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Court of Appeals Cause No. 63646-4-I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CITIZENS FOR RATIONAL SHORELINE PLANNING, a Washington
Nonprofit Corporation, and RONALD T. JEPSON, an individual,

Petitioners,

v.

WHATCOM COUNTY, a municipal corporation of the State of Washington,
the WHATCOM COUNTY COUNCIL, and the STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY.

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Peter L. Buck, WSBA No. 05060
The Buck Law Group, PLLC
2030 First Avenue, Suite 201
Seattle, Washington 98121
Telephone: (206) 448-6229
Attorneys for Petitioners

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This scope was noted by Geoffrey Crooks in The Washington Shoreline Management
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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

The Petitioners are Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning (“CRSP”), a Washington nonprofit corporation organized to advance its members’ interests in Whatcom County’s shoreline regulations, and Ronald T. Jepson, an owner of shoreline property in Whatcom County. These petitioners were Plaintiffs/Appellants below, and will be referred to jointly as “CRSP.”

B. CITATION TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Petitioners seek review of a published decision filed by Division One of the Court of Appeals on May 10, 2010. See Appendix A, *Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning, et al. v. Whatcom County, et al.* _____ P. 3d _____, 2010 Wn. 1839407 (2010).

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Are the regulations adopted by local governments in shoreline master programs (SMPs) subject to judicial review pursuant to RCW 82.02.020’s prohibitions or are they exempt because they are not local adoptions?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Statement of Facts.

The Shoreline Management Act, chapter 90.58 RCW (“SMA”), was enacted in 1971 to “provide for the management of the shorelines of the state

by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses.” RCW 90.58.020. In balancing these goals, local jurisdictions containing “shorelines of the state” must prepare a shoreline master program (“SMP”) setting forth desired goals and use and development regulations for shoreline areas. RCW 90.58.080. The SMA also requires local governments to periodically update their SMPs. RCW 90.58.080(4).

In 2004, Whatcom County initiated the process to review and update its SMP. CP 102. Three years later, on February 27, 2007, the Whatcom County Council passed Ordinance No. 2007-017. Its amendments reflected the particular policy choices of the County’s elected officials. Among other things, the County Council determined that it would require large, uniformly sized shoreline setbacks—areas adjacent to the shoreline in which no development is permitted.

The Court of Appeals accurately describes the new restrictions as follows:

Whatcom County’s critical areas ordinance imposes buffer zones of 150 feet from shoreline streams, WCC 16.16.740(B), 150 feet from the marine shore, WCC 16.16.740(C), 100 feet from lakes of over 20 acres, WCC 16.16.740(C), and between 25 to 300 feet from wetlands, WCC 16.16.630. Second, the SMP limits the buildable area of non-conforming lots to not more than 2,500 square feet. WCC 23.50.07(K)(2).

Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning, ___ P.3d ___, 3 (2010).

State of Washington Department of Ecology (“Ecology”) reviewed

the County's amended SMP. It recommended no changes in the provisions related to this action. Shortly after adopting Ordinance No. 2007-017, the County forwarded the package of amendments to Ecology for review and approval. Ecology reviewed the County's SMP amendments and identified a handful of minor revisions that the County would need to incorporate before Ecology would issue its formal approval. *See* Whatcom County Resolution No. 2008-056.

Ecology did not identify any revisions relating to the County's large, uniformly sized shoreline setbacks. Instead, it approved these provisions without any changes. *See id.* These large, large uniformly sized setbacks started and finished as a local government decision.

The County Council initially purported to adopt Ecology's revisions by resolution in August 2008. *See id.* Appellants challenged the County's attempt to adopt the revisions by resolution (as opposed to ordinance) as a violation of the County's code and charter. *See* CP 35. While this challenge was pending, but before the trial court issued a decision on the matter, the County formally adopted Ecology's revisions by ordinance. *See* Whatcom County Ordinance No. 2009-013. As a result, the County's amended SMP (which incorporated Ecology's requested revisions on issues other than setbacks) took effect. *See* RCW 90.58.090.

2. Procedural Posture.

On October 20, 2008, Appellants filed a complaint with the Skagit County Superior Court alleging, *inter alia*, that the uniform shoreline setbacks and certain other limitations prescribed by the County's amended shoreline master program constituted a violation of RCW 82.02.020, as recently interpreted by this Court in *Citizens' Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims*, 145 Wn. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008). CP 1-10.

Shortly after the complaint was filed, Ecology sought intervention on the side of Whatcom County. Appellants agreed to Ecology's intervention by stipulation. CP 17-18.

On April 7, 2009, Respondents filed a motion with the Skagit County Superior Court seeking dismissal of Appellants' RCW 82.02.020 claims pursuant to CR 12(b)(6). CP 113-22. Respondents' motion was based on the theory that the County's shoreline master program was in actuality a state law, and thus not subject to the limitations set forth in RCW 82.02.020. *See id.*

On May 4, 2009, the Skagit County Superior Court heard oral argument on Respondents' motion to dismiss. Following oral argument, the court announced its decision to grant Respondents' motion. CP 165-66.

On May 14, 2009, Appellants' filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court erred in concluding that a county's shoreline master program constitutes state law and erred in dismissing Appellants' RCW 82.02.020 claims. CP 167-71. The court denied Appellants' motion for reconsideration by letter dated June 26, 2009. CP 184.

On July 23, 2009, the court entered its final order and judgment on all claims. CP 185-93.

3. Argument Why Review Should be Accepted.

If allowed to stand, the Division I Court of Appeals' decision eliminates the State legislative controls of RCW 80.02.010 that caution local government not to take a cavalier approach to adopting large one-size-fits-all no-build in SMPs throughout the State's shorelines.

While this case is in the name of one property owner and one non-profit corporation, there are tens of thousands of other property owners along the shorelines of the State who will be directly affected by this case as other counties and cities adopt new SMPs.

The local public interest in this matter in just one county is shown by the Whatcom County proceedings. The Ordinance described the County's extensive local effort to adopt its Whatcom County SMP, including:

- (1) Appointing a technical advisory committee, which conducted 34 open public meetings between July 2004 and May

2006;

- (2) Appointing a citizens advisory committee, which conducted 43 open public meetings between July 2004 and May 2006 concerning the shoreline master program update;
- (3) Hosting shoreline master program workshops and expert panel discussions on September 30 and October 6, 2004;
- (4) Releasing a draft shoreline master program on June 30, 2006, for public review and comment;
- (5) Conducting public workshops on July 12 and 13, and August 15 and 16, 2006, to introduce and discuss important changes and additions presented in the draft shoreline master program;
- (6) Conducting additional shoreline master program-related outreach efforts at the 2004 Birch Bay and Bellingham Marine Shoreline Stewardship Workshops, the 2005 and 2006 Nooksack Recovery Team Annual Salmon Summits, the 2005 and 2006 Whatcom County Home & Garden Shows, and the 2005 and 2006 Drayton Harbor Shellfish District Open House events;
- (7) Meeting with or presenting to key stakeholder groups, including the Washington Dairy Federation, Washington Farm Bureau, Building Industry Association of Whatcom County, Nooksack Recovery Team, Whatcom County Association of Realtors, Marine Resources Committee, Whatcom County Agricultural Advisory Committee, and various environmental groups;
- (8) Holding a public hearing before the Planning Commission on September 28, 2006; and
- (9) Holding Planning Commission work sessions on September 28 and October 26, 2006.

Whatcom County Ordinance No. 2007-017.

This, however, is not just an action involving the hundreds of shoreline owners in Whatcom County. Rather, unless review is granted, the Court of Appeals' decision will set precedent that will determine the rights of tens of thousands of people.

The precise number of owners of shoreline property in the State is not known. Considering the private property along the Columbia River, Pacific Ocean, Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, Hood Canal, and numerous lakes, streams and rivers bordered by private property, the number is large. This scope was noted by Geoffrey Crooks in *The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971*, 49 WASH. L. REV. 423, 423 (1974), explaining the broad applicability of the SMA stating: "The Washington Act, unusually broad in scope, concerns not merely 'coastal' areas but also shorelines of bodies of water of virtually every description, including lakes and streams so small or so obscure as to be nameless."

This Court should be the body that makes this determination. This is particularly true since the people of the State in the general election of November 1972 voted for Initiative 43B, which was a decision in favor of local government SMPs as opposed to a State program. They voted against Initiative 43 which had been proposed to the legislature by the Washington Environmental Council. The importance of the distinction between the voters'

choices is documented by Geoffrey Crooks in *The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971*, 49 WASH. L. REV. 423, 424 n.5 (1974). There he said, "The two major differences between the SMA and the initiative were that the former covered land two hundred feet landward of the shoreline and placed primary planning and administrative responsibility on local governments, while the latter extended coverage to five hundred feet and centralized responsibility in the state Department of Ecology." (Emphasis added).

Significantly, if this Court grants review and were to reverse the Court of Appeals, the State's shorelines would still be protected. No one disputes the duty of counties and cities to adopt new local SMPs with greater environmental protection. Reversal by this Court would simply mean that local governments would have to act with an eye toward balancing various factors, including the extent to which they take private property rights or run afoul of RCW 80.02.020.

Whatcom County was the first County to adopt a master program with one size fits all buffers prohibiting development. There are, however, hundreds of other counties and cities in Divisions II and III that must adopt SMP amendments. Thus the judicial remedy for property rights of tens of thousands of citizens will be determined in the coming years by the issue at hand.

The issue of the applicability of RCW 82.02.020 is bound to arise in trial courts throughout the state and then in both Division II and Division III. This is a significant issue. If the tens of thousands of property owners cannot avail themselves of RCW 82.02.020 many will then turn to Federal constitutional taking claims.

The United States Supreme Court adopted important constitutional safeguards limiting the authority of government to impose exactions on development in *Nollan v. California Coastal Commission*, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Together, these decisions formulated the two-part essential nexus and rough proportionality test for use in determining whether an exaction constitutes an impermissible taking. Under these tests, the court must first determine whether there is a connection between the exaction and the impact resulting from the unregulated use of the owner's property. *Nollan*, 483 U.S. at 836-37. If the required nexus exists, the court must next decide whether the required exaction is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. *Dolan*, 512 U.S. at 391. An exaction that is not supported by nexus and proportionality is "not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" *Nollan*, 483 U.S. at 837 (citations omitted).

Washington's courts recognized that the nexus and proportionality requirements set out the same test as that in RCW 82.02.020, and held that the statute incorporated the constitutional test. *See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County*, 127 Wn.2d 901, 913 (1995) (incorporating *Nollan* essential nexus test); *Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County*, 124 Wn.2d 261, 274 (1994) (incorporating *Dolan* rough proportionality test); *Citizens' Alliance*, 145 Wn. App. at 669 (applying both tests). And as a result, the Washington Supreme Court held that RCW 82.02.020 provides a statutory basis for invalidating an unlawful condition, thereby shielding local government from constitutional liability. *See Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas*, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752-53 (2002) (reversing Court of Appeals' conclusion that the city's mandatory set aside condition was an unconstitutional taking, concluding instead the condition violated RCW 82.02.020). This may be important to local governments throughout the state, since the alternative forms of actions are likely to include claims for attorneys' fees and damages which are not allowed through RCW 82.02.020. For this reason, local governments throughout the state will also be impacted if RCW 82.02.020 is discarded in the case of SMPs.

The public interest suggests that the Washington Supreme Court should be the court that addresses this issue before RCW 80.02.020 is

jetisoned.


This is a good case for Supreme Court review because it is based on dueling motions that do not involve factual disputes. It presents a purely legal issue. Additionally, review will avoid this issue being heavily re-litigated in the trial courts of Divisions II and III.

E. CONCLUSION

RAP 13.4(b) provides that a petition for review will be accepted if the decision below involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the Supreme Court. For the above reasons, this is such a case.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of June, 2009.

THE BUCK LAW GROUP, PLLC

By: 

Peter L. Buck, WSBA No. 05060

Attorneys for Petitioners

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, Sharon Kendall, declare:

I am not a party in this action. I reside in the State of Washington and am employed by The Buck Law Group, PLLC in Seattle, Washington.

On June 9, 2010 a true copy of the foregoing Petition for Review was served on the office of the following persons in the manner described below.

Karen N. Frakes
Royce Scott Buckingham
Whatcom Co. Prosecuting Attorney
311 Grand Avenue, Suite 201
Bellingham, WA 98225
(via legal messenger)


Katharine G. Shirey
Kelly Thomas Wood
Attorney General of Washington
Ecology Division
2425 Bristol Court, 2nd Floor
Olympia, WA 98502
(via legal messenger)

Charles Klinge
Samuel Rodabough
Groen Stephens & Klinge
11100 NE 8th Street, Suite 750
Bellevue, WA 98004
(via email as agreed by counsel)

Brian Trevor Hodges
10940 NE 33rd Pl., Suite 210
Bellevue, WA 98004-1432
(via email as agreed by counsel)

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed this 9th day of June, 2010 at Seattle, Washington.



Sharon Kendall

APPENDIX

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CITIZENS FOR RATIONAL)	No. 63646-4-I
SHORELINE PLANNING, a)	
Washington Nonprofit Corporation,)	
and RONALD T. JEPSON, a individual,)	
)	
Appellants,)	DIVISION ONE
)	
and)	
)	
BUILDING INDUSTRY ASS'N OF)	
WHATCOM COUNTY,)	
)	
Intervenor-Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	
)	
WHATCOM COUNTY, a municipal)	PUBLISHED OPINION
corporation of the State of Washington,)	
the WHATCOM COUNTY COUNCIL,)	
and the STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY,)	
)	
Respondents.)	FILED: May 10, 2010

Dwyer, C.J. — At issue in this appeal from the superior court's CR 12(b)(6) order of dismissal is whether shoreline master programs (SMPs), developed pursuant to the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, chapter 90.58 RCW, are subject to RCW 82.02.020, which prohibits local governments from imposing direct or indirect taxes, fees, or charges on development. Because of the pervasive and necessary involvement of the state, through the Department of Ecology, in the development, review, and approval of SMPs, the superior court

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correctly ruled that RCW 82.02.020's prohibitions do not apply to these regulations. Accordingly, we affirm.

Whatcom County began amending its SMP in 2004, as required by the Shoreline Management Act. RCW 90.58.080(2)(a)(i). The county submitted its proposed SMP revisions to the Department of Ecology for review and approval. Ecology provided the county with 13 pages of mandatory revisions to the proposed SMP and two pages of recommended changes. Whatcom County accepted the changes and, on August 8, 2008, Ecology notified the county that it had approved the proposed SMP as modified. Ecology's final approval made Whatcom County's SMP effective.

Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning (CRSP) then sued Whatcom County alleging, among other things, that several provisions in the newly-adopted SMP violated RCW 82.02.020. Ecology was allowed to intervene as a defendant.¹

In particular, two of the SMP's final provisions are at issue in this lawsuit. First, the buffer zone provisions applicable to shoreline lots are the same as those set forth in the Whatcom County Critical Areas Ordinance, chapter 16.16 Whatcom County Code (WCC), in effect at the time the SMP was adopted. Whatcom County Ordinance 2007-017, § 23.90.13.B; WCC 23.90.13.C (SMP

¹ The Building Industry Association of Whatcom County was allowed to intervene as a plaintiff but is not a party to this appeal.

Table). Whatcom County's critical areas ordinance imposes buffer zones of 150 feet from shoreline streams, WCC 16.16.740(B), 150 feet from the marine shore, WCC 16.16.740(C), 100 feet from lakes of over 20 acres, WCC 16.16.740(C), and between 25 to 300 feet from wetlands, WCC 16.16.630. Second, the SMP limits the buildable area of non-conforming lots to not more than 2,500 square feet. WCC 23.50.07(K)(2).

Ecology and Whatcom County moved to dismiss, pursuant to CR 12(b)(6), CRSP's claim alleging that the SMP violated RCW 82.02.020. The basis for this motion was the contention that CRSP failed to state a claim because the SMP was a product of state regulatory action, to which RCW 82.02.020 does not apply. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. CRSP moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. In so ruling, the trial court stated that there was a "pervasive level of state involvement in and control over the entire SMP process."

CRSP appeals.

II

As this appeal is from an order of dismissal entered pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) and concerns a pure question of law, we review de novo the trial court's decision. Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 717, 189 P.3d 168 (2008).

III

CRSP contends that Whatcom County's SMP provisions requiring various buffers from shorelines and restricting the building area of non-conforming lots to no more than 2,500 square feet are indirect taxes, fees, or charges imposed on development by a local government and, as such, are prohibited by RCW 82.02.020. We disagree.

RCW 82.02.020 prohibits municipalities from imposing direct or indirect taxes, fees, or charges on development.² This statutory prohibition is not limited to the extraction of monetary payments. See, e.g., Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002) (30 percent of land set aside for open space); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wn.2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994) (dedication or reservation of land for recreation); Citizens' Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wn. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008) (prohibition on clearing more than 35 to 50 percent of property). The statutory prohibition is intended "to stop the imposition of general social costs on developers, while at the same time allowing the continued imposition of costs that are directly attributable to the development." Isla Verde, 146 Wn.2d at 760

² RCW 82.02.020 provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided in RCW 64.34.440 and 82.02.050 through 82.02.090, no county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall impose any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect, on the construction or reconstruction of residential buildings, commercial buildings, industrial buildings, or on any other building or building space or appurtenance thereto, or on the development, subdivision, classification, or reclassification of land. However, this section does not preclude dedications of land or easements within the proposed development or plat which the county, city, town, or other municipal corporation can demonstrate are reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or plat to which the dedication of land or easement is to apply.

n.14 (quoting Southwick, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 58 Wn. App. 886, 893-94, 795 P.2d 712 (1990)). By its plain terms, the statute does not apply to actions taken by the state government. Humbert v. Walla Walla County, 145 Wn. App. 185, 193, 185 P.3d 660 (2008) (“[RCW 82.02.020] by its terms speaks only to the local political subdivisions of the state.”).

The Shoreline Management Act (SMA) was enacted in 1971 to facilitate protection of our state’s shorelines.³ All development on the shorelines of this state must be conducted in conformance with the SMA. Buechel v. Dep’t of Ecology, 125 Wn.2d 196, 203, 884 P.2d 910 (1994). In enacting the SMA, the legislature recognized that “the shorelines of the state are among the most valuable and fragile of its natural resources” and that “ever increasing pressures of additional uses are being placed on the shorelines necessitating increased coordination in the management and development of the shorelines of the state.” RCW 90.58.020. Accordingly, “[t]he SMA is to be broadly construed in order to protect the state shorelines as fully as possible.” Buechel, 125 Wn.2d at 203.

The SMA requires that shoreline management and planning of development near shorelines be coordinated between the state government and local governments. RCW 90.58.020, .050. The SMA delineates particular elements and specific provisions that local governments and Ecology must include within SMPs. See, e.g., RCW 90.58.100(2) (listing elements that shall be included within SMPs), .100(5) (requiring SMPs to contain provisions for

³ The “shorelines of the state” are defined at RCW 90.58.030.

conditional use permits and variances), .100(6) (requiring SMPs to contain standards for protecting single family residences), .150 (selected timber harvesting), .320 (height limitation). Although the SMA directs each local government to develop and administer its SMP, the state has an extensive, statutorily-mandated role in the development and administration of SMPs.

Most significantly, a SMP becomes effective only upon approval by Ecology. RCW 90.58.090(1). Moreover, Ecology is to approve a SMP only if it determines the SMP to be consistent with both the SMA and certain guidelines developed by Ecology. RCW 90.58.090(3)-(5). In the event that a local government declines, refuses, or fails to develop an adequate SMP, Ecology is authorized to develop and impose a SMP in the local government's stead. RCW 90.58.070(2), .090(5). All SMPs approved or adopted by Ecology become elements of the official state master program, RCW 90.58.030(3)(c), which "constitute[s] use regulations for the various shorelines of the state." RCW 90.58.100(1).

Ecology's statutorily-mandated involvement in the process of SMP development is considerable and, ultimately, determinative. Among other responsibilities, Ecology (1) develops guidelines that provide criteria for developing master programs, RCW 90.58.030(3)(a); (2) reviews, revises, and approves SMPs, RCW 90.58.090; (3) administers certain types of development along the shorelines, RCW 90.58.140(10); and (4) enforces the SMA and SMP

use regulations against the federal government, RCW 90.58.260.

IV

Our Supreme Court has previously recognized the pervasive level of state control over and involvement in the development of SMPs. In Orion Corporation v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), the court held that only the state, and not the county, was responsible for any unconstitutional takings arising out of the adoption of Skagit County's SMP regulations. 109 Wn.2d at 643. This was so, the court ruled, because the county was acting as an agent of the state in developing the SMP. Orion, 109 Wn.2d at 643-44. Indeed, the court noted that "the County acted at the instance of and, in some material degree, under the direction and control of the State." Orion, 109 Wn.2d at 644. In so holding, the court emphasized that the county's actions were directed and controlled by the state in that the SMA and Ecology's guidelines required the county to include certain provisions in the SMP and that the SMP became effective only when adopted or approved by Ecology. Orion, 109 Wn.2d at 643.

CRSP, however, contends that Orion and other decisions recognizing that SMPs are state regulations, including Buechel, 125 Wn.2d 196, and Harvey v. Board of Commissioners of San Juan County, 90 Wn.2d 473, 584 P.2d 391 (1978), were effectively invalidated in 1995 by legislative amendments made to the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW. We disagree.

The cited amendments were proposed in order to consolidate and integrate

the GMA, the SMA, the State Environmental Policy Act,⁴ and other environmental laws so as to “simplify[] rules and regulations in the state.” Final B. Report on Engrossed Substitute H.B. 1724, at 1, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995). One aspect of these amendments revised the process by which Ecology approves SMPs developed by local governments, allowing Ecology to administratively approve such SMPs, rather than requiring Ecology to adopt them by formal rulemaking. Laws of 1995, ch. 347, § 311. However, there is no evidence that, by adopting these provisions, the legislature intended to alter the level of state involvement in the development of SMPs. While the locally-developed and Ecology-approved SMPs are no longer published in the Washington Administrative Code as a formal rule, this fact does not alter the status of the SMPs as the product of state regulation. Ecology must still approve proposed SMPs in order for them to become effective and must still follow specific SMA procedures in so doing. Moreover, all approved SMPs continue to become part of the state master program, constituting the use regulations for the state. RCW 90.58.030(3)(c), .100(1); see also Buechel, 125 Wn.2d at 203-04 (“The total of all approved shoreline management master programs constitute Washington State’s Shoreline Management Master Program.”). The Supreme Court’s decision in Orion remains authoritative.

Recent developments support this conclusion. In 2007, our Supreme Court issued a decision concerning Bainbridge Island’s moratoria on shoreline development. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wn.2d 683, 169 P.3d 14

⁴ Ch. 43.21C RCW.

(2007), superseded by statute Laws of 2009, ch. 444 (codified at RCW 90.58.590). Although the court was divided on the question of whether the SMA precluded such moratoria, resulting in the publication of three opinions (none representing the views of a majority of the justices), the court was unanimous in its agreement that the SMA continued to be properly viewed as a statutory scheme providing for coordinated authority between the state and local government, with the state reserving ultimate control unto itself.

Thus, in its lead opinion, the court explained, "Under the SMA, the State has the primary authority to manage shoreline development. This is done in a coordinated fashion, in conjunction with local governments." Biggers, 162 Wn.2d at 687 (J.M. Johnson, J., plurality opinion). The basis for the primacy of the state's control, in Justice Johnson's view, lies in the state constitution.

Article XVII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution declares that shorelines were originally owned by the State, and therefore subject to *State* regulation. Even after sale or lease of shorelines, the State continues to hold remaining sovereign interests of the public. Indeed, the SMA was expressly based on the proposition that shorelines are of "statewide significance." Local governments do *not* possess any inherent constitutional police power over state shoreline use.

Biggers, 162 Wn.2d at 694 (J.M. Johnson, J., plurality opinion).

The state maintains its primacy, Justice Johnson further explains, because "the interests of all Washington residents in these shorelines cannot be impliedly abdicated to local government." Biggers, 162 Wn.2d at 696 (J.M. Johnson, J., plurality opinion). Thus, the SMA "delegate[s] only specified

powers to local governments.” Biggers, 162 Wn.2d at 697 (J.M. Johnson, J., plurality opinion).

Similarly, the concurring opinion acknowledged that “the State has chosen to share its power to regulate [shore lands] with its municipalities through the mandates and guidelines of the SMA.” Biggers, 162 Wn.2d at 705 (Chambers, J., concurring opinion). Even the dissenting opinion reiterated the pervasive nature of state involvement under the SMA, noting that “state and local governments share authority for developing shoreline regulations under the SMA.” Biggers, 162 Wn.2d at 713 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting opinion). Thus, all Justices joined opinions expressing views similar to those expressed in Orion.

The purpose of RCW 82.02.020 is to prevent *local governments* from imposing the general societal costs of development on developers. Isla Verde, 146 Wn.2d at 760 n.14 (quoting Southwick, Inc., 58 Wn. App. at 893-94). It is not effective against the state. The state’s significant involvement in the development of SMPs, as demonstrated by the statutory scheme discussed above and as recognized by our Supreme Court in Orion and Biggers, indicates that the trial court was correct in ruling that RCW 82.02.020 does not apply to regulations contained within SMPs.

V

Nevertheless, CRSP asserts that because local governments are afforded deference by Ecology in the development of many SMP provisions, the SMPs

must fall within the purview of RCW 82.02.020. Again, we disagree. In actuality, the amount of deference conferred by Ecology is that amount which good management, intergovernmental civility, and political considerations dictate. The SMA and Ecology's guidelines do not mandate any particular degree of deference. In fact, the opposite is true. Local governments are obligated to develop a SMP and submit it for Ecology's approval. RCW 90.58.070, .080. If the local government does not discharge this obligation, Ecology is empowered to unilaterally develop and impose a SMP on that jurisdiction. RCW 90.58.070(2), .090(5). Such a heavy-handed statutory authorization is the opposite of legislatively-mandated deference.

VI

CRSP proposes several additional contentions as to why Whatcom County's SMP should be found to be a local regulation subject to RCW 82.02.020. These can be summarized as follows: (1) the 1995 amendments, by defining GMA development regulations to include SMP regulations, caused SMPs to become subject to RCW 82.02.020; (2) one of Ecology's regulations references chapter 82.02 RCW, thereby effectively imposing RCW 82.02.020's prohibitions on SMPs; (3) SMPs adopted pursuant to the SMA are not exempt from RCW 82.02.020's prohibitions because of our decision in Sims; and (4) at the very least Whatcom County's SMP contains some provisions that are purely local regulations that should, on that basis, be subject to RCW 82.02.020. We

have reviewed each of these contentions and determined that none has merit.

First, CRSP contends that the 1995 amendments caused SMPs to become subject to RCW 82.02.020. CRSP reasons that this is so because the 1995 amendments incorporated SMP regulations as part of a local government's GMA development regulations. Laws of 1995, ch. 347, § 104; RCW 36.70A.030(7), .480. However, these amendments did not alter the pervasive level of state control over and involvement in the development of SMPs. Thus, these amendments did not bring SMPs within the ambit of RCW 82.02.020.

Second, CRSP argues that Ecology's own regulations establish that RCW 82.02.020 applies to SMPs because WAC 173-26-186 mentions chapter 82.02 RCW.⁵ However, Ecology's regulation does not make RCW 82.02.020 applicable where it would not otherwise apply, nor could it do so. "It is well settled that administrative rules cannot amend or change legislative enactments." Kabbae v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 144 Wn. App. 432, 443, 192 P.3d 903 (2008); see also Kitsap-Mason Dairymen's Ass'n v. Wash. State Tax Comm'n, 77 Wn.2d 812, 815, 467 P.2d 312 (1970) ("Rules must be written within the framework and policy of the applicable statutes."). It is the intent of

⁵ WAC 173-26-186(5) states:

The policy goals of the act, implemented by the planning policies of master programs, may not be achievable by development regulation alone. Planning policies should be pursued through the regulation of development of private property only to an extent that is consistent with all relevant constitutional and other legal limitations (where applicable, statutory limitations such as those contained in chapter 82.02 RCW and RCW 43.21C.060) on the regulation of private property. Local government should use a process designed to assure that proposed regulatory or administrative actions do not unconstitutionally infringe upon private property rights.

the legislature, not the executive branch, that is at issue in resolving the dispute herein.

Third, CRSP asserts that our decision in Sims establishes that RCW 82.02.020 applies to a local government's actions even when the local government is promulgating an ordinance in direct response to state law requirements. But the holding in Sims is inapplicable to the circumstances herein, given that the legislature created considerably different structures within the GMA and the SMA. The plurality opinion in Biggers describes the differences:

The process for adopting SMPs is different from the process for adopting GMA comprehensive plans and regulations. The SMA did not vest planning authority exclusively in local government, as did the GMA. Instead, the SMA provides for *state* checks and balances on local authority, including the requirement that the Department of Ecology approve all local shoreline master plans before they become effective.

162 Wn.2d at 701 (J.M. Johnson, J., lead opinion) (citing RCW 90.58.090(1)). King County's adoption of the clearing limits challenged in Sims was solely a local government action, distinct from the circumstances herein where the county's adoption of its SMP was contingent upon obtaining approval from the state.

Finally, CRSP avers that, even if we conclude that RCW 82.02.020 does not apply to SMPs because of the state's involvement, we should nevertheless hold that any portions of the SMP that are developed entirely at the local

government's discretion are subject to RCW 82.02.020. But the fact that the particular provisions challenged by CRSP herein were required either by the SMA or by Ecology is not the key determinate in reaching our holding.⁶ Rather, our holding is driven by the state's pervasive involvement throughout the entire SMP development process. Even where portions of a SMP are developed without a direct Ecology mandate, the state's statutorily-required role in oversight and approval dictates that RCW 82.02.020 does not apply.

VII

SMPs are developed at the insistence of, and with direction by, the state and are effective only upon state approval. Because of the state's involvement,

⁶ CRSP protests both the SMP's limitation on the buildable area of non-conforming lots and the SMP's uniform shoreline setbacks. Ecology required Whatcom County to revise its provision regarding the building area size on non-conforming lots before Ecology would approve of the county's SMP. In addition, the uniform shoreline setbacks were effectively required by the SMA in this instance because Whatcom County had designated all of its shorelines as critical areas. WCC 16.16.710. The SMA required Whatcom County to "provide[] a level of protection of critical areas at least equal to that provided by [Whatcom County's] critical areas ordinances." RCW 90.58.090(4). Thus, Whatcom County met this requirement by incorporating within the SMP the same buffer zones for shoreline areas as its critical areas ordinance contained.

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SMP provisions do not constitute local regulations constrained by RCW

82.02.020. The superior court correctly so ruled.

Affirmed.

Dupe, C. S.

We concur:

John J.

Edington, J.

RCW 82.02.020

State preempts certain tax fields — Fees prohibited for the development of land or buildings — Voluntary payments by developers authorized — Limitations — Exceptions.

***** CHANGE IN 2010 *** (SEE 2538-S.SL) *****

Except only as expressly provided in chapters 67.28, 81.104, and 82.14 RCW, the state preempts the field of imposing retail sales and use taxes and taxes upon parimutuel wagering authorized pursuant to RCW 67.16.060, conveyances, and cigarettes, and no county, town, or other municipal subdivision shall have the right to impose taxes of that nature. Except as provided in RCW 64.34.440 and 82.02.050 through 82.02.090, no county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall impose any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect, on the construction or reconstruction of residential buildings, commercial buildings, industrial buildings, or on any other building or building space or appurtenance thereto, or on the development, subdivision, classification, or reclassification of land. However, this section does not preclude dedications of land or easements within the proposed development or plat which the county, city, town, or other municipal corporation can demonstrate are reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or plat to which the dedication of land or easement is to apply.

This section does not prohibit voluntary agreements with counties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations that allow a payment in lieu of a dedication of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been identified as a consequence of a proposed development, subdivision, or plat. A local government shall not use such voluntary agreements for local off-site transportation improvements within the geographic boundaries of the area or areas covered by an adopted transportation program authorized by chapter 39.92 RCW. Any such voluntary agreement is subject to the following provisions:

(1) The payment shall be held in a reserve account and may only be expended to fund a capital improvement agreed upon by the parties to mitigate the identified, direct impact;

(2) The payment shall be expended in all cases within five years of collection; and

(3) Any payment not so expended shall be refunded with interest to be calculated from the original date the deposit was received by the county and at the same rate applied to tax refunds pursuant to RCW 84.69.100; however, if the payment is not expended within five years due to delay attributable to the developer, the payment shall be refunded without interest.

No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall require any payment as part of such a voluntary agreement which the county, city, town, or other municipal corporation cannot establish is reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or plat.

Nothing in this section prohibits cities, towns, counties, or other municipal corporations from collecting reasonable fees from an applicant for a permit or other governmental approval to cover the cost to the city, town, county, or other municipal corporation of processing applications, inspecting and reviewing plans, or preparing detailed statements required by chapter 43.21C RCW.

This section does not limit the existing authority of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation to impose special assessments on property specifically benefitted thereby in the manner prescribed by law.

Nothing in this section prohibits counties, cities, or towns from imposing or permits counties, cities, or towns to impose water, sewer, natural gas, drainage utility, and drainage system charges. However, no such charge shall exceed the proportionate share of such utility or system's capital costs which the county, city, or town can demonstrate are attributable to the property being charged. Furthermore, these provisions may not be interpreted to expand or contract any existing authority of counties, cities, or towns to impose such charges.

Nothing in this section prohibits a transportation benefit district from imposing fees or charges authorized in RCW 36.73.120 nor prohibits the legislative authority of a county, city, or town from approving the imposition of such fees within a transportation benefit district.

Nothing in this section prohibits counties, cities, or towns from imposing transportation impact fees authorized pursuant to chapter 39.92 RCW.

Nothing in this section prohibits counties, cities, or towns from requiring property owners to provide relocation assistance to tenants under RCW 59.18.440 and 59.18.450.

Nothing in this section limits the authority of counties, cities, or towns to implement programs consistent with RCW

36.70A.540, nor to enforce agreements made pursuant to such programs.

This section does not apply to special purpose districts formed and acting pursuant to Title 54, 57, or 87 RCW, nor is the authority conferred by these titles affected.

[2009 c 535 § 1103; 2008 c 113 § 2; 2006 c 149 § 3; 2005 c 502 § 5; 1997 c 452 § 21; 1996 c 230 § 1612; 1990 1st ex.s. c 17 § 42; 1988 c 179 § 6; 1987 c 327 § 17; 1982 1st ex.s. c 49 § 5; 1979 ex.s. c 196 § 3; 1970 ex.s. c 94 § 8; 1967 c 236 § 16; 1961 c 15 § 82.02.020. Prior: (i) 1935 c 180 § 29; RRS § 8370-29. (ii) 1949 c 228 § 28; 1939 c 225 § 22; 1937 c 227 § 24; Rem. Supp. 1949 § 8370-219. Formerly RCW 82.32.370.]

Notes:

Intent -- Construction -- 2009 c 535: See notes following RCW 82.04.192.

Application -- Effective date -- 2008 c 113: See notes following RCW 64.34.440.

Findings -- Construction -- 2006 c 149: See notes following RCW 36.70A.540.

Effective date -- 2005 c 502: See note following RCW 1.12.070.

Intent -- Severability -- 1997 c 452: See notes following RCW 67.28.080.

Savings -- 1997 c 452: See note following RCW 67.28.181.

Part headings not law -- Effective date -- 1996 c 230: See notes following RCW 57.02.001.

Severability -- Part, section headings not law -- 1990 1st ex.s. c 17: See RCW 36.70A.900 and 36.70A.901.

Severability -- Prospective application -- Section captions -- 1988 c 179: See RCW 39.92.900 and 39.92.901.

Intent -- Construction -- Effective date -- Fire district funding -- 1982 1st ex.s. c 49: See notes following RCW 35.21.710.

Effective date -- 1979 ex.s. c 196: See note following RCW 82.04.240.

Severability -- 1970 ex.s. c 94: See RCW 82.14.900.