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**SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

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APCOMPPOWER, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES,

Respondent.

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**ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW  
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES**

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ROBERT W. FERGUSON  
Attorney General

Sarah Kortokrax  
Assistant Attorney General  
WSBA No. 38392  
Office Id No. 91022  
PO Box 40121  
Olympia, WA 98504-0121  
(360) 586-7768

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) opposes further review of this Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) appeal. *See ApComPower, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.* No. 43104-I-II (Dec. 17, 2013) (“Slip op.”). The Department cited APComPower, Inc. (APC) for several workplace violations of WISHA regulations regarding the handling of asbestos. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) affirmed the Department’s citation, finding that APC had permitted its employees to handle asbestos without the proper protection. BR 54. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Board’s decision for substantial evidence, and upheld it in an unpublished decision. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that APC failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover workplace hazards because it relied on the imperfect memory of one person about the location of asbestos at the worksite and did not obtain verification through a good faith survey or a written statement that there was no asbestos present.

APC claims the Court of Appeals used the wrong standard of review and it argues the Court of Appeals erred by considering the regulatory presumption that thermal insulation found in buildings built before 1980 contain asbestos. *See WAC 296-62-07703*. It argues that the Court of Appeals’ decision in this regard conflicts with other decisions of

the Court of Appeals. But this case is fact-specific and turns on factual issues and whether substantial evidence supports the Board's findings. APC fails to show that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard or improperly considered the regulation, let alone that there was any conflict that merits this Court's review.

## **II. ISSUE PRESENTED**

If review were granted, the following issue would be presented:

Does substantial evidence establish that APC had knowledge of the hazardous condition when the evidence shows that APC knew asbestos was present at the plant where workers would be working and failed to reasonably determine whether asbestos was in the specific work area of employees within the plant?

## **III. COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

### **A. APC Did Not Obtain a Copy of a Good Faith Survey to Determine Where Asbestos Was Located at the Plant**

APC contracted to perform boiler maintenance work at TransAlta's steam plant in Centralia, Washington. BR Ortis 7-8.<sup>1</sup> In the course of performing these services, APC assigned employees to work on two boiler air preheaters, numbers 11 and 12, during a scheduled maintenance period in May 2009. BR Ortis 8-9.

APC states that it "received repeated assurances that all the asbestos thermal insulation had been removed" between the preheaters

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<sup>1</sup> The certified appeal board record is cited as "BR". Citations to the hearing and deposition transcripts will be listed with BR followed by the name of the witness and the page number of the transcript.

before work commenced. Pet. at 6. However, before work commenced APC did not obtain a copy of an asbestos good faith survey at the plant that would document the location of asbestos. BR Ortis 11-13, 33. It also did not obtain a written statement of reasonable certainty that asbestos would not be removed. BR Ortis 11-13, 33. WAC 296-62-07721(2)(e) requires that contractors receive a written copy of a good faith survey or written statement of reasonable certainty that asbestos will not be disturbed before commencing work.

The preheaters are large mechanical units that pipe hot gas emerging from the boilers in close proximity to cold air entering the boilers. BR Larson 8-9. This allows for a heat exchange that warms the incoming air, reducing thermal shock and stress on the boilers. BR Larson 8-9. To achieve an efficient heat exchange, the preheaters are heavily insulated. BR Ortis 8. To work on the underlying equipment, workers must first remove this insulation. BR Ortis 8-9; BR Larson 16.

Because the plant was built in 1972, its construction involved the extensive use of asbestos products, especially in its insulation. BR Ortis 6. By rule, thermal system insulation found in a building constructed before 1980 is presumed to contain asbestos. WAC 296-62-07703. The presumption may be rebutted as provided in WAC 296-62-07721.

APC's contract with TransAlta states that APC will not perform

any asbestos abatement as part of the services it provides. BR Larson 4-5. APC is not a certified asbestos contractor, and the employees assigned to the work on the preheaters were not certified asbestos workers. BR Fierro 72; BR Johnson 92.

**B. APC Was Told That the Plan Used Asbestos Block Material in the Vicinity Where the Workers Worked**

In preparation for the work on preheaters 11 and 12, APC discussed with TransAlta, without much detail, which areas surrounding pre-heaters 11 and 12 contained asbestos and which, at least, according to asbestos abatement subcontractor, Keith Ortis, did not. BR Ortis 9-12. Ortis informed APC's foreman, Ralph Mitchell, that the insulation between the pre-heaters did not contain asbestos. BR Ortis 12, 37. However, Ortis did inform APC that asbestos block material was in the vicinity of preheaters 11 and 12. BR Ortis 12, 35; Ex. No. 1. APC knew that TransAlta typically only removes asbestos from the spot where work is needed, leaving behind asbestos where it believes work was not being performed. BR Puderbaugh 43. Ortis provided Mitchell with a hand-drawn map that indicated where, according to Ortis, asbestos was located in that general area. BR Ortis 35; BR Mitchell 57; *see also* BR Ex. No. 1. This map was confusing and had east and west reversed. BR Mitchell 57; BR Ortis 36; BR Ex. No. 1. Ortis relied on his memory

to determine where the asbestos was located, and he kept no documentation. BR Ortis 33. Based on the map and Mitchell's discussion with Ortis, a job safety analysis prepared by APC and approved by TransAlta does not list asbestos as a safety concern. BR Larson; 61; BR Puderbaugh 30.

On May 25, 2009, APC began removing insulation between preheaters 11 and 12. BR Ortis 8. The work site was not demarcated and controlled as a regulated area, nor did it have a negative pressure enclosure or a decontamination area. APC's employees worked without high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) respirators, and APC never performed initial or continuing monitoring of its workers' asbestos exposure. BR Ortis 26; BR Fierro 71.

### **C. APC Workers Encountered Asbestos Containing Material**

APC states that "asbestos-containing material had been removed and replaced" from the preheater area before work commenced. Pet. at 5; *see also* Pet. at 2.<sup>2</sup> However, after removing a thick layer of fiberglass wool insulation, APC employees encountered dry white block insulation in twelve by twelve-inch pieces. BR Fierro 66; BR Johnson 85; *see also* BR Ortis 34. One employee estimated that he and his partner removed

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<sup>2</sup> APC quotes the Board decision where the IAJ recounts Mitchell's testimony that when there were modifications in the past the asbestos had been removed in the area, rather than the Board's actual findings. Pet. at 2; BR 41. It also quotes Mitchell's testimony that the block material had been removed. Pet. at 5; BR 41.

between 8 and 15 of the blocks from the preheaters before stopping work. BR Fierro 78. After removing the block insulation, APC's employees broke up the blocks and placed the pieces into 50 or 60 gallon clear plastic garbage bags. BR Fierro 66. They later disposed of these bags in the plant's dumpsters. BR 62-65, 75; BR Johnson 85, 92.

After APC's employees had finished removing the insulation from the work area, Mitchell walked by. BR Fierro 67. One of the employees picked up a small piece of the block insulation lying nearby and asked Mitchell if he should have any safety concerns. BR Fierro 67. Mitchell told the employee to wait while he summoned Ortis to examine the material. BR Fierro 67-68. When Ortis arrived, he informed Mitchell and the worker that the block contained asbestos. BR Ortis 15-16.

APC's safety coordinator then directed the employees to proceed to the nearest bathroom, where they placed their clothing and boots in sealed contamination bags. BR Fierro 79. The safety coordinator did not use a HEPA vacuum to decontaminate the men before asking them to leave the work area. BR Fierro 71.

In order to test whether the insulation the APC employees handled actually contained asbestos, Ortis later retrieved a small sample of the white block material from one of the clear plastic bags placed in a dumpster. BR Ortis 20-21. A laboratory tested this piece of material, as

well as material sampled from the vicinity of preheaters 11 and 12. BR Galloway 18-19; Ex. No. 15. All of the materials contained asbestos. BR Galloway 18-19; Ex. No. 15.

**D. The Board Agreed With the Department That APC Committed Several WISHA Violations, Which the Court of Appeals Upheld**

The Department investigated the incident and cited APC for serious violations of the asbestos regulations. BR Gore 98-100. APC appealed the citation and contested the violations before an Industrial Appeals Judge (IAJ).

The IAJ determined that in the performance of its contract, APC had performed asbestos work under the governing regulatory scheme. BR 50. Although APC claims the IAJ found that all asbestos thermal insulation had been removed previously in the work area (*see* Pet. at 2), the IAJ's finding of fact number 2 finds that APC workers "removed thermal system asbestos" at the jobsite. BR 50. He found that APC "permitted two of its workers" to undertake an asbestos abatement removal project. BR 52.

The IAJ concluded that APC could not rely on Ortis' statements regarding the presence of asbestos, or the "confusing" map that he drew, in order to excuse APC's lack of compliance with the asbestos regulations. BR 44-45. The IAJ rejected APC's argument that the Department could

not show any worker exposure to asbestos after finding the Department adequately showed chain-of-custody. BR 43. After rejecting APC's arguments, the IAJ upheld the citation in its entirety in the proposed decision and order. BR 54-55. APC filed a petition for review to the Board. BR 3. The Board denied APC's petition for review and adopted the proposed decision and order as its own order. BR 2.

APC then appealed the Board's order to the superior court, which reversed the order and vacated the citation in its entirety. CP 65-66. The Department appealed the superior court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the superior court and reinstated the Board's order affirming the citation. *See ApComPower*, Slip op. at 9.

The Court of Appeals rejected APC's arguments that its intent governed the applicability of the asbestos regulations, that it could rely on Ortiz's statements as to the absence of asbestos to discharge its duty to comply with the regulations, that it could not have known of the violations by exercising reasonable diligence, that exposure was not proven on a chain of custody theory, and that the Department was required to show actual exposure.<sup>3</sup>

APC moved for reconsideration, which was denied. APC now petitions for review.

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<sup>3</sup> APC has abandoned its arguments regarding intent, chain of custody, and actual exposure, *See Pet.* at 1-20.

#### IV. ARGUMENT

The Court should not grant review because APC has not demonstrated a conflict with any Supreme Court or Court of Appeals decision, its stated bases for seeking review. Pet. at 13. APC first argues that the Court of Appeals used the wrong standard of review by applying the Administrative Procedure Act in conflict with *Cobra Roofing Servs, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 122 Wn. App. 402, 409, 97 P.3d 17 (2004), *aff'd* 157 Wn.2d 90 (2006). Pet. 2, 9. As *Cobra Roofing* indicates, the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to WISHA appeals. RCW 34.05.030. Here, the Court of Appeals expressly cited and relied upon the WISHA standard of review statute, and no conflict with *Cobra Roofing* is demonstrated. *See ApComPower*, Slip op. at 3.

APC then argues that the Court of Appeals should not have relied upon the regulation establishing a rebuttable presumption that provides that certain materials contain asbestos. Pet. at 13. It argues that *Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.*, 111 Wn. App. 771, 48 P.3d 324 (2002), does not allow the Department to use presumptions to establish its *prima facie* case. Pet. at 15. There is no conflict. In *Kaiser Aluminum*, the court did not allow the Department to assume equipment failed where the evidence proved that it did not. *Id.* at 780. But no Washington case holds that the Department may not rely upon a

presumption established in a properly adopted regulation. To the contrary, this Court recognizes that properly promulgated regulations have the force and effect of law. See *Wingert v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.*, 146 Wn.2d 841, 848, 50 P.3d 256 (2002). APC has not demonstrated any conflict justifying further review under RAP 13.4(b)(1) or RAP 13.4(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court should deny review.

**A. The Court of Appeals Decision Does Not Conflict With *Cobra Roofing* as the Court of Appeals Applied the Correct Standard**

The Court of Appeals used the correct standard of review in this case, and this Court should reject APC's attempt to elevate an incidental citation in the decision into a conflict. APC claims that the Court of Appeals did not use the "substantial evidence" test to review the Superior Court's Findings of Fact that were missing from the decision." Pet. at 9. It references the Court of Appeals' cite to RCW 34.05.562(2)(a) to say that the wrong standard was used. Pet. at 10. First, it is the Board's findings that are reviewed, not the superior court's. *J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 139 Wn. App. 35, 42, 156 P.3d 250 (2007). Second, the Court of Appeals properly cited RCW 49.17.150(1) for the "substantial evidence" standard of review applicable in this case. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 3 (quoting RCW 49.17.150(1)).<sup>4</sup> Third, the

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<sup>4</sup> APC also argues that the Court of Appeals decision conflicts with a federal case, *Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n*, 947 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir.), which

citation to the Administrative Procedure Act provision was in the context of discussing legal authority on the question of whether the court should remand to the Board for further findings, not the standard of review.

APC argued below that the Board failed to make a finding as to the element of knowledge and therefore, the citation should be vacated in its entirety. Appellant's Br. at 25. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that, at most, the remedy would be to remand the case to the Board to make the necessary finding but, because the evidence was uncontroverted, a remand was needless. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 14. As part of its analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that remanding to the Board to enter the necessary findings was the appropriate remedy under RCW 34.05.562(2)(a). *Id.* APC argues that because the Court of Appeals cited this statute in discussing the remedy, the decision conflicts with *Cobra Roofing*, which states that this Act does not apply to WISHA appeals. *See Cobra Roofing*, 122 Wn. App. at 417; *see* Pet. at 2, 10. But the Court of Appeals did not remand. It ultimately determined that remanding the case to the Board would be a "useless act," citing a non-Administrative Procedure Act case to support its conclusion. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 7 (citing *Cogswell v. Cogswell*, 50 Wn.2d 597,

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notes the substantial evidence standard. Pet. at 11. There is no conflict because that case also used the substantial evidence standard. Even had there been a conflict, conflict with a federal case is not relevant to the inquiry under RAP 13.4(b)(1)(2).

601-02, 313 P.2d 364 (1957)). The Board record was sufficient for review on the knowledge issue.

In any event, the proposition that a remand may be appropriate for entry of a necessary finding is not unique to the Administrative Procedure Act, but applies generally in cases. *See, e.g., In re Breedlove*, 138 Wn.2d 298, 311, 979 P.2d 417 (1999); *see also Zink v. City of Mesa*, 140 Wn. App. 328, 340, 166 P.3d 738 (2007). The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with established case law.

Moreover, although APC claims that there was not a specific finding about knowledge (Pet. at 9), the Board found that APC "permitted" its workers to undertake an asbestos abatement project. BR 50. APC cannot properly be said to have "permitted" an employee to take a given action unless it had awareness of the fact that the employee took that action. Awareness is knowledge.

**B. The Court of Appeals Decision Does Not Conflict With *Kaiser Aluminum* as That Case Does Not Hold That the Department Cannot Apply Its Regulation About Presumed Asbestos Containing Material**

Contrary to APC's arguments, the Court of Appeals decision did not conflict with *Kaiser Aluminum*, 111 Wn. App. 771, or any other decision, when it applied WAC 296-62-07703 and WAC 296-62-07721. WAC 296-62-07703 creates a presumption that certain material in

buildings built before 1980 contain asbestos. APC argues that this regulation cannot be used because it believes that presumptions are not relevant to determine whether the Department met its burden of proof at the Board to show employer knowledge. *See* Pet. at 15.

APC's reliance on *Kaiser Aluminum* is misplaced. In *Kaiser Aluminum*, the Department cited the employer for a violation of a general duty clause to provide a safe work place when a Bobcat bucket that was raised during repairs descended on the worker, suffocating him. *Kaiser Aluminum*, 111 Wn. App. at 780.<sup>5</sup> The Department assumed that the cause of the accident was because an angle iron had either failed or become dislodged. *Id.* The court determined that the Department could not rely on this factual assumption, which it called a "presumption," when the evidence demonstrated that the angle iron did not contribute to the accident. *Kaiser Aluminum*, 111 Wn. App. at 780.

The court's rejection of the Department's "presumption" in *Kaiser Aluminum* is wholly different from the present case. In *Kaiser Aluminum*, the Department made a *factual* assumption as to the cause of the accident. Here, the presumption that thermal insulation located in a building built before 1980 contains asbestos is applied as a matter of law in a regulation promulgated to address the specific hazards associated with asbestos. It is

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<sup>5</sup> The general duty clause applies to recognized hazards for which no specific standard or regulation has been promulgated. WAC 296-800-11005.

well-established that a properly promulgated regulation has the force of law. *See Wingert*, 146 Wn.2d at 848. APC asserts that no federal or state case “allows” the Department to rely on a presumption in order to establish an element of its burden of proof. *See Pet.* at 16. Not only does APC not cite any authority for this proposition, it mistakes what the Court of Appeals did. The court did not determine that the presumption itself established knowledge, but merely that reasonable diligence required APC to know that the regulations required it to treat the material as presumed to contain asbestos until that presumption was rebutted. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 8.

APC also argues that the presumption was rebutted. *Pet.* at 14. Besides rearguing the facts, this is not correct. WAC 296-62-07721 presumes that certain types of materials, such as thermal insulation in buildings constructed before 1980, contain asbestos. WAC 296-62-07721(2)(b)(i). This type of insulation is also explicitly defined as presumed asbestos containing material. WAC 296-62-07703. To rebut the presumption that thermal insulation contains asbestos, the regulations require that an employer either obtain an inspection according to the requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 763, also known as a good faith survey, or perform tests of the material to demonstrate that it does not contain asbestos. WAC 296-62-07721(3).

The TransAlta plant was constructed in 1972 and contained asbestos throughout. BR Ortis 6. The evidence established that APC's employees removed thermal system insulation and surfacing material. BR Fierro 66; BR Johnson 85; BR Ortis 10, 44. Thus, the block material removed by APC's employees was presumed to contain asbestos, and the evidence established that it did, in fact, contain asbestos. BR Ortis 20-21, 29. APC argues that the "findings below at the Board found that all of the asbestos thermal insulation had been removed and replaced" before the work commenced. Pet. at 2; *see also* Pet. at 5. This is not correct. To make its assertion, APC cites to a summary of its own testimony, not to the Board's findings of fact. Pet. at 5; BR 25. But the IAJ specifically found in finding of fact no. 2 that APC workers "removed thermal system asbestos" from the jobsite. BR 50; *see also* BR 43. Substantial evidence supports this finding. *See* BR Fierro 66; BR Johnson 85-86.

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that because APC failed to adequately investigate whether its employees would encounter asbestos, it failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the violative conditions. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 13, 15. Reasonable diligence is relevant to the question of knowledge. A serious violation of a WISHA regulation exists if the employer knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition.

RCW 49.17.180(6); *Erection Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 160 Wn. App. 194, 206-07, 248 P.3d 1085 (2011). As part of its analysis, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because APC's employees were removing thermal insulation, it had a duty to treat the material as presumed asbestos-containing material until that presumption was rebutted. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 13. The Court of Appeals determined that APC failed to rebut the presumption and therefore failed to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent its employees from disturbing asbestos containing material. *Id.*

APC asserts that nowhere below was the presumption applied. Pet. at 9. While the Board did not expressly discuss this presumption in its analysis of whether APC exercised reasonable diligence, it did find that APC's reliance on Ortis' statements, its failure to treat the material as containing asbestos, and failure to understand the location of any asbestos, amounted to a failure to exercise reasonable diligence. BR 44-45. This is effectively the same as requiring APC to rebut the presumption that the material the employees were disturbing was presumed to contain asbestos. The Board and the Court of Appeals determined that APC had a duty to verify Ortis' statements. *See* BR 44-45; *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 12-13. This is consistent with the requirement of the employer to exercise reasonable diligence to discover hazardous conditions, which "include[s]

an employer's obligation to inspect the work area, to anticipate hazards to which employees may be exposed, and to take measures to prevent the occurrence." *Erection Co.*, 160 Wn. App. at 206-07.

APC further argues that this presumption has never been applied when the material at issue was previously abated and the building owner provided assurances that the asbestos was removed. Pet. at 14. It argues that because Ortis told APC that asbestos was not in the immediate area where APC's employees would be working, it rebutted the presumption that the material contained asbestos. *Id.* However, both the Board and the Court correctly determined that APC could not absolve itself of its own responsibility to understand and verify the location of asbestos in the plant. BR 44-45; *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 6-7.

Substantial evidence supports this conclusion because APC knew that there was asbestos block material in the area where its employees would be working and it knew that Ortis relied on his memory as to its location. BR Ortis 33; BR Mitchell 56-57. APC further knew asbestos had been in the relevant area and that only part of it had been removed. BR Mitchell 56. APC knew that in most cases asbestos is only partially removed to the extent necessary for work to be performed, thus it knew asbestos could still be in the area. BR Puderbaugh 43. The Board and the Court correctly determined that in order to rebut the presumption, APC

should have verified Ortis' statements either through a good faith survey or through other testing of the area.

APC asserts that the Board and the Court placed the duty to conduct a good faith survey on APC, when the regulations require the building owner to perform the survey. Pet. at 15. Contrary to APC's assertion, the Court did note that it is the building owner's duty to conduct the survey. *ApComPower*, Slip op. at 6. The Court correctly determined that APC had its own duty to verify that the presumption was rebutted—in other words, that the building owner had met its obligation—before sending in its workers to work around asbestos. *Id* at 7. Indeed, the regulations place a duty on employers to ensure they receive a copy of the good faith survey or a written statement of the reasonable certainty that asbestos will not be disturbed. *Id.*; WAC 296-62-07721(2)(c)(iv)(e). APC obtained neither.

The regulations provide that a good faith survey is not required if the owner provides a written statement that the owner is reasonably certain that asbestos or presumes asbestos material will not be disturbed. WAC 296-62-07721(2)(b)(ii)(B). APC asserts that Ortis' statements and the map he drew were sufficient to meet this exception. Pet. at 18. A poorly drawn map is not a written statement. More critically, certainty requires more than someone's memory when asbestos is known to be in

the area. Substantial evidence demonstrates that the map Ortis drew from his memory was not sufficient to meet a statement of reasonable certainty. In order to have a reasonable basis to be certain that asbestos would not be disturbed, APC would have to receive objective data concerning the location of the asbestos, such as a good faith survey, testing, or records of asbestos abatement to verify the exact location of abatement, none of which APC obtained from Ortis. WAC 296-62-07721(3); *see also* WAC 296-62-07709(2)(a)(iii). Not only did APC fail to verify that Ortis' statements were accurate, it failed to communicate what information it did have on the location of asbestos to the employees removing the insulation, another requirement under WAC 296-62-07721(2)(c)(ii).

APC's failure to presume that the insulation its employees were removing contained asbestos until it had verified that asbestos would not be present in the area where its employees were working established that APC did not exercise reasonable diligence to know of the violative condition.

**V. CONCLUSION**

APC has demonstrated no conflict with decisions of either the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, nor has it shown any other basis warranting review. For the reasons discussed above, the Department asks this Court to deny review

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 day of May, 2014.

ROBERT W. FERGUSON  
Attorney General



Sarah Kortokrax  
Assistant Attorney General  
WSBA No. 38392  
Office Id No. 91022  
PO Box 40121  
Olympia, WA 98504-0121  
(360) 586-7768

NO. 899878

**SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

APCOMPOWER, INC.,  
Petitioner,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT  
OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES,  
Respondent.

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The undersigned, under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of Washington, certifies that on the below date, I caused to be served the Department's Answer to Petition for Review and this Certificate of Service in the below-described manner.


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PEGGY BERTRAND  
Legal Assistant 2  
Office of Attorney General  
PO Box 40121  
Olympia, WA 98504-0121

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**Subject:** Supreme Cause No 899878; APComPower v. DLI.....  
**Importance:** High

Good morning Mr. Carpenter! Attached is the Department's Answer to Petition for Review along with a Cert of Mailing and letter explaining in the above noted matter. Thank you!

APCompower, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries

Supreme Court No. 899878

Reference to Thurston County Superior Court Cause No. 13-2-01677-7

Sarah E. Kortokrax, AAG

(360) 586-7768

WSBA# 38392

KORTOKRAX, SARAH E. (ATG) [SarahK2@ATG.WA.GOV](mailto:SarahK2@ATG.WA.GOV) <<mailto:SarahE2@ATG.WA.GOV>>

### **Peggy Bertrand**

Legal Assistant 2

Attorney General's Office

Labor & Industries Division

PO Box 40121

Olympia, WA 98504-0121

Hours: 7:30am – 4:00pm

Attorneys: Sarah Kortokrax; Jim Johnson & Penny Allen

☎ (360) 586-7769

☎ (360) 586-7717

✉ [Peggyb3@atg.wa.gov](mailto:Peggyb3@atg.wa.gov)