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      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE FORFEITURE )
OF ONE 1970 CHEVROLET CHEVELLE. )                          No. 81116-4
                                                    )
IN THE MATTER OF THE FORFEITURE )
OF ONE 2004 NISSAN SENTRA.                          )
                                                    )
ALAN ROOS AND STEPHNE ROOS,                         )
                                                    )      En Banc
                             Petitioners,           )
                                                    )
              v.                                    )
                                                    )
SNOHOMISH REGIONAL DRUG                             )
TASK FORCE,                                         )
                                                    )
                             Respondent.            )
___________________________________                 )      Filed September 3, 2009

       C. JOHNSON, J. -- This case involves a challenge to an order of the forfeiture 

of two automobiles pursuant to RCW 69.50.505, drug trafficking laws.  Alan and 

Stephne Roos owned two cars that their son, Thomas, was found to be using for 

trafficking drugs.  The hearing examiner found that the Rooses should have known 

of the illicit activities for which their cars were used and were, therefore, not 

considered "innocent owners" under RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii).  The hearing  

Cause No.  81116-4

examiner rejected an actual knowledge standard and ordered the vehicles forfeited.  

The Superior Court affirmed the order of forfeiture and the Court of Appeals 

affirmed.  

       The definition of "knowledge" applied by these courts is inconsistent with our 

cases, other similarly worded statutes, and the relevant legislative history.  We hold 

the term "knowledge" under the meaning of RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii) is satisfied 

only by proof of actual knowledge.  We reverse.

                                           FACTS

       Between June 10, 2005 and September 9, 2005, Thomas Roos was found by 

police four times to be either unconscious in or operating a vehicle that contained, 

among other things, various controlled substances and large sums of cash.  Each 

time the police arrested and charged Thomas accordingly.  On two of these 

occasions, incident to arrest and pursuant to RCW 69.50.505, the Snohomish 

Regional Drug Task Force (SRDTF) seized a 2004 Nissan Sentra and a 1970 

Chevrolet Chevelle.  The Nissan was titled to Alan Roos and the Chevrolet was 

titled to Stephne Roos, Thomas' parents.

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Cause No.  81116-4

       Both Alan and Stephne filed claims for return of the vehicles, asserting they 

were subject to the "innocent owner" exception in the vehicle forfeiture provision of 

RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii).  Alan and Stephne claimed that, while they had given 

Thomas permission to use the cars on a temporary basis, they had no actual 

knowledge of any illegal use of their vehicles.

       At the administrative hearing, a hearing officer for the Snohomish County 

sheriff found the SRDTF proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Thomas 

used both vehicles to facilitate drug trafficking, which subjected the vehicles to 

forfeiture under RCW 69.50.505.  The hearing officer applied an objective standard 

of knowledge (knowing or having reason to know) and found Alan and Stephne had 

reason to know what Thomas was up to and failed to take appropriate steps to 

ensure their vehicles were not used in such a manner.  The hearing officer did not 

make any finding that Alan or Stephne had actual knowledge about Thomas' illegal 

use of the Nissan or the Chevrolet.  The hearing officer ordered the vehicles 

forfeited.

       Alan and Stephne appealed, and the Snohomish County Superior Court 

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Cause No.  81116-4

affirmed the order of forfeiture.  Alan and Stephne appealed that ruling, and the 

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and held the objective standard of 

knowledge is appropriate for determining whether owners are "innocent owners"

under RCW 69.50.505.  In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet, 140 Wn. App. 

802, 167 P.3d 599 (2007).  Alan and Stephne's petition for review by this court was 

granted.  In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet, 164 Wn.2d 1007, 195 P.3d 87 

(2008).

                                            ISSUE

       Does the phrase "without the owner's knowledge" in RCW 

69.50.505(1)(d)(ii) permit objective knowledge (reason to know) to satisfy the term 

"knowledge" or is subjective knowledge (actual knowledge) required?

                                         ANALYSIS

       This matter concerns the interpretation of RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii), the 

innocent owner provision.  We review the meaning of a statute de novo because it is 

a question of law.  Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 

43 P.3d 4 (2002).  The objective of statutory interpretation is to carry out legislative 

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Cause No.  81116-4

intent.  Where a statute is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain meaning as 

an expression of legislative intent.  In determining the meaning, we may account for 

the ordinary meaning of words, basic rules of grammar, and the statutory context to 

conclude what the legislature has provided for in the statute and related statutes.  

When a statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, it is 

appropriate to resort to other aids of construction, such as legislative history.

       RCW 69.50.505 is the seizure and forfeiture provision of the Uniform 

Controlled Substances Act, which provides in relevant part:

              (1) The following are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no 
       property right exists in them:
              . . . .
              (d) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, 
       which are used, or intended for use, in any manner to facilitate the sale, 
       delivery, or receipt of [controlled substances], except that:
              . . . .
              (ii) No conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this section by 
       reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have 
       been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent.

(Emphasis added.) Subsection (1)(d)(ii) is commonly referred to as the "innocent 

owner" exception.

       RCW 69.50.505(5) provides that, "[i]n all cases, the burden of proof is upon 

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Cause No.  81116-4

the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the property is subject to forfeiture." Once established, RCW 69.50.506(a) shifts 

the burden "of any exemption or exception . . . upon the person claiming it."  

Tellevik v. 31641 W. Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 89, 838 P.2d 111, 845 P.2d 

1325 (1992).

       Here, the hearing officer properly found that the vehicles were subject to 

forfeiture.  Alan and Stephne do not challenge this finding.  As such, the burden 

shifted to Alan and Stephne to establish they had no "knowledge" pursuant to RCW 

69.50.505(1)(d)(ii).  The parties disagree as to the meaning of "knowledge" in this 

statutory exception to forfeiture.  The hearing officer found objective knowledge 

(i.e., reason to know) sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements, as did the 

Court of Appeals.

       In holding that objective knowledge is sufficient to satisfy RCW 69.50.505, 

the Court of Appeals relied on Tellevik, 120 Wn.2d 68 and Escamilla v. Tri-City 
Metro Drug Task Force, 100 Wn. App. 742, 753-54, 999 P.2d 625 (2000).1  

1 As will be shown by our analysis of Tellevik, Escamilla is unhelpful in this case.  Escamilla did not concern the 
definition of "knowledge"; rather, it concerned the sufficiency of evidence needed to show consent.  Escamilla is 
not binding on this court and appears to have incorrectly approved of (at least tacitly) a "knew or should have 
known" standard with respect to "innocent owners."

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Cause No.  81116-4

Although both cases involve interpretation of the similarly worded forfeiture statute 

for real property, a closer read of these cases shows the Court of Appeals has 

misapplied its holdings here.

       Tellevik concerned the forfeiture of real property used in trafficking drugs.  

While Tellevik focused on the definition of "consent," as used in the statute, our 

discussion there sheds light on the definition of "knowledge" for the purposes of 

RCW 69.50.505.  There, we defined consent as "'the failure to take all reasonable 

steps to prevent illicit use of [the] premises once one acquires knowledge of that 

use.'"  Tellevik, 120 Wn.2d at 88 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting 

United States v. 141st St. Corp. by Hersch, 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990)). In 

adopting this definition from 141st Street, we noted that this definition makes sense 

because "'when combined with [the disjunctive] construction of the phrase 

'knowledge or consent,' it provides a balance between the two congressional 

purposes of making drug trafficking prohibitively expensive for the property owner 

and preserving the property of an innocent owner.  A claimant with knowledge of 

the illegal use to which his property is put may defend on the basis of lack of 

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Cause No.  81116-4

consent . . . .'"  Tellevik, 120 Wn.2d at 88 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)

(quoting 141st St., 911 F.2d at 879).  This explanation means that determining 

whether there is a lack of consent first requires that the claimant has acquired 

knowledge, the first term in the statute's disjunctive construction.

       In 141st Street, the court engaged in the following discussion about the term 

consent:

              Consent is "compliance or approval esp[ecially] of what is done 
       or proposed by another." Webster's Third New International 
       Dictionary 482 (1971).  In order to comply with or approve of 
       something, it is only common sense that one must have knowledge of 
       it.  Thus, in order to consent to drug activity, one must know of it.

911 F.2d at 878 (emphasis added).  Similarly, it is only common sense that 

when one says someone knows of something or has knowledge of something, 

actual knowledge is contemplated knowledge not objective knowledge 

(reason to know).

       The 141st Street court went on to state that "to show lack of consent 

[an innocent owner claimant must] prove that he did all that reasonably could 

be expected to prevent the illegal activity once he learned of it." 911 F.2d at 

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Cause No.  81116-4

879 (emphasis added).  The court concluded that it was entirely appropriate 

to trigger the disjunctive means of claiming one is an innocent owner after the 

person "acquires knowledge" of the illicit use of one's property.  The logical 

extension of the phrase "acquired knowledge" means that one must actually 

possess certain knowledge not that one merely should have (had reason to) 

acquired the knowledge.  In other words, the court's phraseology interpreted 

the law to require a subjective knowledge standard (actual knowledge), not 

an objective standard (reason to know).  Because the 141st Street court's 

ruling was the foundation for determining consent in Tellevik, the subjective 

(actual) knowledge standard is likewise warranted when determining the 

definition of the term "knowledge."

       Such an interpretation also comports with the plain language of the 

"innocent owner" provision.  RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii) ("No conveyance is 

subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or omission 

established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without 

the owner's knowledge or consent." (emphasis added)).  The provision's use 

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Cause No.  81116-4

of the term "knowledge" expresses a legislative choice in adopting a specific 

standard.

       The legislature had several options to choose from in crafting the 

language of this provision.  It could have defined knowledge with an 

objective definition by using phrases like "knows or has reason to know,"  

"knowing or having reason to know," or "actual or constructive knowledge."  

In fact, the legislature could have expressed its intent in a variety of ways.  

But the legislature chose to use the term "knowledge."

       In other statutes, the legislature has utilized terms to require objective 

versus subjective knowledge.  See, e.g., RCW 4.24.630(1) ("For purposes of 

this section, a person acts 'wrongfully' if the person intentionally and 

unreasonably commits the act or acts while knowing, or having reason to 

know, that he or she lacks authorization to so act." (emphasis added)); RCW 

19.108.010(2)(b)(ii) ("At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to 

know . . ." (emphasis added)).  Where the legislature uses certain statutory 

language in one statute and different language in another, a difference in 

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Cause No.  81116-4

legislative intent is evidenced.  State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 625, 

106 P.3d 196 (2005). We assume the legislature means exactly what it says 

and interpret the wording of statutes according to those terms.  Where the 

legislature uses different terms we deem the legislature to have intended 

different meanings.  Because we recognize the legislature is familiar with 

objective versus subjective "knowledge," the use of "knowledge" on its own 

in the "innocent owner" provision establishes the legislature intended actual 

knowledge as the standard.

       This legislative choice also makes sense in the overall context of what 

is occurring.  The government has provided for the taking of one's property 

due to the criminal act of someone else.  In another similar context, the 

legislature has established criminal liability based on someone else's acts, 
such as proof of aiding and abetting or accessory liability.  RCW 9A.08.020.2  

Such instances require proof of someone actually doing something to support 

or facilitate the commission of a crime or actually knowing and assisting in 

2 See also State v. Everybodytalksabout, 145 Wn.2d 456, 472, 39 P.3d 294 (2002) (noting that the State must show 
the defendant had knowledge of the crime and aided in the planning or commission of that crime).

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Cause No.  81116-4

the criminal activity in order to be subject to criminal sanctions.  Perhaps a 

person should know many things, but often the opposite could be true, like 

here: The parents could have just as easily presumed their son's criminal 

activities would stop after the first arrest just as they could have suspected 

their son's criminal activities would continue.  

       Turning back to Tellevik, we noted there that objective facts could be 

used to determine subjective knowledge.  That is, where certain facts are able 

to be linked with reasonable inferences, it may raise a genuine issue of fact 

regarding what a person knows.  Deriving reasonable inferences from 

objective facts about what a person's subjective knowledge was at the time is 

appropriate because it prevents the "I had my head in the sand" defense.

       Tellevik, a consolidated case, concerned the forfeiture of the Wilsons'

property (used as a primary residence) and the Pearsons' property (used as a 

rental property).  Here, we are concerned only with the Pearsons' property.  

The Eastside Drug Task Force executed a search of the Pearsons' rental 

property and found a marijuana grow operation.  Mr. Pearson was present 

                                              12 

Cause No.  81116-4

during this search.  In response to the possible forfeiture of her home based 

on the alleged drug trafficking, Mrs. Pearson moved for summary judgment 

under the "innocent owner" provision of RCW 69.50.505.  The trial court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Pearson.  

       On appeal, we found a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mrs. 

Pearson actually knew of her husband's illegal activities.  The following facts 

were relevant: (1) Mrs. Pearson was residing in the house when the 

renovations were being made, including a trap door to the basement grow
room where 40 marijuana plants were seized;3 (2) Mrs. Pearson had joint 

control over the finances; and (3) the marijuana was being packaged and 

dried in her current residence.  Indeed, the only "fact" presented in 

contradiction was Mrs. Pearson's denial of any knowledge of wrongdoing.  

       In contrast, here, the record in the Rooses' case provides many 

contradictory facts to suggest Alan and Stephne were not actually aware of 

Thomas' illegal activities involving their vehicles.  For example, (1) Thomas 

3According to her deposition, Mrs. Pearson lived in the Pearson home from 1980 to 1986.  During this time, the 
entire basement was built to house where the grow operation was located.  The house was lifted, the basement was 
built, the trap door and lock were installed, and a new floor was put down to cover the floor.  This work was done 
without Mrs. Pearson's opposition (supposedly without her knowledge of the reason for the elaborate remodel).

                                              13 

Cause No.  81116-4

did not live at home; (2) Thomas was leading a "secretive" life; and (3) 

"someone" in the household had been intercepting mail and voicemail, which 

may have provided Alan and Stephne with more information about Thomas'

illegal activities.  These facts contradict the idea that Thomas' parents were 

actually aware of his drug trafficking.  Unlike the facts in Tellevik, we do not 

have sufficient objective facts here to determine the subjective knowledge of 

Alan and Stephne during the relevant time period of Thomas' criminal activity 

involving his parents' vehicles.  As such, we cannot agree with the trial court 

and the Court of Appeals that Thomas' parents had actual knowledge but 

simply stuck their heads in the sand.

                                       CONCLUSION

       We hold the term knowledge, as used in RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii) means 

subjective (actual) knowledge.  We vacate the judgment of forfeiture of the vehicles, 

reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand for further proceedings.

AUTHOR:
       Justice Charles W. Johnson

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Cause No.  81116-4

WE CONCUR:
       Chief Justice Gerry L. Alexander

       Justice Richard B. Sanders                       Justice Debra L. Stephens

       Justice Tom Chambers

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