

FILED
Court of Appeals
Division II
State of Washington
4/4/2018 3:51 PM

No. 51247-5-II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of

JAMES A. L. FOWLER
Appellant

and

MARTA K. FOWLER
Respondent

ON REVIEW FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR THURSTON COUNTY

AMENDED BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PATRICIA NOVOTNY
NANCY ZARAGOZA
Attorneys for Appellant
3418 NE 65th Street, Suite A
Seattle, WA 98115
(206) 525-0711

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I. INTRODUCTION

James Fowler appeals from an order denying his motion to terminate a permanent protection order. In denying the motion, the trial court considered the statutory factors, weighed the evidence, and concluded termination unwarranted. The court also, as requested by James, considered additional facts, though not as dispositive. The court acted based on substantial evidence and well within its discretion.

In his challenge to the court's decision, James misrepresents the history of domestic violence he perpetrated upon his ex-wife, Marta, which Marta corrects below. Overall, James spins a misleading and victim-blaming narrative, arguing, for instance, that he should be relieved of the protection order because it constrains him from neighborhood activities after he, bizarrely, purchased a home in Marta's neighborhood by which she must pass for ingress and egress. He argues his new marriage somehow demonstrates he is unlikely to perpetrate further domestic violence, as if Marta, as his former spouse, was the reason he committed domestic violence. His arguments, actions, and the degree to which he obliterates the actual facts of this case reinforce the trial court's conclusion that the protection order should remain in place.

II. RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Does a trial court have discretion to deny a motion to terminate a protection order, which discretion is structured by statute?
2. Did the trial court here act within its discretion, after finding James failed to carry his burden of proof?
3. Should the court take judicial notice of the judicial system records of domestic violence incidents offered to rebut misleading assertions James makes?
4. Should Marta receive her fees on appeal?

III. RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Marta and James Fowler were divorced in 1999 following a marriage with a history of domestic violence. James had a temper and lashed out at Marta during the marriage, throwing things at her, slapping her in the face and pushing her. CP 196. In December 1996, James assaulted her in front of their children, who were then ages three and six. CP 196 . James came after Marta, shoved her to the floor, chased her up the stairs, and tried to throw her down the stairs. She managed to get away but he came after her and pushed her again, causing her to fall on the bathroom floor, then seized her arm and tried to hit her. When she grabbed the phone to call 911 he unplugged it to prevent her from calling. He chased her through the house until she was able to get to a bedroom,

lock the door, and call 911. When police arrived, she had bruises on her arms and face and a bloody nose. James was arrested and a temporary no contact order was issued. He spent the night in jail but showed up at the house the next morning shortly after Marta had left with the children to stay with friends. *Id.* When he found out where they were, he repeatedly drove by the home where Marta took shelter and repeatedly called the number there. *Id.*

James was charged with assault in the fourth degree and pled guilty. See Appendix (Thurston County District Court #C5263TC). In January 1997, Marta obtained a DVPO and James was ordered to complete domestic violence treatment. See CP 22; Appendix (Thurston County Superior Court #96-2-04545-1).¹ Shortly thereafter, Marta filed for dissolution (Thurston County Superior Court #97-3-00037-9).

James asserts in his brief that the DVPO expired after a year “without incident” and otherwise implies he has undergone a complete transformation. See, e.g., *Br. Appellant*, at 3. In fact, as records from the

¹ The order was not made part of the record in the current proceeding, but the docket refers to entry of an Order for Protection on January 8, 1997. James appends to his brief a transcript from the hearing where the order was presented, though that transcript is not part of the record in this proceeding either. James asks to “supplement the record” with it, citing RAP 9.6. *Br. Appellant*, at 3, n. 2. RAP 9.6 applies to supplemental designations of the record, not supplementing the record, which is addressed by RAP 9.10 and RAP 9.11. It appears from the docket this transcript may also be part of the 1996 case. Because of James’s misrepresentations of facts, Marta submits in her appendix information from the Judicial Information System, and asks this Court to take judicial notice of it under ER 201.

Judicial Information Service show, James violated the 1997 protection order merely two months after its entry (i.e., violated in March 1997). See Appendix (Thurston County District Court #8720). He was again ordered to complete domestic violence treatment. See CP 199, 22.

The dissolution decree was entered in May 1999 and contained an order restraining both parties from entering the other's home or workplace, but did not restrict James's contact with Marta, as had the previous orders. CP 23. James continued to stalk and harass Marta, including driving down her driveway and looking into her house, driving a boat in front of her house and taking pictures of the house, and telephoning her up to 15 times a day. CP 22, 24. He also showed up at the children's schools or at special events during times he was not supposed to be there. CP 22.

In 2002, Marta sought another DVPO following an incident where James assaulted their son and the son's friend. CP 4-11. This occurred during a sleep over at James's home when he lost his temper with the boys. CP 7. After a parent of one of the boys filed a police report, Marta filed a petition for a DVPO. CP 23, 4-11. James omits this parent's perspective from his statement of facts. The court's order addressed visitation with the children pending further order of the court, but did not contain any provisions restricting James's contact with Marta, an apparent

clerical error (CR 60(a)), which the court attempted unsuccessfully to correct. CP 19-20.²

In June 2003, James moved into Marta's neighborhood, purchasing a home about half a mile from Marta's in a location where she must pass his home to leave or enter the neighborhood. CP 21. Unsettled by this move and fearing it would allow him to gain more access to her, Marta sought a permanent protection order in July 2003. CP 27, CP 21-26.

James agreed to a permanent DVPO, which was entered on August 20, 2003. CP 37-41, 176. The order prohibited James from contacting Marta or coming within 1500 feet of her home, and restricted contact with the children except as provided in the parenting plan. CP 38-39.³ In February 2006, James violated the order by going to his son's school, CP 276 (FOF 2.6); 8/11/17 RP 18-19; CP 200. Marta was out of town at the time, the police were called, and a criminal charge was filed. 8/11/17 RP 18-19.⁴ The protection order was then amended to allow James to go to

² There was apparently an attempt by the court to correct the order and issue it in the form of DVPO; an order was drafted and sent to James's attorney, but he did not respond and the order was never entered. CP 24.

³ The order made an exception for James's presence on the road to his property. CP 39.

⁴ James claims Marta had him arrested when he violated the 2003 agreed protection order prohibiting him from going to the school. 08/11/17 RP 6; see, also, Br. Appellant, at 8. There was no evidence about this event, only the argument of James's counsel. Marta was out of town. The fair inference is that the school, which would normally be advised of protection orders, called the police when James showed up. The fair conclusion is that James had himself arrested by violating the order when he could easily have allowed the

the children's school, and the charge was ultimately dismissed without prejudice. CP 200; CP 42-43; see Appendix (2006 Olympia Municipal Court #CR0200002).

In 2007, James filed a motion to terminate the permanent order, CP 46-47, but the parties entered an agreed order to amend the DVPO by removing the children from the order. CP 49-50, 176. The agreed permanent DVPO remained in effect as to Marta. In 2014, Marta received a letter from a neighbor who was friendly with James, pressuring her to drop the order. CP 67-68.

In June 2017, James filed a motion to modify the permanent DVPO to allow him to attend his daughter's graduation. CP 190-193. The parties agreed to modify the order to allow him to attend the graduation and an order was entered accordingly. CP 51-53. James then filed an amended motion to terminate the order. CP 54-57. He complained the order was preventing him from attending social functions at neighborhood homes within 1500 of Marta's home and other future events they would both want to attend, and created embarrassment when he was pulled out of line at airports. 7/5/17 RP 10; 8/11/17 RP 17.

After review of the statutory factors, the commissioner denied the motion, CP 134-136, and James sought revision. CP 129-131. On

children's temporary caregivers to deal with the situation. As the trial court recognized, the essential point is that James violated the order.

revision, the judge also denied the motion to terminate the order, finding James failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances establishing he was not likely to resume acts of domestic violence if the DVPO is terminated. The court modified the DVPO to allow James to remain at “the same event or function at a location not specifically identified” in the order. CP 171, 178. Otherwise, the order remains unchanged.

James appeals. CP 180-184.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW.

“Whether to grant, modify or terminate a protection order is a matter of judicial discretion.” *Freeman v. Freeman*, 169 Wn.2d 664, 670-671, 239 P.3d 557 (2010); RCW 26.50.130(1). Thus, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to terminate a protection order is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a clear showing that the trial court’s decision was manifestly unreasonable, or based on untenable or for untenable reasons. *Id.* Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, 118 Wn.2d 801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO TERMINATE THE PERMANENT PROTECTION; JAMES FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE STATUTE.

Our legislature has articulated a clear public policy to protect domestic violence victims, authorizing courts to issue permanent protection orders in some circumstances. *Freeman*, 169 Wn.2d at 671-672; RCW 26.50.060(2). According to a statutory revision made after the *Freeman* decision, a permanent order of protection may only be terminated as provided in RCW 26.50.130(3)(a):

The court may not terminate an order for protection that is permanent or issued for a fixed period exceeding two years upon a motion of the respondent unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial change in circumstances such that the respondent is not likely to resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or those persons protected by the protection order if the order is terminated.

The statute provides a list of factors the court may consider in determining whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. RCW 26.50.130(3). The statute expressly makes these factors unweighted, with no inference to be drawn from the order in which they are listed:

- (i) Whether the respondent has committed or threatened domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, or other violent acts since the protection order was entered;
- (ii) Whether the respondent has violated the terms of the protection order, and the time that has passed since the entry of the order;

- (iii) Whether the respondent has exhibited suicidal ideation or attempts since the protection order was entered;
- (iv) Whether the respondent has been convicted of criminal activity since the protection order was entered;
- (v) Whether the respondent has either acknowledged responsibility for the acts of domestic violence that resulted in entry of the protection order or successfully completed domestic violence perpetrator treatment or counseling since the protection order was entered;
- (vi) Whether the respondent has a continuing involvement with drug or alcohol abuse, if such abuse was a factor in the protection order;
- (vii) Whether the petitioner consents to terminating the protection order, provided that consent is given voluntarily and knowingly;
- (viii) Whether the respondent or petitioner has relocated to an area more distant from the other party, giving due consideration to the fact that acts of domestic violence may be committed from any distance.

RCW 26.50.130(3)(c). The statute further precludes the court from basing its determination solely on the fact that time has passed without a violation of the order, or the fact that the respondent or petitioner has relocated to an area more distant from the other party. RCW 26.50.130(3)(d).

Here, the trial court explicitly considered all the statutory factors, CP 177, and found that James did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence a substantial change in circumstances such that he is not likely to resume acts of domestic violence. CP 178. In support of its ruling, the

court made the following specific findings of fact, which are unchallenged on appeal and sufficient to support the court's decision:

The Respondent agreed to the entry of a DVOP [sic] in this case on August 20, 2003. The DVOP [sic] provided for no expiration, but indicates "THIS ORDER FOR PROTECTION IS PERMANENT." (FOF 2.1)

The Respondent violated the terms of the protection order in February 2006 (FOF 2.6)⁵

The Respondent has not completed domestic violence perpetrator treatment or counseling since the DVPO was entered (FOF 2.9)⁶

The Respondent has not relocated to an area more distant from the Petitioner. After the parties were divorced, but either before this action was filed or during the pendency of this action, the Respondent bought a home which is very close in proximity to Petitioner's home. (FOF 2.14)

The Respondent has maintained his mental health condition and been on his medication since the DVOP [sic] was entered. Said condition and medications existed prior to entry of the DVOP [sic]. (FOF 177)

The Respondent has maintained a long-term, healthy relationship with his now wife since entry of the DVOP [sic]. The relationship began before the DVOP [sic] was entered. It has been about 19.5 years (FOF 2.17)

The Petitioner's description about the 1996 domestic violence incident with Respondent where Petitioner was assaulted on multiple occasions was detailed and clearly still fresh in her mind. Petitioner indicated she was

⁵ Here the court refers to the incident involving the school.

⁶ Here the court refers to treatment since the current order (issued in 2003), not any treatment or counseling done before then. The court acknowledged that James completed counseling in 1996 after the domestic violence incident and completed some form of domestic violence counseling but the extent and duration are unknown. CP 177 (FOF 2.15).

affected by having to create her declaration and describe again the 1996 assaults. (FOF 2.18)

Domestic violence is not a concrete thing. Domestic violence affects victims differently. (FOF 2.19)

Petitioner has a current, real and genuine fear of imminent physical harm by Respondent. (FOF 2.20)

Respondent's concern about the order affecting his travel, being stopped or questioned about the DVOP [sic] at an airport, is not a sufficient reason to terminate the DVOP [sic] in balancing all of the other considerations. (FOF 2.21)

Respondent's desire to go to the home of a friend who lives within 1500 feet of Petitioner is not a sufficient reason to terminate the DVOP [sic] in balancing all other considerations. (FOF 2.22)

Respondent's concerns about future events for the parties' children and concern about other future events, such as celebratory and/or memorial services of mutual friends which both would want to attend, is not a sufficient reason to terminate the DVOP [sic] in balancing all of the other considerations. However, it is an important reason and significant enough for the court to consider modifying the terms of the DVOP [sic] instead of terminating it. (FOF 2.23)

CP 176-178.

James contends that the statutory factors "warrant termination of the protection order," Br. Appellant at 13, emphasizing those factors he claims weigh in his favor (no domestic violence since the order was entered, no suicidal ideations, some acceptance of responsibility, no drug abuse) and ignoring those that do not (no domestic violence treatment since entry of order, no relocation to an area more distant from Marta, no

consent from Marta for termination). Br. Appellant, at 13-17. James fails to show the trial court abused its discretion. The listed statutory factors are those a court “may” consider in making this ultimate determination, and are expressly deemed “unweighted factors.” RCW 26.50.130(3)(c). James cannot supply what weight to give these factors; that is the court’s job. Additionally, the statute permits the court to consider “other factors relating to a substantial change in circumstances.” RCW 26.50.130(c)(ix). Here, the court noted James had moved to Marta’s neighborhood. CP 176 (FOF 2.14). The court also found significant that James agreed to make the order permanent, noting “they didn’t have to agree to that; they could have argued that issue to then Commissioner Wickham, and he could have ruled on that issue even if they had an agreement to every other term.” 8/1//17 RP 23. It was for the trial court to weigh the circumstances before it, which include a 20-year history of multiple court actions necessitated by James’s behavior.

As the trial court found, James did not prove a substantial change of circumstances showing he was unlikely to commit domestic violence if the order was terminated: he has not undergone any domestic violence treatment since the order was issued in 2003, CP 177; his mental health condition existed and he was on medication for it before the DVPO was entered, CP 178; his relationship with his current wife existed at the time

the DVPO was entered, CP 177; and, remarkably, he has moved into Marta's neighborhood despite living in a metropolitan area (Olympia and South Puget Sound). CP 177. As Marta argued to the trial court, prior violations of restraining orders occurred near her home, including peering through her windows, entering her driveway, and driving a boat by her house and photographing it. CP 202. Moreover, James's close proximity appears to have further emboldened him to attempt more unwanted (by Marta) contact, as evidenced by his manipulation of neighbors who have pressured her to "drop" the restraining order. Altogether, far from proving it unlikely that James will resume acts of domestic violence, his actions since 2003 prove the continuing need for a permanent order; without one in place, Marta remains completely vulnerable to further stalking and harassment by James. Simply, James fails to show the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.

The statute also prohibits the court from considering "the fact that time has passed without a violation of the order" as the sole basis for its determination, RCW 26.50.130(d), since the order may be the reason for no violations. Yet this is precisely what James urges this Court to do. See Br. Appellant at 20-22 (no domestic violence for 14 years, domestic violence allegations date back over 18 years ago, children are grown). Not only does James minimize his consistent threatening conduct during this

time period, he cannot simply ignore the statute's sensible mandate regarding the weight to be given the passage of time.

James also faults the trial court for considering Marta's "subjective fear" when the statute focuses only on the respondent's likelihood of committing domestic violence, not the protected party's fear. Br. Appellant, at 24-25. James is right about the statute, but he is the one who insisted the trial judge consider fear anyway, thus any claimed error is invited and also harmless, since the court did not rely on fear in making its decision. Indeed, the court made plain it correctly understood the statute, despite James arguing the court was required to find that Marta had a current fear that was objectively reasonable. RP 9-10. The trial court pointed out this was not the legal standard; rather, the current statute requires no proof of fear, shifting the burden from the protected party to the respondent, in response to the court's opinion in *Freeman*, which put the burden on the protected party to prove reasonable fear. RP 9-10; RCW 26.50.130(3)(a) ("the petitioner bears no burden of proving that he or she has a current reasonable fear of imminent harm by the respondent."), RCW 26.50.130(3)(b) (court may consider "only factors which address whether the respondent is likely to commit future acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or those persons protected by the protection order."). Nonetheless, James persisted in arguing the statute still requires

a finding of fear and “the only difference is that my client has the burden of proving it.” RP 10.

On appeal, James reverses course; he acknowledges the statute does not require a finding of the protected party’s fear and claims the trial court erred by considering Marta’s fear, even though the court did so at his urging. Br. Appellant, at 25-26; see RP 9-10; CP 178 (FOF 2.20). Now James attempts to make hay from the fact the court obliged him by entering a finding of Marta’s continuing fear. As the court knew, this finding was superfluous, as indicated above. Moreover, if error, it is invited error, precluding James from challenging it on appeal. *In re Pers. Restraint of Thompson*, 141 Wn.2d 712, 723-24, 10 P.3d 380 (2000) (doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error by an affirmative act and then complaining about it on appeal). James, not the court, bears responsibility for this diversion.

In any event, as noted, the court made clear on the record it understood what the statute requires and that proof of Marta’s current reasonable fear was not at issue and not the legal standard. RP 10. Thus, at most, any error was not only invited but harmless. *See* RCW 4.36.240 (“The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of

the adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.”).

Finally, James complains the trial court erred by finding insufficient the reasons he gave in support of terminating the order “in balancing all of the other considerations.” CP 178 (his desire to go to a friend’s home within 1500 feet of Marta’s home, concern about future events they both may want to attend, concern about being questioned about the DVPO at an airport). James contends the court violated the statute by considering these reasons because they were not factors that address his likelihood of committing domestic violence. Br. Appellant at 23-24. Again, the statute permits the court to consider “other factors relating to a substantial change in circumstances.” RCW 26.50.130(c)(ix). And, again, any error in making these findings was certainly invited because James specifically asked the court to consider these reasons. He is therefore precluded from challenging the findings on appeal.

Thompson, 141 Wn.2d at 723-24.

No matter what James says, the trial court did the job the statute requires of it – applied the proper legal standard to the facts it found supported by substantial evidence. The court properly exercised its discretion when it denied James’s motion.

C. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

The pertinent statute permits an award of costs and attorney fees incurred by a protected party “in responding to a motion to terminate or modify a protection order.” RCW 26.50.130(6). Under RAP 18.1, this statute likewise authorizes costs and fees on appeal. Marta requests an award here, not only because of the persistent and prolonged efforts she has had to undertake over nearly two decades to protect herself, but because in this appeal, James makes every effort to efface that pertinent history, to claim errors where there are none (or were of his making), and otherwise simply asks this Court to usurp the trial court’s role.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Marta Fowler respectfully asks this Court to affirm the order of the trial court and to award her costs and reasonable attorney fees as permitted by statute.

Respectfully submitted as amended this 4th day of April 2018.

/s Patricia Novotny, WSBA #13604

/s Nancy Zaragoza, WSBA #23281

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ZARAGOZA NOVOTNY PLLC

3418 NE 65th Street, Suite A

Seattle, WA 98115

Telephone: 206-525-0711

Fax: 206-525-4001

Email: Patricia@novotnyappeals.com

Nancy@novotnyappeals.com

APPENDIX

**BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
FOWLER v. FOWLER
No. 51247-5-II**

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3. 1997 Violation of Order of Protection – Thurston County District Court #8720
4. 2006 Violation of Order of Protection – Olympia Municipal Court #CR0200002



02/28/18 10:43:11

DN1001MI Case Filing Inquiry (NCC)

THURSTON COUNTY DIST PUB 1 of 1

Case:
Name: NmCd:
StID:

Filing Date: 12 30 1996 Case Type: CN Criminal Non-Traffic
Case : C5263TC THC Jur: THU Orig Agency No.:
Name Code : IN Party: DEF 1
Name : FOWLER, JAMES ANDREW LAGASA

Sex: M DOB: 10 18 1951

Viol Date : 12 27 1996 Speed in a Zone Accident: N
---Violation-----Description-----DV---Bail-----Plea/Response-Finding/Jdgmt
9A.36.041.DV DV ASSAULT 4TH 500.00 G 04 11 1997 G 04 11 1997

Amt Due : 500.00 Case Disposition: CL Closed 07 19 1999
Officer : 00052 GUNDERSON, M.

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PF23	PF24								

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Case Information

96-2-04545-1 | MARTA M K FOWLER VS JAMES A L FOWLER

Case Number	Court	
96-2-04545-1	Thurston	
File Date	Case Type	Case Status
12/30/1996	DVP Domestic Violence	Completed/Re- Completed

Party

Respondent
FOWLER, JAMES A L

Petitioner
FOWLER, MARTA M K

Events and Hearings

12/30/1996 Petition for Order for Protection ▼

Comment

1: PET ORD FOR PROTECTION;

12/30/1996 Notice of Appearance ▼

Comment

2: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE PRO SE;

12/30/1996 Motion Hearing ▼

Comment

-: MOTION HEARING; COMMISSIONER PRO TEM JOHN JARRETT; CC BALDWIN;

12/30/1996 Tapes of Proceedings ▼

Comment

-: TAPES OF PROCEEDINGS 96-182 DV-12; TAPE FOOTAGE #1527 - 1908;

12/30/1996 Temporary Order for Protection ▼

Comment

3: TEMP ORD FOR PROTECTION;

12/30/1996 Notice of Hearing ▼

Comment

-: NOTICE OF HEARING; 01-08-1997DV; PROTECTION ORDER;

01/06/1997 Sheriffs Return on Service ▼

Comment

4: SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE; UPON JAMES FOWLER;

01/08/1997 Domestic Violence Calendar 9:15 AM ▼

Hearing Time

8:00 AM

Comment

PROTECTION ORDER

01/08/1997 Case Resolution Closed by Court Order After a Hearing

01/08/1997 Motion Hearing ▼

Comment

-: MOTION HEARING; JUDGE PRO TEM MEYN; CC SMITH;

01/08/1997 Tapes of Proceedings ▼

Comment

-: TAPES OF PROCEEDINGS 97-004DV-01; FOOTAGE 159-474;

01/08/1997 Order for Protection ▼

Comment

5: ORD FOR PROTECTION;

01/08/1997 Notice of Appearance ▼

Comment

6: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE;

01/23/1997 Transcript of Proceedings ▼

Comment

7: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS;

08/01/1999 ADM05 ▼

Comment

8: SCANNED THRU SUB #7;

06/27/2005 Microfilm Case File ▼

Comment

Reel: SCANNED;



02/28/18 10:38:08

DN1001MI Case Filing Inquiry (NCC)

THURSTON COUNTY DIST PUB 1 of 1

Case: TCP StID:
Name: NmCd:

Filing Date: 03 26 1997 Case Type: CN Criminal Non-Traffic
Case : 8720 TCP Jur: THU Orig Agency No.:
Name Code : IN Party: DEF 1
Name : FOWLER, JAMES ANDREW LAGASA

Sex: M DOB: 10 18 1951

Viol Date : 01 13 1997 Speed in a Zone Accident: N
---Violation-----Description-----DV---Bail-----Plea/Response-Finding/Jdgmt
26.50.110 PROTECTION ORDER V 1000.00 G 04 11 1997 G 04 11 1997

Amt Due : 1,000.00 Case Disposition: CL Closed 09 27 1999
Officer :

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PF11	PF12								
PF13	PF14	PF15	PF16	PF17	PF18	PF19	PF20	PF21	PF22
PF23	PF24								

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02/28/18 10:57:46

DD1001MI Case Docket Inquiry (CDK)

OLYMPIA MUNICIPAL CT PUB

Case: CR0200002 OPD CN StID: - - -

Name: FOWLER, JAMES ANDREW LAGASA NmCd: IN

Name/Title: FOWLER, JAMES ANDREW LAGASA
VIOL PROTECTION ORDER (CIVIL)

Case: CR0200002 OPD CN Criminal Non-Traffic Closed

	02	06	2006	{040606044446P56} COURT ORDER	AJY
S	02	07	2006	Case Filed on 02/07/2006	AJY
S				Charge 1 is DV-related	AJY
S				DEF 1 FOWLER, JAMES ANDREW LAGASA Added as Participant	AJY
S				Charge 1 Dismissed W/O Prejudice : City's Mtn-Other	AJY
S				Case Heard Before Judge AHLF, SCOTT K	AJY
S				Case Disposition of CL Entered	AJY
				{020706095627A27} CITATION	AMC
S	12	22	2015	CASE ORDERED PERMANENTLY RETAINED	ALH
S				JUDGE: SKA DETERMINES PERMANENT RETENTION REASONS TO BE:	ALH
S				PR 08 - Domestic violence was involved.	ALH
				AT JUDGE AHLF'S ORDER - CASE RETAINED PERMANENTLY	ALH
S	04	10	2017	Criteria met for case file to be destroyed, included on Destr	SYS
S				uction of Records Report	SYS

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PF11	PF12								
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