the offender to penalties;

21 (e) If the court finds that a failure to pay is willful
22 noncompliance, it may impose the sanctions specified in RCW
23 9.94A.633(1); and

24 (f) If the court finds that the violation was not willful, the
25 court may, and if the court finds that the defendant is indigent as
26 defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c), the court shall modify
27 the terms of payment of the legal financial obligations, reduce or
28 waive nonrestitution legal financial obligations, or convert
29 nonrestitution legal financial obligations to community restitution
30 hours, if the jurisdiction operates a community restitution program,
31 at the rate of no less than the state minimum wage established in RCW
32 49.46.020 for each hour of community restitution. The crime victim
33 penalty assessment under RCW 7.68.035 may not be reduced, waived, or
34 converted to community restitution hours.

35 (4) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing on
36 noncompliance shall be credited against any confinement ordered by
37 the court.

38 ~~((4))~~ (5) Nothing in this section prohibits the filing of
39 escape charges if appropriate.

1 **Sec. 14.** RCW 9.94A.760 and 2011 c 106 s 3 are each amended to
2 read as follows:

3 (1) Whenever a person is convicted in superior court, the court
4 may order the payment of a legal financial obligation as part of the
5 sentence. The court may not order an offender to pay costs as
6 described in RCW 10.01.160 if the court finds that the offender at
7 the time of sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)
8 (a) through (c). An offender being indigent as defined in RCW
9 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c) is not grounds for failing to impose
10 restitution or the crime victim penalty assessment under RCW
11 7.68.035. The court must on either the judgment and sentence or on a
12 subsequent order to pay, designate the total amount of a legal
13 financial obligation and segregate this amount among the separate
14 assessments made for restitution, costs, fines, and other assessments
15 required by law. On the same order, the court is also to set a sum
16 that the offender is required to pay on a monthly basis towards
17 satisfying the legal financial obligation. If the court fails to set
18 the offender monthly payment amount, the department shall set the
19 amount if the department has active supervision of the offender,
20 otherwise the county clerk shall set the amount.

21 (2) Upon receipt of ((an offender's monthly)) each payment((7
22 restitution shall be paid prior to any payments of other monetary
23 obligations. After restitution is satisfied)) made by or on behalf of
24 an offender, the county clerk shall distribute the payment
25 ((proportionally among all other fines, costs, and assessments
26 imposed, unless otherwise ordered by the court)) in the following
27 order of priority until satisfied:

28 (a) First, proportionally to restitution to victims that have not
29 been fully compensated from other sources;

30 (b) Second, proportionally to restitution to insurance or other
31 sources with respect to a loss that has provided compensation to
32 victims;

33 (c) Third, proportionally to crime victims' assessments; and

34 (d) Fourth, proportionally to costs, fines, and other assessments
35 required by law.

36 ((+2)) (3) If the court determines that the offender, at the
37 time of sentencing, has the means to pay for the cost of
38 incarceration, the court may require the offender to pay for the cost
39 of incarceration ((+)). The court shall not order the offender to
40 pay the cost of incarceration if the court finds that the offender at

1 the time of sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)
2 (a) through (c). Costs of incarceration ordered by the court shall
3 not exceed a rate of fifty dollars per day of incarceration, if
4 incarcerated in a prison, or the ~~((court may require the offender to~~
5 ~~pay the))~~ actual cost of incarceration per day of incarceration, if
6 incarcerated in a county jail. In no case may the court require the
7 offender to pay more than one hundred dollars per day for the cost of
8 incarceration. ~~((Payment of other court-ordered financial~~
9 ~~obligations, including all legal financial obligations and costs of~~
10 ~~supervision shall take precedence over the payment of the cost of~~
11 ~~incarceration ordered by the court.))~~ All funds recovered from
12 offenders for the cost of incarceration in the county jail shall be
13 remitted to the county and the costs of incarceration in a prison
14 shall be remitted to the department.

15 ~~((3))~~ (4) The court may add to the judgment and sentence or
16 subsequent order to pay a statement that a notice of payroll
17 deduction is to be issued immediately. If the court chooses not to
18 order the immediate issuance of a notice of payroll deduction at
19 sentencing, the court shall add to the judgment and sentence or
20 subsequent order to pay a statement that a notice of payroll
21 deduction may be issued or other income-withholding action may be
22 taken, without further notice to the offender if a monthly court-
23 ordered legal financial obligation payment is not paid when due, and
24 an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month
25 is owed.

26 If a judgment and sentence or subsequent order to pay does not
27 include the statement that a notice of payroll deduction may be
28 issued or other income-withholding action may be taken if a monthly
29 legal financial obligation payment is past due, the department or the
30 county clerk may serve a notice on the offender stating such
31 requirements and authorizations. Service shall be by personal service
32 or any form of mail requiring a return receipt.

33 ~~((4))~~ (5) Independent of the department or the county clerk,
34 the party or entity to whom the legal financial obligation is owed
35 shall have the authority to use any other remedies available to the
36 party or entity to collect the legal financial obligation. These
37 remedies include enforcement in the same manner as a judgment in a
38 civil action by the party or entity to whom the legal financial
39 obligation is owed. Restitution collected through civil enforcement
40 must be paid through the registry of the court and must be

1 distributed proportionately according to each victim's loss when
2 there is more than one victim. The judgment and sentence shall
3 identify the party or entity to whom restitution is owed so that the
4 state, party, or entity may enforce the judgment. If restitution is
5 ordered pursuant to RCW 9.94A.750(6) or 9.94A.753(6) to a victim of
6 rape of a child or a victim's child born from the rape, the
7 Washington state child support registry shall be identified as the
8 party to whom payments must be made. Restitution obligations arising
9 from the rape of a child in the first, second, or third degree that
10 result in the pregnancy of the victim may be enforced for the time
11 periods provided under RCW 9.94A.750(6) and 9.94A.753(6). All other
12 legal financial obligations for an offense committed prior to July 1,
13 2000, may be enforced at any time during the ten-year period
14 following the offender's release from total confinement or within ten
15 years of entry of the judgment and sentence, whichever period ends
16 later. Prior to the expiration of the initial ten-year period, the
17 superior court may extend the criminal judgment an additional ten
18 years for payment of legal financial obligations including crime
19 victims' assessments. All other legal financial obligations for an
20 offense committed on or after July 1, 2000, may be enforced at any
21 time the offender remains under the court's jurisdiction. For an
22 offense committed on or after July 1, 2000, the court shall retain
23 jurisdiction over the offender, for purposes of the offender's
24 compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations, until the
25 obligation is completely satisfied, regardless of the statutory
26 maximum for the crime. The department may only supervise the
27 offender's compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations
28 during any period in which the department is authorized to supervise
29 the offender in the community under RCW 9.94A.728, 9.94A.501, or in
30 which the offender is confined in a state correctional institution or
31 a correctional facility pursuant to a transfer agreement with the
32 department, and the department shall supervise the offender's
33 compliance during any such period. The department is not responsible
34 for supervision of the offender during any subsequent period of time
35 the offender remains under the court's jurisdiction. The county clerk
36 is authorized to collect unpaid legal financial obligations at any
37 time the offender remains under the jurisdiction of the court for
38 purposes of his or her legal financial obligations.

39 ((+5)) (6) In order to assist the court in setting a monthly sum
40 that the offender must pay during the period of supervision, the

1 offender is required to report to the department for purposes of
2 preparing a recommendation to the court. When reporting, the offender
3 is required, under oath, to respond truthfully and honestly to all
4 questions concerning present, past, and future earning capabilities
5 and the location and nature of all property or financial assets. The
6 offender is further required to bring all documents requested by the
7 department.

8 (~~(6)~~) (7) After completing the investigation, the department
9 shall make a report to the court on the amount of the monthly payment
10 that the offender should be required to make towards a satisfied
11 legal financial obligation.

12 (~~(7)~~) (8)(a) During the period of supervision, the department
13 may make a recommendation to the court that the offender's monthly
14 payment schedule be modified so as to reflect a change in financial
15 circumstances. If the department sets the monthly payment amount, the
16 department may modify the monthly payment amount without the matter
17 being returned to the court. During the period of supervision, the
18 department may require the offender to report to the department for
19 the purposes of reviewing the appropriateness of the collection
20 schedule for the legal financial obligation. During this reporting,
21 the offender is required under oath to respond truthfully and
22 honestly to all questions concerning earning capabilities and the
23 location and nature of all property or financial assets. The offender
24 shall bring all documents requested by the department in order to
25 prepare the collection schedule.

26 (b) Subsequent to any period of supervision, or if the department
27 is not authorized to supervise the offender in the community, the
28 county clerk may make a recommendation to the court that the
29 offender's monthly payment schedule be modified so as to reflect a
30 change in financial circumstances. If the county clerk sets the
31 monthly payment amount, or if the department set the monthly payment
32 amount and the department has subsequently turned the collection of
33 the legal financial obligation over to the county clerk, the clerk
34 may modify the monthly payment amount without the matter being
35 returned to the court. During the period of repayment, the county
36 clerk may require the offender to report to the clerk for the purpose
37 of reviewing the appropriateness of the collection schedule for the
38 legal financial obligation. During this reporting, the offender is
39 required under oath to respond truthfully and honestly to all
40 questions concerning earning capabilities and the location and nature

1 of all property or financial assets. The offender shall bring all
2 documents requested by the county clerk in order to prepare the
3 collection schedule.

4 ~~((+8))~~ (9) After the judgment and sentence or payment order is
5 entered, the department is authorized, for any period of supervision,
6 to collect the legal financial obligation from the offender.
7 Subsequent to any period of supervision or, if the department is not
8 authorized to supervise the offender in the community, the county
9 clerk is authorized to collect unpaid legal financial obligations
10 from the offender. Any amount collected by the department shall be
11 remitted daily to the county clerk for the purpose of disbursements.
12 The department and the county clerks are authorized, but not
13 required, to accept credit cards as payment for a legal financial
14 obligation, and any costs incurred related to accepting credit card
15 payments shall be the responsibility of the offender.

16 ~~((+9))~~ (10) The department or any obligee of the legal financial
17 obligation may seek a mandatory wage assignment for the purposes of
18 obtaining satisfaction for the legal financial obligation pursuant to
19 RCW 9.94A.7701. Any party obtaining a wage assignment shall notify
20 the county clerk. The county clerks shall notify the department, or
21 the administrative office of the courts, whichever is providing the
22 monthly billing for the offender.

23 ~~((+10))~~ (11) The requirement that the offender pay a monthly sum
24 towards a legal financial obligation constitutes a condition or
25 requirement of a sentence and the offender is subject to the
26 penalties for noncompliance as provided in RCW 9.94B.040, 9.94A.737,
27 or 9.94A.740. If the court determines that the offender is homeless
28 or a person who is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025, failure
29 to pay a legal financial obligation is not willful noncompliance and
30 shall not subject the offender to penalties.

31 ~~((+11))~~ (12)(a) The administrative office of the courts shall
32 mail individualized periodic billings to the address known by the
33 office for each offender with an unsatisfied legal financial
34 obligation.

35 (b) The billing shall direct payments, other than outstanding
36 cost of supervision assessments under RCW 9.94A.780, parole
37 assessments under RCW 72.04A.120, and cost of probation assessments
38 under RCW 9.95.214, to the county clerk, and cost of supervision,
39 parole, or probation assessments to the department.

1 (c) The county clerk shall provide the administrative office of
2 the courts with notice of payments by such offenders no less
3 frequently than weekly.

4 (d) The county clerks, the administrative office of the courts,
5 and the department shall maintain agreements to implement this
6 subsection.

7 (~~(12)~~) (13) The department shall arrange for the collection of
8 unpaid legal financial obligations during any period of supervision
9 in the community through the county clerk. The department shall
10 either collect unpaid legal financial obligations or arrange for
11 collections through another entity if the clerk does not assume
12 responsibility or is unable to continue to assume responsibility for
13 collection pursuant to subsection (~~(4)~~) (5) of this section. The
14 costs for collection services shall be paid by the offender.

15 (~~(13)~~) (14) The county clerk may access the records of the
16 employment security department for the purposes of verifying
17 employment or income, seeking any assignment of wages, or performing
18 other duties necessary to the collection of an offender's legal
19 financial obligations.

20 (~~(14)~~) (15) Nothing in this chapter makes the department, the
21 state, the counties, or any state or county employees, agents, or
22 other persons acting on their behalf liable under any circumstances
23 for the payment of these legal financial obligations or for the acts
24 of any offender who is no longer, or was not, subject to supervision
25 by the department for a term of community custody, and who remains
26 under the jurisdiction of the court for payment of legal financial
27 obligations.

28 **Sec. 15.** RCW 9.94B.040 and 2002 c 175 s 8 are each amended to
29 read as follows:

30 (1) If an offender violates any condition or requirement of a
31 sentence, the court may modify its order of judgment and sentence and
32 impose further punishment in accordance with this section.

33 (2) In cases where conditions from a second or later sentence of
34 community supervision begin prior to the term of the second or later
35 sentence, the court shall treat a violation of such conditions as a
36 violation of the sentence of community supervision currently being
37 served.

1 (3) If an offender fails to comply with any of the nonfinancial
2 requirements or conditions of a sentence the following provisions
3 apply:

4 (a)(i) Following the violation, if the offender and the
5 department make a stipulated agreement, the department may impose
6 sanctions such as work release, home detention with electronic
7 monitoring, work crew, community restitution, inpatient treatment,
8 daily reporting, curfew, educational or counseling sessions,
9 supervision enhanced through electronic monitoring, jail time, or
10 other sanctions available in the community.

11 (ii) Within seventy-two hours of signing the stipulated
12 agreement, the department shall submit a report to the court and the
13 prosecuting attorney outlining the violation or violations, and
14 sanctions imposed. Within fifteen days of receipt of the report, if
15 the court is not satisfied with the sanctions, the court may schedule
16 a hearing and may modify the department's sanctions. If this occurs,
17 the offender may withdraw from the stipulated agreement.

18 (iii) If the offender fails to comply with the sanction
19 administratively imposed by the department, the court may take action
20 regarding the original noncompliance. Offender failure to comply with
21 the sanction administratively imposed by the department may be
22 considered an additional violation;

23 (b) In the absence of a stipulated agreement, or where the court
24 is not satisfied with the department's sanctions as provided in (a)
25 of this subsection, the court, upon the motion of the state, or upon
26 its own motion, shall require the offender to show cause why the
27 offender should not be punished for the noncompliance. The court may
28 issue a summons or a warrant of arrest for the offender's appearance;

29 (c) The state has the burden of showing noncompliance by a
30 preponderance of the evidence. If the court finds that the violation
31 has occurred, it may order the offender to be confined for a period
32 not to exceed sixty days for each violation, and may (i) convert a
33 term of partial confinement to total confinement, (ii) convert
34 community restitution obligation to total or partial confinement, or
35 ~~(iii) ((convert monetary obligations, except restitution and the~~
36 ~~crime victim penalty assessment, to community restitution hours at~~
37 ~~the rate of the state minimum wage as established in RCW 49.46.020~~
38 ~~for each hour of community restitution, or (iv))~~) order one or more
39 of the penalties authorized in (a)(i) of this subsection. Any time

1 served in confinement awaiting a hearing on noncompliance shall be
2 credited against any confinement order by the court;

3 (d) If the court finds that the violation was not willful, the
4 court may modify its previous order regarding (~~payment of legal~~
5 ~~financial obligations and regarding~~) community restitution
6 obligations; and

7 (e) If the violation involves a failure to undergo or comply with
8 mental status evaluation and/or outpatient mental health treatment,
9 the community corrections officer shall consult with the treatment
10 provider or proposed treatment provider. Enforcement of orders
11 concerning outpatient mental health treatment must reflect the
12 availability of treatment and must pursue the least restrictive means
13 of promoting participation in treatment. If the offender's failure to
14 receive care essential for health and safety presents a risk of
15 serious physical harm or probable harmful consequences, the civil
16 detention and commitment procedures of chapter 71.05 RCW shall be
17 considered in preference to incarceration in a local or state
18 correctional facility.

19 (4) If the violation involves failure to pay legal financial
20 obligations, the following provisions apply:

21 (a) The department and the offender may enter into a stipulated
22 agreement that the failure to pay was willful noncompliance,
23 according to the provisions and requirements of subsection (3)(a) of
24 this section;

25 (b) In the absence of a stipulated agreement, or where the court
26 is not satisfied with the department's sanctions as provided in a
27 stipulated agreement under (a) of this subsection, the court, upon
28 the motion of the state, or upon its own motion, shall require the
29 offender to show cause why the offender should not be punished for
30 the noncompliance. The court may issue a summons or a warrant of
31 arrest for the offender's appearance;

32 (c) The state has the burden of showing noncompliance by a
33 preponderance of the evidence. The court may not sanction the
34 offender for failure to pay legal financial obligations unless the
35 court finds, after a hearing and on the record, that the failure to
36 pay is willful. A failure to pay is willful if the offender has the
37 current ability to pay but refuses to do so. In determining whether
38 the offender has the current ability to pay, the court shall inquire
39 into and consider: (i) The offender's income and assets; (ii) the
40 offender's basic living costs as defined by RCW 10.101.010 and other

1 liabilities including child support and other legal financial
2 obligations; and (iii) the offender's bona fide efforts to acquire
3 additional resources. An offender who is indigent as defined by RCW
4 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c) is presumed to lack the current ability
5 to pay;

6 (d) If the court determines that the offender is homeless or a
7 person who is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025, failure to
8 pay a legal financial obligation is not willful noncompliance and
9 shall not subject the offender to penalties;

10 (e) If the court finds that the failure to pay is willful
11 noncompliance, the court may order the offender to be confined for a
12 period not to exceed sixty days for each violation or order one or
13 more of the penalties authorized in subsection (3)(a)(i) of this
14 section; and

15 (f) If the court finds that the violation was not willful, the
16 court may, and if the court finds that the defendant is indigent as
17 defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c), the court shall modify
18 the terms of payment of the legal financial obligations, reduce or
19 waive nonrestitution legal financial obligations, or convert
20 nonrestitution legal financial obligations to community restitution
21 hours, if the jurisdiction operates a community restitution program,
22 at the rate of no less than the state minimum wage established in RCW
23 49.46.020 for each hour of community restitution. The crime victim
24 penalty assessment under RCW 7.68.035 may not be reduced, waived, or
25 converted to community restitution hours.

26 (5) The community corrections officer may obtain information from
27 the offender's mental health treatment provider on the offender's
28 status with respect to evaluation, application for services,
29 registration for services, and compliance with the supervision plan,
30 without the offender's consent, as described under RCW 71.05.630.

31 ~~((5))~~ (6) An offender under community placement or community
32 supervision who is civilly detained under chapter 71.05 RCW, and
33 subsequently discharged or conditionally released to the community,
34 shall be under the supervision of the department of corrections for
35 the duration of his or her period of community placement or community
36 supervision. During any period of inpatient mental health treatment
37 that falls within the period of community placement or community
38 supervision, the inpatient treatment provider and the supervising
39 community corrections officer shall notify each other about the

1 offender's discharge, release, and legal status, and shall share
2 other relevant information.

3 ~~((6))~~ (7) Nothing in this section prohibits the filing of
4 escape charges if appropriate.

5 **Sec. 16.** RCW 3.62.085 and 2005 c 457 s 10 are each amended to
6 read as follows:

7 Upon conviction or a plea of guilty in any court organized under
8 this title or Title 35 RCW, a defendant in a criminal case is liable
9 for a fee of forty-three dollars, except this fee shall not be
10 imposed on a defendant who is indigent as defined in RCW
11 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c). This fee shall be subject to division
12 with the state under RCW 3.46.120(2), 3.50.100(2), 3.62.020(2),
13 3.62.040(2), and 35.20.220(2).

14 **Sec. 17.** RCW 36.18.020 and 2017 3rd sp.s. c 2 s 3 are each
15 amended to read as follows:

16 (1) Revenue collected under this section is subject to division
17 with the state under RCW 36.18.025 and with the county or regional
18 law library fund under RCW 27.24.070, except as provided in
19 subsection (5) of this section.

20 (2) Clerks of superior courts shall collect the following fees
21 for their official services:

22 (a) In addition to any other fee required by law, the party
23 filing the first or initial document in any civil action, including,
24 but not limited to an action for restitution, adoption, or change of
25 name, and any party filing a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
26 party claim in any such civil action, shall pay, at the time the
27 document is filed, a fee of two hundred dollars except, in an
28 unlawful detainer action under chapter 59.18 or 59.20 RCW for which
29 the plaintiff shall pay a case initiating filing fee of forty-five
30 dollars, or in proceedings filed under RCW 28A.225.030 alleging a
31 violation of the compulsory attendance laws where the petitioner
32 shall not pay a filing fee. The forty-five dollar filing fee under
33 this subsection for an unlawful detainer action shall not include an
34 order to show cause or any other order or judgment except a default
35 order or default judgment in an unlawful detainer action.

36 (b) Any party, except a defendant in a criminal case, filing the
37 first or initial document on an appeal from a court of limited

1 jurisdiction or any party on any civil appeal, shall pay, when the
2 document is filed, a fee of two hundred dollars.

3 (c) For filing of a petition for judicial review as required
4 under RCW 34.05.514 a filing fee of two hundred dollars.

5 (d) For filing of a petition for unlawful harassment under RCW
6 10.14.040 a filing fee of fifty-three dollars.

7 (e) For filing the notice of debt due for the compensation of a
8 crime victim under RCW 7.68.120(2) (a) a fee of two hundred dollars.

9 (f) In probate proceedings, the party instituting such
10 proceedings, shall pay at the time of filing the first document
11 therein, a fee of two hundred dollars.

12 (g) For filing any petition to contest a will admitted to probate
13 or a petition to admit a will which has been rejected, or a petition
14 objecting to a written agreement or memorandum as provided in RCW
15 11.96A.220, there shall be paid a fee of two hundred dollars.

16 (h) Upon conviction or plea of guilty, upon failure to prosecute
17 an appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction as provided by law, or
18 upon affirmance of a conviction by a court of limited jurisdiction,
19 an adult defendant in a criminal case shall be liable for a fee of
20 two hundred dollars, except this fee shall not be imposed on a
21 defendant who is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through
22 (c).

23 (i) With the exception of demands for jury hereafter made and
24 garnishments hereafter issued, civil actions and probate proceedings
25 filed prior to midnight, July 1, 1972, shall be completed and
26 governed by the fee schedule in effect as of January 1, 1972.
27 However, no fee shall be assessed if an order of dismissal on the
28 clerk's record be filed as provided by rule of the supreme court.

29 (3) No fee shall be collected when a petition for relinquishment
30 of parental rights is filed pursuant to RCW 26.33.080 or for forms
31 and instructional brochures provided under RCW 26.50.030.

32 (4) No fee shall be collected when an abstract of judgment is
33 filed by the county clerk of another county for the purposes of
34 collection of legal financial obligations.

35 (5) (a) Until July 1, 2021, in addition to the fees required to be
36 collected under this section, clerks of the superior courts must
37 collect surcharges as provided in this subsection (5) of which
38 seventy-five percent must be remitted to the state treasurer for
39 deposit in the judicial stabilization trust account and twenty-five
40 percent must be retained by the county.

1 (b) On filing fees required to be collected under subsection
2 (2)(b) of this section, a surcharge of thirty dollars must be
3 collected.

4 (c) On all filing fees required to be collected under this
5 section, except for fees required under subsection (2)(b), (d), and
6 (h) of this section, a surcharge of forty dollars must be collected.

7 **Sec. 18.** RCW 43.43.7541 and 2015 c 265 s 31 are each amended to
8 read as follows:

9 Every sentence imposed for a crime specified in RCW 43.43.754
10 must include a fee of one hundred dollars unless the state has
11 previously collected the offender's DNA as a result of a prior
12 conviction. The fee is a court-ordered legal financial obligation as
13 defined in RCW 9.94A.030 and other applicable law. For a sentence
14 imposed under chapter 9.94A RCW, the fee is payable by the offender
15 after payment of all other legal financial obligations included in
16 the sentence has been completed. For all other sentences, the fee is
17 payable by the offender in the same manner as other assessments
18 imposed. The clerk of the court shall transmit eighty percent of the
19 fee collected to the state treasurer for deposit in the state DNA
20 database account created under RCW 43.43.7532, and shall transmit
21 twenty percent of the fee collected to the agency responsible for
22 collection of a biological sample from the offender as required under
23 RCW 43.43.754. This fee shall not be imposed on juvenile offenders if
24 the state has previously collected the juvenile offender's DNA as a
25 result of a prior conviction.

26 **Sec. 19.** RCW 7.68.035 and 2015 c 265 s 8 are each amended to
27 read as follows:

28 (1)(a) When any person is found guilty in any superior court of
29 having committed a crime, except as provided in subsection (2) of
30 this section, there shall be imposed by the court upon such convicted
31 person a penalty assessment. The assessment shall be in addition to
32 any other penalty or fine imposed by law and shall be five hundred
33 dollars for each case or cause of action that includes one or more
34 convictions of a felony or gross misdemeanor and two hundred fifty
35 dollars for any case or cause of action that includes convictions of
36 only one or more misdemeanors.

37 (b) When any juvenile is adjudicated of an offense that is a most
38 serious offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, or a sex offense under

1 chapter 9A.44 RCW, there shall be imposed upon the juvenile offender
2 a penalty assessment. The assessment shall be in addition to any
3 other penalty or fine imposed by law and shall be one hundred dollars
4 for each case or cause of action.

5 (c) When any juvenile is adjudicated of an offense which has a
6 victim, and which is not a most serious offense as defined in RCW
7 9.94A.030 or a sex offense under chapter 9A.44 RCW, the court shall
8 order up to seven hours of community restitution, unless the court
9 finds that such an order is not practicable for the offender. This
10 community restitution must be imposed consecutively to any other
11 community restitution the court imposes for the offense.

12 (2) The assessment imposed by subsection (1) of this section
13 shall not apply to motor vehicle crimes defined in Title 46 RCW
14 except those defined in the following sections: RCW 46.61.520,
15 46.61.522, 46.61.024, 46.52.090, 46.70.140, 46.61.502, 46.61.504,
16 46.52.101, 46.20.410, 46.52.020, 46.10.495, 46.09.480, 46.61.5249,
17 46.61.525, 46.61.685, 46.61.530, 46.61.500, 46.61.015, 46.52.010,
18 46.44.180, 46.10.490(2), and 46.09.470(2).

19 (3) When any person accused of having committed a crime posts
20 bail in superior court pursuant to the provisions of chapter 10.19
21 RCW and such bail is forfeited, there shall be deducted from the
22 proceeds of such forfeited bail a penalty assessment, in addition to
23 any other penalty or fine imposed by law, equal to the assessment
24 which would be applicable under subsection (1) of this section if the
25 person had been convicted of the crime.

26 (4) Such penalty assessments shall be paid by the clerk of the
27 superior court to the county treasurer (~~who shall monthly transmit~~
28 ~~the money as provided in RCW 10.82.070~~). Each county shall deposit
29 (~~fifty~~) one hundred percent of the money it receives per case or
30 cause of action under subsection (1) of this section (~~and retains~~
31 ~~under RCW 10.82.070~~), not less than one and seventy-five one-
32 hundredths percent of the remaining money it retains under RCW
33 10.82.070 and the money it retains under chapter 3.62 RCW, and all
34 money it receives under subsection (7) of this section into a fund
35 maintained exclusively for the support of comprehensive programs to
36 encourage and facilitate testimony by the victims of crimes and
37 witnesses to crimes. A program shall be considered "comprehensive"
38 only after approval of the department upon application by the county
39 prosecuting attorney. The department shall approve as comprehensive
40 only programs which:

1 (a) Provide comprehensive services to victims and witnesses of
2 all types of crime with particular emphasis on serious crimes against
3 persons and property. It is the intent of the legislature to make
4 funds available only to programs which do not restrict services to
5 victims or witnesses of a particular type or types of crime and that
6 such funds supplement, not supplant, existing local funding levels;

7 (b) Are administered by the county prosecuting attorney either
8 directly through the prosecuting attorney's office or by contract
9 between the county and agencies providing services to victims of
10 crime;

11 (c) Make a reasonable effort to inform the known victim or his or
12 her surviving dependents of the existence of this chapter and the
13 procedure for making application for benefits;

14 (d) Assist victims in the restitution and adjudication process;
15 and

16 (e) Assist victims of violent crimes in the preparation and
17 presentation of their claims to the department of labor and
18 industries under this chapter.

19 Before a program in any county west of the Cascade mountains is
20 submitted to the department for approval, it shall be submitted for
21 review and comment to each city within the county with a population
22 of more than one hundred fifty thousand. The department will consider
23 if the county's proposed comprehensive plan meets the needs of crime
24 victims in cases adjudicated in municipal, district or superior
25 courts and of crime victims located within the city and county.

26 (5) Upon submission to the department of a letter of intent to
27 adopt a comprehensive program, the prosecuting attorney shall retain
28 the money deposited by the county under subsection (4) of this
29 section until such time as the county prosecuting attorney has
30 obtained approval of a program from the department. Approval of the
31 comprehensive plan by the department must be obtained within one year
32 of the date of the letter of intent to adopt a comprehensive program.
33 The county prosecuting attorney shall not make any expenditures from
34 the money deposited under subsection (4) of this section until
35 approval of a comprehensive plan by the department. If a county
36 prosecuting attorney has failed to obtain approval of a program from
37 the department under subsection (4) of this section or failed to
38 obtain approval of a comprehensive program within one year after
39 submission of a letter of intent under this section, the county
40 treasurer shall monthly transmit one hundred percent of the money

1 deposited by the county under subsection (4) of this section to the
2 state treasurer for deposit in the state general fund.

3 (6) County prosecuting attorneys are responsible to make every
4 reasonable effort to insure that the penalty assessments of this
5 chapter are imposed and collected.

6 (7) Every city and town shall transmit monthly one and seventy-
7 five one-hundredths percent of all money, other than money received
8 for parking infractions, retained under RCW 3.50.100 and 35.20.220 to
9 the county treasurer for deposit as provided in subsection (4) of
10 this section.

11 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 20.** Nothing in this act requires the courts
12 to refund or reimburse amounts previously paid towards legal
13 financial obligations or interest on legal financial obligations.

14 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 21.** If specific funding for the purposes of
15 this act, referencing this act by bill or chapter number, is not
16 provided by June 30, 2018, in the omnibus appropriations act, this
17 act is null and void.

--- END ---

RUSSELL SELK LAW OFFICE

January 28, 2019 - 6:33 AM

Transmittal Information

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Appellate Court Case Title: State of Washington, Respondent v. Richard S. McLaughlin, Appellant
Superior Court Case Number: 16-1-00060-4

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