

No. 30698-4-III  
(consolidated with 30694-1-III)  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION III

FILED  
SEPT 11, 2012  
Court of Appeals  
Division III  
State of Washington

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

JOHN J. ZUVELA,

Defendant/Appellant.

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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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**A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR**

1. The “to-convict” instructions erroneously stated the jury had a “duty to return a verdict of guilty” if it found each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. The trial court erred in finding Mr. Zuvela had the means to pay the costs of incarceration and in ordering him to pay those costs as a condition of his sentence. CP 51, ¶ 4.D.4.

3. The trial court erred in ordering Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs of any medical care incurred by Yakima County on his behalf as a condition of his sentence. CP 51, ¶ 4.D.5.

4. The trial court erred in ordering Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs and assessments within 180 days after his release as a condition of his sentence. CP 51, ¶ 4.D.7.

*Issues Pertaining to Assignments of Error*

1. In a criminal trial, does a “to-convict” instruction, which informs the jury it has a duty to return a verdict of guilty if it finds the elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, violate a defendant’s right to a jury trial, when there is no such duty under the state and federal Constitutions?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Mr. Zuvela had the means to pay the costs of incarceration and in ordering him to pay those costs as a condition of his sentence, where there was no evidence to support that finding?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs of any medical care incurred by Yakima County on his behalf as a condition of his sentence, where there was no evidence of any medical costs?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in arbitrarily ordering Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs and assessments within 180 days after his release as a condition of his sentence without considering his ability to realistically pay that amount within the ordered timeframe?

**B. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

John Zuvela was found guilty by a jury of first degree burglary. CP 44. The jury was given a “to convict” instruction containing the language, “If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.” CP 28.

As part of the sentence, the Court found Mr. Zuvela had the means to pay the costs of incarceration and ordered him to pay those costs. CP

51, ¶ 4.D.4. The Court also ordered Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs of any medical care incurred by Yakima County on his behalf. CP 51, ¶ 4.D.5. The Court ordered costs and assessments totaling \$1650. It ordered Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs and assessments within 180 days after his release. CP 51, ¶ 4.D. 7. This appeal followed. CP 55-56.

### C. ARGUMENT

1. Mr. Zuvela’s constitutional right to a jury trial was violated by the court’s instructions, which affirmatively misled the jury about its power to acquit.

As part of the “to-convict” instruction used to convict Mr. Zuvela, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.” CP 28. Zuvela contends there is no constitutional “duty to convict” and that the instruction accordingly misstates the law. The instruction violated Zuvela’s right to a properly instructed jury.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Division One of the Court of Appeals rejected the arguments raised here in its decision in State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wn. App. 693, 958 P.2d 319, *rev denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1028 (1998), *abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco*, 154 Wn.2d 156, 110 P.3d 188 (2005). Counsel respectfully contends Meggyesy was incorrectly decided.

a. Standard of review. Constitutional violations are reviewed *de novo*. Bellevue School Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 702, 257 P.3d 570 (2011). Jury instructions are reviewed *de novo*. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). Instructions must make the relevant legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror. State v. Killo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 864, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).

b. The United States Constitution. The right to jury trial in a criminal case was one of the few guarantees of individual rights enumerated in the United States Constitution of 1789. It was the only guarantee to appear in both the original document and the Bill of Rights. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, ¶ 3; U. S. Const. amend. 6; U.S. Const. amend. 7. Thomas Jefferson wrote of the importance of this right in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 15, p. 269 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1958).

In criminal trials, the right to jury trial is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. It is thus further guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968);

Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d 87, 94, 653 P.2d 618 (1982).

Trial by jury was not only a valued right of persons accused of crime, but was also an allocation of political power to the citizenry.

[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power -- a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156.<sup>2</sup>

c. Washington Constitution. The Washington Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens in some areas than does the United States Constitution. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). Under the Gunwall analysis, it is clear that the right to jury trial is such an area. Pasco v. Mace, *supra*; Sofie v. Fiberboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 656, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).

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<sup>2</sup> In Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., the majority saw this allocation of political power to the citizens as a limit on the power of the legislature. 112 Wn.2d 636, 650-53, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989). Two of the dissenting members of the court acknowledged the allocation of power, but interpreted it rather as a limit on the power of the judiciary. Sofie, 112 Wn.2d at 676 (Callow, C.J., joined by Dolliver, J., dissenting).

i. The textual language of the state constitution.

The drafters of our state constitution not only granted the right to a jury trial, Const. art. 1, § 22,<sup>3</sup> they expressly declared it “shall remain inviolate.” Const. art. 1, § 21.<sup>4</sup>

The term "inviolable" connotes deserving of the highest protection . . . Applied to the right to trial by jury, this language indicates that the right must remain the essential component of our legal system that it has always been. For such a right to remain inviolable, it must not diminish over time and must be protected from all assault to its essential guarantees.

Sofie, 112 Wn.2d at 656. Article 1, section 21 "preserves the right [to jury trial] as it existed in the territory at the time of its adoption." Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d at 96; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 115, 110 P. 1020 (1910). The right to trial by jury "should be continued unimpaired and inviolate." Strasburg, 60 Wash. at 115.

The difference in language suggests the drafters meant something different from the federal Bill of Rights. See Hon. Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 491, 515 (1984) (Utter).

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<sup>3</sup> Rights of Accused Persons. In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed . . . .

<sup>4</sup> “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolable . . . .”

The framers added other constitutional protections to this right. A court is not permitted to convey to the jury its own impression of the evidence. Const. art. 4, § 16.<sup>5</sup> Even a witness may not invade the province of the jury. State v. Black, 109 Wn.2d 336, 350, 745 P.2d 12 (1987). The right to jury trial also is protected by the due process clause of article I, section 3.

While the Court in State v. Meggyesy<sup>6</sup> may have been correct when it found there is no specific constitutional language that addresses this precise issue, the language that *is* there indicates the right to a jury trial is so fundamental that any infringement violates the constitution.

ii. State constitutional and common law history.

State constitutional history favors an independent application of Article I, Sections 21 and 22. In 1889 (when the constitution was adopted), the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the states. Instead, Washington based its Declaration of Rights on the Bills of Rights of other states, which relied on common law and not the federal constitution. State v. Silva, 107 Wn. App. 605, 619, 27 P.3d 663 (2001), *citing* Utter, 7 U.

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<sup>5</sup> “Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, not comment thereon, but shall declare the law.”

<sup>6</sup> 90 Wn. App. 693, 701, 958 P.2d 319, *rev denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1028 (1998), *abrogated on other grounds by* State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156, 110 P.3d 188 (2005).

Puget Sound Law Review at 497. This difference supports an independent reading of the Washington Constitution.

State common law history also favors an independent application. Article I, Section 21 “preserves the right as it existed at common law in the territory at the time of its adoption.” Sofie, 112 Wn.2d at 645; Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d at 96; *see also* State v. Hobble, 126 Wn.2d 283, 299, 892 P.2d 85 (1995). Under the common law, juries were instructed in such a way as to allow them to acquit even where the prosecution proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash.Terr. 381, 7 Pac. 872 (Wash.Terr.1885). In Leonard, the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction and set out in some detail the jury instructions given in the case. The court instructed the jurors that they “should” convict and “may find [the defendant] guilty” if the prosecution proved its case, but that they “must” acquit in the absence of such proof.<sup>7</sup> Leonard, at 398-399. Thus the common law practice *required* the jury to acquit upon a failure of proof, and *allowed* the jury to acquit even if the proof was sufficient.<sup>8</sup> Id.

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<sup>7</sup> The trial court’s instructions were found erroneous on other grounds.

<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the territorial court reversed all criminal convictions that resulted from erroneous jury instructions (unless the instructions favored the defense). *See, e.g.*, Miller v. Territory, 3 Wash.Terr. 554, 19 P. 50 (Wash.Terr.1888); White v. Territory, 3 Wash.Terr. 397, 19 P. 37 (Wash.Terr.1888); Leonard, *supra*.

The Court of Appeals in Meggyesy attempted to distinguish Leonard on the basis that the Leonard court "simply quoted the relevant instruction. . . ." Meggyesy, 90 Wn. App. at 703. But the Meggyesy court missed the point—at the time the Constitution was adopted, courts instructed juries using the permissive "may" as opposed to the current practice of requiring the jury to make a finding of guilt. The current practice does not comport with the scope of the right to jury trial existing at that time, and should now be re-examined.

iii. Preexisting state law.

In criminal cases, an accused person's guilt has always been the sole province of the jury. State v. Kitchen, 46 Wn. App. 232, 238, 730 P.2d 103 (1986); *see also* State v. Holmes, 68 Wash. 7, 122 P. 345 (1912); State v. Christiansen, 161 Wash. 530, 297 P. 151 (1931). This rule applies even where the jury ignores applicable law. *See, e.g.,* Hartigan v. Washington Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 447, 449 (1874) ("[T]he jury may find a general verdict compounded of law and fact, and if it is for the defendant, and is plainly contrary to the law, either from mistake or a willful disregard of the law, there is no remedy.")<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> This is likewise true in the federal system. *See, e.g.,* United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1969).

- iv. Differences in federal and state constitutions' structures.

State constitutions were originally intended to be the primary devices to protect individual rights, with the United States Constitution a secondary layer of protection. Utter, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. at 497; Utter & Pitler, "Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique," 20 Ind. L. Rev. 637, 636 (1987). Accordingly, state constitutions were intended to give broader protection than the federal constitution. An independent interpretation is necessary to accomplish this end. Gunwall indicates that this factor will always support an independent interpretation of the state constitution because the difference in structure is a constant. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 62, 66; *see also State v. Ortiz*, 119 Wn.2d 294, 303, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992).

- v. Matters of particular state interest or local concern.

The manner of conducting criminal trials in state court is of particular local concern, and does not require adherence to a national standard. *See, e.g., State v. Smith*, 150 Wn.2d 135, 152, 75 P.3d 934 (2003); *State v. Russell*, 125 Wn.2d 24, 61, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1129 (1995). Gunwall factor number six thus also requires an independent application of the state constitutional provision in this case.

vi. An independent analysis is warranted.

All six Gunwall factors favor an independent application of Article I, Sections 21 and 22 of the Washington Constitution in this case. The state constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution, and prohibits a trial court from affirmatively misleading a jury about its power to acquit.

d. Jury's power to acquit. A court may never direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal case. United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970) (directed verdict of guilty improper even where no issues of fact are in dispute); Holmes, 68 Wash. at 12-13. If a court improperly withdraws a particular issue from the jury's consideration, it may deny the defendant the right to jury trial. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 132 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1995) (improper to withdraw issue of "materiality" of false statement from jury's consideration); *see* Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 15-16, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (omission of element in jury instruction subject to harmless error analysis).

The constitutional protections against double jeopardy also protect the right to a jury trial by prohibiting a retrial after a verdict of acquittal.

U.S. Const. amend. 5; Const. art. I, § 9.<sup>10</sup> A jury verdict of not guilty is thus non-reviewable.

Also well-established is "the principle of noncoercion of jurors," established in Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1671). Edward Bushell was a juror in the prosecution of William Penn for unlawful assembly and disturbing the peace. When the jury refused to convict, the court fined the jurors for disregarding the evidence and the court's instructions. Bushell was imprisoned for refusing to pay the fine. In issuing a writ of habeas corpus for his release, Chief Justice Vaughan declared that judges could neither punish nor threaten to punish jurors for their verdicts. *See generally* Alschuler & Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 912-13 (1994).

If there is no ability to review a jury verdict of acquittal, no authority to direct a guilty verdict, and no authority to coerce a jury in its decision, there can be no "duty to return a verdict of guilty." Indeed, there is no authority in law that suggests such a duty.

We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence... If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason

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<sup>10</sup> "No person shall be ... twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."

which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision.

United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969), *cert. denied*, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).

Under Washington law, juries have always had the ability to deliver a verdict of acquittal that is against the evidence. Hartigan, *supra*. A judge cannot direct a verdict for the state because this would ignore "the jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence, sometimes referred to as the jury's pardon or veto power." State v. Primrose, 32 Wn. App. 1, 4, 645 P.2d 714 (1982). *See also* State v. Salazar, 59 Wn. App. 202, 211, 796 P.2d 773 (1990) (relying on jury's "constitutional prerogative to acquit" as basis for upholding admission of evidence). An instruction telling jurors that they *may not* acquit if the elements have been established affirmatively misstates the law, and deceives the jury as to its own power. Such an instruction fails to make the correct legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 864.

This is not to say there is a right to instruct a jury that it may disregard the law in reaching its verdict. *See, e.g.,* United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction on other grounds). However, if the court may not tell the jury it may disregard the

law, it is at least equally wrong for the court to direct the jury that it has a duty to return a verdict of guilty if it finds certain facts to be proved.

e. Scope of jury's role re: fact and law. Although a jury may not strictly determine what the law is, it does have a role in applying the law of the case that goes beyond mere fact-finding. In Gaudin, the Court rejected limiting the jury's role to merely finding facts. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 514-15. Historically the jury's role has never been so limited: "[O]ur decision in no way undermine[s] the historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of a criminal defendant to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence on every issue, which includes application of the law to the facts."

Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 514.

Prof. Wigmore described the roles of the law and the jury in our system:

Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That is because law is a general rule (even the stated exceptions to the rules are general exceptions); while justice is the fairness of this precise case under all its circumstances. And as a rule of law only takes account of broadly typical conditions, and is aimed at average results, law and justice every so often do not coincide. ... We want justice, and we think we are going to get it through 'the law' and when we do not, we blame the law. Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction is preserved. ... That is what a jury trial does. It supplies that flexibility of legal rules which is essential to justice

and popular contentment. ... The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are the indispensable elements in popular justice.

John H. Wigmore, "A Program for the Trial of a Jury", 12 Am. Jud. Soc. 166 (1929).

Furthermore, if such a "duty" to convict existed, the law lacks any method of enforcing it. If a jury acquits, the case is over, the charge dismissed, and there is no further review. In contrast, if a jury convicts when the evidence is insufficient, the court has a legally enforceable duty to reverse the conviction or enter a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980); State v. Carlson, 65 Wn. App. 153, 828 P.2d 30, *rev. denied*, 119 Wn.2d 1022 (1992).

Thus, a legal "threshold" exists before a jury may convict. A guilty verdict in a case that does not meet this evidentiary threshold is contrary to law and will be reversed. The "duty" to return a verdict of not guilty, therefore, is genuine and enforceable by law. A jury must return a verdict of not guilty if there is a reasonable doubt; however, it may return a verdict of guilty if, and only if, it finds every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

f. Current example of correct legal standard in instructions. The duty to acquit and permission to convict is well-reflected in the instruction in Leonard:

If you find the facts necessary to establish the guilt of defendant proven to the certainty above stated, then you *may* find him guilty of such a degree of the crime as the facts so found show him to have committed; but if you do not find such facts so proven, then you *must* acquit.

Leonard, 2 Wash.Terr. at 399 (emphasis added). This was the law as given to the jury in murder trials in 1885, just four years before the adoption of the Washington Constitution. This allocation of the power of the jury “shall remain inviolate.”

The Washington Pattern Jury Instruction Committee has adopted accurate language consistent with Leonard for considering a special verdict. *See* WPIC 160.00, the concluding instruction for a special verdict, in which the burden of proof is precisely the same:

... In order to answer the special verdict form “yes”, you must unanimously be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that “yes” is the correct answer. ... If you unanimously have a reasonable doubt as to this question, you must answer “no”.

The due process requirements to return a special verdict—that the jury must find each element of the special verdict proven beyond a reasonable doubt—are exactly the same as for the elements of the general

verdict. This language in no way instructs the jury on "jury nullification."

But it at no time imposes a "duty to return a verdict of guilty."

In contrast, the "to convict" instruction at issue here does not reflect this legal asymmetry. It is not a correct statement of the law. As such, it provides a level of coercion, not supported by law, for the jury to return a guilty verdict. Such coercion is prohibited by the right to a jury trial. Leonard, *supra*; State v. Boogaard, 90 Wn.2d 733, 585 P.2d 789 (1978).

g. Contrary case law is based on a poor analysis; this Court should decide the issue differently.<sup>11</sup> In State v. Meggyesy, the appellant challenged the WPIC's "duty to return a verdict of guilty" language. The court held the federal and state constitutions did not "preclude" this language, and so affirmed. Meggyesy, 90 Wn. App. at 696.

In its analysis, Division One of the Court of Appeals characterized the alternative language proposed by the appellants—"you *may* return a verdict of guilty"—as "an instruction notifying the jury of its power to acquit against the evidence." 90 Wn. App. at 699. The court spent much of its opinion concluding there was no legal authority requiring it to instruct a jury it had the power to acquit against the evidence.

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<sup>11</sup> A decision is incorrect if the authority on which it relies does not support it. State v. Nunez, --- Wn.2d \_\_\_, \_\_\_ P.3d \_\_\_, 2012 WL 2044377 \*6 (June 7, 2012).

Division Two has followed the Meggyesy holding. State v. Bonisio, 92 Wn. App. 783, 964 P.2d 1222 (1998), *rev. denied*, 137 Wn.2d 1024 (1999); State v. Brown, 130 Wn. App. 767, 124 P.3d 663 (2005). Without much further analysis, Division Two echoed Division One's concerns that instructing with the language "may" was tantamount to instructing on jury nullification.

Appellant respectfully submits the Meggyesy analysis addressed a different issue. "Duty" is the challenged language herein. By focusing on the proposed remedy, the Meggyesy court side-stepped the underlying issue raised by its appellants: the instructions violated their right to trial by jury because the "duty to return a verdict of guilty" language required the juries to convict if they found that the State proved all of the elements of the charged crimes.

However, portions of the Meggyesy decision are relevant. The court acknowledged the Supreme Court has never considered this issue. 90 Wn. App. at 698. It recognized that the jury has the power to acquit against the evidence: "This is an inherent feature of the use of general verdict. But the power to acquit does not require any instruction telling the jury that it may do so." Id. at 700 (foot notes omitted). The court also relied in part upon federal cases in which the approved "to-convict"

instructions did *not* instruct the jury it had a “duty to return a verdict of guilty” if it found every element proven. *See, Meggyesy*, 90 Wn. App. at 698 fn. 5.<sup>12, 13</sup> These concepts support Zuvela’s position and do not contradict the arguments set forth herein.

The Meggyesy court incorrectly stated the issue. The question is not whether the court is required to tell the jury it can acquit despite finding each element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The question is whether *the law* ever requires the jury to return a verdict of guilty. If the law never requires the jury to return a verdict of guilty, it is an incorrect statement of the law to instruct the jury it does. And an instruction that says it has such a duty impermissibly directs a verdict. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993).

Unlike the appellant in Meggyesy,<sup>14</sup> Zuvela does not ask the court to approve an instruction that affirmatively notifies the jury of its power to acquit. Instead, he argues that jurors should not be affirmatively misled.

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<sup>12</sup> E.g., United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.1991) (“In order for the Powells to be convicted, the government must have proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Powells had failed to file their returns.”).

<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the federal courts do not instruct the jury it “has a duty to return a verdict of guilty” if it finds each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt. *See* Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions:

In order for the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: ...

This question was not addressed in either Meggyesy or Bonisisio; thus the holding of Meggyesy should not govern here. The Brown court erroneously found that there was “no meaningful difference” between the two arguments. Brown, 130 Wn. App. at 771. Meggyesy and its progeny should be reconsidered, and the issue should be analyzed on its merits.

h. The court’s instructions in this case affirmatively misled the jury about its power to acquit even if the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction given in Zuvela’s case did not contain a correct statement of the law. The court instructed the jurors that it was their “duty” to accept the law, and that it was their “duty” to convict the defendant if the elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. CP 28. A duty is “[a]n act or a course of action that is required of one by... law.” *The American Heritage Dictionary* (Fourth Ed., 2000, Houghton Mifflin Company). The court’s use of the word “duty” in the “to-convict” instruction conveyed to the jury that it *could not* acquit if the elements had been established. This misstatement of the law provided a level of coercion for the jury to return a guilty verdict, deceived the jurors about their power to acquit in the face of sufficient evidence, Leonard, *supra*, and failed to make the correct legal standard manifestly apparent to the

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<sup>14</sup> And the appellant in Bonisisio.

average juror. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 864. By instructing the jury it had a duty to return a verdict of guilty based merely on finding certain facts, the court took away from the jury its constitutional authority to apply the law to the facts to reach its general verdict.

The instruction creating a "duty" to return a verdict of guilty was an incorrect statement of law. The error violated Zuvella's state and federal constitutional right to a jury trial. Accordingly, his convictions must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Hartigan, *supra*; Leonard, *supra*.

2. The trial court abused its discretion in finding Mr. Zuvella had the means to pay the costs of incarceration and in ordering him to pay those costs as a condition of his sentence, where there was no evidence to support that finding.

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Ryan v. State, 112 Wn.App. 896, 899, 51 P.3d 175 (2002) (citing State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable

reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard. Ryan, 112 Wn.App. at 899-900 (citing In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997))

RCW 9.94A.760(2) authorizes the imposition of the costs of incarceration at \$50 per day for a prison sentence if the court determines that the offender, at the time of sentencing, has the means to pay for the cost of incarceration. This statutory language is preprinted in ¶ 4.D.4 of the judgment and sentence, herein, as the court's finding and court-ordered sentencing condition, which the court capped at \$500. CP 51. The Court did not make any specific finding that Mr. Zuvella had the means to pay for the cost of incarceration.

A trial court's entry of general rather than specific findings does not automatically require vacation of the trial court's order if evidence in the record supports it. McCausland v. McCausland, 129 Wn.App. 390, 406-07, 118 P.3d 944 (2005). However, there was no evidence presented that Mr. Zuvella had the means to pay for the cost of incarceration. Since there was no evidence to support the general boilerplate finding and order in the judgment and sentence, both the finding and the order are based on

untenable grounds. Therefore, the Court abused its discretion and the sentencing condition should be stricken.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs of any medical care incurred by Yakima County on his behalf as a condition of his sentence, where there was no evidence of any medical costs.

(The law regarding abuse of discretion when a court's ruling is based on untenable grounds is set forth in the previous issue.)

This order to pay medical costs is preprinted in ¶ 4.D.5 of the judgment and sentence as a court-ordered sentencing condition. CP51. There was no evidence presented that any costs for medical care were incurred in this incident, and the trial court made no mention of the matter at the sentencing hearing. Since there was no evidence to support this general boilerplate order in the judgment and sentence, the court's finding and order is based on untenable grounds. Therefore, the Court abused its discretion and the sentencing condition should be stricken.

4. The trial court abused its discretion in arbitrarily ordering Mr. Zuvela to pay the costs and assessments within 180 days after his release as a condition of his sentence without considering his ability to realistically pay that amount within the ordered timeframe.

(The law regarding abuse of discretion when a court's ruling is based on untenable grounds is set forth in the first issue.)

This order to pay the costs and assessments within 180 days after his release is preprinted in ¶ 4.D.7 of the judgment and sentence as a court-ordered sentencing condition. CP 51. Implicit in the court's order is an implied finding that Mr. Zuvela has the ability to pay within the 180-day timeframe. There was no evidence presented that Mr. Zuvela had the means to pay the costs and assessments within 180 days. There is also no statutory provision or necessity for requiring payment within this timeframe. In fact, under RCW 9.94A.760(4), the court retains jurisdiction over an offender, for purposes of the offender's compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations, until the obligation is completely satisfied, regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime.

Hence, this 180-day timeframe is merely a local Yakima County provision destined to produce probation violations, resulting in further sanctions when offenders are unable to pay their legal financial obligations

in so short a time period. In order to comply with this order, Mr. Zuvela would have to pay \$275 per month after his release (\$1650 divided by 6 months [180 days] equals \$275 per month). This is not a realistic monthly payment that an indigent person could afford. The 180-day timeframe is completely arbitrary and does not take into account the amount owed or the financial status of the defendant.

Moreover, the trial court's order is unsupported by any evidence that Mr. Zuvela has the ability to pay the amount owed within the 180-day timeframe, or any finding to that effect. Since there was no oral or written finding, and since there was no evidence to support the order, the order is based on untenable grounds. Therefore, the Court again abused its discretion and this sentencing condition should be stricken as well.

**D. CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated, the conviction should be reversed, or in the alternative, the unauthorized sentencing conditions should be stricken and the judgment and sentence modified accordingly.

Respectfully submitted on September 11, 2012,

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s/David N. Gasch  
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PROOF OF SERVICE (RAP 18.5(b))

I, David N. Gasch, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on September 11, 2012, I mailed to the following by U.S. Postal Service first class mail, postage prepaid, or provided e-mail service by prior agreement (as indicated), a true and correct copy of the brief of appellant:

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