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Court of Appeals
Division III
State of Washington

No. 33050-8-III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION III

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

NICOLE R. BASHAW,

Defendant/Appellant.

Appellant's Brief

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A. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The trial court erred when it ordered Ms. Bashaw to pay legal financial obligations without first making an individualized inquiry into her current and future ability to pay them.

B. ISSUE PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Since the directive to pay LFO's was not based on any finding of ability to pay, should the matter be remanded for the sentencing court to make an individualized inquiry into Ms. Bashaw's current and future ability to pay before imposing LFOs?

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ms. Bashaw was convicted in juvenile court of vehicular assault.

CP 16. The Court imposed \$700 in discretionary Legal Financial Obligations (LFO's)¹ to be paid at the rate of \$25 per month beginning February 21, 2015. CP 17.

The Court did not inquire into Ms. Bashaw's financial resources or consider the burden payment of LFOs would impose on her. RP 216-18. This appeal followed. CP 20.

D. ARGUMENT

Since the directive to pay LFO's was not based on any finding of ability to pay, the matter should be remanded for the sentencing court to make an individualized inquiry into Ms. Bashaw's current and future ability to pay before imposing LFOs.

a. *This court should exercise its discretion and accept review.*

Ms. Bashaw did not make this argument below. However, the Washington Supreme Court has held the ability to pay legal financial LFOs may be raised for the first time on appeal by discretionary review. *State v. Blazina*, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680, 683 (2015). In *Blazina* the Court felt compelled to accept review under RAP 2.5(a) because “[n]ational and local cries for reform of broken LFO systems demand ... reach[ing] the merits” *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 683. The Court reviewed the pervasive nature of trial courts’ failures to consider each defendant’s ability to pay in conjunction with the unfair disparities and penalties that indigent defendants experience based upon this failure.

Public policy favors direct review by this Court. Indigent defendants who are saddled with wrongly imposed LFOs have many “reentry difficulties” that ultimately work against the State’s interest in

¹ \$500 fine and \$200 filing fee. Both are discretionary costs for juvenile offenders. See

accomplishing rehabilitation and reducing recidivism. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 684. Availability of a statutory remission process down the road does little to alleviate the harsh realities incurred by virtue of LFOs that are improperly imposed at the outset. As the *Blazina* Court bluntly recognized, one societal reality is “the state cannot collect money from defendants who cannot pay.” *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 684. Requiring defendants who never had the ability to pay LFOs to go through collections and a remission process to correct a sentencing error that could have been corrected on direct appeal is a financially wasteful use of administrative and judicial process. A more efficient use of state resources would result from this court’s remand back to the sentencing judge who is already familiar with the case to make the ability to pay inquiry.

As a final matter of public policy, this Court has the immediate opportunity to expedite reform of the broken LFO system. This Court should embrace its obligation to uphold and enforce the Washington Supreme Court’s decision that RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the sentencing judge to make an individualized inquiry on the record into the defendant’s current and future ability to pay before the court imposes LFOs. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 685; see also *Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist.*

RCW 7.68.035 and 13.40.192 (2)

#405, 129 Wn. App. 832, 867-68, 120 P.3d 616, 634 (2005) rev'd in part sub nom. *Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist.* #405, 164 Wn.2d 199, 189 P.3d 139 (2008) (The principle of stare decisis—"to stand by the thing decided"—binds the appellate court as well as the trial court to follow Supreme Court decisions). This requirement applies to the sentencing court in Ms. Bashaw's case regardless of his failure to object. See, *Kitsap Alliance of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.*, 160 Wn. App. 250, 259-60, 255 P.3d 696, 701 (2011) ("Once the Washington Supreme Court has authoritatively construed a statute, the legislation is considered to have always meant that interpretation.") (citations omitted).

The sentencing court's signature on a judgment and sentence with boilerplate language stating that it engaged in the required inquiry is wholly inadequate to meet the requirement. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 685. Post-*Blazina*, one would expect future trial courts to make the appropriate inquiry on the record or defense attorneys to object in order to preserve the error for direct review. Ms. Bashaw respectfully submits that in order to ensure all indigent defendants are treated as the LFO statute requires, this Court should reach the unpreserved error and accept

review. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 687 (FAIRHURST, J. (concurring in the result)).

b. *Substantive argument.*

Courts may require an indigent defendant to reimburse the state for costs only if the defendant has the financial ability to do so. *Fuller v. Oregon*, 417 U.S. 40, 47-48, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); *State v. Curry*, 118 Wn.2d 911, 915-16, 829 P.2d 166 (1992); RCW 10.01.160(3); RCW 9.94A.760(2). The imposition of costs under a scheme that does not meet with these requirements, or the imposition of a penalty for a failure to pay absent proof that the defendant had the ability to pay, violates the defendant's right to equal protection under Washington Constitution, Article 1, § 12 and United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. *Fuller v. Oregon*, supra. It further violates equal protection by imposing extra punishment on a defendant due to his or her poverty. *Bearden v. Georgia*, 461 U.S. 660, 665, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2071, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983).

RCW 9.94A.760(1) provides that upon a criminal conviction, a superior court "may order the payment of a legal financial obligation." RCW 10.01.160(1) authorizes a superior court to "require a defendant to pay costs." These costs "shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by

the state in prosecuting the defendant.” RCW 10.01.160(2). In addition, “[t]he court shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them.” RCW 10.01.160(3). RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the record to reflect that the sentencing judge made an individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future ability to pay before the court imposes LFOs. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 685. “This inquiry also requires the court to consider important factors, such as incarceration and a defendant's other debts, including restitution, when determining a defendant's ability to pay.” *Id.* The remedy for a trial court’s failure to make this inquiry is remand for a new sentencing hearing. *Id.*

Blazina further held trial courts should look to the comment in court rule GR 34 for guidance. *Id.* This rule allows a person to obtain a waiver of filing fees and surcharges on the basis of indigent status, and the comment to the rule lists ways that a person may prove indigent status. *Id.* (citing GR 34). For example, under the rule, courts must find a person indigent if the person establishes that he or she receives assistance from a needs-based, means-tested assistance program, such as Social Security or food stamps. *Id.* (citing comment to GR 34 listing facts that prove indigent status). In addition, courts must find a person indigent if his or her household income falls below 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline.

Id. Although the ways to establish indigent status remain nonexhaustive, if someone does meet the GR 34 standard for indigency, courts should seriously question that person's ability to pay LFOs. *Id.*

While the ability to pay is a necessary threshold to the imposition of costs, a court need not make formal specific findings of ability to pay: "[n]either the statute nor the constitution requires a trial court to enter formal, specific findings regarding a defendant's ability to pay court costs." *Curry*, 118 Wn.2d at 916. However, *Curry* recognized that both RCW 10.01.160 and the federal constitution "direct [a court] to consider ability to pay." *Id.* at 915-16. The individualized inquiry must be made on the record. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 685.

Here, the record does not show the trial court took into account Ms. Bashaw's financial resources and the potential burden of imposing LFOs on her. RP 216-18. The Court ordered Ms. Bashaw to begin paying \$25 per month beginning February 21, 2015. CP 17. Therefore, the matter should be remanded for the sentencing court to make an individualized inquiry into Ms. Bashaw's current and future ability to pay before imposing LFOs. *Blazina*, 344 P.3d at 685.

E. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the case should be remanded to make an individualized inquiry into Ms. Bashaw's current and future ability to pay before imposing LFOs.

Respectfully submitted February 6, 2016,

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PROOF OF SERVICE (RAP 18.5(b))

I, David N. Gasch, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on February 6, 2016, I mailed to the following by U.S. Postal Service first class mail, postage prepaid, or provided e-mail service by prior agreement (as indicated), a true and correct copy of the brief of appellant:

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