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No. 67900-7-1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE

FILED
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STATE OF WASHINGTON
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Carolyn Bilal, an individual,
Appellant,
Vs.

Barbara Casey, an individual,
Respondent

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON KING COUNTY
MARIANNE SPEARMAN, JUDGE

BRIEF OF APPELLANT - AMENDED

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Division I Appellate Court**

Amended Brief of Appellant Carolyn Bilal

I. INTRODUCTION

The petitioner in this action, Carolyn Bilal, filed a petition for judicial review pursuant, to Rules of the Appellant Court judicial review provisions; RAP 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, on October 20, 2011. The petition was filed on an order issued by the trial court providing summary judgment in favor of respondent, Barbara Casey, September 23, 2011 based on S.L.A.P.P. A motion for reconsideration was submitted to the trial court and denied October 18, 2011. The summary judgment order was among other things arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The order and motion are **CP, 45-47** and **CP, 48-61** respectively.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in applying the statute RCW 4 24 525 on September 23, 2011 because the statute not enacted and not applicable to matters herein occurring August 2008 and April 2010.

2. The trial court erred in entering the order September 23, 2011 granting Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Claim -- Damages, Costs, Attorneys' Fees, and other relief, basically under summary judgment, September 23, 2011.
3. The trial court erred in applying the statute RCW 4 24 510 on September 23, 2011 granting defendant immunity pursuant to language of the statute
4. The trial court erred in entering judgment on September 23, 2011 assessing damages, costs and attorney fees to defendant October 21, 2011.

Issues Pertaining To Assignment Of Errors

Statutory Authority

1. Whether statutory authority was absent September 23, 2011 for acts on August 2008, and April 2010 when the statute RCW 4 24 525 was neither enacted nor applicable to the matters herein?

Summary Judgment

2. Whether a statement ascertaining a document as altered and or falsified could create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm or injury minus reasonable care for validity?

Communication to Government Agency - Public Participation

3. Whether under the plain language of RCW 4 24 510 a communication was made to a government agency?
4. Whether under plain language of the statute the communication involved public participation; was regarding a matter of public concern, or any matter reasonably of concern to an agency?

Public Participation Lawsuits...Damages, Costs, Attorneys'

Fees...

5. Whether under the statute RCW 4 24 525 the trial court granting damages, costs, and attorneys' fees is void because RCW 4 24 525 was not enacted or applicable to the matters herein?
6. Whether falsity is an act of bad faith under RCW 4 24 525?
7. Whether the Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Claim, Damages, Costs and Attorneys' Fees was frivolous, and filed to delay, thus subject to sanctions and damages?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ms. Bilal, the appellant, was employed by Seattle Public Schools (SPS) from October 2000 until January 2007 when wrongfully terminated for alleged misconduct. Ms. Bilal was denied unemployment benefits after termination and filed an appeal on the denial with Washington Employment Security. A hearing was held in May 2007 by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The OAH issued an initial decision; **CP pgs 32-36** on the matter, in June 2007. The OAH decision found Ms. Bilal credible and the SPS allegations unsustainable and without evidence to support the allegations made. The decision fully adjudicated Ms. Bilal from all the misconduct allegations. Ms Bilal was granted unemployment benefits.

SPS filed for review of the initial OAH unemployment decision in June 2007 alleging impartially by the Trier of Fact. The matter was reviewed by an OAH Review Commissioner and decision issued in August 2007, again, in my favor that upheld the initial decision.

Despite the review decision SPS began aggressively and clandestinely rummaging through Ms. Bilal's private life determined to find wrongdoing. In 2008 more than a year after Ms. Bilal's

wrongful termination Sue Means, an employee, of SPS contacted Barbara Casey about a recommendation letter; **CP pgs 14-17**; that Barbara Casey had written for Ms. Bilal in 2006. According to Barbara Casey she was asked to review the letter and determine its “authenticity” although all ties and relationship between SPS and Ms Bilal had been severed and completed with the 2007 OAH Commissioner’s Final Review and Adjudication of matters previously between the parties.

In August 2008 after reviewing the recommendation letter Barbara Casey published an e-mail to SPS asserting the letter was “extensively altered” and or falsified; **CP, p 31**. Barbara Casey also asserted in her email publication that Ms Bilal falsified information regarding her professional qualifications; i.e., “did not do a required one year practicum under her tutelage at Garfield High School, Seattle, for completion of the Seattle University (SU) post graduate Master’s Education Administrators’ program credential.

Sue Means communicated information from SPS to the Office of Professional Practices (OPP) **CP pgs 7-22**, within the Office of Superintendent for Public Instruction (OSPI) she obtained from Barbara Casey.

In 2009 Ms Bilal received a letter from OSPI containing a proposed order for revocation of her teaching and administrative credentials. The proposed order was based on the adjudicated SPS misconduct allegations that, again, were found in Ms. Bilal's favor and should have been barred by res judicata and or collateral estoppels, because OPP and OSPI had no new, additional information, or evidence to change the OAH 2007 decision founded on the merits of the matters. The OSPI revocation order includes Barbara Casey's assertions, amongst other things, although falsities. Minus the assertions of Barbara Casey's falsities no other violation exist under WAC 181 87 050 for revocation of Ms. Bilal's credentials. The OPP / OSPI revocation order was appealed by Ms Bilal. The revocation matter was heard in April 2010 by the OAH division of the OSPI.

IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court erred because it thought, based on Council's argument; the defamation lawsuit Ms Bilal filed was initiated by testimony Barbara Casey gave in April 2010 at the OAH revocation proceedings which is incorrect.

This matter comes before the Court because Barbara Casey defamed Ms Bilal in 2008 by making oral statements and publishing documents with false assertions, about Ms. Bilal, to others that was accepted as truth. The information Barbara Casey asserted was shared with persons, organizations and agencies causing injury to Ms. Bilal.

The trial court erred in determining Barbara Casey had a privilege of immunity pursuant to RCW 4 24 510 because Barbara Casey acted both recklessly and in bad faith when she communicated false information. The trial court erred in applying the statute RCW 4 24 525 to the matters herein as the statute was not enacted when the acts herein occurred. The trial court erred in issuing an order of summary judgment against Ms Bilal based on RCW 4 24 525 on September 23, 2011. The trial court erred in assessing damages, costs, and attorney fees against Ms. Bilal.

V. ARGUMENT

Public Participation Lawsuits

The trial court dismissed Ms Bilal's lawsuit, essentially as summary judgment on September 23, 2011. The summary judgment eradicated Ms Bilal's right to maintain a cause of action and was wrong because it was based on S.L.A.P.P. ; under Washington statutes RCW 4 24 510 and RCW 4 24 525.

In 2008 Barbara Casey was contacted by SPS to review a letter of recommendation she had written in 2006 for Ms Bilal. According to Barbara Casey, in her 2008 e-mail; **CP p 31**, after reviewing the letter she concluded it was "extensively altered." Barbara Casey's assertion of the letter being "extensively altered" was intentionally and willingly made without reasonable care or regard for truth of the matters or Ms Bilal because Barbara Casey was aware, when she reviewed the letter her signature was affixed upon it and she had no way to confirm her assertions the letter had been altered because she "neglected to save a copy;" **CP, pgs 14-17**. Barbara Casey knowingly detailed specific accusations of wrongdoing in her email that she knew would cause others to believe Ms Bilal altered and / or falsified the letter of recommendation; **CP p 31**.

Barbara Casey willingly sent the defamatory e-mail to SPS via Sue Means who communicated that information to OPP on acting as a local government agency; i.e., SPS reporting information to another government agency; i.e. OPP rather than a “person” under the language of the statute RCW 4 24 510 (annotated) which would immunize a “person” who communicates information to a branch or agency of the federal, state, or local government from civil liability under the S.L.A.P.P. statute. **Segaline v. State Department of Labor and Industries (2010) 169 Wash.2d 467, 238 P.3d 1107.**

The trial court record does not illustrate evidence of Barbara Casey communicating the information contained in her e-mail to any person or agency aside from SPS via Sue Means.

And the recommendation letter written by Barbara Casey was not as Council argues a matter of “public concern” **CP p150, lines 18-20** to the agency. [“A public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way... [E]ssentially private concerns or disagreements do not become public controversies simply because they attract attention... Rather; a public controversy is a dispute that in fact has

would have done so rather than demonstrate the agency had no interest.

Despite the above the trial court stated it “finds...Barbara Casey communicated to OSPI...” which is even contradicted by Council who confirms Barbara Casey communicated to SPS via Sue Means. Nevertheless the trial court stated it “finds” [Barbara Casey] “communicated a “matter of concern” to the agency... [And] finds the defendant met its burden by preponderance of the evidence...;” **VR, p 22, lines 13-17.**

RCW 4.24.510 states in pertinent part:

“A person who communicates a complaint or information to any branch or agency of federal, state, or local government...that has been delegated authority by a federal, state, or local government agency and is subject to oversight by the delegating agency, is immune from civil liability for claims based upon communication to the agency...regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency...”

Sue Means communicating information to OPP or OSPI again, is not a communication between a ‘person’ and a government agency as defined by the statutory language and Washington Courts strict

adherence for language of the statute. SPS reporting information to OPP or OSPI which is another government agency under the plain language of RCW 4 24 510 is not considered a "person" under S.L.A.P.P. and making neither Sue Means nor Barbara Casey immune from civil liabilities for slander, libel and defamation, per se.

Segaline v. State Department of Labor and Industries (2010)

169 Wash.2d 467, 238 P.3d 1107.

Clearly, the trial court record illustrates no evidence to support neither Barbara Casey communicating information to OSPI nor what evidence it "finds" to support its finding. If the trial court has no evidence what is it making a "finding" on? The trial court must have evidence if not; how can it weigh the accuracy, and reliability of information presented before it - without evidence?

RCW 4 25 525

In August 2008 when Ms Bilal was defamed by Barbara Casey RCW 4 24 525 was not enacted and also not enacted in April 2010 when Barbara Casey was called by Ms. Bilal, as a witness, to correct her falsities and speak truth of the matters that she opted to not do; **CP p 43 #151,152,154 44;** and **CP p 44, #156, 157,158.**

RCW 4 24 525 was enacted June 10, 2010.

Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Claim -- Damages, Costs, Attorneys' Fees, and other relief was "frivolous... [And] solely intended to cause unnecessary delay or avoidance for Barbara Casey's having to answer the interrogatories Ms Bilal requested August 18, 2011. Council did not file defendant's special motion to strike, until more than ninety days, after Ms Bilal filed the defamation lawsuit. The motion to strike claim.... should have been filed within sixty days pursuant to RCW 4 24 525 yet was filed 14 days prior, to the deadline for submitting answers. Council was aware pursuant to **RCW 4 24 525 (5) (c)** "All discovery and any pending hearings or motions in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a special motion to strike under subsection (4) of this section [and] the stay of discovery shall remain in effect until the entry of the order ruling on the motion."

Council was aware answers the interrogatories would establish, by clear and convincing evidence the frivolous nature of the motion to strike based upon discovery from the interrogatories demonstrating high probability of Ms Bilal prevailing on her defamation claim.

RCW 4.24.525 (6) (b) states in pertinent part:

"If the court finds that the special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award to a responding party who prevails, in part or in whole, without regard to any limits under state law:

(i) Costs of litigation and any reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with each motion on which the responding party prevailed;

(ii) An amount of ten thousand dollars, not including the costs of litigation and attorneys' fees; and

(iii) Such additional relief, including sanctions upon the moving party and its attorneys or law firms, as the court determines to be necessary to deter repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly situated.

The trial court erred in applying RCW 4 24 525 (2) to this matter as the statute was not enacted until June 10, 2010. Notwithstanding the record clearly illustrates Barbara Casey defamed Ms Bilal, in 2008, prior to any public participation.

Abuse of Privilege

Even if Council's argument were viable that Barbara Casey had an immunity privilege, which clearly she did not, that privilege would have been lost because Barbara Casey engaged in falsities while under oath and engaged in falsities while not under oath both in August 2008 and April 2010 respectively.

Barbara Casey did not have absolute immunity which is for "...State actors, who perform functions that are "critical...to the judicial process itself" are entitled to absolute immunity; **Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976))**. "Beyond those functions historically recognized as absolutely immune at common law, qualified and only qualified immunity exists." *Id.* at 897; **Doe v Lebbos, No. 02-16326, Discussion I, (November, 2003)**

Barbara Casey did not have a qualified immunity privilege and if she had it would have been lost because qualified immunity may be lost if it can be shown that the privilege has been abused. Barbara Casey would have abused any possible privilege had she had one due to engaging in bad faith by lying and not using reasonable care. "A defendant abuses the qualified privilege if he or she (1)

knows the matter to be false or acts in reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of a statement,” **Bender, 99 Wash.2d at 600, 664 P.2d 492 (citing Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wash.2d 956, 960, 603 P.2d 828) (1979);**

Clearly, Barbara Casey does not lack fundamental knowledge and ability to understand her actions, although she now tries to justify her actions as to what she “believed.” Barbara Casey’s actions were reasonably foreseeable to a person of reasonable mind that making the statements she did with proof would place Ms Bilal in false light; i.e., the defamatory email publication, and other statements she made. Barbara Casey is not illiterate, rather a career school administrator who holds a PhD Degree from Seattle University. Barbara Casey cannot now “retract” her prior admission of fault; i.e. “I neglected to keep a copy of the letter” made in her Declaration, and is further proof of her failure to use reasonable care before she defamed Ms. Bilal by asserting the recommendation letter was altered, and suggesting it was Ms. Bilal who altered it. Barbara Casey’s recent claim she was confused about the words “mentorship and practicum,” and “does not “believe” she would use the words is absurd, and clearly not true.

She used the words “mentorship and practicum” on the Seattle University (SU) reference letter form she completed in May 2006; **CP p 42.**

The statement she “believed” the letter was altered and or falsified is inconsistent with her intellect and knowledge and unreasonable when she confirms her signature affixed on the letter and her signature “authentic.” Barbara Casey was aware Ms Bilal had no access to the recommendation letter pursuant to her declaration; **CP pgs 14-17** wherein she declares “I prepared” the letter... “in my office” at work... [And] “I neglected to save a copy.” If she admits neglecting to save a copy there would be no way the “original” letter could have been altered or falsified because according to Barbara Casey, the “original” letter has her “authentic” signature; **CP p 31.** Barbara Casey was aware SPS policy mandates all SPS computers be password protected. Barbara Casey knew she never gave her password to Ms Bilal and knew Ms Bilal did not work in the building her office is located. Barbara Casey knew Ms Bilal had no access to her office because SPS administrative policy states all administrators’ offices must be kept locked if the administrator is

not present due to the number and nature of confidential documents and information retained in an administrator's office. If Barbara Casey "believed" in 2008 the recommendation letter was altered and or falsified, and acknowledged during her testimony in 2011 the letter she examined at the OAH revocation proceeding "appeared authentic," along with her "original" signature; why not state at that time she "believed" her defamatory statements were true. Barbara Casey has never stated what she said about Ms Bilal was true because she knows it wasn't and isn't. The statements in her declaration that she "still believes" the letter was altered and or falsified is preposterous. Barbara Casey and Council are aware of the documentary evidence and witness testimony from the 2010 OAH revocation proceedings that "... establish...Dr Casey's letter...went directly into the Appellant's SU placement file..." and was not hand delivered by Ms. Bilal; **CP p 43, #151,152,154 and CP p 44 #156,157,158.**

Barbara Casey's "believed" claim is indefensible. And the statement of "believed" does not reveal, disclose, make known, discuss, relay or in any other way permit to be known, by the court, or any other

person the substance of her “belief” the letter she wrote was altered and or falsified.

Barbara Casey as a professional experienced administrator in education is aware “providing” Ms. Bilal the recommendation letter would be unethical. It is well known common knowledge recommendation letters must be official and all writers are required to place letters in an envelope, with their signature across the sealed flap of the envelope than mailed directly by the writer to the requestor pursuant to instructions on the reference letter form; **CP p 42**, (see bottom of form).

Summary Judgment

Councils argument that the communications Barbara Casey made in 2008 and 2011 are protected under **RCW 4 24 525** because Barbara Casey was engaging in public participation is wrong and not illustrated by anything in the trial court record. The trial court erred by issuing summary judgment pursuant to:

CR 56 (c) Summary Judgment that states in pertinent part:

“... [Summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith “... if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...”

The trial court failed to acknowledge Ms. Bilal's declaration; **CP pgs 21-22** submitted in response to the motion to strike claims. Ms. Bilal's statements as made in the declaration when "...considered in a light most favorable to the non moving party..." were sufficient to raise a question of fact which should have prevented summary judgment.

The trial court erred in "finding" the communications Barbara Casey made in 2008 and 2010 were privileged for immunity as the statute RCW 4 24 525 was not enacted and not applicable to the communications and the communications were not only made in bad faith but, again; 1) "... made to an individual; 2) not "submitted in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding or other governmental proceeding authorized by law; 3) not "submitted or made in a place open to the public, or in a public forum in connection with an issue of public concern..."

The trial court record illustrates no evidence in opposition to the above. Council's contention Ms. Bilal's lawsuit was designed "to harass Dr Casey for her involvement, and retaliate against her for

providing testimony during the revocation hearing...;" **VR p 2, lines 6-9** is unsupported by rationale or evidence in the trial court record.

RCW 4 24 525 (4) - Special Motion to Strike Claims

(b) A moving party bringing a special motion to strike a claim under this subsection has the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is based on an action involving public participation and petition.

(c) In making a determination under (b) of this subsection, the court shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

(ii) The determination does not affect the burden of proof or standard of proof that is applied in the underlying proceeding.

(5)(a) The special motion to strike may be filed within sixty days of the service of the most recent complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.

Council did not meet the requisite burden of proof for the trial court granting summary judgment as the trial court and Council err through misinterpreting the law regarding the communications between Barbara Casey and Sue Means as constituting

"proceedings" within the purview of the statutes **RCW 4 24 510** and or **RCW 4.24.525**.

The court erred by reading into the record the adjudicated SPS allegations over objection of Ms. Bilal; **VR, p 23, lines 7-25, p 24, lines 1-25, p 25, lines 1-25, p26, lines 1-25, p 27, lines 1-25, p 28, lines 1-6**; when evidence in the record demonstrates the allegations were not sustained and unfounded; **CP pgs 32-36**. Council's statements of "...Ms Means was ... "assisting OSPI in their investigation; **VR, p21, line 7...** [And] "...Ms Means was helping with that determination*...;" [*to revoke or not revoke Ms. Bilal's education credentials]; **VR, p 21, lines 14-16**. Council's statements suggest a conspiracy between OPP, OSPI and SPS because both Barbara Casey and Sue Means are SPS employees and Council's client; although it was Sue Means who contacted Barbara Casey to communicate, produce and provide the 'smoking gun' of defamatory statements made by Barbara Casey that were used for revoking Ms. Bilal's credentials, and used for summary judgment by the trial court along with the adjudicated SPS allegations

The trial court erred in determining communications between Barbara Casey and Sue Means were "...communications to a government official privileged underneath the statute," **VR, p 21, lines 20-25.**

The trial court erred in determining; "Barbara Casey communicated to OSPI...a matter of concern to the agency..." **VR p 23, lines 13 - 15.** The trial court erred in finding "the defendant met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence..." **VR p 22, lines 13-17.** The record does not demonstrate evidence.

RCW 4.24.525 (4) (b) states in pertinent part: "once a moving party meets the initial burden the burden shifts to the plaintiff "...to establish by clear and convincing [evidence] probability of prevailing on their claim..."

The trial court erred and did not get to the facts in this matter because Ms. Bilal was not provided opportunity by the trial court to present the facts; **VR, p 22, lines 17-22, after** the court made its determination in favor of the respondent.

Damages, Costs, Attorneys' Fees...

Former RCW 4.24.510 (1999) contained express language that communication to a governmental agency is made in "good faith, but that language was deleted by way of a 2002 amendment to the statute.

However, the legislature kept the "good faith" requirement for the determination of statutory damages; **Right Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty Council, 146 Wash.2d 370, 46 P.3d 789 (2002)**. The Washington Supreme Court analyzed the former **RCW 4.24.510** and ruled that the good faith requirement did not chill free speech and required plaintiffs to prove in a defamation action that "by clear and convincing evidence the defendant knew of the falsity of their communications, or acted with reckless disregard as to their falsity." *Id.* 46 P.3d at 796.

To satisfy the requirements of the statute providing damages and sanctions when a person defends against a claim of civil liability based on S.L.A.P.P. a person must in good faith provide information to a government agency about a matter reasonably of concern to the agency; **Eugster v City of Spokane (2007) 139 Wash. App, 21, 156 P.3d 912**.

Again, Barbara Casey did not communicate to an agency and did not communicate in good faith because she recklessly communicated information without reasonable care and with willful disregard for Ms. Bilal's career and future when she was aware or should have been aware the information she communicated could cause injury to Ms. Bilal.

VI. Conclusion

Council failed to show her client had a privilege of immunity under the statute RCW 4 24 510. The statute RCW 4 24 525 was not enacted when Barbara Casey defamed Ms Bilal. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment pursuant to **CR 56**; as a showing does exist in the record of "a genuine issue as to a matter fact." Council did not and cannot meet the requisite burden of proof under the statute for the trial court's granting her client immunity, summary judgment, damages, costs and attorney fees. Council's motion to strike claims was nothing more than a memo - not evidence.

The first S.L.A.P.P. law had Section 3 vetoed, prior to enactment, because Section 3 failed to ensure the State's legislative intent. According to the Governor; "... it [section 3] provided that if an agency fails to respond to a complaint regarding a matter of concern to the agency, the person filing the complaint would be immune from civil liability on claims arising from the communication of the complaint..."


"...I understand that the intent of this section is to ensure that good faith citizen complaints are acted upon by governmental agencies, by providing immunity, from suit to people who may choose to go public with their concerns. That is an admirable purpose which I support. However, I am concerned that the language used in this section could be interpreted to mean that immunity would be conferred even when statements are made that go beyond the original communication to the agency, such as inferences made about the character of an individual. These [S.L.A.P.P.] claims may arise from the communication and therefore be subject to the immunity provisions. That broadened immunity from civil action is more than what is needed in these instances. If an agency failed to reasonably respond to a complaint, the complainant would be

granted immunity to communicate to other person's information about a private individual that was actually false and damaging to the individual's reputation; as long as the complainant claimed he reasonably "believed" the information was true. Unfortunately proving or in this case disproving the complainants' state of mind is not easy. The injured individual would be precluded from taking action against the person who disseminated the false information...; Washington Laws, Volume 1, Chapter 234 (1989). The Governor's words precisely detail what has occurred in this matter. Ms Bilal should not be precluded from pursuing her claim for the injury Barbara Casey caused. The purpose and intent of Washington's S.L.A.P.P statute was not intended to provide a shield for wrongdoing.

Ms. Bilal asks this Court to reverse the trial court.

DATED: This 7th, day of May 2012

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carolyn Bilal', is written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive.

Carolyn Bilal, Pro se

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

CAROLYN BILAL,)
Plaintiff)
V)
BARBARA CASEY,)
Defendant)

COURT OF APPEALS NO - 67900-7-1
SUPERIOR COURT NO 11 2 20077 9 SEA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


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STATE OF WASHINGTON
2012 MAY -9 PM 12:14

I hereby certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington that a copy of

Plaintiff's Amended Appellant Brief was delivered to the following party of record:

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At Keating, Bucklin & Mc Cormack Inc. P.S.
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DATED: this 11th day of May, 2012 at Seattle, Washington



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