

FILED
Court of Appeals
Division III
State of Washington
4/6/2018 2:51 PM

No. 35555-1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Douglas County Superior Court Cause No. 17-2-00277-9

TYE SHEATS,

Appellant,

v.

CITY OF EAST WENATCHEE, DOUGLAS COUNTY, CITY OF
WENATCHEE, CHELAN COUNTY, and
THE WENATCHEE WORLD NEWSPAPER,

Respondents/Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT CITY OF WENATCHEE

DAVIS, ARNEIL LAW FIRM, LLP
Danielle R. Marchant, WSBA No. 29260
Michael G. Bradford, WSBA No. 43169
617 Washington Street
Wenatchee, WA 98801
(509) 662-3551
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES	3
III.	STATEMENT OF THE CASE	3
IV.	LEGAL ARGUMENT.....	6
	1. Commencement of Action.....	6
	2. RCW 42.56.540	7
	3. <i>Brady</i> Disclosure Obligations.....	11
	• A Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to a Defendant.....	11
	• A Prosecutor’s Discovery Obligation to a Defendant.....	14
	• A Prosecutor’s Constitutional Obligation to a Defendant.....	15
	4. Premature Appeal.....	16
V.	ATTORNEYS FEES	17
VI.	CONCLUSION.....	18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963)9, 18, 19, 225, 6, 15, 16, 20

Campiti v. Matesanz,
186 F.Supp.2d 29, 48 (2002)..... 16

Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed2d 104
(1972) 15

Kyles v. Whitely,
514 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1995) 15

United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985) 15

Washington Cases

Cecil v. Dominy,
69 Wash.2d 289, 290, 418 P.2d 233 (1966)..... 17, 18

Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. State,
179 Wn.App.711, 719, 328 P.3d 905
(2014) 10

*Service Employees International Union Local 925 v. Freedom
Foundation*
197 Wn.App.203, 210, 389 P.3d 641 (2016) 8,9

Yakima v. Yakima Herald-Republic,
170 Wash.2d 775, 806, 246 P.3d 768 (2011)..... 7,8

Statutes

RCW 4.16.170.....	6, 7
RCW 4.28.020.....	7
RCW 42.56.050.....	3, 6
RCW 42.56.230(3)	3, 6
RCW 42.56.240(1)	3, 6
RCW 42.56.540.....	3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18
RCW 43.101.095.....	3, 6

Administrative Regulations

WAC 139-07-040.....	3, 6
---------------------	------

Court Rules

CrR 4.7.....	13, 14, 19
CrRLJ 4.7	13, 14, 19
CR 3	6
RAP 2.2.....	16
RAP 2.2(a)(1)	16
RAP 2.2(a)(2)	16
RAP 2.2 (a)(13)	16

Rules of Professional Conduct

RPC 3.8.....	11, 12, 13
--------------	------------

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves issues pertaining to dissemination of a pre-employment polygraph report as potential impeachment evidence in criminal cases and dissemination in response to Public Records Act requests.

Tye Sheats is employed by the City of East Wenatchee as a police officer. Sheats applied for employment with the City of Wenatchee Police Department. Sheats participated in a polygraph examination as part of the application process.

The polygraph examiner provided a written report to the City of Wenatchee regarding Sheat's polygraph examination. The polygraph report contained several admissions made by Sheats involving acts of theft, untruthfulness and dishonesty.

The City of Wenatchee notified Appellant that it intended to disclose potential impeachment disclosure information from the polygraph report to defense counsel in a pending criminal case unless he obtained an order preventing the disclosure. Appellant's attorney contacted the City of Wenatchee Prosecutor to indicate he would not be seeking a protective order. The letter was then provided to defense counsel. The City of Wenatchee also provided a potential impeachment disclosure notice to neighboring

prosecuting authorities, Chelan County, Douglas County, and the City of East Wenatchee in furtherance of its ethical obligations under RPC 3.8.

The Douglas County Prosecuting Attorney and the City of East Wenatchee Prosecuting Attorney each made a public records request to the City of Wenatchee for the polygraph report which was denied as exempt from the Public Records Act. The Douglas County Prosecuting Attorney served a Subpoena Duces Tecum on the City of Wenatchee which the City complied with.

The Wenatchee World newspaper made public record requests to the City of East Wenatchee and to Douglas County seeking a copy of the redacted polygraph report.

Sheats commenced an action in the Douglas County Superior Court attempting to block dissemination of the report in criminal cases and in response to Public Record Act requests. The written decision of the Superior Court approved the Prosecuting Attorney's redactions to the polygraph report, authorized disclosure of the redacted polygraph report in criminal cases as potential impeachment evidence, and authorized dissemination of the potential impeachment evidence as a public record. Sheats appeals from an adverse decision of the Superior Court.

II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issues in Response to Assignment of Error:

- 1) Was this matter properly commenced?
- 2) Was RCW 42.56.540 complied with procedurally?
- 3) Should the City of Wenatchee ("City") be a party to this matter?
- 4) Can the City be forced to alter its *Brady* disclosure obligations?
- 5) Is this appeal premature?
- 6) Is Respondent City entitled to attorney fees?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 26, 2017, Appellant filed his Ex-Parte Motion for an Order Temporarily Enjoining Release of Materials Pursuant to RCW 42.56, RCW 42.56.050, RCW 42.56.230(3), RCW 42.56.240(1), RCW 43.101.095, WAC 139-07-040 ("Ex-Parte Motion") under Douglas County Superior Court cause no. 17-2-00277-9. In Appellant's Ex-Parte Motion, he sought to enjoin disclosure of a redacted polygraph examination conducted by Everett Polygraph Services, LLC, as part of Appellant's application for employment to the City of Wenatchee ("City").

The Appellant named as parties Douglas County, Chelan County, the City of East Wenatchee and the City of Wenatchee. Both Douglas County and the City of East Wenatchee received public records requests for the polygraph examination from the Wenatchee World. The City has not received a public records request for the polygraph examination.

In bringing this action, Appellant never filed a Complaint or Summons, nor has it served a Complaint or Summons on the City.

On July 26, 2017, Douglas County Superior Court Judge Hotchkiss signed a Temporary Order on Motion for Injunction temporarily enjoining the Defendants from disclosing or obtaining the polygraph examination while the court reviewed Appellant's Ex-Parte Motion.

On July 31, 2017, Douglas County filed a Motion and Declaration for Order Dissolving Temporary Order seeking to dissolve the Temporary Order.

On August 2, 2017, an Agreed Temporary Order on Motion for Injunction was entered, ordering that the Cities of East Wenatchee and Wenatchee and Douglas and Chelan Counties could, in order to comply with prosecution constitutional and ethical duties, temporarily disseminate the redacted polygraph examination

to defense counsel in each criminal case in which the Appellant was identified as a prosecution witness, so long as a motion for protective order is made to limit defense counsel's use of the redacted polygraph report to use in that criminal case and to prohibit further dissemination of the redacted polygraph report to third parties, including defense counsel's client.

On August 14, 2017, the matter was heard before Judge Hotchkiss. On August 18, 2017, Judge Hotchkiss issued a Decision of the Court ("Decision"). Judge Hotchkiss determined that the material contained in the redacted version of the polygraph examination is required to be disclosed to defense Counsel in order to comply with *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In addition, Judge Hotchkiss held that the redacted version of the polygraph examination would be required to be disclosed to anyone else who may ask for the same under the Public Records Act. Judge Hotchkiss noted that the redacted version of the polygraph examination had already been published to the general public by the Wenatchee World. In addition, Judge Hotchkiss held that the disclosure of the polygraph report, other than the redacted report for purposes of *Brady* is exempt from disclosure.

The Court only issued the Decision. It did not issue a final judgment, a decision determining action or a final order after judgment.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

1) Commencement of Action. CR 3 provides that a civil action is commenced by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a complaint or by filing a complaint. In addition, RCW 4.16.170 provides that an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of the complaint or upon service of summons, whichever occurs first.

The record before this Court reflects that Appellant commenced this action by filing an Ex-Parte Motion for an Order Temporarily Enjoining Release of Materials Pursuant to RCW 42.56, RCW 42.56.050, RCW 42.56.230(3), RCW 42.56.240(1), RCW 43.101.095, WAC 139-07-040 ("Ex-Parte Motion") on July 26, 2017, under Douglas County Superior Court cause no. 17-2-00277-9.

Appellant never filed or served a summons or complaint. Thus, it does not appear as if an action was properly commenced.

A court acquires jurisdiction and obtains control over subsequent proceedings from the time of the commencement of the action by service of summons, or by the filing of a complaint. RCW 4.28.020. Because Appellant has failed to file a summons and complaint, Douglas County Superior Court never acquired jurisdiction over this matter or the parties.

2) RCW 42.56.540. In addition to lack of jurisdiction, at the hearing before Judge Hotchkiss on August 14, 2017, attorney for Appellant argued that “under 42.56.540 (sic), the Public Records Act, allows third-parties, upon notification, to seek an injunction of the Court.”

RCW 42.56.540 does provide that the examination of any specific public record may be enjoined if, upon motion and affidavit by a person who is named in the record, “the superior court for the county in which the movant resides or in which the record is maintained, finds that such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions.”

Case law interprets this statute. In *Yakima v. Yakima Herald-Republic*, the Yakima Herald-Republic argued that the judge

erred in granting an injunction under RCW 42.56.540 because “neither party resisting examination of the records identified an exemption nor demonstrated that “irreparable damage” would occur if the records were produced for examination or copying.” *Yakima v. Yakima Herald-Republic*, 170 Wash.2d 775, 806, 246 P.3d 768 (2011). The court held that as to records outside the court and subject to the Public Records Act the injunction was improper. *Id.*

The court held that “RCW 42.56.540 does not constitute a substantive basis for a remedy.” *Id.* The court explained further that RCW 42.56.540 “is only a procedural statute granting those to whom it applies the right to seek an injunction against disclosure and granting the trial court the authority to enjoin the release of a specific record if it falls within a specific exemption found elsewhere in the act.” *Id.* at 807-08, 246 P.3d 768. It explained further that “the court must find that a specific exemption applies and that disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage a person.” *Id.* at 808, 246 P.3d 768.

In *Service Employees International Union Local 925 v. Freedom Foundation*, Service Employees International Union Local 925 (“SEIU”) filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief

against DSHS and Freedom Foundation requesting a permanent injunction under RCW 42.56.540 to prohibit DSHS from releasing names of childcare providers in Washington's "Family and Friends and Neighbors" program and their "state contact" information. *Service Employees International Union Local 925 v. Freedom Foundation*, 197 Wn. App. 203, 210, 389 P.3d 641 (2016).

In *SEIU*, the court addressed RCW 42.56.540. It explained that "a party other than a government agency seeking to prevent the disclosure of public records under the PRA may seek an injunction under RCW 42.56.540." *Id.* at 213, 389 P.3d 641. The court explained that "under this statute, the moving party must prove that (1) the record in question specifically pertains to that party, (2) an exemption applies, and (3) the disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably harm that party or a vital government function." *Id.* The court explained further that in applying RCW 42.56.540, the trial court first determines whether a PRA exemption applies, and "only if an exemption applies does the trial court address whether an injunction is appropriate under the statutory requirements: Whether disclosure would not be in the public interest and would

substantially and irreparably damage a person or vital government functions.” *Id.*

In such an action to enjoin production of documents, the party seeking to prevent production “has the burden to prove that the requested documents fall within the scope of an exemption.” *Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. State*, 179 Wn. App. 711, 719, 328 P.3d 905 (2014).

RCW 42.56.540 and its interpreting case law illustrate that RCW 42.56.540 does not constitute a substantive basis for a remedy. A party may seek an injunction under the statute and must prove that the record in question specifically pertains to that party, an exemption applies and that the disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably harm that party or a vital government function.

Appellant failed to file a complaint for an injunction. Appellant likewise failed to carry the burden to show that disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably harm that party or a vital government function. In addition, the trial court failed to make any findings in this regard as the statute appears to require.

3) Brady Disclosure Obligations. At the outset, it is imperative to note that Appellant's brief stipulates that disclosure of the redacted polygraph report should have been ordered on a case-by-case basis if the report is material under *Brady*. Appellant cited *Brady*, defining evidence as material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.

The obligation that the City has under the Public Records Act ("PRA") is a separate and distinct obligation from that which it has to a criminal defendant where the Appellant is a witness. As to Judge Hotchkiss's decision that the material contained in the redacted version of the polygraph report is required to be disclosed to defense Counsel (see Decision of the Court), this decision should be upheld.

1. A Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation To A Defendant.

Although the ethical duties that apply to all attorneys apply equally to prosecutors, there are additional ethical obligations applicable solely to prosecutors. For example, RPC 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor" states:

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

...

- (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;

...

- (g) when a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood, that a convicted defendant is innocent of the offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
 - (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
 - (2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
 - (A) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
 - (B) make reasonable efforts to inquire into the matter, or make reasonable efforts to cause the appropriate law enforcement agency to undertake an investigation into the matter.

RPC 3.8.

Comment 7 to RPC 3.8 states that the prosecutor's obligation is not just owed to the defendants in their jurisdiction, but it is owed to defendants in other jurisdictions. Comment 7 states:

When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person

outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction, was convicted of a crime that the person is innocent of committing, paragraph (g) **requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred**. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, paragraph (g) requires the prosecutor to make reasonable efforts to inquire into the matter to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent, or make reasonable efforts to cause the appropriate law enforcement agency to undertake an investigation into the matter.

(Emphasis added.)

In this matter, each prosecutor with knowledge of the Appellant's admissions that may be used as impeachment evidence has an ethical obligation to provide information relating to the admissions to the defendant and/or defense counsel. In addition, if a prosecutor is aware of cases outside its jurisdiction which may be affected, the prosecutor is required to notify those outside jurisdictions. If the Court overturns the trial court's decision, it would effectively be ordering the prosecutor to commit an ethical violation. But, if the Court believes that RPC 3.8 does not apply to this case, the prosecutor still has a duty under CrRLJ 4.7/CrR 4.7 to disclose the potential impeachment information.

2. A Prosecutor's Discovery Obligation To A Defendant.

CrR 4.7, and its district court counterpart CrRLJ 4.7, require the prosecuting attorney to “disclose to defendant’s counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney’s knowledge which tends to negate defendant’s guilt as to the offense charged.” As explained in the next section of this memorandum, impeachment evidence is information that may negate the defendant’s guilt. As a result, a prosecutor is mandated by the discovery rules to disclose Appellant’s truth or veracity admissions outlined in the polygraph report to defendants and/or to defense counsel. In essence, Appellant is requesting prosecutors to violate the discovery mandate stated in CrR 4.7/CrRLJ 4.7.

If the Court determines that CrR 4.7/CrRLJ 4.7 is inapplicable to the analysis as to whether the Court’s decision should be overturned, a prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to a defendant to inform the defendant and/or defense counsel of Appellant’s truth and veracity admissions outlined in the polygraph report. Therefore, the trial court’s decision should be upheld based on constitutional grounds.

3. A Prosecutor's Constitutional Obligation To A Defendant.

A prosecutor's disclosure of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence is part of the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial. *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The law requires the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment. *Brady*, at 87; *Giglio*, at 154. Because they are constitutional obligations, *Brady* and *Giglio* evidence must be disclosed regardless of whether the defendant makes a request for exculpatory or impeachment evidence. *Kyles v. Whitely*, 514 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1995).

Impeachment evidence is material to a finding of guilt—and thus the Constitution requires disclosure when there is a reasonable probability that effective use of the evidence will result in an acquittal. *United States v. Bagley*, 475 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Recognizing that it is sometimes difficult to assess the materiality of evidence before trial, prosecutors generally must take a broad view of materiality and err on the side of disclosing exculpatory and impeaching evidence. *Kyles*, at 439. In other words, *Kyles*

encourages prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure if admissibility is a close question.

Very similar to the Appellant's admissions of misconduct and dishonesty and the subject polygraph examination, in *Campiti v. Matesanz*, 186 F.Supp.2d 29, 48 (2002) the court found a *Brady* violation for failure to disclose impeachment material when the prosecution failed to turn over information about unlawful activity by a police officer.

In this case, Appellant is effectively requesting this Court to ignore the defendant's right to a fair trial. Such a request is improper. Thus, the Court should uphold the trial court's decision.

4) Premature Appeal. RAP 2.2 governs which decisions of the Superior Court may be appealed. A party may appeal from only the superior court decisions set forth in RAP 2.2. These decisions include final judgment, a decision determining action and a final order after judgment. RAP 2.2(a)(1), (2) & (13). None of these have occurred in this case. The Douglas County Superior Court issued a Decision of the Court ("Decision"). This is not a final judgment. This is not a decision determining action which in effect determines the action and prevents a final judgment or discontinues the action. And this is not a final order after judgment. The

issuance of a final order after judgment finalizing the Decision should have occurred prior to the appeal.

Because a party may not appeal from the Decision, this appeal is premature and not properly before this Court. This matter should be remanded to Douglas County Superior Court for issuance of a final order after judgment.

V. ATTORNEY FEES

In *Cecil v. Dominy*, 69 Wash.2d 289, 290, 418 P.2d 233 (1966) the court held that where the sole issue in a trial is whether a temporary injunction shall be made permanent, a reasonable attorney's fee is a "recoverable element of damages for procuring dissolution of the injunction in a trial on the merits." It described the rule as to the appropriateness of reasonable attorney's fees as follows:

The true test with regard to the allowance of counsel fees as damages would seem to be, that if they are necessarily incurred in procuring the dissolution of the injunction, when that is the sole relief sought by the action, they may be recovered; but if the injunction is only ancillary to the principal object of the action and the liability for counsel fees is incurred in defending the action generally, the dissolution of the injunction being only incidental to that

result, then such fees can not be recovered.

Id. at 292, 418 P.2d 233.

In this case, the sole issue before Douglas County Superior Court was whether the temporary injunction should be made permanent. The City was required to defend against the temporary injunction regarding disclosure of the redacted polygraph examination becoming a permanent injunction. The court did not extend the temporary injunction. The City is therefore entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to *Cecil*.

VI. CONCLUSION

Appellant failed to commence this matter properly by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a complaint or by filing a complaint. This matter was not properly brought before the Douglas County Superior Court and it is therefore not properly before this Court.

RCW 42.56.540 permits a party to move the superior court for the county in which the movant resides to enjoin disclosure of a public record if the superior court finds that such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and

irreparably damage vital governmental functions. However, as explained above, Appellant never properly commenced the injunction action. He failed to establish that disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person. Likewise, Appellant failed to show that disclosure would substantially and irreparably harm/damage vital government function. At the least, no findings were made in this regard.

In this matter, each prosecutor with knowledge of the Appellant's admissions that may be used as impeachment evidence has an ethical obligation to provide such information to defendants and/or defense counsel. In addition, a prosecutor is required under CrR 4.7 and CrRLJ 4.7 to disclose to defendant's counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney's knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged. This obligation mandates disclosure of Appellant's truth and veracity admissions outlined in the polygraph examination to defendants and/or to defense counsel.

Likewise, a prosecutor's disclosure of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence is part of the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial. The law requires the disclosure of exculpatory and

impeachment evidence when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment. This Court should uphold Judge Hotchkiss's decision that the material contained in the redacted version of the report is required to be disclosed to defense counsel in order to comply with *Brady*.

This appeal is premature. There has been no final judgment, no decision determining action and no final order after judgment. This matter should therefore be remanded to Douglas County Superior Court so that the appropriate action may be taken before this Court reviews the matter further.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of April, 2018.


DANIELLE R. MARCHANT
WSBA No. 29260
For Respondent City of
Wenatchee


MICHAEL G. BRADFORD
WSBA No. 43169
For City of Wenatchee

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, Toni J. Martin, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington, declare as follows:

I am a legal assistant at Davis, Arneil Law Firm, LLP, over the age of eighteen (18), and competent to be a witness herein.

That on the 6th day of April, 2018, the foregoing Brief of Respondent City of Wenatchee was served on the following as follows:

Kenneth H. Kato
Attorney at Law
1020 N. Washington St.
Spokane, WA 99201-2237

By United States Mail,
postage prepaid
 By Email
 By Facsimile
 By UPS Next Day Air

Douglas J. Shae
Chelan County Prosecuting
Attorney
P.O. Box 2596
Wenatchee, WA 98807

By United States Mail,
postage prepaid
 By Email
 By Facsimile
 By UPS Next Day Air

Steven M. Clem
Douglas County Prosecuting
Attorney
P.O. Box 360
Waterville, WA 98858-0360

By United States Mail,
postage prepaid
 By Email
 By Facsimile
 By UPS Next Day Air


Devin Poulson
East Wenatchee City Attorney
271 Ninth Street N.E.
East Wenatchee, WA 98802

By United States Mail,
postage prepaid
 By Email
 By Facsimile
 By UPS Next Day Air

Erin McCool
Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC
1 Fifth St., Suite 200
Wenatchee, WA 98801

By United States Mail,
postage prepaid
 By Email
 By Facsimile
 By UPS Next Day Air

DATED this 6th day of April, 2018, at Wenatchee,
Washington



TONI J. MARTIN

DAVIS ARNEIL LAW FIRM, LLP

April 06, 2018 - 2:51 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division III
Appellate Court Case Number: 35555-1
Appellate Court Case Title: Tye Sheats v. City of East Wenatchee, et al
Superior Court Case Number: 17-2-00277-9

The following documents have been uploaded:

- 355551_Briefs_20180406145025D3787552_7697.pdf
This File Contains:
Briefs - Respondents
The Original File Name was Brief of Respondent City of Wenatchee.pdf

A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

- douglas.shae@co.chelan.wa.us
- dpoulson@east-wenatchee.com
- emccool@omwlaw.com
- khkato@comcast.net
- prosecuting.attorney@co.chelan.wa.us
- sclem@co.douglas.wa.us
- tonim@jgsmlaw.com

Comments:

Sender Name: Meredith Scott - Email: meredith@dadkp.com

Filing on Behalf of: Danielle R Marchant - Email: danielle@dadkp.com (Alternate Email: amy@dadkp.com)

Address:
617 Washington
Wenatchee, WA, 98801
Phone: (509) 662-3551

Note: The Filing Id is 20180406145025D3787552