

NO. 87009-8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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Abeda Jafar, Petitioner

v.

William Douglas Webb, Respondent.

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FILED  
SUPREME COURT  
STATE OF WASHINGTON  
2013 FEB 13 P 12:15  
BY RONALD R. CARPENTER  
CLERK

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY OFFICIALS

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## **I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE**

The Washington Association of County Officials (WACO) represents the elected Superior Court County Clerks of Washington State pursuant to RCW 36.47. The County Clerks responsibilities are expressed in the State Constitution and in statute and include filing of the documents and handling of the fees at issue herein. WACO has filed this brief at the request of the Court.<sup>1</sup>

## **II. ISSUES PRESENTED**

1. Whether the Superior Court misapplied GR 34 when it ordered Ms. Jafar to pay \$50 in mandatory fees and surcharges, notwithstanding the Superior Court's determination that Ms. Jafar is indigent.
2. Whether , in the alternative, insofar as GR 34 permits the Superior Court to order Ms. Jafar to pay \$50 in mandatory fees and surcharges, notwithstanding the Superior Court's determination that Ms. Jafar is indigent, GR 34 is unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Jafar.

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<sup>1</sup>WACO appreciates the input provided by Snohomish County Prosecutor's Office on behalf of the Snohomish County Superior Court and by the Washington State Attorney's General Office.

### III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to RAP 10.8, the Petitioner's Statement of the Case is accepted and adopted herein, except for those portions clearly intended as argument or opinion (see, for example, second paragraph, page 7 of Petitioner's Brief), and augmented with the following additional information.

The Fee Order at issue contains numerous alternative provisions from which the issuing court may choose in a "check the box" manner. Of note, Section 3.4 provides "[i]t is hereby ordered that this case shall be dismissed, without further order of the court, on \_\_\_\_\_ (date) if any of the above fees have not been paid as ordered." See CP 2. In Jafar's case, the court did not complete Section 3.4 and left it blank.

From the time Petitioner filed her action on January 11, 2012, until the Notice of Acceptance of Review by Washington Supreme Court on May 14, 2012, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner was denied access to the Snohomish County Superior Court. See, generally, the Snohomish County Superior Court Docket attached hereto as Appendix A.

#### IV. ARGUMENT

##### A. JAFAR HAS NOT BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO THE COURT AND THEREFORE HER PETITION IS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW.

Jafar has not been denied access to the Snohomish County Superior Court. Jafar's case was proceeding in the normal course and the Fee Order did not include language mandating dismissal should Jafar fail to pay the remaining fees. There is nothing to suggest in the court docket (See Appendix A) or otherwise that the Court intimated that she would necessarily be denied access.

Because she has not been denied access to the Snohomish County Superior Court, Jafar's challenge is not ripe for review. "The unconstitutionality of a law is not ripe for review unless the person is harmfully affected by the part of the law alleged to be unconstitutional." *State v. Massey*, 91 Wn. App 198, 200, 913 P.2d 424 (1996) citing *State v. Langland*, 42 Wn. App 287, 292, 711 P.2d 1039 (1985). Because this matter is not ripe for review, the Court should deny Jafar's request that the Fee Order be vacated.

B. NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE STATE CONSTITUTION  
REQUIRE A FULL WAIVER OF COURT FEES FOR  
INDIGENT CIVIL LITIGANTS.

It is indeed well-settled that the State cannot require fees that effectively deny access to justice to indigent civil litigants in cases involving a “fundamental human relationship.” See *Boddie v. Connecticut*, 401 U.S. 371, 91 Sup.Ct 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) and *Bullock v. Superior Court*, 84 Wn.2d 101, 524 P.2d 385 (1974). Jafar is incorrect however in her assertion that, in such cases, “waiver of all mandatory court fees is constitutionally required.” (Petitioner’s Brief at 12).

*Boddie* simply does not explicitly require that the only choice in a waiver decision by the court be an all or nothing decision. In fact, *Boddie* does not explicitly discuss fee waiver at all, only deciding that

Thus we hold only that a State may not, consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, preempt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.

*Boddie* at 383.

Further, *Boddie* recognized that there are some practical limits on access to the courts: “the right to a meaningful opportunity

to be heard within the limits of practicality, must be protected against denial by particular laws.” *Boddie* at 379. Obviously, fee waiver whether partial or full is but one way to afford access to the courts.

Beyond any constitutional requirement, Washington courts have recognized the inherent authority of the court to waive its own fees as a means of ensuring access to the courts:

It is within the inherent power of a court exercising common-law jurisdiction, which the superior court does, to make such orders as are necessary to protect the rights of the poor to access to the judicial system.

*O'Connor v. Matzdorff*, 76 Wn.2d 589, 600, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).

Whether a court is waiving fees for constitutional reasons or as an exercise of inherent power or some mixture of these authorities, it is clear that the court can tailor the exercise of that authority. Consider, for example, the Court’s action in *Iverson v Marine Bancorp*, 83 Wn.2d 163, 517 P.2d 197 (1973) where the Court imposed a lien, after waiving filing and other fees, to protect the public treasury:

Consistent with fundamental fairness and in order not to overburden the public treasury, we hereby impose a lien upon all amounts over and above the original lien which the plaintiff may recover for the payment of cost incurred or for reimbursement to the state, as the case may be. If, in fact, the plaintiff does recover an increased amount, she will then be

in a position to pay the cost incurred or to reimburse the state and should pay her share of the cost of her appeal.

The *Iverson* court clearly intended to retain the option of reviewing the waived fees and costs for possible reimbursement.

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the *in forma pauperis* language of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1915, making this observation:

Although it is not axiomatic, the greater power to waive all fees includes the lesser power to set partial fees. Requiring the payment of fees according to a plaintiff's ability to pay serves the *in forma pauperis* statute's goal of granting equal access to the courts regardless of economic status. At the same time, requiring a partial payment within a plaintiff's ability to pay serves the dual aims of defraying some of the judicial costs of litigation and screening out frivolous claims.

*Olivares v. Marshall*, 59 Fed.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. Cal. 1995). The Court in *Olivares* (at page 109) also points out that nine other circuits reached the same conclusion that courts could require partial payment of fees – not simply all or nothing.

**C. GR 34 DOES NOT REQUIRE A FULL WAIVER OF COURT FEES FOR INDIGENT CIVIL LITIGANTS.**

GR 34(a): Any individual, on the basis of indigent status as defined herein, may seek a waiver of filing fees or surcharges the payment of which is a condition precedent to a litigant's ability to secure access to judicial relief from a judicial officer in the applicable trial court.

By its very terms, GR 34 is limited to fees and surcharges “precedent to a litigant’s ability to secure access to judicial relief”.<sup>2</sup> There are of course other considerations in a fee waiver request including whether the litigation is brought in good faith and is or is not frivolous, neither of which is at issue in this case. As the court stated in *O’Connor* at 603:

Nevertheless, we are not prepared to say that, in every action brought or appeal pursued by a poor person, his court fees should be automatically waived. If an action or petition is patently frivolous, or brought for purposes of harassment, the court should not lend its encouragement by waiving its fees. But where a case appears to have been brought in good faith and to have probable merit, the exercise of a sound discretion dictates that a litigant should not be denied his day in court simply because he is financially unable to pay the court fees.

The Comments to GR 34 make it clear which fees precedent may be subject to waiver under the GR 34 process. The comments unquestionably demonstrate that the court’s authority in this area is discretionary:

[t]he rule establishes the process by which judicial officer’s *may* waive civil filing fees and surcharges for which judicial officers have authority to grant a waiver; (Emphasis added).

every level of court has the inherent authority to waive payment of filing fees and surcharges *on a case by case analysis*; (Emphasis added).

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<sup>2</sup> This brief limits its discussion to the question of fees and costs.

[e]ach court is responsible for the proper and impartial administration of justice which includes ensuring meaningful access to judicial review is available to the poor as well as to those who can afford to pay.

Jafar's assertion that the language from GR 34 quoted above combined with the Comment *requires* waiver of *all* fees is a leap of logic. The language of both the rule and comment explain which fees the court in its discretion may waive.

As Jafar recognizes, the original draft version of GR 34 simply stated that a person could seek a waiver "of filing fees or costs" and this was not limited to fees or costs "precedent to a litigant's ability to secure access" as the adopted rule reads. (See Petitioner's Brief page 19, note 6 and Appendix Tab E). Likewise, the Comment was silent on which fees or costs were subject to waiver by the court. The Rule and Comment merely explain which fees are potentially impacted by the Rule. There simply is no language in the Rule or in the Comment which mandates an all or nothing waiver.

#### D. WASHINGTON COURTS PROPERLY INTERPRET AND APPLY GR 34 TO REQUESTS FOR FEE WAIVER.

Although this Review arises solely out of a Snohomish County Superior Court case, Jafar argues that many Superior

Courts are violating GR 34 by not using the “mandatory pattern forms” promulgated by AOC. This fails on two counts.

First, the only “mandatory pattern form” discussed in GR 34 is the form on which an applicant attests to his or her financial condition:

The application for such a waiver may be made *ex parte* in writing or orally, *accompanied by a mandatory pattern form created by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) whereby the applicant attests to his or her financial status* or, in the case of an individual represented by a qualified legal services provider (“QLSP”) or an attorney working in conjunction with a QLSP, a declaration of counsel stating that the individual was screened and found eligible by the QLSP.

GR 34(a)(1), emphasis added. There simply is no requirement to use any standard form for the application, motion, or order. The only specified “mandatory pattern form” is the financial declaration.

Second, Jafar misreads the phrase “mandatory pattern form” as “mandatory form.” Merriam-Webster Online defines a pattern as “a form or model proposed for imitation.” To give full meaning to the language of the rule, you cannot ignore the word “pattern.”

Since GR 34 does not mandate the use of any particular application, motion or order form, much of Jafar’s argument regarding specific court forms should be dismissed out of hand. Even so, a discussion of the specific allegations made against

certain courts is appropriate, assuming from this point forward that there is no mandatory form required by GR 34 as argued above.

Jafar complains that the Snohomish County application form encourages deferrals or partial waivers, and the order form has multiple checkboxes for different fees and costs. Nothing in GR 34 prohibits deferral or revisiting payment and such options are entirely consistent with *Iverson* and the comments made by the Ninth Circuit in *Oliveras*. Checkboxes would only be a concern if waiver of fees was an all or nothing proposition, which -- as argued above -- it is not.

Jafar complains that Kitsap County's form encourages deferral rather than waiver and an acknowledgment that the court can require payment prior to finalization. Likewise Benton County and Franklin County review fees prior to finalization. Nothing in GR 34 prohibits deferral or revisiting payment and such options are entirely consistent with *Iverson* and the comments made by the Ninth Circuit in *Oliveras*.

Jafar complains that Jefferson County's form is "non-conforming" yet a comparison of the financial declaration (the only mandatory pattern form contemplated in GR 34) is that it covers identical information to the form promulgated by AOC.

Jafar complains that Thurston County's instruction form advises people that certain fees will never be waived. The referenced document (Petitioner's Brief Appendix Tab U) is a two page descriptive document to assist people in locating the documents they want, not the application, motion or order forms themselves.

Both Spokane and Pierce County's instruction sheets indicate a person "may" be required to pay the facilitator fee. (Petitioner's Brief Appendix Tab V and W). This language is not contained in the application, motion or order forms themselves, but in descriptive or instruction documents.

And Jafar complains that the King County Court Commissioner in one case, following a motion for reconsideration of the court's order to waive fees, referred the petitioner to the two programs whose fees had not been waived for review of the fees. That motion for reconsideration did not make any claim that the forms used were deficient, only that all of the fees and costs should be waived. And even though the commissioner denied the petitioner's motion, the petitioner was given yet another opportunity to make her case for fee waiver on the remaining fees. Nothing in this example is relevant to the use or non-use of mandatory pattern forms.

This example is perhaps more pertinent to Jafar's general argument on page 25 of her brief that "some judges and court administrators erroneously believe that GR 34 is not mandatory, but instead reserves to Superior Courts unfettered discretion to grant or deny fee waivers to indigent litigants."

GR 34 does preserve the discretion of the court to make decisions regarding fees waivers. As discussed above GR 34 does not mandate waivers for any individual or class of individuals. The Rule contemplates that courts will make decisions case by case as noted in the comments to the Rule:

The adoption of this rule is rooted in the constitutional premise that every level of court has the inherent authority to waive payment of filing fees and surcharges on a case by case basis. Each court is responsible for the proper and impartial administration of justice which includes ensuring that meaningful access to judicial review is available to the poor as well as to those who can afford to pay.

Notably, GR 34 does not require the court to grant any waiver application. But, the court does not have unfettered discretion to grant or deny a fee waiver request as Jafar asserts. The discretion preserved in GR 34 exists within the bounds and guidelines established in constitutional principles and stare decisis.

As Jafar acknowledges early in her argument, the intent of GR 34 is to bring consistency, predictability and efficiency to the fee-waiver process. GR 34 does exactly that by 1) establishing a framework of what questions to ask, and 2) establishing the general process of fee waiver. And GR 34 accomplishes its goal of consistency, predictability and efficiency while allowing for local courts to tailor their own forms and rulings to their particular circumstances.

GR 34 neither mandates a particular set of forms be used, nor does it mandate that fee waiver is an all or nothing decision. The Snohomish County Superior Court did not err in its use of forms nor in its partial waiver of fees.

**E. GR 34 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO JAFAR.**

As discussed above, the focus of *Boddie*, *O'Connor*, *Iverson* and GR 34 is on *access* to the courts. If the Snohomish Court order denied Jafar access to the court, then clearly a discussion of whether GR 34 is unconstitutional as applied would be appropriate.

However, as previously discussed, Petitioner was not denied access to the Snohomish County Superior Court. Even if the Court had completed Section 3.4 in its Fee Order, such a soft deadline such as this is consistent with *Boddie*, *O'Connor* and *Iverson*, with the primary goal of ensuring access to the courts, while giving appropriate consideration to the courts, other litigants and the public.

The case here, however, is that Jafar was not denied access to the court or by the court. The court's order waived or deferred all fees. It was in Jafar's power to proceed with her action.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

GR 34 as adopted established a consistent, predictable process for intake, review and processing of fee waiver requests. GR 34 does not require any particular form for applications, motions or orders; it only sets a pattern for the financial declaration required in the fee waiver application process.

GR 34 does not require waivers to be an all or nothing decision, nor an automatic decision if an applicant meets the standards spelled out in the rule. The individual courts retain their inherent authority and discretion to tailor waivers to the individual litigant's circumstances within constitutional constraints. Those decisions are made case by case, applicant by applicant. Finally,

that discretion includes the use of partial waivers, deferral of fees, and review of fees.

The Snohomish County Superior Court did not deny Jafar access to the Court. The Snohomish County Superior Court did not err in its Fee Order. The Court's order should be affirmed and the petition dismissed. To the extent Petitioner is challenging other courts' application of GR 34, her challenge is without merit.

Respectfully Submitted this 11<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2013



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Monty Cobb, WSBA 23575  
Policy Director and General Counsel  
WA Association of County Officials

NO. 87009-8

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Abeda Jafar, Petitioner

v.

William Douglas Webb, Respondent.

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**Appendix A:**

Snohomish County Electronic Document Management System

Docket for 12-3-00284-5

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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY OFFICIALS



## Docket for 12-3-00284-5

Sub #	Date	Code	Description	Secondary Field	ILB	Security
-	01/11/2012	\$NF	NON FEE			1
1	01/11/2012	SMPT	SUMMONS & PETITION		CL15148875	1
-	01/11/2012	APPS	APPEARANCE PRO SE			1
		PSP01	JAFAR, ABEDA			1
2	01/11/2012	TMRO	TEMP RESTRAINING ORDER		CL15148884	1
3	01/11/2012	PPP	PROPOSED PARENTING PLAN		CL15148877	1
4	01/11/2012	DCLSP	DECLARATN IN SUPP OF PARENTING PLAN		CL15148878	1
5	01/11/2012	MTAF	MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION		CL15148881	1
6	01/11/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF COURTNEY OSTBYE		CL15148883	1
7	01/11/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF INDIRA JAFAR		CL15148880	1
8	01/11/2012	NTC	NOTE FOR CALENDAR	01-30-2012D2	CL15148879	1
		ACTION	MTN FOR TEMP ORDERS #5			1
		ACTION	CONT 01 31-12 PER RAIFORD			1
9	01/11/2012	MTWVF	MOTION FOR WAIVER OF FEES		CL15148873	1
10	01/11/2012	ORPRFP	ORDER TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS		CL15148874	1
		COM09	COMMISSIONER SUSAN C. GAER			1
-	01/11/2012	EXWACT	EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER			1
11	01/11/2012	CIF	CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FORM		CL15148882	3
12	01/11/2012	SADP	SEALED ACKNLEDG/DENIAL OF PATERNITY		CL15148876	3
13	01/12/2012	NTAPR	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE		CL15090007	1
		ATP01	RAIFORD, MICHELLE DENISE			1
-	01/17/2012	CNA	CONTINUANCE AGREEMENT	01-31-2012D2		1
			IN PERSON (ATTY RAIFORD)			1
		ACTION	MTN FOR TEMP ORDERS #5			1
		ACTION	CONT 2-6-12 PER RAIFORD			1
14	01/17/2012	LTR	LETTER FROM MICHELLE RAIFORD TO MS. CAMPBELL		CL15109853	1
15	01/17/2012	NTC	NOTE FOR CALENDAR		CL15109854	1
16	01/19/2012	AFSR	AFFIDAVIT/DCLR/CERT OF SERVICE		CL15051397	1
17	01/23/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF RICHARD KRAFT		CL14982589	1
-	01/26/2012	CNA	CONTINUANCE AGREEMENT	02-06-2012D2		1
			PER TELEPHONE (MARNIE/RAIFORD)			1
		ACTION	MTN FOR TEMP ORDERS #5			1
		ACTION	CONFIRMED/RAIFORD			1
-	01/30/2012	HCNTPA	CONTINUED: PLAINTIFF/PROS REQUESTED 1-31-12			1
18	01/26/2012	AT	ATTACHMENT - 01/23/12 EMAIL CONFIRMING AGREED CONTINUANCE		CL15090844	1
19	01/26/2012	AT	ATTACHMENT - PACIFIC MUNICIPAL PD REPORT. RE PTNR		CL15086258	1
20	01/30/2012	NTAPR	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE		CL15086813	1
		ATR01	CAMPBELL, DONNA J			1
21	01/30/2012	RSP	RESPONSE TO PETITION		CL15086812	1
		ATR01	CAMPBELL, DONNA J			1
22	01/30/2012	PPP	PROPOSED PARENTING PLAN		CL15086811	1
23	01/30/2012	AFRSP	AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT		CL15086814	1

Docket for 12-3-00284-5

Sub #	Date	Code	Description	Secondary Field	ILB	Security
24	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF RHIANNON ACREE		CL15086803	1
25	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF SIERRA L. ROGERS-MOORE		CL15086804	1
26	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF MATTHEW CRAIG		CL15086805	1
27	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF LISA M. BORS		CL15086806	1
28	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF ASHLEY WEBB		CL15086808	1
29	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF THUY H LE		CL15086807	1
30	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF JASON DOLLARHIDE		CL15086809	1
31	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF JAMIE ARINK		CL15086810	1
32	01/30/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF JACQUELINE D MOORE		CL15086802	1
-	01/31/2012	HCNTPA	CONTINUED: PLAINTIFF/PROS REQUESTED 2-6-12			1
33	02/01/2012	AFPT	AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER		CL15077695	1
34	02/01/2012	CP	COPY OF PLEADINGS FROM KING COUNTY PROTECTION ORDER CASES RE RSPT		CL15077762	1
35	02/01/2012	CP	COPY OF DOCKETS FROM RSPT'S CITY OF RENTON CRIMINAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES		CL15077761	1
36	02/01/2012	COPC	CONFIRMATION OF PARENTING CLASS PTNR		CL15077696	1
37	02/06/2012	MTHRG ACTION ACTION COM04	MOTION HEARING COMPLIANCE REVIEW STRICKEN/PROGRAM'S OFFICE COMMISSIONER LESTER H. STEWART	02-29-2012CG	CL15211364	1
-	02/06/2012	HCNTU ACTION	HEARING CONTINUED: UNSPECIFIED REVIEW	04-06-2012D2		1
38	02/06/2012	TCO	TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER		CL15509897	1
-	02/06/2012	TMRO	TEMP RESTRAINING ORDER			1
-	02/06/2012	ORSRH	ORDER SETTING REVIEW HEARING			1
39	02/06/2012	ORAPGL	ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM		CL15083901	1
40	02/06/2012	ORAPGL	ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM SUPPLEMENTAL		CL15083900	1
-	02/06/2012	ORSRH	ORDER SETTING REVIEW HEARING			1
41	02/06/2012	NTTSNA ACTION	NT FOR TRIAL & STMT OF NONARBITRA SET FOR NON JURY	02-21-2012TA	CL15509898	1
42	02/09/2012	AFSR	AFFIDAVIT/DCLR/CERT OF SERVICE		CL14982795	1
43	02/09/2012	NTAPR ATP02 ATP03	NOTICE OF LMTD APPEARANCE BUCKLEY, BRIAN D MEISSNER, BRADLEY THOMAS		CL15510107	1
44	02/09/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF TRACY MARSHALL		CL15506060	1
45	02/09/2012	NTDRSC	NT OF DISCR. REVIEW TO SUPREME CT.		CL15510106	1
-	02/21/2012	ASTD	ASSIGNMENT OF TRIAL DATE	06-20-2012		1
46	02/21/2012	PNCA	PERFECTION NOTICE FROM SUPREME CT		CL15504904	1
-	02/29/2012	HSTKU	HEARING CANCELLED: UNKNOWN PARTY SUPREME COURT CLERK DATED 02/24/12			1
47	02/27/2012	LTR	LETTER TO COURT FROM R. CARPENTER SUPREME COURT CLERK DATED 02/24/12		CL15105236	1
48	03/02/2012	FNDCLRP	FINANCIAL DECLARATION OF PET		CL15443551	1
49	03/02/2012	MTAF	MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION		CL15443552	1

## Docket for 12-3-00284-5

12-3-00284-5 Domestic/Divorce 01/11/2012 ABEDA JAFAR &amp; WILLIAM WEBB

NO

Sub #	Date	Code	Description	Secondary Field	ILB	Security
		ACTION	MT FOR TEMP CHILD SUPPORT #49			1
50	03/02/2012	NTC	NOTE FOR CALENDAR	03-15-2012D2	CL15443553	3
		ACTION	MT FOR TEMP CHILD SUPPORT #49			1
		ACTION	CONFIRMED/RAIFORD			1
		ACTION	CONT 3-23-12 PER RAIFORD			1
51	03/08/2012	SEALFN	SEALED FINANCIAL DOCUMENT(S)		CL15476866	3
52	03/08/2012	NT	NOTICE OF STATE'S INTEREST		CL15098752	1
53	03/08/2012	FNDCLRR	FINANCIAL DECLARATION OF RESP		CL15476868	1
54	03/08/2012	CSWP	CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET/PROPOSED		CL15476865	1
55	03/08/2012	AFRSP	AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT		CL15476867	1
56	03/08/2012	NTAB	NOTICE OF ABSENCE/UNAVAILABILITY		CL15498995	1
57	03/09/2012	ORTSC	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE	03-23-2012D2	CL15470442	1
		ACTION	SHOW CAUSE #57			1
		COM09	COMMISSIONER SUSAN C. GAER			1
-	03/09/2012	EXWACT	EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER			1
58	03/12/2012	PT	PETITION FO RESIDENTIAL		CL15470811	1
			SCHEDULE/PARENTING PLAN & CHILD			1
			SUPPORT AMENDED			1
		ATP01	RAIFORD, MICHELLE DENISE			1
59	03/12/2012	CSWP	CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET/PROPOSED		CL15470810	1
60	03/12/2012	AFPT	AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER		CL15470809	1
61	03/12/2012	NTTD	NOTICE OF TRIAL DATE		CL15470938	1
62	03/12/2012	SEALFN	SEALED FINANCIAL DOCUMENT(S)		CL15470813	3
63	03/13/2012	NTAB	NOTICE OF ABSENCE/UNAVAILABILITY		CL15548602	1
			AMENDED			1
-	03/14/2012	CNA	CONTINUANCE AGREEMENT	03-23-2012D2		1
			PER TELEPHONE (MARNIE/RAIFORD)			1
		ACTION	MT FOR TEMP CHILD SUPPORT #49			1
		ACTION	CONFIRMED/RAIFORD			1
-	03/15/2012	HCNTPA	CONTINUED: PLAINTIFF/PROS			1
			REQUESTED			1
			3-23-12			1
64	03/14/2012	LTR	LETTER TO MS. CAMPBELL FROM		CL15546569	1
			MATTHEW BRADY DATED 03/14/12			1
65	03/15/2012	AFRSP	AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT		CL15553470	1
66	03/19/2012	MTSC	MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE		CL15477270	1
67	03/19/2012	DCLR	DECLARATION OF COUNSEL		CL15477271	1
68	03/20/2012	AFPT	AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER		CL15471814	1
69	03/21/2012	SEALRPT	SEALED CONFIDENTIAL RPTS CVR SHEET		CL15549330	3
70	03/23/2012	MTHRG	MOTION HEARING		CL15211976	1
		COM04	COMMISSIONER LESTER H. STEWART			1
71	03/23/2012	ORAR	ORDER REGARDING ACCESS TO		CL15211974	1
			RECORDS			1
-	03/23/2012	ORSRH	ORDER SETTING REVIEW HEARING	05-25-2012D2		1
		ACTION	REVIEW HEARING #71			1
-	03/23/2012	OR	ORDER STRIKING HEARING			1
-	03/23/2012	ORES	ORDER FOR EXPERT SERVICES			1
72	03/23/2012	TMORS	TEMP ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT		CL15547252	1
		COM09	COMMISSIONER SUSAN C. GAER			1
-	03/23/2012	EXWACT	EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER			1
-	03/26/2012	RRL	REGISTRY REFERRAL LETTER -			1

## Docket for 12-3-00284-5

12-3-00284-5 Domestic/Divorce 01/11/2012 ABEDA JAFAR &amp; WILLIAM WEBB

NO

Sub #	Date	Code	Description	Secondary Field	ILB	Security
			TMORSW/CSW,CIF			1
73	04/05/2012	NTAPR	NOTICE OF APPEARANCE		CL15561288	1
		ATP01	RAIFORD, MICHELLE DENISE			1
-	04/06/2012	HSTKNC	HRG STRICKN: NOT CONFIRMD & NOT HRD			1
74	04/26/2012	AFSR	AFFIDAVIT/DCLR/CERT OF SERVICE		CL15460730	1
75	04/26/2012	DSGCKP	DESIGNATION OF CLERK'S PAPERS		CL15375836	1
-	04/30/2012	CLP	PTNR'S CLERK'S PAPERS (VOL I, PGS 1-47)			1
76	05/04/2012	LTTEAC	LTR OF TRNSMTTAL/XHIBTS TO APP CRT		CL15415807	1
77	05/07/2012	LTTEAC	LTR OF TRNSMTTAL/XHIBTS TO APP CRT		CL15252819	1
78	05/11/2012	AFSR	AFFIDAVIT/DCLR/CERT OF SERVICE		CL15460930	1
79	05/14/2012	AFSR	AFFIDAVIT/DCLR/CERT OF SERVICE		CL15342003	1
80	05/14/2012	NT	NOTICE OR ACCEPTANCE OF REVIEW BY WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT		CL15520785	1
-	05/25/2012	HSTKNC	HRG STRICKN: NOT CONFIRMD & NOT HRD			1
81	08/17/2012	RQ	REQUEST FOR NOTIFICATION		CL15776256	1
82	11/29/2012	NTAB	NOTICE OF ABSENCE/UNAVAILABILITY		CL15709316	1
83	11/30/2012	NTAB	NOTICE OF ABSENCE/UNAVAILABILITY		CL15841856	1