

1. September 5, 2014 Meeting Minutes



JISC DATA DISSEMINATION COMMITTEE
September 5, 2014
8:30 – 9:30 a.m.
Administrative Office of the Courts
SeaTac Office Building
18000 International Blvd. Suite 1106
SeaTac, WA 98188

DRAFT - MEETING MINUTES

Members Present

Judge Thomas J. Wynne, Chair
Judge J. Robert Leach
Ms. Barbara Miner
Judge Steven Rosen
Ms. Aimee Vance

Members Not Present

Judge Jeannette Dalton
Judge James Heller

AOC Staff Present

Stephanie Happold, Data Dissemination Administrator

Judge Wynne called the meeting to order and the following items of business were discussed:

1. Meeting Minutes for June 27, 2014

Committee approved the meeting minutes.

2. Access to JIS for Non-Court IT Employees


The Data Dissemination Committee continued its discussion about JIS access for non-court/clerk local government IT personnel. Results from the survey sent to clerks and court staff were discussed. AOC staff will find out if providing DVOL access instead of PROD will protect JIS security. Also, Barb Miner will ask her IT personnel what sort of JIS access is needed and why. Last, the Committee asked AOC staff if training for court staff and clerks could be provided on JISC and DDC policies, RACFIDs, and JIS use.

3. Other business

Committee asked AOC staff to provide information on prosecutors' and public defenders' access to JABS, how the accounts are set-up, and if the system can handle all prosecutors and public defenders given a JABS account.

There being no other business to come before the Committee, the meeting was adjourned.

2. Redacting Names in JIS Based on Court Order



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September 15, 2014

Office of Administrator of the Courts
1112 Quince St SE
PO Box 41170
Olympia, WA 98504-1170

RE: Display of Sealed or Redacted Information on Washington State Courts Website

Greetings:

My office represents Darcy Kinkela-Frye (hereinafter "DKF"). It has come to my attention that the Washington State Court website continues to display information that a Superior Court has ordered redacted and/or sealed. The issue appears on five related cases wherein DKF had petitioned to Superior Court for domestic violence orders of protection.

The case numbers and dates are as follows:

08-2-01410-5	April 4, 2014 & July 11, 2014
10-2-00266-4	April 4, 2014 & July 11, 2014
10-2-03196-6	April 4, 2014 & July 11, 2014
11-2-03205-7	April 4, 2014 & July 11, 2014
11-2-03536-6	April 4, 2014 & July 11, 2014


On April 4, 2014, following a motion, Hon. Tollefson of the Pierce County Superior Court ordered the cases to be redacted removing all references to DKF's full name, and in place using her initials "DKF". Due to minor omissions reflected in that order a supplemental order was also issued on June 27, 2014.¹ These orders are attached.

It is my belief that there is a somewhat technical aspect that is causing this issue. Specifically, that the State Courts website utilizes the judicial information system, and that system is also used by several other State offices including law enforcement and the department of licensing.

¹ Although Pierce County's docket sheet (as reflected by LINX) will show different dates, the actual order dates are those reflected by the court's signature.

I do not know what technical limitations may exist or be appropriate for resolving this issue. However, the Administrative Office of the Courts should be aware and take steps to redact references to DKF's 5 cases pursuant to the court order.

Thank you,



Jonathan Baner, WSBA # 43612

Enclosures

7/15/2014 1891 0031



11-2-03536-6 42902158 FNFL 07-14-14

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6 **IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**
7 **IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE**

8 D.K.F,

9 Petitioner,

10 vs.

11 *Colin Lee Williams*
12 ~~NATHAN TYLER ADAMS,~~

13 Respondent.

Case No. (s): 08-2-01410-5

10-2-00266-4

10-2-03196-6

11-2-03205-7

11-2-03536-6 ✓

FILED
DEPT. 8
IN OPEN COURT

JUL 11 2014

By *Bm*
DEPUTY

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

14 The Petitioner's Motion for an Order to Redact Court File and Records having come
15 before the Court and the Court having considered the files and records herein; the court deeming
16 itself fully informed makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
17

18
19 **Findings of Fact**

- 20 1. From approximately May 9, 2008 to September 30, 2011, Petitioner was compelled to
21 file five separate petitions for domestic violence protection orders in Pierce County
22 superior court against the same respondent, Colin Lee Williams.
23
24 2. As a result of the Petitioner's unique name she is subjected to inquiry, embarrassment,
25 and the potential for background checks for employment or otherwise to be construed
26 unfairly and negatively against her for having sought protection orders in the above
27 captioned case(s).
28

Order to Redact Court File and Records

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Tacoma, WA 98405
Phone: 253-212-0353
Fax: 253-237-1859

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7/15/2014

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3. Petitioner's has an important interest in redacting her personal identifiers to protect herself from embarrassment and unfair negative background checks that impact her ability to find employment.
4. The Respondent has been notified of the opportunity to contest the Petitioner's motion to seal or redact, and has not appeared, answered, or in any way challenged Petitioner's motion. *Not has anyone else objected*
5. Respondent is not a member of the armed forces.
6. The Court has carefully analyzed whether sealing the court record is the least restrictive measure available.
7. The Pierce County Superior Court Clerk is unable to amend or redact the court records of the Judicial Information System ("JIS").

Conclusions of Law *no order*

1. Petitioner's motion to redact the above captioned court records is granted.
2. The Court has reviewed and weighed the competing interest of the Petitioner and the public interest and considered alternative methods available.
3. The Court concludes that an order directing the Clerk of the Court to redact court records to abbreviate the Petitioner's name to her initials is the least restrictive measure available, and that the order signed by the Court on this day is no broader in its application and duration than necessary to serve its purpose.
4. The relief requested by the Petitioner is necessary to effectuate the prior order of the Court on April 4, 2014.

0033
1891
7/15/2014

Order

1. Petitioner's motion for redaction is granted.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall redact information contained in records maintained electronically in the Pierce County Legal Information Exchange Network ("LINX") to reflect only the Petitioner's initials "DKF."
3. The court records ordered to be redacted shall be provided by the Petitioner or the Petitioner's attorney.
4. The order of the Court on April 4, 2014 in this matter shall be redacted as to name only.
5. The court records being replaced by redacted copies pursuant to this order of the Court and the order of the Court on April 4, 2014 in this matter shall be sealed.
6. The order of the Court on April 4, 2014 in this matter requiring the Clerk of the Court to redact certain court records in the Judicial Information System ("JIS") shall be amended to no longer require the Clerk of the Court to redact JIS records.
7. The Document Redaction Log attached to this order shall be utilized by the Petitioner or Petitioner's attorney in providing redacted copies of the described orders to the Pierce County Clerk's Office.
8. The Document Redaction Log attached to this order shall be filed separate from this order and shall be filed under seal. It shall be marked as Sealed in LINX, and not accessible without court order.
9. The "Document Redaction Log" attached to or filed with the April 4, 2014 order of the Court in this matter shall be filed under seal.


Order terminates 75 years from today
DATED and SIGNED IN OPEN COURT this 11th day of July, 2014.

Cause No
11-2-03536-6



JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER

Presented by:



Jonathan Baner WSBA: 43612

July 11, 2014

FILED
DEPT. 8
IN OPEN COURT

JUL 11 2014

By 


DEPUTY

Order to Redact Court File and Records

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7/15/2014 1891 0034

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11-2-03536-6 43056599 OR 08-07-14

FILED
IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

A.M. **AUG 07 2014** P.M.
PIERCE COUNTY WASHINGTON
KEVIN STOCK, County Clerk
BY _____ DEPUTY

FILED
DEPT. 8
IN OPEN COURT
APR - 4 2014
By BT
DEPUTY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

DKF

Petitioner,

vs.

COLIN LEE WILLIAMS,

Respondent.

Case No.(s): 08-2-01410-5
10-2-00266-4
10-2-03196-6
11-2-03205-7
11-2-03536-6 ←

ORDER TO REDACT COURT FILE AND RECORDS

[CLERK'S ACTION REQUIRED]

The Petitioner's Motion for an Order to Redact Court File and Records having come

before the Court and the Court having considered the files and records herein, it is hereby

~~AND NO ONE APPEARING IN OPPOSITION~~

ORDERED: that the clerk of the court will redact the JIS and SCOMIS dockets to reflect only

Petitioner's initials as a party and to redact the title of any document filed within this cause citing

her full and correct name with the same initials. Ordered further that the documents and

identifiers detailed in the document redaction log attached as Exhibit 1 to this order shall be

redacted as provided on Exhibit 1.

DATED and SIGNED IN OPEN COURT this 4th day of April, 2014.

BT
JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER

Presented by:

Order to Redact Court File and Records


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OR

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Jonathan Baner, WSBA #43612

Order to Redact Court File and Records

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181 Wash.2d 1
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.

Aaron HUNDTOFTE and Kent Alexander,
Respondents,

v.

Ignacio ENCARNACIÓN and Norma Karla Farías,
and all others in possession, Petitioners,
King County Superior Court Office of Judicial
Administration, Respondent.

No. 88036–1. | July 24, 2014.

Synopsis

Background: Tenants who had settled unlawful detainer action filed motion to redact the court record and substitute their initials for their full names. The Superior Court, King County, [James Cayce, J.](#), granted the motion. Clerk appealed. The [Court of Appeals, 169 Wash.App. 498, 280 P.3d 513](#), reversed. Tenants sought certification to appeal, which was granted.

[Holding:] The Supreme Court, en banc, [Owens, J.](#), held that redaction of court records following settlement of unlawful detainer action was not warranted.

Affirmed.

[Madsen, C.J.](#), filed concurring opinion.

[Gonzalez, J.](#), filed dissenting opinion in which [McCloud, J.](#), concurred.

[Stephens, J.](#), filed opinion concurring in dissent in which [Fairhurst, J.](#), concurred.

West Headnotes (16)

[1] **Records**
🔑 Court records

The Supreme Court reviews a trial court's decision to seal a court record for abuse of discretion. (Per [Owens, J.](#), with three justices

concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [GR 15\(b\)\(4\)](#).

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[2] **Appeal and Error**
🔑 Abuse of discretion

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, or is exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. (Per [Owens, J.](#), with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.)

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[3] **Courts**
🔑 Abuse of discretion in general

A decision is based on untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons, so as to constitute an abuse of discretion, if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard. (Per [Owens, J.](#), with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.)

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[4] **Records**
🔑 Court records

A court starts with the presumption of openness when determining whether a court record may be sealed from the public. (Per [Owens, J.](#), with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); [GR 15\(b\)\(4\)](#).

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[5] **Records**
🔑 Court records

Any exception to the constitutional safeguard in the openness of court records is appropriate only in the most unusual of circumstances. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#).

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[6] **Records**
🔑 Court records

The party moving to override the presumption of openness and seal court records usually has the burden of proving the need to do so. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#).

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[7] **Records**
🔑 Court records

A party seeking to seal court records must make some showing of the need therefor. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[8] **Records**
🔑 Court records

A party seeking to seal court records should state the interests or rights which give rise to

that need as specifically as possible without endangering those interests. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[9] **Records**
🔑 Court records

If the sealing of court records is meant to protect a right other than the right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a serious and imminent threat to some other important interest. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[10] **Records**
🔑 Court records

Anyone present when a motion seeking closure (and/or sealing) of court records is made must be given an opportunity to object. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[11] **Records**
🔑 Court records

When considering a motion to seal court records, the court and the parties must analyze whether the requested method for curtailing access would be both the least restrictive means available and effective in protecting the interests threatened. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#);

GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[12] **Records**
🔑 Court records

When considering a motion to redact court records, the court must weigh the competing interests of the party seeking the redaction and the public, and it must consider alternative methods to protect the interest. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[13] **Records**
🔑 Court records

When ruling on a motion to seal court records, a court must articulate its consideration in specific findings and conclusions. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[14] **Records**
🔑 Court records

If an order involves sealing of court records, it shall apply for a specific time period with a burden on the proponent to come before the court at a time specified to justify continued sealing. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[15] **Records**
🔑 Court records

A court must evaluate a motion to seal or redact court records on a case-by-case basis. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15.

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[16] **Records**
🔑 Court records

Public's constitutional interest in open administration of justice outweighed tenants' privacy concerns, so as to preclude redaction of Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS) indices to remove names of tenants who had settled unlawful detainer action brought against them by landlord, where articulated privacy interest was the need to obtain rental housing by tenants in a desired location, there was no evidence of imminent rejection based on the unlawful detainer action, tenants were permitted to explain on housing applications the facts behind the unlawful detainer action, and the public's interest in openness of court records was great. (Per Owens, J., with three justices concurring and one justice concurring separately.) [West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 10](#); GR 15(b)(4).

[Cases that cite this headnote](#)

Attorneys and Law Firms

*170 Allyson Grace O'Malley-Jones, [Eric Dunn](#), Northwest Justice Project, Leticia Camacho, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Sarah Jackson, David M. Seaver, King County Prosecutor's Office, [Thomas William Kuffel](#), Office of

the Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Respondent Intervenor.

[Katherine George](#), Harrison–Benis LLP, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Allied Newspapers of Washington, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Newspaper Publishers Association and Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington COALition for Open Government.

Rory B. O’Sullivan, King County Bar Association, Seattle, WA, [Leona Correia Bratz](#), Snohomish County Legal Services, Everett, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of King County Housing Justice Project and Amicus Curiae on behalf of Snohomish County Housing Project.

[Victoria M. Slade](#), [Robert B. Spitzer](#), Garvey Schubert Barer, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Tenants Union of Washington State.

[David J. Ward](#), Legal Voice, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Legal Voice.

[Grace S. Huang](#), Wa State Coalition Against Dom Violence, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State COALition Against Domestic Violence.

[Sarah A. Dunne](#), Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington Foundation, [Nancy Lynn Talner](#), Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Aclu.

Opinion

*171 OWENS, J.

¶ 1 Ignacio Encarnación and Norma Karla Farías were sued for unlawful detainer even though they had a valid lease and did nothing to warrant eviction. The case settled. They moved to amend the Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS) indices to replace their full names with their initials in order to hide the fact that they were defendants to the unlawful detainer action. Encarnación and Farías argued that even though the unlawful detainer action was meritless, they could not obtain sufficient rental housing after prospective landlords learned that they had an unlawful detainer action filed against them. The superior court granted their motion and ordered that the indices be changed to show only their initials. The King County Superior Court Office of Judicial Administration (the clerk)¹ objected and appealed the order. The Court of Appeals reversed. Although we sympathize with Encarnación and Farías, and other renters in similar situations, we affirm the Court of Appeals. The public’s interest in the open administration of justice prohibits the redaction of the indices in this

case.

FACTS

¶ 2 Encarnación and Farías moved into their Burien, Washington, apartment in December 2007. They renewed their lease twice, most recently in July 2009. That lease was for one year. One month later, Aaron Hundtofte and Kent Alexander purchased the apartment building and asked Encarnación and Farías to sign a new month-to-month lease. Encarnación and Farías refused, citing the lease for one year that they signed in July 2009. Hundtofte and Alexander sued Encarnación and Farías for unlawful detainer. Encarnación and Farías refused to leave and continued to tender rent. On November 12, 2009, the parties settled the dispute. Encarnación and Farías agreed to move out before December. In exchange, Hundtofte and Alexander agreed to return rental payments for the months of September, October, and November and to pay court costs and attorney fees. Hundtofte and Alexander also agreed to provide a favorable reference for them in the future.

¶ 3 Because of the unlawful detainer action, Encarnación and Farías found it difficult to find a new apartment. They eventually found a property that they liked and paid \$80 for a background check as a part of their application, but the property manager turned them away, citing company policy to reject any applicant with an unlawful detainer record, regardless of the outcome. The favorable reference made no difference to the prospective landlord. Eventually, Encarnación and Farías found housing for at least six months at a home in Pierce County. But they worry that this home may be subject to foreclosure in the near future, and they wish to find housing closer to their old apartment in Burien. They fear that prospective landlords will be able to discover the previous unlawful detainer action by performing a background check that includes a search of court records.

¶ 4 Encarnación and Farías filed a motion to have their names redacted and replaced with their initials in the SCOMIS indices. The clerk opposed the motion, arguing that altering the indices was tantamount to destroying the records. The clerk argued that under [GR 15\(h\)\(1\)](#), a court may not order that a court record be destroyed unless authorized by statute.

¶ 5 The superior court granted the motion. The court found that landlords commonly deny housing to prospective tenants who have been named in unlawful detainers. The court found that this posed a serious and

imminent threat to Encarnación and Farías' compelling interest in obtaining future rental housing. The court concluded that Encarnación and Farías "were not culpable and did nothing improper" to warrant the unlawful detainer action and that their privacy interest outweighed the public's interest in access to the court records. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 730. The court limited the redaction to seven years because the Fair Credit Reporting Act, chapter 19.182 RCW, prevents consumer *172 reporting agencies—like tenant screening firms—from reporting unlawful detainer actions that are more than seven years old. See RCW 19.182.040(1)(b).

¶ 6 The clerk appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the public's interest in the open administration of justice was too great in this case to allow for redaction. *Hundtofte v. Encarnación*, 169 Wash.App. 498, 521–22, 280 P.3d 513 (2012). Encarnación and Farías petitioned this court, and we granted review. *Hundtofte v. Encarnación*, 176 Wash.2d 1019, 297 P.3d 707 (2013).

ISSUE

¶ 7 Did the trial court err when it ordered that the SCOMIS indices be redacted to obscure the fact that the petitioners were defendants in an unlawful detainer action?

ANALYSIS

1. The SCOMIS Indices Are a Court Record

¶ 8 As a threshold matter, we note that the SCOMIS indices are a court record. GR 31 defines a "court record" as including "[a]ny index, calendar, docket, register of actions, official record of the proceedings ... and any information in a case management system created or prepared by the court that is related to a judicial proceeding." GR 31(c)(4)(ii). GR 15 governs the destruction, sealing, and redaction of court records, and it "applies to all court records, regardless of the physical form of the court record, the method of recording the court record, or the method of storage of the court record." GR 15(a). The SCOMIS indices are court records because they are both an "index" and "information in a case management system created or prepared by the court that is related to a judicial proceeding." GR 31(c)(4)(ii). A motion to redact the indices must be evaluated under GR

15. GR 15(c). The superior court properly treated the motion to redact the indices as a motion to redact a court record.

2. Standard of Review

^[1] ^[2] ^[3] ¶ 9 An order to redact a court record is treated as an order to seal. GR 15(b)(4). We review a trial court's decision to seal a court record for abuse of discretion. *Rufer v. Abbott Labs.*, 154 Wash.2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005). A trial court abuses its discretion when its "decision is manifestly unreasonable, or is exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." *State v. Rohrich*, 149 Wash.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (quoting *State v. Blackwell*, 120 Wash.2d 822, 830, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993)). "A decision is based 'on untenable grounds' or made 'for untenable reasons' if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard." *Id.* (quoting *State v. Rundquist*, 79 Wash.App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)).

3. The Open Administration of Justice Is a Vital Constitutional Safeguard, and This Court Will Not Allow Closure Except in the Most Unusual of Circumstances

^[4] ^[5] ^[6] ¶ 10 Article I, section 10 of our constitution states that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." CONST. art. I, § 10. The openness of our courts "is of utmost public importance" and helps "foster the public's understanding and trust in our judicial system." *Dreiling v. Jain*, 151 Wash.2d 900, 903, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). Thus, we must start with the presumption of openness when determining whether a court record may be sealed from the public. *Rufer*, 154 Wash.2d at 540, 114 P.3d 1182. Any exception to this "vital constitutional safeguard" is appropriate only in the most unusual of circumstances. *In re Det. of D.F.F.*, 172 Wash.2d 37, 41, 256 P.3d 357 (2011). The party moving to override the presumption of openness and seal court records usually has the burden of proving the need to do so. *Rufer*, 154 Wash.2d at 540, 114 P.3d 1182.

¶ 11 Under the General Rules, a court record may be sealed if a court "enters written findings that the specific sealing or redaction is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety concerns that outweigh the public interest in access to the court record." *173 GR 15(c)(2). "Agreement of the parties alone does not constitute a sufficient basis for the sealing or redaction of court records." *Id.* But GR 15 is not, by itself, sufficient—the rule must be harmonized with article I, section 10 of our constitution. *State v. Waldon*, 148 Wash.App. 952,

966–67, 202 P.3d 325 (2009). Thus, a court must analyze a motion to redact using both GR 15 and the five-step framework for evaluating a closure outlined in *Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa*, 97 Wash.2d 30, 37–39, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). *Waldon*, 148 Wash.App. at 967, 202 P.3d 325.

[7] [8] [9] ¶ 12 First, the party seeking to seal court records “must make some showing of the need therefor.” *Ishikawa*, 97 Wash.2d at 37, 640 P.2d 716. The party “should state the interests or rights which give rise to that need as specifically as possible without endangering those interests.” *Id.* If the sealing is meant to protect a right other than the right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a “ ‘serious and imminent threat to some other important interest.’ ” *Id.*

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] ¶ 13 Second, “ ‘[a]nyone present when the closure [and/or sealing] motion is made must be given an opportunity to object.’ ” *Id.* at 38, 640 P.2d 716 (second alteration in original) (quoting *Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz*, 94 Wash.2d, 51, 62, 615 P.2d 440 (1980)). Third, the court and the parties must “analyze whether the requested method for curtailing access would be both the least restrictive means available and effective in protecting the interests threatened.” *Id.* Fourth, “ ‘[t]he court must weigh the competing interests of the [party seeking the redaction] and the public’,” and it must consider alternative methods to protect the interest. *Id.* (quoting *Kurtz*, 94 Wash.2d at 64, 615 P.2d 440). It must articulate its consideration in specific findings and conclusions. *Id.* Finally, the order must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest. *Id.* at 39, 640 P.2d 716. “If the order involves sealing of records, it shall apply for a specific time period with a burden on the proponent to come before the court at a time specified to justify continued sealing.” *Id.* A court must use the *Ishikawa* steps and evaluate a motion to seal or redact court records on a case-by-case basis. *Rufer*, 154 Wash.2d at 549–50, 114 P.3d 1182.

4. The Trial Court Erred when It Ordered Redaction in This Case

[16] ¶ 14 In this case, the trial court abused its discretion because it applied an improper legal standard and because its findings are not supported in the record. The interest at stake—when properly articulated—is not as compelling as the one evaluated by the trial court, and Encarnación and Farías have not shown a serious and imminent threat to their interest. The court erred in concluding that their interest outweighed the public’s interest in the open administration of justice. Keeping court records open is a vital constitutional safeguard. While we do not overlook

the hardships that the petitioners and other renters in similar circumstances face, we must fulfill our independent obligation to protect the open administration of justice.

¶ 15 The privacy interest at stake in this case is not so compelling as to warrant redaction. The petitioners and the trial court broadly articulated the privacy interest as the “need to obtain rental housing for [Encarnación and Farías] and their three young children.” CP at 729–30. But the interests and rights justifying redaction must be articulated “as specifically as possible.” *Ishikawa*, 97 Wash.2d at 37, 640 P.2d 716. Here, the petitioners found rental housing for their family, but they would prefer housing closer to Burien. Encarnación and Farías worry that their commute is too long and that their new property may face foreclosure. Because one property in Burien rejected them based on the court records, they fear that they will be unable to obtain future housing in their preferred location. Thus, the more specific articulation of their interest is the interest in finding future rental housing in a desired location. This is not as compelling of an interest as the one articulated by the trial court. Without more, it is not enough to override the constitutional presumption of openness.

¶ 16 Because we articulate the proper interest at stake in this case, the dissent accuses us of “rebalanc[ing] the facts from our *174 ivory tower” and improperly applying the abuse of discretion standard of review. Dissent at 179. The dissent mischaracterizes our analysis for the sake of rhetoric. A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, and here the trial court did just that when it articulated the interest at stake. Rather than define the interest “as specifically as possible,” as *Ishikawa* commands, 97 Wash.2d at 37, 640 P.2d 716, the trial court chose to articulate the need for housing very broadly. This is not a rebalancing of the facts, but rather a faithful application of the proper legal standard.

¶ 17 Encarnación and Farías have also failed to show a serious and imminent threat to their interest. We agree that housing is a very important interest, and we agree with the trial court that landlords sometimes deny rental housing to prospective tenants who were named in unlawful detainers.² But Encarnación and Farías must still show a serious and imminent threat to their interest. *Id.* They have not made that showing for two reasons. First, there is no evidence of an imminent rejection based on the unlawful detainer action. Encarnación and Farías do not have any applications pending—they merely cite one past rejection based on the action and speculate about their future inability to find a suitable home. The threat of rejection is not imminent. Second, in future applications,

Encarnación and Farías can explain that the unlawful detainer was wrongfully filed and can provide a favorable reference from their previous landlords. Again, the record shows only one failed attempt to secure housing. While one property turned them away without considering their defense or checking their reference, it does not follow that every property will. Importantly, they found housing elsewhere—apparently on their second attempt—thus, it is not impossible for them to obtain housing. Pure speculation about the future inability to obtain housing in a desired location is not a serious and imminent threat to a compelling interest.

¶ 18 Here too, the dissent mischaracterizes our review. As stated above, a trial court abuses its discretion if its conclusions are not supported in the record. The record in this case does not reflect a serious and imminent threat to Encarnación and Farías’ housing interest. Rather, it shows one attempt to secure rental housing at a preferred location. The trial court and the dissent mistakenly assume that this one rejection is indicative of the *entire* rental market in Washington, when there is no such evidence in the record. The record indicates only that at least one landlord has a blanket policy of not renting to tenants who have been named in unlawful detainer actions. The only other evidence Encarnación and Farías presented regarding their inability to secure housing were their own declarations regarding their general fears about being named in the SCOMIS records. CP at 43 (Decl. of Encarnación) (“I do not believe that anyone else will rent to us without [sic] the court record appearing as if we were evicted from our apartment.”); CP at 95 (Decl. of Farías) (“We thought that no one else would rent to us when they saw the case that was filed against us.”). But the record also shows that Encarnación and Farías were able to find housing on their second attempt, despite the SCOMIS records. The trial court abused its discretion when it made the unsupported finding of a serious and imminent threat to their interest.

¶ 19 The trial court also erred when it found that the petitioners’ interest in this case outweighed the public’s interest in the open administration of justice. Our open courts jurisprudence has always stressed the importance of transparency and access to court records. That is why we generally place the burden on the party who moves to seal court records and why a court may order a sealing only in the most unusual of circumstances. *Rufer*, 154 Wash.2d at 540, 114 P.3d 1182; *D.F.F.*, 172 Wash.2d at 41, 256 P.3d 357. These are not the most unusual of circumstances. The parties settled their dispute, as do many other parties in unlawful detainer actions. Property owners in this state have an interest in being able to *175 discover unlawful detainer actions that settle, and the

public has a general interest in the open administration of justice. Altering the indices to obscure the fact that an action was filed will not help to “foster the public’s understanding and trust in our judicial system.” *Dreiling*, 151 Wash.2d at 903, 93 P.3d 861. We must ensure that justice is administered openly. The trial court erred when it found that the interest asserted in this case outweighed the public’s interest in openness.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20 The open administration of justice is a vital constitutional safeguard that may not be overridden to seal or redact court records except in the most unusual of circumstances. The circumstances of this case do not warrant redaction of the SCOMIS indices. The petitioners have not shown a serious and imminent threat to a compelling interest, and the interest at stake does not outweigh the public’s interest in the open administration of justice. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WE CONCUR: C. JOHNSON, J., J.M. JOHNSON, J.P.T. and WIGGINS, J.

MARY I. YU, J., not participating.

MADSEN, C.J. (concurring).

¶ 21 Under the plain language of GR 15, the trial court erred in ordering the King Superior Court Clerk to replace the names of Ignacio Encarnación and Norma Karla Farías with their initials in the SCOMIS (Superior Court Management Information System) index. Because GR 15 resolves this case, the lead opinion’s analysis of the *Ishikawa*¹ factors is unnecessary.

¶ 22 Essentially, Encarnación and Farías want to change a court record so that their status as parties in an unlawful detainer action cannot be discovered by potential landlords. But, altering the existing record in this way makes their involvement in the court proceeding virtually undiscoverable by anyone for any purpose. This result is contrary to the meaning and purpose of GR 15. GR 15 establishes a uniform procedure for the destruction, sealing, and redaction of all court records, but nothing in the rule permits a court to change court records as the trial court did here.

¶ 23 I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion.

Discussion

A. Standard of review

¶ 24 Interpretation of court rules is reviewed de novo. *State v. McEnroe*, 174 Wash.2d 795, 800, 279 P.3d 861 (2012). The same principles that apply to determine the meaning of statutes apply to determine the meaning of court rules. *Id.* The goal is to effectuate the intent of the drafters. To this end, when a plain meaning can be determined a court will give effect to the plain meaning as the expression of the drafters' intent. *State v. Chhom*, 162 Wash.2d 451, 458, 173 P.3d 234 (2007). "Plain meaning is discerned from reading the rule as a whole, harmonizing its provisions, and using related rules to help identify the legislative intent embodied in the rule." *Id.* (citing *State v. Williams*, 158 Wash.2d 904, 908, 148 P.3d 993 (2006)).

¶ 25 A trial court's decision to seal or unseal a court record is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Rufer v. Abbott Labs.*, 154 Wash.2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005). The trial court's ruling that allowed redaction is subject to this abuse of discretion standard. Generally, when a trial court applies the wrong legal standard an abuse of discretion will necessarily be found and the case remanded for the trial court to apply the correct standard. *Id.* (where the trial court based its decision on an improper rule, we will remand to the trial court to apply the correct rule). To determine whether the legal standard applied by the trial court is the correct legal standard involves a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See *Dreiling v. Jain*, 151 Wash.2d 900, 908, 93 P.3d 861 (2004).

B. General Rule 15 does not permit substitution of initials for parties' names in the court index

¶ 26 In 2006, GR 15 was substantially revised in the wake of our decision in *Rufer* to *176 include detailed procedural as well as substantive provisions governing destruction, sealing, or redaction of a court record. See 2 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE GR 15 author's cmts. at 54–56 (7th ed.Supp.2013).

¶ 27 The electronic records index at issue here is a court record under GR 15(b)(2) and GR 31(c)(4). However, the purported "redaction" of names from the index is not an action authorized under GR 15. "Redaction" is defined as

"to protect from examination by the public and unauthorized court personnel a portion or portions [of] a specified court record." GR 15(b)(5). Under GR 15(b)(4), a motion or order to delete, purge, remove, excise, erase, or redact shall be treated as a motion or order to seal. An order to replace the names of the parties with initials is a *change to the record*—not a redaction as defined in the rule. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling is not authorized by GR 15's provisions governing redaction.

¶ 28 Moreover, an order to redact a record is less restrictive than an order to seal a court record. Yet, even when a court orders a record sealed, the parties' names must be preserved on the docket and made available to the public. The obvious purpose of the rule is to permit orders that protect a court record's *content* from examination and not to protect the identity of the parties, unless otherwise permitted by statute. For example, GR 15(c)(4) provides:

When the clerk receives a court order to seal the entire court file, the clerk shall seal the court file and secure it from public access. All court records filed thereafter shall also be sealed unless otherwise ordered. *The existence of a court file sealed in its entirety, unless protected by statute, is available for viewing by the public on court indices.* The information on the court indices is limited to the case number, *names of the parties*, the notation "case sealed," the case type and cause of action in civil cases and the cause of action or charge in criminal cases, except where the conviction in a criminal case has been vacated, section (d) shall apply. The order to seal and written findings supporting the order to seal shall also remain accessible to the public, unless protected by statute.

GR 15(c)(4) (emphasis added).

¶ 29 GR 15 also carries forward the important procedural significance of court dockets that identify parties by complete names. GR 15(c)(5)(A) and (C) provide that when a

[court] clerk receives a court order to seal specified court records the clerk *shall*:

... On the *docket*, preserve the docket code, document

title, document or subdocument number and date of the original court records;

[and] [f]ile the order to seal and the written findings supporting the order to seal. Both shall be accessible to the public.

(Emphasis added.) A “docket” is “[a] formal record in which a judge or court clerk briefly notes all the proceedings and filings in a court case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 552 (9th ed.2009). The docket serves as a table of contents and map of the proceedings for courts, lawyers, and the public to locate court records. Because the docket is an important means to effectuate open administration of justice, a reliable docket sheet serves the fairness and appearance of fairness required under our constitution.

¶ 30 The importance of the docket was apparent in Washington’s territorial days, when session laws from the first legislative assembly in 1854 required clerks to keep an execution docket as a public record. Laws of 1855 § 234, at 173. The law expressly provided, in relevant part, “the clerk shall enter in said execution docket a statement of each final judgment, rendered at such term, containing (1st) the names, *at length*, of all the parties; (2d) the date of the judgment and against whom rendered.” *Id.* § 235, at 174 (emphasis added).

¶ 31 The requirement that parties’ names “at length” be recorded shows early intent that parties’ full names be accessible and not just their initials. Today, GR 15 continues to make the parties’ complete names publicly accessible. If a docket or court index is changed as the trial court allowed here, it becomes undiscoverable by the public. This is clearly inconsistent with Washington’s historical *177 treatment of a docket and the meaning of GR 15.

¶ 32 Use of complete names in dockets has been important in contexts other than indices. For example, where a court file has been destroyed in a criminal case, a docket sheet may substitute for a judgment and sentence because the docket bears a “ ‘minimum indicia of reliability.’ ” *State v. Mendoza*, 139 Wash.App. 693, 710–11, 162 P.3d 439 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *State v. Blunt*, 118 Wash.App. 1, 8, 71 P.3d 657 (2003)), *aff’d*, 165 Wash.2d 913, 205 P.3d 113 (2009). It is highly unlikely that an entry with only the parties’ initials would bear such indicia of reliability, even if the entry could be found in the first place.

¶ 33 In short, GR 15 preserves a long-established principle that the complete names of parties are to be listed with the actions to which they are parties.

¶ 34 There are exceptions, but these exceptions are carefully delimited. For example, in cases of sexual assault and child victims, the court shall not disclose the child’s identity to the public or in any court proceeding or court record. RCW 10.52.100. Courts have used pseudonyms or initials to protect the identity of a child victim pursuant to RAP 3.4. See *Marcum v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 172 Wash.App. 546, 550, 290 P.3d 1045 (2012) (use of pseudonym to protect the identity of abused and neglected child); see also RCW 13.34.115 (the court may close a hearing when it is in the best interest of the child).

¶ 35 Washington law recognizes several other areas in which the public has no right of access. Records of juvenile justice or care agencies are deemed confidential at the juvenile court level pursuant to RCW 13.50.100 (including juvenile nonoffender, juvenile dependency, truancy, at-risk youth, child in need of services, termination of parental rights, and developmental disability placement records). GR 22(c)(2). Other examples include adoption records, mental illness commitment records, alcohol and drug treatment commitment records, paternity records (except final orders), and confidential name change records.

¶ 36 But here there is no statutory authorization for Encarnación and Farías to protect their identities, as parties to a court proceeding, from the public on the alleged ground that they have suffered discrimination because of a wrongful unlawful detainer action. The trial court’s ruling is contrary to the plain meaning of GR 15 because it allows a change to court records under a theory of redaction that is not permitted even under the more restrictive sealing provisions of GR 15. The language in the court rule is mandatory, not permissive. This case is controlled by the procedural provisions in GR 15.

¶ 37 The trial court misapplied GR 15 when it ruled that a court record, specifically the court’s electronic records index, could be “redacted” by substituting the initials of parties to an unlawful detainer action for their complete names. Because the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the law, the court abused its discretion. While remand is the usual course when the trial court misapplies the law, here, as a matter of law, the motion to “redact” must be denied. GR 15 bars changing a court record to reflect the parties’ initials rather than their complete names as parties to the action.

¶ 38 Finally, rather than deciding this case on the basis of GR 15, the lead opinion decides that the rule is not sufficient by itself and it must be harmonized with article

I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. Unfortunately, the majority does not adequately consider the procedural provisions in GR 15 that resolve this case. GR 15 sets forth clear procedural requirements expressed in mandatory language that the court must follow. The court cannot offer relief where the rule does not permit it.

Conclusion

¶ 39 Because a change to the court record here is not permitted under GR 15, it is unnecessary to apply the *Ishikawa* balancing test to determine whether the action may be permitted under *Ishikawa*. The court should hold that the trial court erred in ordering the King County Superior Court clerk to replace Encarnación's and Farías's names with their initials in the SCOMIS *178 index because this action is not permitted by GR 15.

¶ 40 I concur in the result.

GONZÁLEZ, J. (dissenting).

¶ 41 Ignacio Encarnación and Norma Karla Farías did nothing to warrant eviction. They had a valid lease, were current on rent, and did not engage in any conduct proscribed by their rental agreement. Despite all this, an unlawful detainer action was filed against them. Even though they negotiated a favorable settlement, they had, and probably will have in the future, substantial difficulties in finding housing. Because of these difficulties, they have found themselves in an unsuitable and unstable living situation. To the justices of the lead opinion, the public's interest in having access to Encarnación's and Farías's full names in the case caption of the court record—which should never have existed in the first place—outweighs the family's interest in having access to suitable, stable housing. In reaching this conclusion, the lead opinion has ignored the careful findings of the trial court judge, overstepped the bounds of our abuse of discretion review, and minimized the reality of the housing situation facing Encarnación, Farías, and their three children. Not only do I disagree with the resolution of the merits of this case, but I am also unconvinced that the King County Department of Judicial Administration (Clerk), the entity that appeared before us, has standing to appeal the trial court's order. I find it particularly troubling that the lead opinion has provided no justification for allowing the Clerk, neither a party nor an intervenor in the case, to maintain the appeal. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

A. Standing

¶ 42 “Only an aggrieved party may seek review by the appellate court.”¹ RAP 3.1. Even if we overlook the fact that the Clerk did not formally intervene in this case at the trial stage, the lead opinion fails to establish the Clerk, the entity that challenged the trial court's order, was an aggrieved party for purposes of appellate standing. Here, the Clerk does not have a sufficiently substantial right in dispute and has not suffered sufficient injury to satisfy this standing requirement.² The trial court's order does not deny an individual or property right to the Clerk, nor does it impose a burden or obligation that would justify standing. Though the Clerk has a duty to maintain the public record, at best, the scope of this duty extends to the Clerk's procedural role under GR 15. No such procedural questions are at issue here. Indeed, the lead opinion resolves the case on the basis of the test established in *Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa*, 97 Wash.2d 30, 37–39, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), which balances the interest of a party seeking to seal a record against the interest of the public in maintaining the open administration of justice.³ This goes well beyond the Clerk's *179 interest and role as the custodian of public records. Permitting the Clerk to have standing on this appeal without interrogating the issue sets a bad precedent and undermines the purpose of RAP 3.1.

B. Abuse of Discretion Analysis

¶ 43 The lead opinion correctly recites that we review the issuance of a redaction order for abuse of discretion. But, the lead opinion fails to faithfully apply this appropriate standard of review. “Abuse of discretion occurs only when a trial court's decision is ‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’ ” *Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 173 Wash.2d 264, 278, 267 P.3d 998 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc.*, 156 Wash.2d 677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006)). “A discretionary decision rests on ‘untenable grounds’ or is based on ‘untenable reasons’ if the trial court relies on unsupported facts or applies the wrong legal standard; the court's decision is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ if ‘the court, despite applying the correct legal standard to the supported facts, adopts a view that no reasonable person would take.’ ” *Mayer*, 156 Wash.2d at 684, 132 P.3d 115 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *State v. Rohrich*, 149 Wash.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)). Instead of applying these standards, the justices of the lead opinion weigh the evidence and substitute their own

judgment for that of the trial court. This is not abuse of discretion review. At best, the lead opinion engages the record de novo.

¶ 44 The lead opinion finds that “[i]n this case, the trial court abused its discretion because it applied an improper legal standard and because its findings are not supported in the record.” Lead opinion at 173. But, to stay within the confines of abuse of discretion review, the supposed error in application must have either (1) been based on unsupported facts or (2) adopted a view that no reasonable person would take. The facts on which the trial judge relied were well supported by numerous declarations and ample testimony. The view taken by the trial court was entirely reasonable given these supported facts.

¶ 45 Simply put, the justices of the lead opinion would have preferred the lower court to interpret and weigh the facts differently and reach a different factual conclusion. In other words, the lead opinion has rebalanced the facts from our ivory tower to find the burden of redaction for a Clerk without standing is more compelling than the prospect of homelessness for a family with small children. Not only is this position callous but also, to get there, the lead opinion goes well beyond abuse of discretion review.

¶ 46 The lead opinion states that “[t]he privacy interest at stake in this case is not so compelling as to warrant redaction.” Lead opinion at 173. Specifically, the lead opinion finds that the “trial court broadly articulated the privacy interest as the ‘need to obtain rental housing for [Encarnación and Farías] and their three young children’ ” when it should have been articulated as “the interest in finding future rental housing in a desired location.” *Id.* at 173 (alteration in original) (quoting Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 729–30). This is an impermissible reconsideration of the facts. Apparently, the justices of the lead opinion do not find the supporting declaration, which established that Encarnación and Farías could not find housing and reasonably feared homelessness because of an errant eviction record, sufficiently persuasive. It is not, however, this court’s role to do that.

¶ 47 It is worrisome that the justices of the lead opinion have, without the benefit of testimony or other attributes of trial, substituted their own interpretation of the facts and judgment of the evidence for those of the trial judge. Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard of review. Without demonstrating that the trial court relied on unsupported facts or adopted a view that no reasonable person would take—which the *180 lead opinion has failed to do—we must accept the lower court’s factual conclusions.

C. *Ishikawa* Analysis

¶ 48 The right embodied in [article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution](#) that justice be administered openly—is not absolute. *Dreiling v. Jain*, 151 Wash.2d 900, 909, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). “[W]hile we presume court records will be made open and available for public inspection, court records may be sealed ‘to protect other significant and fundamental rights.’ ” *Rufer v. Abbott Labs.*, 154 Wash.2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005) (quoting *Dreiling*, 151 Wash.2d at 909, 93 P.3d 861). “To balance the constitutional requirement of the open administration of justice against potentially conflicting rights, we directed courts to apply the five *Ishikawa* factors.” *Id.* at 544, 114 P.3d 1182 (citing *Dreiling*, 151 Wash.2d at 908, 913, 93 P.3d 861).

¶ 49 Here, the lower court properly applied the *Ishikawa* factors. Encarnación and Farías have shown the need for redaction as a result of a compelling interest in securing housing for themselves and their young children. The trial judge allowed objection by present parties. The trial judge analyzed the proposed redaction to ensure that it was both the least restrictive means available and effective in protecting the interests at stake. The trial judge weighed the interests of Encarnación and Farías and their children against those of the public. And finally, the trial judge ensured that the order applied for a limited and specific time period that is justified by the private interest. All of the *Ishikawa* factors were faithfully considered.

¶ 50 Even if it were appropriate for us to reevaluate the careful factual findings made by the trial court, the lead opinion misstates and misapplies the standard that Encarnación and Farías must meet to prevail. The lead opinion finds that an exception to the presumption of openness “is appropriate only in the most unusual of circumstances.” Lead opinion at 172 (citing *In re Det. of D.F.F.*, 172 Wash.2d 37, 41, 256 P.3d 357 (2011)). And, in conclusion, the lead opinion proclaims that “[t]hese are not the most unusual of circumstances.” Lead opinion at 174. This is not the controlling standard.

¶ 51 Though the *D.F.F.* lead opinion does use the “most unusual circumstances” language, 172 Wash.2d at 41, 256 P.3d 357, that opinion only received four signatures and does not articulate our established legal standard. No other case applying the *Ishikawa* factors requires litigants to make such a stringent showing. Indeed, in *Rufer*, we established that “ ‘documents may not be kept from public view without some overriding interest requiring secrecy.’ ” 154 Wash.2d at 542, 114 P.3d 1182 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Dreiling*, 151 Wash.2d at 910, 93 P.3d 861). Requiring *some* overriding interest from a party seeking to redact a public record is not requiring the “most unusual of circumstances.” Overriding interest here means the private interest outweighs the competing interest of public access to the redacted information. The majority fails to articulate and apply the proper standard.

¶ 52 When the correct law is applied to established facts, Encarnación and Farías have demonstrated the existence of an overriding interest. Having access to acceptable housing is not just a compelling interest on its own, but, practically speaking, it is also necessary to secure other fundamental rights and interests. Access to employment, education, voting, health care, and most other public and private interests is greatly diminished, if not eliminated, when stable, suitable housing is unavailable.

¶ 53 For Encarnación and Farías, this interest was threatened by the existence of the public record. The trial court weighed the evidence presented and found that “Mr. Encarnación and Ms. Farías have already attempted to obtain rental housing and were denied by reason of this [unlawful detainer] action having been filed against them, and [that they] have good reason to expect that other rental applications will also be rejected so long as the record of this unlawful detainer suit remains available through SCOMIS [Superior Court Management Information System],” CP at 730. Further, the trial *181 judge established that “Mr. Encarnación and Ms. Farías currently live in a home that is not suitable for their needs and is facing a bank foreclosure, and [they] have a good faith expectation that they will need to change residences in the near future.” *Id.* To the trial court, “this is a compelling circumstance that requires sealing or redaction.” *Id.* (citing GR 15(c)(2)(F)). My colleagues who signed the lead opinion believe that no reasonable person would so conclude. They are wrong.

¶ 54 It is the majority’s reasoning that fails. The majority found that because “Encarnación and Farías do not have any [rental] applications pending,” they have failed to “show a serious and imminent threat to their interest.” Lead opinion at 174. The lead opinion adds that “they found housing elsewhere ... thus, it is not impossible for them to obtain housing.” Lead opinion at 174. The implication of this sentiment is perhaps even more alarming than the blatant disregard of our limits under abuse of discretion review. If an unsuitable and unstable housing situation and a prior rejection of a housing application as a result of the SCOMIS record is insufficient to establish their compelling interest in housing, it seems that Encarnación and Farías could

satisfy the justices of the lead opinion only if they and their children were, in fact, homeless. And while the lead opinion finds that “[p]ure speculation about the future inability to obtain housing in a desired location is not a serious and imminent threat to a compelling interest,” lead opinion at 174, it has, without any evidence or factual basis, suggested that the threat of future rejection is not imminent because “Encarnación and Farías can explain that the unlawful detainer was wrongfully filed and can provide a favorable reference from their previous landlords,” *id.* Not only does the record contradict both of these assertions and establish Encarnación and Farías’s compelling interest in suitable, stable housing, but the lead opinion also overstates the public’s interest in having access to these court records.

¶ 55 The lead opinion is correct that the public has an interest in the open administration of justice and that “[o]ur open courts jurisprudence has always stressed the importance of transparency and access to court records.” Lead opinion at 174. But, this right is not absolute. And so the trial court could reasonably conclude that the public’s interest is not diminished by the redaction of Encarnación’s and Farías’s full names from the case caption because doing so “will not materially impair members of the public from utilizing the records of this action for ... public purposes, such as evaluating the Court’s performance or conducting financial audits on court records, particularly as the Defendants’ names will remain on other court documents within the case file.” CP at 730–31. After all, it is important to remember just how measured and narrowly tailored the ordered redaction is here. The redaction concerns only the case name and lasts no longer than necessary to prevent harm to Encarnación and Farías’s interest.

¶ 56 Finally, that “[p]roperty owners in this state have an interest in being able to discover unlawful detainer actions that settle,” lead opinion at 174–75, is not commensurate with the public’s interest guaranteed by [article I, section 10](#). We need not balance the private business interests of landlords against the privacy interest of Encarnación and Farías as part of the *Ishikawa* analysis. But, even if we did, the privacy interest prevails.

¶ 57 Though I respect the lead opinion’s desire to protect the public’s interest in the open administration of justice, the level of review and reasoning applied by the lead opinion threatens to make the command contained in [article I, section 10](#) absolute at the expense of compelling private interests. This is not a wise direction to take settled law. Because we must give the trial court due deference and because Encarnación and Farías’s interest in suitable, stable housing far outweighs the public’s

interest in immediately accessing a record that should have never been created, I respectfully dissent.

I CONCUR: GORDON McCLOUD, J.

STEPHENS, J. (concurring in dissent).

¶ 58 This case presents valid, competing concerns. The public has an interest in open *182 court proceedings and records. Ignacio Encarnación and Norma Karla Farías have an interest in obtaining housing without having their status as defendants in a dismissed unlawful detainer action used against them. While most of the attention in this case has focused on comparing these concerns, of equal concern to me is whether we should entertain the merits of an “appeal” brought by a court clerk who disagrees with a judge’s order under GR 15. By quickly stepping over this issue to address the merits of the action taken by the trial court, I believe we set a dangerous precedent. I would dismiss this appeal on the ground that the court clerk lacks standing to appeal and concur in that portion of Justice Gonzalez’s dissent.

¶ 59 I recognize court clerks carry out important functions under GR 15, but those functions should not be construed in a way that puts the clerk’s office in an adversarial relationship with the court issuing an order to seal or redact court records. Allowing the clerk to “appeal” the judge’s order on the ground that the order is unlawful is unprecedented. At a minimum, as Justice Gonzalez’s dissent points out, the clerk is not an aggrieved party under RAP 3.1 and therefore lacks standing to appeal. Dissent at 178–79. More critically, the clerk serves as part of the court when acting in response to a judge’s order. The mere fact that GR 15 speaks to steps the clerk must take when the judge issues an order does not provide an

opening to appeal an order the clerk believes is contrary to the rule or, more generally, is unlawful. I am concerned that recognizing the ability of a clerk to appeal in this instance will only invite further questions of other instances in which a clerk may feel obligated to challenge a judge’s order on the ground that it contravenes not merely a court rule, but a statute or constitutional provision.

¶ 60 While it is possible to conceive of a situation in which a clerk, as a member of the public, might seek to intervene in a case to raise the public interest in open courts and records under article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution, that is not posture of this case. See *Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic*, 170 Wash.2d 775, 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (recognizing possibility of limited intervention of newspaper in criminal case in which both parties sought closure of court records). And, as the dissent notes, the clerk here disavows any reliance on *Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa*, 97 Wash.2d 30, 35, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), in which a nonparty newspaper filed a separate action against the trial judge. Dissent at 178–79 n. 3. Thus, there is simply no proper party bringing this appeal. I do not deny that the questions raised in this case are interesting and important, but this fact merely tests our commitment to longstanding justiciability requirements; I would hold firm.

I CONCUR: FAIRHURST, J.

Parallel Citations

330 P.3d 168

Footnotes

- 1 In all other counties, this is known as the clerk’s office. For the sake of clarity, we refer to this office as “the clerk.”
- 2 Despite our conclusions in this case, we recognize the problems innocent renters face when they are named as defendants to unlawful detainer actions. We note that petitioners and amici could seek a statutory remedy for similarly situated renters.
- 1 *Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa*, 97 Wash.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).
- 1 An “aggrieved party” is “one whose personal rights or pecuniary interests have been affected.” *State v. Taylor*, 150 Wash.2d 599, 603, 80 P.3d 605 (2003) (citing *State ex rel. Simeon v. Superior Court*, 20 Wash.2d 88, 90, 145 P.2d 1017 (1944)). In a case predating the RAP, we observed
“no one can appeal to an appellate court unless he has a substantial interest in the subject matter of that which is before the court and is aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment or order of the court. Some personal right or pecuniary interest must be affected. The mere fact that one may be hurt in his feelings,

or be disappointed over a certain result, or feels that he has been imposed upon, or may feel that ulterior motives have prompted those who instituted proceedings that may have brought about the order of the court of which he complains does not entitle him to appeal. He must be aggrieved in a legal sense.”

Sheets v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, 34 Wash.2d 851, 855, 210 P.2d 690 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Simeon*, 20 Wash.2d at 90, 145 P.2d 1017).

- 2 The Clerk argues that standing is satisfied because the trial court’s order imposes a burden or obligation on the Clerk to comply with an illegal task. This, however, is not commensurate with the purported injury in this case—whether the public will be deprived access to court records.
- 3 The Clerk stresses that it “does not oppose Encarnación’s [and Farías’s] motion on *Ishikawa*-related grounds,” and it is “disinclined to speak on behalf of either the general public or Encarnación and Farías as to the balancing of their competing interests.” Suppl. Br. of King County Dep’t of Judicial Admin, at 4. The Clerk claims a substantial right in its duty to maintain the public record and contends the trial court’s order forces it to engage in actions not allowed under *GR 15*. *Id.* at 4–5. Yet, the lead opinion’s resolution of this case rests primarily on its discussion of the trial court’s application of *Ishikawa* factors. *See* lead opinion at 173–74. It is safe to say then, that the lead opinion views the interest in dispute, and the injury at issue, as one that affects the public’s open access to the administration of justice. The Clerk is not the proper party to vindicate this right.
- 4 *See* lead opinion at 173–74.



October 24, 2014

TO: JISC Data Dissemination Committee
FROM: Stephanie Happold, AOC Data Dissemination Administrator
RE: Redacting names in JIS Based on Court Order.

Issue

Should DKF's name be redacted in JIS so the full name does not appear on the AOC public case search website?

Background

AOC staff was contacted by Mr. Jonathan Baner who is legal counsel for Ms. Darcy Kinkela-Frye. Mr. Baner expressed concern that his client's full name is displayed on the AOC public search website for 5 cases the Pierce County Superior Court had ordered redactions to all references of the name.¹ In the Pierce County case management system, Linx, the cases provided by Mr. Baner show a case title with the initials "DKF" instead of her name. However, in doing a case search or name search on the AOC public search website, his client's full name is still listed as a participant.

Discussion

The JIS Committee (JISC) authorized the JISC Data Dissemination Committee (DDC) to act on its behalf in addressing "issues with respect to access to the Judicial Information System (JIS) and the dissemination of information from it."² AOC staff now brings this issue before the DDC as JIS currently does not allow redaction of names similar to Linx. Further, AOC staff seeks direction on this issue based on the recent decision in *Hundtofte v. Encarnacion*, 181 Wn.2d 1, 330 P.3d 168 (2014).

In *Hundtofte*, Ignacio Encarnacion and Norma Karla Farias were involved in an unlawful detainer action that ended in a settlement. However, because their names were associated with an unlawful detainer, they found it difficult to find housing. *Hundtofte*, 330 P.3d at 171. They filed a motion to have their names redacted and replaced with initials in the Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS) indices. *Id.* The trial court granted the motion and the ruling was appealed. *Hundtofte*, 330 P.3d at 172. The Supreme Court held that the SCOMIS indices are a court record per GR 31 as they are both an "index and information in a case management system created or

¹ Mr. Baner's letter and a copy of Pierce County Superior Court Case No. 11-2-03536-6 are provided to the Committee.

² JISC Bylaws, Article 7, Sec. 1.

prepared by the court that is related to a judicial proceeding.” *Hundtofte*, 330 P.3d at 172. The indices are also subject to redaction and sealing per GR 15. *Hundtofte*, 330 P.3d at 172-173. However, the Court held that the petitioners in *Hundtofte* did not offer a compelling enough reason to warrant redaction of the SCOMIS indices. *Hundtofte*, 330 P.3d at 174-175. It went on to state that “the open administration of justice is a vital constitutional safeguard that may not be overridden to seal or redact court records except in the most unusual of circumstances.” *Hundtofte*, 330 P.3d at 175.

In the current matter, DKF requested redaction of her name in the court records due to being subjected to inquiry, embarrassment, and employment background checks that could potentially be used against her. The Pierce County Superior Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law acknowledge that the County Clerk cannot redact court records in the JIS database. Technically, the PER screens cannot be altered as it changes the official person record, thereby prohibiting the courts the ability to see all the cases related to one individual. Therefore, the Pierce County Superior Court orders were amended to just direct the Clerk of the Court to redact court records except for those in the JIS database. Mr. Baner then contacted the AOC to notify the agency of the matter and to take steps to redact references of his client’s full name in the cases referenced in in the court’s order.

Information on the AOC public case search website comes from the JIS database that contains information from the SCOMIS and DISCIS/JIS case management systems. Many local courts use the website as a case index. Looking to the *Hundtofte* decision, AOC staff seeks direction from the DDC about this matter and whether AOC resources should be allocated to research how to redact names in the JIS database.

3. DSHS-CA Request for Case Type 7s

Hello Stephanie,

I am the Title IV-E Policy, Training & Quality Assurance Manager for Children's Administration. I would like to appear in person at the October 24th JISC Data Dissemination Committee meeting to request access to King County Juvenile Court records for Title IV-E Eligibility Specialists. Title IV-E Eligibility Specialists review court orders on a daily basis for children entering foster care to ensure that federal requirements are met as part of the eligibility determination process for Title IV-E.

Section 471(a) (8) (D) of the Social Security Act provides for disclosure of information concerning individuals assisted by the title IV-E programs for purposes directly connected with audits conducted by the Federal Government and otherwise authorized by law. All title IV-E records, including court orders, are subject to federal audit for children assisted by title IV-E programs, and the Federal government audits such cases by random sampling on a tri-annual basis. Electronic access to court records for title IV-E purposes is also supported by the Federal Government's Court Improvement initiative.

Please let me know if additional information is needed to put this item on the JISC Data Dissemination Committee meeting agenda for October 24th.

Title IV-E is based on Public Law 96-272, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. It has also been changed by subsequent federal legislation. The most recent sweeping change occurred with Public Law 110-351, the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008.

We would still like access to the ADH, PER and DCH screens in the JIS system, as these screens may contain information on the parent that we would use for title IV-E purposes.

We would also like access to the case type 7s, as this would give up pertinent information needed to request the court orders from the clerks' office i.e. dates of court hearings, persons involved, prior dependencies etc.



October 24, 2014

TO: JISC Data Dissemination Committee

FROM: Stephanie Happold, AOC Data Dissemination Administrator

RE: The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services – Children’s Administration request for access to case type 7s.

Issue

Should DSHS-CA have access to case type 7 information in JIS?

Background

The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services – Children’s Administration (DSHS-CA) is requesting ADH, PER and DCH screens and SCOMIS case type 7 access for its Title IV-E Specialists. SCOMIS case type 7s are: dependencies, petitions for At Risk Youth, petitions for Child in Need of Services, reinstatement of parental rights, termination of parent-child relationship, and truancies.

The request is before the Data Dissemination Committee (DDC) because the JIS Committee (JISC) authorized the DDC to act on its behalf in reviewing and acting on requests for access to JIS by non-court users.¹ In deciding these requests, the DDC may refer to Washington state statutes and court rules, as well as, the JISC Data Dissemination Policy that sets forth the following factors for consideration:

- The extent to which access will result in efficiencies in the operation of a court or courts.
- The extent to which access will enable the fulfillment of a legislative mandate.
- The extent to which access will result in efficiencies in other parts of the criminal justice system.
- The risks created by permitting such access.²

For the current request, AOC staff will provide DSHS-CA a level 22³ JIS-Link account as it is a certified criminal justice agency. Level 22 agencies have access to ADH, DCH and PER screens. Therefore, the following recommendation will only address DSHS-CA access to case type 7s.

¹ JISC Bylaws, Article 7, Secs. 1 and 2.

² DD Policy, Sec. IX.C.

³ Level 22 JIS-Link users are law enforcement agencies, certified criminal justice agencies, DOC, and contract court probation departments.

Recommendation

RCW 13.50.100 governs the release of SCOMIS case type 7 court records. Per RCW 13.50.100, the records are confidential and released under limited circumstances.

Juvenile justice or care agencies are defined in chapter 13.50 RCW as any of the following:

Police, diversion units, court, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, detention center, attorney general, the legislative children's oversight committee, the office of the family and children's ombuds, the department of social and health services and its contracting agencies, schools; persons or public or private agencies having children committed to their custody; and any placement oversight committee created under RCW 72.05.415.

RCW 13.50.010(1)(a). As courts are considered a juvenile justice agency, the SCOMIS case type 7 court records may only be released to other participants in the juvenile justice or care system that have an investigation or case involving the juvenile in question, or that are assigned responsibility of supervising the juvenile. RCW 13.50.100(3). *Id.*

As DSHS-CA is considered a juvenile justice or care agency, it is granted access to case type 7 court records, but only when DSHS-CA is involved in an investigation or case involving the juvenile in question, or when DSHS-CA is assigned the responsibility of supervising the juvenile. In order to be granted access to all case type 7 information contained in JIS, DSHS-CA must demonstrate to the DDC that it is involved in investigations or supervision of all the juveniles in question.

If DSHS-CA can answer that question affirmatively and the DDC grants the request, the next step is the technical process in setting-up the case type 7 access. AOC cannot provide this access. In order for the agency to have access to these restricted court records, each court/clerk that maintains the records would have to establish an account. The account could be similar to the Attorney General's Office access for dependency cases in King, Benton and Kitsap counties.

AOC staff recommends DSHS-CA be granted access to case type 7s if the agency can confirm that it supervises or investigates every juvenile that is party to these particular type of court proceedings and if the individual courts agree to provide the access.

4. Prosecutor and Public Defender JABS Access

October 24, 2014

TO: JISC Data Dissemination Committee
FROM: Stephanie Happold, AOC Data Dissemination Administrator
RE: JABS Access for Prosecutors and Public Defenders.

I. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. May JABS be provided to the prosecutor's staff working with the prosecutors on eTicketing?
2. Can JABS access be given to all prosecutors and public defenders?
3. Confirmation that Prosecutors' and Public Defenders' JABS access for eTicketing purposes is set-up the same way as their JIS-Link access.

II. DISCUSSION

1. May JABS be provided to the prosecutor's staff working with the prosecutors on eTicketing?

AOC staff received a question from Mason County about providing JABS access to the prosecutor's staff working with the prosecutors on eTicketing. The access was initially denied as only prosecutors and public defenders were given permission for JABS use. However, AOC Education staff also raised the question as many courts do not have computers in the courtrooms for the prosecutors/public defenders to use to look at eTicket attachments. Therefore, many prosecutors prep the paperwork before the hearing and that includes printing out the ticket and corresponding attachments. Prosecutors usually have their staff prepare the paperwork in preparation for court. Because staff usually pulls together the corresponding paperwork, the JABS access is requested.

In fact, this is happening so frequently, the AOC Education staff received a request to do JABS training at the WAPA Staff Conference.

2. Can JABS access be given to all prosecutors and public defenders?

The DDC presented this question to AOC staff at its September 5, 2014 meeting. AOC staff confirmed with AOC ISD that providing access to all

public defenders and prosecutors throughout the state would slow the system down substantially.

3. Confirmation that Prosecutors' and Public Defenders' JABS access for eTicketing is set-up the same way as their JIS-Link access.

The DDC presented this question to AOC staff at its September 5, 2014 meeting. Prosecutors are provided level 25 JIS-Link access and Public Defenders are provided level 20. Currently, JABS access for prosecutors and public defenders for eTicketing is determined by the court administrator/coordinator setting-up the account. AOC does not set-up this access. As long as court staff follow the JIS security guidelines, the access is correct.

5. Public Access to Accounting Data in JIS for Data Dissemination Requests

October 24, 2014

TO: JISC Data Dissemination Committee
FROM: Stephanie Happold, AOC Data Dissemination Administrator
RE: Public Access to Accounting Data in JIS for Data Dissemination Requests.

Issue

Can AOC provide JIS accounting data for data dissemination requests?

Recommendation

AOC is receiving numerous requests from state agencies, researchers and members of the public for financial case information contained in JIS. Examples of requests are: LFO information, how many cases and what amounts are going to collection agencies, penalties associated with cases, and the amounts courts received in past years. Currently, AOC does not provide this information for data dissemination requests.

Public access to information in court records is governed by GR 31, which provides for open public access to court records unless restricted by federal law, state law, court rule, court order, or case law. GR 31 (d) (1). Public access to the information in court cases is also governed by a well-developed body of common law, under which the public has a right to inspect and copy court case records. See *Nast v. Michels*, 107 Wn.2d 300, 730 P.2d 54 (1986).

The JISC Data Dissemination Policy allows for access to JIS information subject to the JISCR 15(f) requirements of:

- availability of data,
- specificity of the request,
- potential for infringement of personal privacy created by release of the information requested, and
- potential disruption to the internal ongoing business of the courts.

Data Dissemination Policy III.B. Confidential information regarding individual litigants, witnesses, or jurors that is collected for the internal administrative operations of the courts will not be disseminated. Data Dissemination Policy IV.B. This information includes, but is not limited to, credit card and P.I.N. numbers, and social security numbers. *Id.* Identifying information (including, but not limited to, residential addresses and residential phone numbers) regarding individual litigants, witnesses, or jurors will not be disseminated, except that the residential addresses of litigants will be available to the extent otherwise permitted by law. *Id.* The JISC Data Dissemination Policy also

states that JIS information provided in electronic format shall be subject to provisions contained in the electronic data dissemination contract. Data Dissemination Policy III.B.

In looking at JIS-Link public access to financial information, level 1 (public) does not have direct access to the following JIS Screens: Case Financial History (CFHB), Case Obligation Status (COS), Accounting Summaries (CFHS), Accounts Receivable (CFHA), Disbursements Detail (CFHD), Receipting Detail (CFHR), A/R Adjustments (CFHJ), Receipts Totals (CFHR), Journal Vouchers (DJV), and Case Accounting Note Inquiry (CAN). However, according to the JIS-Link Security Levels for Non-JIS Organizations, the public has access to case financial information contained in the CFH screens if provided as a screen print with the personal identifiers, such as state ID, driver's license number, and victim's/witness'/person posting bail's address and telephone numbers, redacted. However, information contained on the COS, DJV and CAN screens is currently not available even as a screen shot.

Based on the public having access to the above-referenced JIS screen shots after the appropriate redactions, AOC staff recommends allowing the data to be similarly released for data dissemination requests. The release of data will conform to GR 31, GR 15, and the JISC Data Dissemination Policy and only after a data dissemination contract is executed. Last, AOC staff requests the Committee to review the financial data contained on the DJV, COS and CAN screens to determine if the information is also disclosable for public dissemination requests.