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Division II
State of Washington
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No. 51642-0-II

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

JOHN MASON and LAURIE ROBERTSON

Respondents,

v.

TATYANA MASON

Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT JOHN MASON

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I. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the Trial Court properly dismissed Tatyana's causes of action for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, alienation of affection, intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud:
 - A. On the basis of res judicata, where all such claims either were raised or could have been raised in the divorce case?
 - B. As failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under CR 12(b)(6)?
 - C. As lacking a sufficient evidentiary basis under CR 56?
 - D. As being barred by the three-year statute of limitations?
2. Whether all claims based upon John allegedly giving false or misleading testimony in the divorce case are barred by the common-law rule of witness immunity?
3. Whether the Trial Court correctly awarded CR 11 sanctions in favor of John and against Tatyana on the basis that her lawsuit was frivolous?
4. Whether this Court should award John his attorney's fees and costs in having to defend the instant appeal, on the basis that it is frivolous?

II. RESPONDENT JOHN MASON'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Tatyana Mason (Tatyana), appellant herein and plaintiff below, filed an amended complaint on June 30, 2017 in Thurston County Superior Court under cause no. 17-2-01121-34. 1 Respondents herein and defendants below are Tatyana's former spouse John Mason (John) and his prior divorce attorney, Laurie Robertson (Robertson). All of the causes of action alleged in the amended complaint arise solely out of the proceedings in the related divorce case, *In re Marriage of Mason*, Thurston County Superior Court Cause No. 07-3-00848-0.

Tatyana filed two different appeals to this Court from the dissolution proceedings. This Court has set forth the facts in detail in *In re Marriage of Mason*, No. 45835-7-II (Wash. Ct. App. July 7, 2015)(unpublished) and *In re Marriage of Mason*, No. 49839-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. July 31, 2018)(unpublished). The record in the divorce case is extensive and will not be discussed in detail here, except to point out some highlights. The following general factual summary is taken from this Court's opinion in the latter case.

In 1999, Tatyana came to the United States and she and John were married. The parties later had two children and were divorced in 2008 pursuant to a decree of dissolution which allocated residential time with the children and required John to make child support payments. In 2011, the court granted John's

1. CP 1

petition to modify the parenting plan and enter a finding of abuse against Tatyana under RCW 26.09.191. Neither party informed the court at that time that John had signed a federal I-864 affidavit of support, which is a binding contract whereby one who sponsors an immigrant spouse agrees to support the immigrant at least to a level of 125% of the federal poverty guidelines.²

On November 25, 2013, the trial court entered an amended order of child support, imputing income to Tatyana on the basis that she was voluntarily unemployed. Tatyana appealed the trial court's order, and on July 2015 this Court affirmed the trial court's order in *In re Marriage of Mason*, No. 45835-7-II (Wash. Ct. App. July 7, 2015) (unpublished).

Thereafter, Tatyana filed a petition in the superior court to modify the parenting plan and to vacate the full amount of the 2013 child support order.³ The trial court treated Tatyana's petition as a motion to vacate under CR 60(b) and held a trial. After trial, the trial court granted Tatyana's motion to vacate the previous child support order, reasoning that the court should have considered the I-864 affidavit obligation at the time the 2013 support order was entered. The

2. *In re Marriage of Mason*, No. 49839-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. July 31, 2018)(unpublished), ¶ 4-7.

3. *Id.*, ¶11.

court awarded Tatyana expert witness fees under RCW 26.09.140 and CR 11 sanctions against John.⁴

John appealed. This Court upheld the award of expert witness fees, and reversed the vacation of the 2013 support order, holding that the existence of John's I-864 obligation was not an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying modification of the 2013 support order under CR 60(b)(11). Further, this Court reversed the award of CR 11 sanctions against John on the basis that the trial court had failed to make adequate findings. *In re Marriage of Mason*, No. 49839-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. July 31, 2018)(unpublished). The Supreme Court denied review on March 6, 2019. *In re Marriage of Mason*, 192 Wn.2d 1024, 2019 Wash. LEXIS 178 (2019).

In her amended complaint that is the subject of the instant appeal, Tatyana seeks damages based on theories of (1) abuse of process, (2) alienation of affection, (3) malicious prosecution, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) fraud and (6) alleged violations by Robertson of the Rules for Professional Conduct by Ms. Robertson.⁵ The facts Tatyana alleges in her rambling and accusatory 19 page amended complaint arise solely out acts and omissions she contends the Respondents committed between 2008 and 2011 in the divorce case.

4. *Id.*, ¶ 22.

5. CP 1

On November 3, 2017, the Trial Court below granted Robertson's motion to dismiss all claims against her and awarded attorney's fees under CR 11.⁶

On October 11, 2017, John filed a motion to dismiss Tatyana's amended complaint⁷ on the bases that all claims against him were barred by: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) res judicata; (3) witness immunity; (4) statute of limitations; and/or (5) lack of evidence. On February 2, 2018, the Superior Court, Hon. James Dixon, entered an Order and Judgment⁸ dismissing Tatyana's claims against John, granting John's motion to strike Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 15(a), 21 and 22 to the amended complaint,⁹ and awarding sanctions under Civil Rule 11.

Tatyana now appeals the April 18, 2017 and February 2, 2108 dismissal orders. In his brief, John will only address those causes of action and issues that concern him. It is his position that (1) the Trial Court's dismissal order and judgment were properly granted and (2) Tatyana's instant appeal is frivolous, justifying an award by this Court of sanctions against Tatyana pursuant to RAP 18.9(a).

III. ARGUMENT

6. CP 40
7. CP 210
8. CP 70
9. CP 154

A. Standards for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.

This Court reviews a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. *Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle*, 87 Wn.2d 6, 15, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976). This Court may affirm a summary judgment on any basis the record supports. *Mangat v. Snohomish County*, 176 Wn. App. 324, 328, 308 P.3d 786 (2013), *rev. den.* 179 Wn.2d 2012, 316 P.3d 495 (2014).

A defendant may also move to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) where a plaintiff's pleadings do not state a claim for which relief can be granted. *Danzig v. Danzig*, 79 Wn. App. 612, 616, 904 P.2d 312 (1995), *rev. den.* 129 Wn.2d 1011, 917 P.2d 130 (1996). Such motion should be granted where “it appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” *Danzig*, 79 Wn. App. at 616. If a CR 12(b)(6) motion is supported by materials outside of the complaint, it is treated as a summary judgment motion. *St. Yves v. Mid State Bank*, 111 Wn.2d 374, 377, 757 P.2d 1384 (1988).¹⁰

The same evidentiary rules apply to both motions. All facts and inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Cent. Heating & Plumbing Co.*, 81 Wn.2d

10. Overruled on other grounds by *Berg v. Hudesman*, 115 Wn.2d 657, 669, 801 P.2d 222 (1990).

528, 530, 503 P.2d 108 (1972). A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part. *Barrie v. Hosts of America, Inc.*, 92 Wn.2d 640, 642, 618 P.2d 96 (1980). While the initial burden is on the moving party, the nonmoving party may not successfully oppose the motion by making argumentative assertions, engaging in speculation or by nakedly asserting that there are unresolved factual questions. *Bates v. Grace United Methodist Church*, 12 Wn. App. 111, 115, 529 P.2d 466 (1974).

B. Res judicata bars all of Tatyana's claims as stated in the amended complaint because they deal with matters that either were litigated or should have been litigated in the divorce case.

Every one of Tatyana's claims as stated in the amended complaint concern issues that either were raised or that should have been raised in the divorce trial. The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to avoid relitigation of claims or causes of action arising out of the same transactional nucleus of facts, *Deja Vu—Everett—Federal Way, Inc. v. City of Federal Way*, 96 Wn. App. 255, 262, 979 P.2d 464 (1999); *Costantini v. Trans World Airlines*, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982). The doctrine exists to avoid repetitive litigation, conserve judicial resources, and prevent the moral force of court judgments from being undermined. *International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Karr*, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993).

Res judicata bars all grounds for recovery that could have been asserted, whether

they were or not, in a prior action between the same parties if there is a concurrence of identity in (1) the subject matter; (2) the cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. *Deja Vu*, 96 Wn. App. at 262, 979 P.2d 464; *Karr*, 994 F.2d at 1429; *Rains v. State*, 100 Wn.2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165 (1983). The party invoking the defense has the burden of proving its applicability. *McDaniels v. Carlson*, 108 Wn.2d 299, 304, 738 P.2d 254 (1987).

The factual underpinning of all of Tatyana's claims is that the contention that John and his attorney engaged in improper actions *solely in the family court divorce action*. All of the requirements of res judicata are satisfied. The subject matter at issue in the present Amended Complaint is barred on the subject matter of the divorce action. The persons and parties are the same. The cause of action (in this case damages for abuse of the judicial system, including violations of Civil Rule 11) were squarely before the Court in the divorce action, which in fact awarded Rule 11 sanctions in favor of Tatyana against John and his attorney. All of the allegedly objectionable action of which Tatyana complains of in her amended complaint (*i.e.*, "misrepresented the facts . . . misinterpreted the laws . . . misquoted many cases . . . mislead the family court . . . committed fraud," etc.) arose solely out of the family court proceedings and the subject matter thereof, and was exclusively subject to that court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff

was barred by res judicata from relitigating those contentions in a new lawsuit, and the Trial Court properly dismissed all of her claims on such basis.

C. All of Tatyana’s claims further fail as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; lack of evidence; and statute of limitations.

1. Abuse of Process.

Tatyana’s abuse of process claims were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6), for failure to prove a prima facie case under CR 56 and as being time-barred by RCW 4.16.080.

Tatyana’s complaint fails to state a claim for abuse of process, which requires proof that she was harmed by some “process” enabled by the litigation, but not intrinsic to it, such as a garnishment or attachment of property. The mere institution of a legal proceeding [in this case a divorce petition] even with a malicious motive does not constitute an abuse of process. *Fite v. Lee*, 11 Wn. App. 21, 27-28, 521 P.2d 964 (1974), *rev. den.* 84 Wn.2d 1005 (1974).

In other words . . . there must be an act after filing suit using legal process empowered by that suit to accomplish an end not within the purview of the suit. . . . The crucial inquiry in abuse of process claims is therefore ‘whether the judicial system’s process, made available to insure the presence of the defendant or his property in court, has been misused to achieve another, inappropriate end.’

Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County, 191 Wn.2d 392, 438-439, 423 P.3d 223 (2018)(Internal citations omitted).

The factual allegations Tatyana makes to support this claim appear at CP 5-6, all of which she alleges occurred during the divorce case: contentions that John took her car; made calls to the police and Child Protective Services; engaged in improper court tactics in the divorce case; unnecessarily increased litigation costs, etc. In summary, there is no set of facts upon which Tatyana can recover on this theory on the face of her amended complaint, and the Trial Court correctly dismissed the abuse of process claim. At a minimum, the record demonstrated the absence of any material factual issues to support such theory, requiring dismissal as a matter of law under CR 56.

Finally, by Tatyana's own chronology, all of the alleged tortious acts of the defendants occurred between 2008 and 2011. Since she did not file her lawsuit until March 2017, her claims are barred by RCW 4.16.080, which limits the time for filing a tort claim to three years.

2. Malicious Prosecution.

As with the abuse of process cause of action, Tatyana's malicious prosecution claims were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6), for failure to make out a prima facie case under CR 56 and as being time-barred by RCW 4.16.080.

As with the tort of abuse of process, a cause of action for malicious prosecution will not lie where there has been no arrest or seizure of property and

proof of special injury. Our Supreme Court set out the common-law elements of the tort of civil malicious prosecution in *Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co.*, 13 Wn.2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942):

To maintain an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must allege and prove (1) that the prosecution claimed to have been malicious was instituted or continued by the defendant; (2) that there was want of probable cause for the institution or continuation of the prosecution; (3) that the proceedings were instituted or continued through malice; (4) that the proceedings terminated on the merits in favor of the plaintiff, or were abandoned; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered injury or damage as a result of the prosecution.

Peasley, 13 Wn.2d at 497. In *Petrich v. McDonald*, 44 Wn.2d 211, 215, 266 P.2d 1047 (1954) the court affirmed the restrictive requirement that proof of element (5) of the *Peasley* test requires arrest or seizure of property:

[A] cause of action for malicious prosecution will not lie when there is neither (1) an arrest, or (in the alternative) attachment of property, nor (2) special injury sustained (meaning an injury which would not necessarily result in similar suits).

In 1977, the legislature enacted RCW 4.24.350, which states in pertinent part:

1) In any action for damages, whether based on tort or contract or otherwise, a claim or counterclaim for damages may be litigated in the principal action for malicious prosecution on the ground that the action was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known to be false and unfounded.

RCW 4.24.350 does not abrogate the common law requirement of seizure of property in an action for malicious prosecution. *Fenner v. Lindsay*, 28 Wn. App. 626, 625 P.2d 180 (1981).

Tatyana's factual allegations in support of her malicious prosecution claim are stated in Section IX of the amended complaint at CP 8 and 9, and again, strictly relate to what Tatyana alleges were improper trial tactics during the divorce proceedings on the part of the defendants. As with the abuse of process claim, there is no set of facts under which Tatyana can recover under a malicious prosecution theory as the amended complaint is pled. Second, dismissal was proper under CR 56 for lack of evidence, and third, such claims were also time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

3. Alienation of Affection.

To establish a prima facie case for the tort of alienation of affection regarding one's children, the complaining party must show:

1. An existing family relationship.
2. A wrongful interference with the relationship by a third person.
3. An intention by the part of the third person that such wrongful

interference results

in such a loss of affection or family association.

4. A causal connection between the party's conduct and the loss of

affection.

5. Resulting damages.

Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wn. App. 13, 14-15, 510 P.2d 250 (1973). In her amended complaint, Tatyana does not allege specific facts supporting this cause of action beyond what was already litigated in the divorce proceedings. The custody issues and the Court's rulings thereon bar her from suing again on the same claims in a new lawsuit. As with her other causes of action, there is no set of facts upon which Tatyana can recover under this theory based upon the amended complaint as pled, so dismissal was proper under CR 12(b)(6). At a minimum, the claim was appropriately dismissed under a summary judgment standard for failure to make out a prima facie case based upon competent evidence under CR 56. Finally, the alienation of affection claims were further barred by the statute of limitations based on the Plaintiff's own pleadings. An action for alienation of affection occurs when the loss of affection is sustained. *Strode*, citing *Fling v. Simpson*, 49 Wn.2d 639, 305 P.2d 803 (1957). The right of action occurs when the parent is aware that the harm is suffered. *Id.*, Tatyana avers in her amended complaint she became aware of the alleged harm no later than March of 2011. See amended complaint, CP 7-8 ("John ALIENATED Tatyana from her children since March 2011 to this date. **The wrongful and malicious behavior of John occurred prior to the**

separation[.]”).¹¹ In conclusion, the Trial Court properly dismissed this cause of action for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6), for lack of evidence under CR 56 and as being time-barred as a matter of law.

4. Fraud.

Tatyana’s fraud claims against John were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6), for failure to allege and prove the factual elements of fraud under CR 56 and as being time-barred by RCW 4.16.080.

At the outset, Tatyana’s fraud claim is barred by Rule 12(b)(6) as failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis that the amended complaint fails to allege independent facts setting forth one of the elements of the tort of fraud with particularity. The nine elements of fraud/intentional misrepresentation are: (1) representation of an existing fact; (2) materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) intent of the speaker that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiffs’ ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiffs’ reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiffs right to rely upon

11. Emphasis in original

it; and (9) damages suffered by the plaintiff. *Stiley v. Block*, 130 Wn.2d 486, 505, 925 P.2d 194, (1996). Each of these elements must be proven by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. *Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc.*, 124 Wn.2d 158, 180, 876 P.2d 435 (1994).

Like her other claims, Tatyana's fraud cause of action solely arises out allegations that John and his attorney engaged in improper conduct in the divorce court proceedings. She neither pleads the separate elements of fraud with particularity nor offers competent evidence to support such allegations. Such cause of action was properly dismissed both for failure to state a claim and under the summary judgment standard for failing to establish a prima facie case.

Tatyana's fraud claim against John fails on the further basis that he is absolutely immune from suits for damages arising out of allegations he gave false or misleading testimony in the divorce case. Judges, attorneys, and witnesses in judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from subsequent suit for damages based on their conduct or testimony in separate litigation. *Briscoe v. LaHue*, 460 U.S. 325, 335, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1115-16, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). The scope of this absolute immunity "is broad," and has existed for hundreds of years. *Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Engineers, Inc.*, 113 Wn.2d 123, 126, 776 P.2d 666, (1989); *Briscoe*, 460 U.S. at 335 (stating "the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons - governmental or

otherwise - who were integral parts of the judicial process.”). One reason for this immunity is to prevent “self-censorship” and a less than full airing of “evidence” at trial for “fear of subsequent liability.” *Bruce*, 113 Wn.2d at 126 (reasoning “A witness who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.”)

John denies that he gave false or misleading testimony in the divorce action. However, even if a witness does, the legal consequences of such are limited to being disbelieved by the fact finder, being sanctioned by the Court or perhaps being prosecuted for perjury. There does not exist under Washington law any other cause of action of the type asserted by Tatyana.

In summary, the Trial Court correctly dismissed the fraud cause of action under CR 12(b)(6) and CR 56. Finally, by Tatyana’s own chronology as with her other claims, all of the alleged tortious acts of the defendants occurred between 2008 and 2011. Her claims are therefore time-barred by RCW 4.16.080(4), which limits the time for filing a fraud claim to three years from the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the fraud.

5. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

At the outset, Tatyana's cause of action for emotional distress is barred by the three-year statute of limitations and by John's witness immunity.

Moreover, there clearly can be no cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) for litigation-related stress. *Grimsby v. Samson*, 85 Wn.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975) holds that any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior "*so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.*" *Id.*, 85 Wn.2d at 59 (quoting *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 46 cmt. d).¹² As with all her claims, Tatyana's claims of emotional distress emanate from her exposure to the stress of divorce litigation, which simply is not actionable in Washington. Engaging in litigation is inherently distressing, and continuous or repeated involvement in litigation does not create an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress. See *Wilson v. Jefferson*, 908 A.2d 13 (Conn. App. 2006). Thus, the Court correctly dismissed the emotional distress claim on multiple bases.

D. The Trial Court correctly awarded CR 11 sanctions on the basis that Tatyana's lawsuit was frivolous, entitling John to an award of his attorneys' fees.

12. Emphasis added.

The purpose of CR 11 is to deter baseless filings and to curb abuses of the judicial system. *Building Industry Ass'n of Washington v. McCarthy*, 152 Wn. App. 720, 745, 218 P.3d 196 (2009).

CR 11(a) provides in relevant part:

The signature of a party or of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the party or attorney that the party or attorney has read the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, and that to the best of the party's or attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is well grounded in fact; (2) it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument of the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

...

If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expense incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, including a reasonable attorney fee.

Rule 11 calls for imposition of sanctions on a party "for making arguments or filing claims that are frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation, or asserted for an improper purpose. *Sallis v. Dime Savings Bank of New York*, 128

F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 1997). Rule 11's goal is not reimbursement for costs spent, but rather a sanction, "intended to bring home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility." *Pavilic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment*, 493 U.S. 120, 126, 110 S. Ct. 456, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989).

All of the authority and argument above that supported dismissal of Tatyana's claims in the Trial Court supported an award of substantial sanctions under Civil Rule 11 on the basis that her amended complaint is patently without merit.

E. The Court should award John his attorneys' fees and costs on the basis that this appeal is frivolous, as is the underlying lawsuit.

Tatyana's instant appeal is so devoid of even arguable merit, this Court should find it frivolous within the purview of RAP 18.9(a), which states:

The appellate court on its own initiative or on motion of a party may order a party . . . who uses these rules for the purpose of delay [or] files a frivolous appeal . . . to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who has been harmed by the delay or the failure to comply[.]

Accordingly, John requests that this Court award his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs against Tatyana under RAP 18.9(a) and CR 11.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, any and all allegations by the Tatyana that the John abused the Court system in the divorce case were solely within the

jurisdiction of the divorce court, and were either adjudicated or should have been adjudicated by the trial judge in that proceeding. Tatyana asserts no facts beyond complaining about the Respondents' behavior in the divorce court to support the independent claims Tatyana alleged in the suit that is the subject of this appeal. All of Tatyana's allegations in her amended complaint case are barred by res judicata, CR 12(b)(6), CR 56 and/or the statute of limitations. This Court should affirm the decision of the Superior Court. The Appellant's lawsuit and the present appeal are frivolous, justifying the award of sanctions under CR 11 by the Trial Court and warranting further sanctions by this Court under RAP 18.9(a) for having to defend this appeal.

DATED this 10 day of September, 2019.

J. MICHAEL MORGAN, PLLC



J. Michael Morgan, WSBA No. 18404
Attorney for Respondent John Mason

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I am now and at all times herein mentioned a resident of the State of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party to or interested in the above-entitled action, and am competent to be a witness herein.

On the date given below, I caused to be served the foregoing document on the following persons and in the manner listed below.

Tatyana Mason P.O. Box 6441 Olympia, WA 98507 Tatyanam377@gmail.com	<input type="checkbox"/> Via First Class Mail <input type="checkbox"/> Via Legal Messenger <input type="checkbox"/> Overnight Courier <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronically via email <input type="checkbox"/> Facsimile
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Andrew Mazzeo Lifetime Legal, PLLC 1235 4 th Ave. E, Suite 200 Olympia, WA 98506-4278 dpm@lifetime.legal	<input type="checkbox"/> Via First Class Mail <input type="checkbox"/> Via Legal Messenger <input type="checkbox"/> Overnight Courier <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronically via email <input type="checkbox"/> Facsimile
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DATED this 10th day of September, 2019.



J. Michael Morgan
mike@jmmorganlaw.com

J. MICHAEL MORGAN, PLLC

September 10, 2019 - 3:11 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division II
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Appellate Court Case Title: Tatyana Mason, Appellant v John Mason and Laurie Robertson, Respondents
Superior Court Case Number: 17-2-01121-2

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