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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

PETITIONER,

v.

BLAYNE JEFFREY COLEY,

RESPONDENT.

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

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PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

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ORIGINAL

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I. INTRODUCTION

This supplemental brief expands upon arguments contained in the brief of respondent. The State's decision not to address certain issues in this supplemental brief should not be considered as a concession, but should be interpreted as the State's determination that the unaddressed issues are adequately discussed in its other briefs.

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1) Did the Court of Appeals err in deciding that structural error had occurred at a hearing which the parties believed to be a competency hearing, but which should have been a restoration hearing?

2) Did the Court of Appeals err by not considering the issue of invited error when counsel for the defendant agreed that the matter was on for competency, and that the defendant had the burden of proof?

3) If the burden of proof was improperly allocated, what is the appropriate remedy?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 11, 2010, the defendant, Blayne Coley, his attorney John Perry, and the deputy prosecutor, all participated in a day-long hearing before the Honorable Judge John M. Antosz. At the start of the hearing there was some discussion as to whether or not the defendant had previously been found to be incompetent prior to the hearing. RP 7, 8¹. Based on an order of competency dated December 9, 2008, the parties mistakenly believed that the hearing before the court was to address Mr. Coley's competency. RP 8. It would later turn out that an order of incompetency had been filed on July 16, 2009, and the hearing before the court should have addressed Mr. Coley's competency restoration. CP 38-39.

On November 9, 2009, when the matter had been before the court to address scheduling, counsel for Mr. Coley informed the court that a hearing would be necessary as the report of the court appointed expert opining that Mr. Coley was now again competent was being challenged. Defense counsel then went on to cite volume 12, §907 of *Washington Practice* which states:

¹ All report of proceedings (RP) references refer to the hearing of June 11, 2010 unless otherwise noted. The State adopts its previous briefing filed in the Court of Appeals, Division III No. 30003-0-III on February 6, 2012, and in its Petition for Discretionary Review filed with this court on November 5, 2012, as well as any briefs of *amici*.

When the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial is raised, the issue is determined by the court, and if neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel contests the findings contained in the report, the judge may make his determination on the basis of the report. However, if the report of the court-appointed experts is contested, the court must hold a hearing.

An accused has the burden of showing that he or she is incompetent to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. This proof requirement is based upon the presumption of sanity.

At that hearing, the experts or professional persons who joined in the report may be called as witnesses. Both the prosecution and the defendant may summon any other qualified expert or professional persons to testify. The rules of evidence are applicable at the hearing.

Royce A. Ferguson, Jr., *Washington Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure* §907, at 177-178 (3d ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 11/09/09 RP 2- 3.

At the hearing on June 11, 2010, after the court, the State, and defense counsel all agreed that the proceeding was a competency hearing, the court addressed the issue of the burden of proof. RP 8-10. The State then referenced the aforementioned volume 12, §907 of *Washington Practice* which allocates the burden of proof upon the defendant. *Id.* Although defense counsel initially took the position that the burden of proof was on the State,

he withdrew from that position without further argument prior to the proceedings getting underway. RP 10.

What followed was a full day hearing. The court first heard from Dr. E. Clay Jorgensen (now deceased), who opined that from his two evaluations of the defendant, each lasting an hour and a half to two hours, he had come to the conclusion that Mr. Coley did understand the nature of the proceedings against him, but believed that Mr. Coley could not assist his attorney. RP 47. Dr. Jorgensen based this on his belief that Mr. Coley did not trust his attorney, as well as what Dr. Jorgensen felt was a delusional belief of Mr. Coley's that "he was somehow coerced by this 12- or 13-year-old boy, who actually in his view sexually molested Mr. Coley." RP 31, 32, 43, 44. Dr. Jorgensen went on to say that he didn't believe that Mr. Coley could assist his counsel "[b]ecause I believe that Mr. Coley has fixed beliefs about how things happened, why he's not guilty, what should happen, and I don't think he's going to cooperate with anybody who doesn't share those beliefs." RP 65, 66.

The court next heard from Dr. William Grant of Eastern State Hospital, who had had about four face to face contacts with Mr. Coley; had been involved with Mr. Coley when he was an inpatient

at Eastern State Hospital; had received information from Mr. Coley's attending physician, psychologist, social workers, and the ward staff who had had contact with Mr. Coley; and had discussed Mr. Coley's case "quite a bit" with the aforementioned individuals. RP 72. Dr. Grant believed that if Dr. Jorgensen had had additional contact with Mr. Coley, Dr. Jorgensen would not have concluded that Mr. Coley had a schizoaffective disorder, as Dr. Grant did not believe that Mr. Coley's behavior had the persistence required for schizoaffective disorder. RP 73. Dr. Grant testified that someone with a "schizoaffective disorder can't pull their thoughts together and speak to people in a meaningful way." RP 80. According to Dr. Grant, this was not the situation with Mr. Coley. RP 80, 81. Dr. Grant opined that Mr. Coley understood the nature of the proceedings against him, and could assist his attorney. RP 86. Dr. Grant believed however, that Mr. Coley might not like what his attorney had to tell him. RP 84

The court then watched a 57 minute DVD recording of an interview between Dr. Grant and Mr. Coley. RP 92. Mr. Coley had not been on medication for a couple of months prior to the DVD being made. RP 93, 108. The court was able to observe that Mr. Coley tracked, and could be brought back on point when he

rambled off on a tangent which Dr. Grant testified he purposefully allowed Mr. Coley to do. RP 105, 119, 120.

Finally the court heard from Mr. Coley himself. Mr. Coley reiterated that he understood the nature of the proceedings against him. RP 129, 130. He also assured the court that he would work with his attorney and could assist him with his case. RP 135.

The court considered not only the testimony of the witnesses, each of whom the court itself made inquiry of, but also considered the reports of both Dr. Jorgensen and Dr. Grant as well. RP 40, 41, 68. In its ruling, the court stated:

During the lunch break and our recesses, I was able to read the file, the rest of the file that I didn't read, and I thought I might need more time to make a ruling, but I'm able to make a ruling now.

And I did find the testimony of the experts quite helpful. I found the video, which is Exhibit 1 ... quite helpful. I found the attorneys' questions quite helpful, and I also found Mr. Coley's testimony to be quite helpful, to be honest, and it was a little bit unusual, because we were wrapping up and then up came the question of Mr. Coley testifying. I also found helpful some of the occasions where during the hearing I had to ask Mr. Coley to allow us to proceed.

There's a difference between Dr. Jorgensen's testimony and Dr. Grant's testimony as to what the diagnosis is, as to whether or not Mr. Coley suffers from schizoaffective disorder versus schizotypal disorder. The schizotypal disorder is more of a, I suppose -- well, I guess more of a -- it's described as more of a personality type disorder,

whereas the schizoaffective disorder is described as an Axis I, more of a medical condition, if you will.

I agree with Mr. Perry in the definition of incompetency in 10.77.010 that either one would fit the definition of a mental disease or defect. As Mr. Perry points out, the legislature could have kept it as mental disease, it didn't, it said mental defect.

I found interesting Dr. Grant's statement in his report and his testimony that it's generally accepted in the psychiatric or psychological community to not find someone as incompetent if it's only a personality disorder. We don't know why yet, but it's probably because it has something to do with volitionality and it being volitional. But the standard I think in the statute is defect or mental disease. Maybe someday I'll find out why.

But I listened carefully to all the testimony and I noted, in Exhibit 2 (sic), the examination of Mr. Coley, just exactly what Dr. Grant testified to. That is sitting down with Mr. Coley and talking to him and not shepherding his answers and not guiding him back to the questions, he will get to a point in his answers where they're non-responsive to the question. As I've said, that happens every day here in court. We get non-responsive answers.

But then it reaches a new level where it goes into not only something that's completely unrelated, but somewhat marginal in its connection to I guess mainstream thought. And I know Mr. Coley describes himself as being unusual, but it really – the answers really go off into – new areas, to say the least.

But I also agreed with Dr. Grant's description that if one guides Mr. Coley back, he will respond to every question. And he's not being belligerent or uncooperative. He will answer that question. He's always able to answer that question with the first few sentences, and it was after that that he then begins to get off target.

I also observed the same thing in the courtroom here, that a few times when Mr. Coley would speak rather loudly to his client (sic), I would politely ask him to refrain and he politely did so. He was cooperative in that way. And likewise, when he took the stand and was asked some questions, I asked him to return to the subject or told him that his answer was no longer responsive, and he was cooperative with that, as well.

And then, finally, when I asked him if he was meeting with his attorney, and his attorney needed to find out what may have happened on these dates in question, who said what and who did what, would he cooperate with his attorney? He indicated that he would.

And it's my assessment here as the trial judge that he was being honest about that and he would do that. Based upon my observation of his demeanor and the way he answered that question. And so that's my finding, is that he would assist his attorney in preparing and be honest with him.

Now, I could see where it might be a real struggle with the attorney if Mr. Coley then goes on to want to say some other things, and I don't know what an attorney can do maybe to say, I'll tell you what, if you can answer all my questions for the first 30 minutes, I'll give you 15 minutes of free air time and let you say all the things you want to say, and maybe that would do it. I'm not sure if that would do it. I think he would assist his attorney. And it would be meaningful assistance. In other words, he would answer the question, just as he answered the questions that were posed by Dr. Grant.

And I would also find that he understands the nature of the proceedings. Even Dr. Jorgensen concedes that. And in listening to Exhibit 1, the video, it's apparent that he does. Now, he again will answer questions about the nature of the proceedings correctly at first and then seems to then get off target again. At times we heard discussions of his federal case. I'm not aware of any federal case, and certain things that are going on. Okay. But I think an attorney could have

a meaningful meeting and session with him, just as Dr. Grant did when he was able to get him back on track.

That being said, I do find that he's competent at this point. I am concerned, though, that we've discussed this dichotomy between delusional thoughts and thoughts, voices in the head versus antisocial behavior. If he does ask to represent himself and we hear reasons such as, well, the attorneys are trying to extort me or the attorneys are falsifying documents, it might be, then that that showing contrary to what Dr. Grant believes, Mr. Coley believes these things, in other words, Dr. Grant testified that when it came down to it, he didn't think that Mr. Coley really believed that Mr. Perry is forging these letters, and that Mr. Coley really doesn't believe his attorney is extorting people, that he's saying that somewhat because of the borderline personality disorder, that he gets angry with someone who disagrees with his viewpoint and in that anger he then puts – Mr. Coley puts the attorney to a category that allows him to rationalize that the attorney can do these things.

But when push came to shove, Mr. Coley really doesn't believe these things. That's what Dr. Grant said. I'm paraphrasing poorly, I think, but nonetheless that's the gist of what Dr. Grant testified to. And if we hear when there's a motion to represent himself, if that's really what he wants to do, that he's really believing these things, they're more than just passing thoughts, he might be back again for another evaluation, because it turns out that he really believes these things, contrary to what Dr. Grant opined. And we'll find out.

We also will find out about the law, if it has set these different standards for competency to represent yourself versus competency to stand trial. That will be for another day. I can only rule upon what's before me today.

So I recognize that Mr. Perry has a very difficult job ahead of him in preparing for trial. I hope maybe he can do some of the things that Dr. Grant was able to do, which was bring Mr. Coley back to the question, and maybe some other time let Mr. Coley say what he wants to say. But Mr. Coley has

been responsive to the court when I've asked him to stop here in court a few times, he has done that, when I had him on the stand I told him he needed to return to the question, he was able to do that here.

So for that reason I do find on the basis of this hearing that he is competent to stand trial. RP 155-161.

IV. ARGUMENT

- A. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CLEAR GUIDANCE AS TO WHICH PARTY HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND APPELLANT AFFIRMATIVELY ACQUIESCED TO IT.

As of June 10, 2010, there was no clear guidance in Washington State as to which party bears the burden of proof in either an initial competency hearing or a subsequent restoration hearing. Often cited for authority was Royce A. Ferguson, Jr., *Washington Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure* volume 12, §907 to address competency. Premised on the axiom that competency is presumed, there seems to be little hesitancy in allocating the burden to the defendant in an initial competency hearing. As the issue of who bears the burden in an initial competency hearing has been addressed by the State in both its initial Respondent's Brief, as well as the State's Petition For Discretionary Review, that argument will not be repeated here.

The Court of Appeals, in its ruling, found that the burden of proof shifted to the State in a restoration proceeding. It found that shifting the burden to Mr. Coley constituted a structural error which therefore could not be harmless error. As Washington law lacked any clear guidance, this finding that the burden shifted to the State was necessarily premised on law from other jurisdictions.

However the State would assert that the issues at the restoration hearing are very much the same for the parties as in an initial competency hearing as to whether the report(s) correctly assess the defendant's competency. Further, in either proceeding, the burden of proof is a mere preponderance, a more likely than not standard. This burden of proof becomes most relevant in those cases in which the positions of the parties are in equipoise. That was not the situation in Mr. Coley's case where Dr. Jorgensen for the defendant, Dr. Grant from Eastern State Hospital, and the defendant, himself, all agreed that Mr. Coley understood the nature of the proceedings, and it was only Dr. Jorgensen who opined that Mr. Coley would be unable to assist his attorney.

While, there are compelling reasons for both parties to bear the burden in a restoration hearing, the reasons for the defendant

to bear the burden outweigh the reasons for the State to bear the burden.

For the State to bear the burden is thought to insure that an incompetent person is afforded protection from being tried as such. The State seeks to hold those individuals who commit crimes accountable for their actions. However, an individual who does not understand the nature of the proceedings or is unable to assist his or her attorney cannot be held accountable, and the State has no wish to prosecute such defendants.

For the defendant to bear the burden in a restoration hearing insures that a full and thorough fact finding on the issue is heard. The party most cognizant of the defendant's status, as well as the party most able to establish defendant's incompetency is the defendant. It is the defendant that holds all the cards, so to speak. For instance, the State cannot compel the defendant to either participate in an evaluation or to participate at a hearing. It is conceivable that a defendant having been previously found to be incompetent could stand mute and resist any effort to change his or her status.

It was in fact Mr. Coley and his counsel who had better access to facts relevant to the two prongs of competency, that is,

whether or not Mr. Coley could understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and whether or not Mr. Coley could assist his attorney.

B. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE ANY ERROR IN THE ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS INVITED.

The Court of Appeals erred in its finding of structural error. Structural error by its own definition is that error which "necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." *In the Matter of the Detention of D.F.F.*, 172 Wn.2d 37, 42, 256 P.3d 357 (2011) (cites omitted). The conclusion of the Court of Appeals is premised solely on its finding that the burden of proof was improperly shifted. However the State would argue that, 1) such error was invited, and 2) such error was harmless. By the very facts and circumstances of the June 11, 2010 hearing, there was no structural error.

The fact that both parties and the court were under the assumption that it was a competency, rather than a restoration hearing, as well as Mr. Coley's counsel's acknowledgment that it was Mr. Coley's burden of proof was tantamount to invited error. Under the invited error doctrine, a reviewing court should decline to

address the merits of a claimed error if the appealing party induced the court to commit the conduct later asserted to be error. *State v. Henderson*, 114 Wn.2d 867, 870, 792 P.2d 514 (1990). The invited error doctrine applies even to manifest constitutional errors. *State v. McLoyd*, 87 Wn.App. 66, 70, 939 P.2d 1255 (1997), *aff'd sub nom.*, *State v. Studd*, 137 Wn.2d 533, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999). In *State v. Momah*, the court held that a courtroom closure was “not a structural error” when the defendant affirmatively accepted and actively participated in the closed hearing. *State v. Momah*, 167 Wn.2d 140, 156, 217 P.3d 321 (2009).

Furthermore, the State would assert that the error is not structural, because the complete and thorough procedure utilized in this case provided assurance that Mr. Coley was afforded due process, and properly found to be competent. The record before this court shows that the trial court considered the testimony and reports of two doctors, a nearly hour long video of Mr. Coley conversing with Dr. Grant, as well the testimony of Mr. Coley himself.

The hearing which began at 9:49 a.m., concluded at 4:36 p.m., during which time the Court was able to continually observe Mr. Coley's behavior. At one point during the morning, Mr. Coley

interjected with a brief objection/explanation, and the Court instructed him to allow his attorney to raise objections, to which Mr. Coley replied “[o]kay”. RP 24, 25. While Dr. Grant was testifying about the video, he asked Mr. Coley a question from the stand to which Mr. Coley responded. RP 110. And towards the end of the proceedings, Mr. Coley did briefly speak out in court but stopped at the request of the court. RP 121, 122. Finally, prior to hearing the parties’ closings, the court asked if it had placed Mr. Coley under oath before he had testified, to which Mr. Coley answered “[y]es, your honor.” RP 139. The court then entered into a brief colloquy with Mr. Coley as to whether he still wished to represent himself. RP 140-142.

Although all of the witnesses agreed that Mr. Coley understood the nature of the proceedings, Dr. Jorgensen disagreed when it came to the second prong as to whether Mr. Coley could assist his counsel. Dr. Jorgensen felt that Mr. Coley could not assist his then current defense counsel because Mr. Coley “thought that Mr. Perry was somehow involved in a conspiracy with some other people against him.” RP 29. Dr. Jorgensen also felt that Mr. Coley’s delusion that he was “somehow coerced by this 12– or

13-year-old boy into committing the crime would make it difficult for Mr. Coley to “facilitate his own defense.” RP 32, 33.

This court has made it clear that the “ability to assist” requirement of competency to stand trial is minimal. *State v. Harris*, 114 Wn.2d 419, 429, 789 P.2d 60 (1990). In *Harris*, the court defined the rationality component of the ability to assist counsel as the ability “to communicate rationally with counsel”, *Harris*, 114 Wn.2d at 430. A defendant need not be able to suggest a trial strategy, help to formulate defenses, or even be able to recall past events. *Harris*, 114 Wn.2d at 428; *State v. Ortiz*, 104 Wn.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985), *cert.denied*, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255, 90 L.Ed.2d 700 (1986); *State v. Hahn*, 106 Wn.2d 885, 894, 726 P.2d 25 (1986). In determining competency, the trial court considers the “defendant’s appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal and family history, past behavior, medical and psychiatric reports and the statements of counsel.” *State v. Dodd*, 70 Wn.2d 513, 514, 424 P.2d 302 (1967). In reviewing a trial court’s decision on competency, we grant the trial court great deference. *Dodd*, 70 Wn.2d at 519-20.

Mr. Coley's belief that his victim is somehow to blame for his predicament is not unusual, but rather fairly classic criminal error thinking which is not infrequently seen. It's not uncommon, for example, to see a perpetrator blame the victim of a sexual offense, or a domestic violence offense, or a crime such as road rage. The fact that Dr. Jorgensen doesn't approve of Mr. Coley's position doesn't mean that Mr. Coley could not assist in his own defense.

C. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON A FINDING THAT MR. COLEY WAS COMPETENT, RATHER THAN FINDING HE HAD FAILED TO PROVE AN ASSERTION OF INCOMPETENCY.

At the beginning of its closing, the State argued that it believed it had dispelled any showing on the part of Mr. Coley that he was incompetent. RP 155. Furthermore a close reading of Judge Antosz's decision (*supra.*) makes it clear that his decision was that competency had been proven, not that Mr. Coley had failed in an attempt to dispel that. Implicit in the court's decision is the proper allocation of proof on the party asserting competency.

The court in part stated:

And then, finally, when I asked him if he was meeting with his attorney, and his attorney needed to find out what may have happened on these dates in question, who said what and who did what, would he cooperate with his attorney? He indicated that he would.

And it's my assessment here as the trial judge that he was being honest about that and he would do that. Based upon my observation of his demeanor and the way he answered that question. And so that's my finding, is that he would assist his attorney in preparing and be honest with him. RP 158.

The court too was an active participant in the proceedings, asking questions of each of the witnesses. As such, a thorough process was engaged in to insure that Mr. Coley's due process rights were protected. "The trial court has wide discretion in judging the mental competency of a defendant to stand trial." *State v. Ortiz*, 104 Wn.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985). A trial court's decision will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. *State v. Benn*, 120 Wn.2d 631, 662, 845 P.2d 289 (1993).

D. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE RECORD OF MR. COLEY'S JUNE 11, 2010, HEARING SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR REVIEW TO DETERMINE IF THE STATE PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE THAT MR. COLEY WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL.

This case stands in somewhat of a unique posture. At the time of the hearing, there was no established Washington case law regarding the burden of proof to be applied in a restoration hearing; there was an agreement between the parties and the court, that the proceeding to be heard was a competency rather than a restoration

hearing; there was an agreement by Mr. Coley, through his counsel, that Mr. Coley bore the burden of proof; and there was a day long proceeding which is memorialized by both a transcript of the testimony, as well as the admitted DVD exhibit of the interview of Mr. Coley.

In *Dillenburg v. Maxwell*, 70 Wn.2d 331, 413 P.2d 940 (1966) *modified* 70 Wn.2d 349, 422 P.2d 783 *cert. denied* 386 U.S.998, 18 L.Ed. 2d 348, 87 S.Ct. 1320 (1967), the court allowed a *de novo* post-trial hearing to determine if juvenile jurisdiction should have been declined pre-trial. After conviction, it was learned that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. Rather than overturning defendant's conviction and ordering a new trial, the court allowed the crucial preliminary determination of jurisdiction over the defendant to be determined post-trial. See also *Waller v. Ga.*, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed. 2d 31 (1984) (court, post-conviction, allowed remand for pre-trial suppression hearing which had been subject to improper closure without requiring a new trial.) In *State v. Wise*, 176 Wn.2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012), the court in addressing the issue of closure during *voir dire*, distinguished that when a violation occurs as part

of an "easily separable part of a trial," remand, rather than a new trial may be appropriate. *Wise* at 19.

Given the complete encapsulated record regarding Mr. Coley's competency to stand trial, if this court is inclined to place the burden of proof on the State in a restoration proceeding, then remand for review of the existing record would facilitate the determination of whether or not Mr. Coley was competent to stand trial, and consequently whether or not his convictions for two counts of Rape of a Child in the Second Degree should stand.


V. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court reverse the Court of Appeals decision, or in the alternative, remand this matter for review of the existing record of June 11, 2010.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2013.

Respectfully Submitted:

D.Angus Lee, WSBA #36473
Grant County Prosecuting Attorney



Carole L. Highland, WSBA #20504
(Deputy) Prosecuting Attorney

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
)
 Petitioner,) No. 88111-1
)
 v.)
)
BLAYNE JEFFREY COLEY,) DECLARATION OF MAILING
)
 Respondent.)
_____)

Under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington, the undersigned declares:

That on this day I deposited in the mails of the United States of America a properly stamped and addressed envelope directed to Gregory C. Link of Washington Appellate Project, Attorney for Respondent, and to Blayne Jeffrey Coley, Respondent, containing a copy of the Petitioner's Supplemental Brief in the above-entitled matter.

Mr. Gregory C. Link
Washington Appellate Project
1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 701
Seattle WA 98101-3635

Blayne Jeffrey Coley - #345865
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Dated: June 19, 2013.



Kaye Burns

Declaration of Mailing.

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Subject: State of Washington v. Blayne Jeffrey Coley - Supreme Court No. 88111-1

Attached is the Petitioner's Supplemental Brief in the above matter. Copies have been mailed to Respondent and his counsel as indicated on the attached Declaration of Mailing. Thank you.

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