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Opinion in PDF Format
Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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JUSTICES
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COUNSEL OF RECORD
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View the Opinion in PDF Format
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CITY OF SPOKANE, )
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Petitioner, ) No. 81271-3
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v. ) En Banc
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LAWRENCE J. ROTHWELL, ) Filed September 3, 2009
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Respondent. )
______________________________ )
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CITY OF SPOKANE, )
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Petitioner, )
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v. )
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HENRY E. SMITH )
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Respondent. )
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J.M. JOHNSON, J. -- The city of Spokane asks this court to reverse a
Court of Appeals decision invalidating two municipal court convictions. The
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court judge who presided over the
trials did not have jurisdiction because the election was not limited to city
voters provided by former RCW 3.46.070 (1984), repealed by Laws of 2008,
ch. 227, § 12. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the judge did not have de
facto jurisdiction. We hold that former RCW 3.46.070 did not apply to
district court judges sitting as part time municipal judges in municipal
departments and that therefore this judge had de jure jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
This case involves the interplay of several now-repealed statutes in
Title 3 RCW, which authorizes Washington's system of district and
municipal courts. Generally, a district court has jurisdiction of all violations
of city ordinances. RCW 3.66.060. But under former chapter 3.46 RCW
(1961), cities had the option of establishing a municipal court as a department
of the district court. Former RCW 3.46.010 (1984), repealed by Laws of
2008, ch. 227, § 12. Where such a municipal department was established, it
had exclusive jurisdiction of matters arising from ordinances of the city.
Former RCW 3.46.030 (2005), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12.
2
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
Spokane Municipal Court had been organized as a municipal
department of the Spokane County District Court pursuant to former chapter
3.46 RCW.1 See former Spokane, Wash., Municipal Code § 5.01.010, .030
(repealed 2008); Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wn.2d 594, 602-03, 800 P.2d
359 (1990) (surveying the history of that department). The city of Spokane
(City) and Spokane County (County) had a long-standing agreement that
municipal court judges would be provided on a rotating basis from among the
district court judges. See Nollette, 115 Wn.2d at 602-03. Since at least
2002, the County had designated all the district court judges collectively as
the municipal department. See Spokane County, Wash., Code § 1.16.050,
cited in Nollette, 115 Wn.2d at 602-03.
In 2002, all nine Spokane County District Court judicial positions were
filled by election. Voters from the entire county were allowed to vote for
each office. The ballot did not disclose that the district court judges would
also be serving as part time municipal court judges. Judge Walker ran for
position four on the district court, and she was elected by voters from the
1 A more detailed history of the Spokane Municipal Court was set out in Nollette v.
Christianson, 115 Wn.2d 594, 601-03, 800 P.2d 359 (1990). The city of Spokane
subsequently shut down its municipal department for a period of time. Cf. City of
Spokane v. County of Spokane, 158 Wn.2d 661, 146 P.3d 893 (2006).
3
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
entire county.
Subsequently, Henry Smith and Lawrence Rothwell were both charged
with crimes under the Spokane Municipal Code. At the time, the district
court was allocating 3.7 full time equivalent hours of district court judge time
to the municipal department, including some of Judge Walker's time.2 Both
cases were assigned to Judge Walker. Defendants filed pretrial motions to
dismiss, challenging Judge Walker's jurisdiction. Judge Walker denied both
motions. In 2005, both men were convicted and appealed to Spokane County
Superior Court, which considered the cases together and affirmed.
Defendants moved for discretionary review in Division Three of the
Court of Appeals, which granted review and consolidated the cases. In City
of Spokane v. Rothwell, 141 Wn. App. 680, 170 P.3d 1205 (2007), a divided
panel reversed. The majority held that Judge Walker was not properly
elected to the position of municipal court judge and did not possess de facto
authority and reversed defendants' convictions. Id. at 686-87. The dissenting
judge would have held that Judge Walker had de facto authority. Id. at 687
(Brown, J., dissenting in part).
2 This number was established in a formal agreement for 2004, and apparently the City and
County continued to operate under the same terms after 2004 by mutual consent.
4
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
Standard of Review
Conclusions of law involving the interpretation of statutes, and
municipal ordinances are reviewed de novo. Nollette, 115 Wn.2d at 600.
Analysis
We must determine whether Judge Walker had jurisdiction over the
defendants' cases under statutes governing municipal departments.
Construction of a statute is a question of law. State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d
342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003). Our objective is to determine legislative
intent. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
Where the language of a statute is clear, legislative intent is derived from the
language of the statute alone. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d at 346. The "plain
meaning" of a statutory provision is to be discerned from the ordinary
meaning of the language at issue, as well as from the context of the statute in
which that provision is found, the related provisions, and the statutory scheme
as a whole. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at 600-01.
Statutes must be construed so that all the language is given effect and
no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147
5
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
Wn.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). The court must also avoid constructions
that yield unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. Id. Courts may not
read into a statute matters that are not in it. Id. We do not favor repeal by
implication, and where potentially conflicting acts can be harmonized, we
construe each to maintain the integrity of the other. Anderson v. Dep't of
Corrections, 159 Wn.2d 849, 858-59, 154 P.3d 220 (2007). But where the
conflict is irreconcilable, a more recent statute takes priority over an older
statute. Id. at 861.
From its inception, the statutory scheme governing municipal
departments provided specific procedures by which they could be staffed with
judges. The City could appoint or elect its own full time municipal judges.
See former RCW 3.46.050 (1984), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12.
The statute did not limit who was eligible to be appointed or elected, but only
city voters could vote for municipal judges. See former RCW 3.46.070
(setting forth procedures "where an election is held for the position of
municipal judge"). Alternately, the municipal court could be staffed with part
time judges -- but the pool of potential judges was limited and the procedure
was different: "appointment of part time municipal judges shall be made from
6
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
the judges of the district by the mayor in such manner as the city legislative
body shall determine." Former RCW 3.46.060 (1984), repealed by Laws of
2008, ch. 227, § 12.
Spokane chose to staff its municipal court entirely by the second
option. See Nollette, 115 Wn.2d at 602 (noting 1978 districting plan
provided that all of the justices of the district court would function as part
time municipal judges). In Nollette, we held that a duly elected district court
judge could obtain the office of municipal court judge only through the
procedures prescribed by statute -- at the time, appointment by the mayor. Id.
at 604-05. Under this arrangement, the mayor had the exclusive power to
appoint municipal court judges from among the district court judges. Id. at
605 (the districting plan only established the relevant pool of judges eligible
to serve as part time municipal court judges; under former RCW 3.46.060 the
city selected the judges from that pool).
After Nollette, the legislature enacted an additional provision:
"[n]otwithstanding RCW 3.46.050 and 3.46.060, judicial positions may be
filled only by election . . . ."3 Former RCW 3.46.063 (1993), repealed by
3 This provision applies by its own terms only to certain part time equivalent and all full
time equivalent judicial positions. See former RCW 3.46.063(1), (2) (1993), repealed by
Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12. It is undisputed that Judge Walker was filling a full time
7
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12. This new "only by election" provision
irreconcilably conflicted with former RCW 3.46.060's earlier-enacted
provision for appointment "by the mayor."4 The language in former RCW
3.46.063 "[n]otwithstanding . . . 3.46.060" suggests the legislature knew it
was creating a conflict. Although repeal by implication is disfavored, we
cannot give equal effect to two irreconcilably conflicted provisions.
However, we can partially harmonize the statutes by implying a repeal only of
the conflicting language.5
Former RCW 3.46.063 does not irreconcilably conflict with all of
former RCW 3.46.060. The first clause of former RCW 3.46.060 defines
who is eligible to serve as a part time municipal judge: "appointment of part
time municipal judges shall be made from the judges of the district." In
contrast, former RCW 3.46.063 addresses only the procedure for selecting
from among the pool of persons eligible to be appointed -- but says nothing
about who is in that pool. Cf. State v. Abrams, 163 Wn.2d 277, 287-88, 178
equivalent position, and therefore the "only by election" requirement applied to her.
4 The new provision also clearly conflicted with cities' appointment power in former RCW
3.46.050, but that change is inconsequential here because, as noted, Spokane had chosen
to staff the municipal department under former RCW 3.46.060.
5 Similarly, where a statute is partially invalid due to unconstitutionality, we sever the
invalid clause and give effect to the balance of the statutory language. See, e.g., State v.
Abrams, 163 Wn.2d 277, 287-88, 178 P.3d 1021 (2008).
8
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
P.3d 1021 (2008) (distinguishing between substantive and procedural clauses
in severance analysis and noting that when this court has found procedural
provisions to be unconstitutional, we have severed them and upheld the
substantive remainder of the statutes).
Minus the conflicting procedural clause, the balance of former RCW
3.46.060 can be harmonized with former RCW 3.46.063. By agreement
between the City and County, all district court judges were part time judges
in the municipal department. Thus, upon the election of district court judges,
the municipal court positions were filled "by election," as required by former
RCW 3.46.063. That is exactly what happened in Judge Walker's case. She
was elected to the district court and, as a consequence of her election,
became a part time municipal court judge; no other procedure was required,
consistent with former RCW 3.46.063.
The only remaining question, then, is the effect of former RCW
3.46.070.6 We read the clause "[o]nly voters of the city shall vote for
municipal judges" as applying only to elections for full time municipal judge
positions under former RCW 3.46.050, and therefore as not applicable to
6 The Court of Appeals relied on the assumption that former RCW 3.46.070 applied to
Judge Walker's election to hold that she did not have de jure authority as a municipal
court judge. Rothwell, 141 Wn. App. at 685.
9
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
Judge Walker's election to the district court. This is the only reading of the
statute that preserves the integrity of the statutory scheme. By its own terms,
former RCW 3.46.070 addresses "election[s] . . . for the position of
municipal judge." However, Judge Walker was not running for the position
of municipal judge. Limiting the electorate to only city voters makes sense if
the position up for election is going to be serving the municipal court full
time; it does not make sense if those judges are splitting their time between
the district court and the municipal department. Such a reading would lead to
absurd results.7 No such requirement exists anywhere in the language of
former chapter 3.46 RCW. Moreover, such an interpretation would render
the first clause of former RCW 3.46.060 meaningless because district court
judges serving part time in the municipal department would have had to be
elected only by city voters -- an impossibility. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that former RCW 3.46.070 applied to Judge Walker's election.
The defendants alternately argue that the municipal department was
7 Applying former RCW 3.46.070 to Judge Walker's election leads to two possible,
equally absurd results. One is that she would have been eligible to only serve part time in
the municipal department if her election had been limited to only city voters -- even though
she was running for a district-wide position. Or, Judge Walker should have appeared on
the same ballot twice, running for positions in the municipal and district courts
simultaneously -- even though "no person may file for more than one office." RCW
29A.20.021(2).
10
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
invalid because it was not created and maintained properly. This argument is
without merit.8 Moreover, assuming arguendo that the department was a
legal nonentity, Judge Walker would have had de jure jurisdiction over these
trials in her capacity as a district court judge.9 See RCW 3.66.060 ("[t]he
district court shall have jurisdiction . . . of all violations of city ordinances").
Because we hold Judge Walker had de jure authority to preside over
the trials here, we need not reach the question of de facto authority.
Conclusion
Judge Walker had de jure authority to hear the defendants' cases as a
properly elected district court judge and member of the municipal department.
Under the City-County agreement, Judge Walker was automatically
designated as a member of the municipal department upon her election to the
8 We have previously recognized that the municipal department was validly created. See
Nollette, 115 Wn.2d at 602. The absence of a current interlocal agreement and
imperfections in the current districting plan do not support the conclusion that the
municipal court was invalid.
9 Amicus Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys initially raised this
argument in its brief to this court, and the City adopted the argument in its supplemental
brief. Although we do not normally consider issues not raised below and not raised in the
petition for review, in this case the argument is pertinent to the substantive issues raised
below and necessary to our rendering a proper decision. See Bennett v. Hardy, 113
Wn.2d 912, 918, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990). We note that respondents had ample opportunity
to address the argument in both their brief in reply to amicus and supplemental brief.
The district court's default jurisdiction is not dispositive of the whole case because,
as noted supra, where a municipal department has been established, it has exclusive
jurisdiction of matters arising under city ordinances. Former RCW 3.46.030.
11
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, City of Spokane v. Smith, No. 81271-3
district court. Her appointment as a municipal judge was a direct result of her
election and therefore was not inconsistent with former RCW 3.46.063,
which required municipal court positions to be filled by election. Judge
Walker's election was for a district court office, not full time municipal judge,
and therefore her election did not have to be only by city voters under former
RCW 3.46.070.
The Court of Appeals is reversed, and the matter is remanded so that
defendants' convictions may be reinstated.
AUTHOR:
Justice James M. Johnson
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice Gerry L. Alexander Justice Susan Owens
Justice Charles W. Johnson Justice Mary E. Fairhurst
Justice Barbara A. Madsen, result
only
Justice Richard B. Sanders Justice Debra L. Stephens
Justice Tom Chambers
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