

No. 36031-4-II

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON

JIM A. TOBIN,

Respondent,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

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ORIGINAL

CONTENTS

I. ISSUE1

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE1

III. ARGUMENT4

 A. THE ACT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE DEPARTMENT TO REIMBURSE ITSELF FROM THE PORTION OF DAMAGES STEMMING FROM PAIN AND SUFFERING BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT AND WILL NOT PAY SUCH DAMAGES UNDER THE CLAIM5

 (1) The *Flanigan* case5

 (2) The *Gersema* case8

 B. RCW 51.24.030(5) DOES NOT CHANGE *FLANIGAN'S* INTERPRETATION OF RCW 51.24.060(1)9

 C. IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT THE AMOUNT THE DEPARTMENT WOULD RECEIVE, IF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THEIR REIMBURSEMENT CALCULATION, MIGHT NOT COVER ALL OF THEIR PAST AND ESTIMATED FUTURE COSTS11

 D. THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSERTION OF A STATUTORY LIEN AGAINST MR. TOBIN'S PAIN AND SUFFERING RECOVERY IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING14

 (1) Mr. Tobin's third party recovery of pain and suffering damages is his private property,

	and is, therefore, constitutionally protected against a taking without due process of law	14
(2)	Attaching a lien pursuant to RCW 51.24.060(1)(e) on Mr. Tobin’s third party recovery pain and suffering damages constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property	15
E.	ALL OF THE ITEMS INCLUDED IN THE APPENDIX TO THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, EXCEPT FOR THE TEXT OF THE STATUTES, SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RAP 10.3(a)(8)	18
F.	MR. TOBIN'S ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES FOR WORK DONE AT SUPERIOR COURT AS WELL AS WORK DONE AT THE COURT OF APPEALS	19
(1)	The Superior Court's attorneys' fee award should be upheld	19
(2)	Mr. Tobin's attorneys should also be awarded fees for work done before the Court of Appeals	20
IV.	CONCLUSION	20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Flanigan v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
123 Wn.2d 418, 869 P.2d 14 (1994) ...1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17

Kingery v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus.
132 Wn. 2d 162, 937 P.2d 565 (1997)4

Hanquet v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus.
75 Wn. App. 657, 879 P.2d 326 (1994)4

Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
26 Wn.2d 550, 174 P.2d 957 (1946)4

Clauson v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
130 Wn.2d 580, 584, 925 P.2d 624 (1996)5

Kilpatrick v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
125 Wn.2d 222, 883 P.2d 1370 (1994)5

Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
109 Wn.2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987)5

Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
142 Wn.2d 801, 811, 16 P.3d 583 (2001)5

Maxey v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
114 Wn.2d 542, 549, 789 P.2d 75 (1990)7

Gersema v. Allstate Insurance Co.
127 Wn. App. 687, 112 P.3d 552 (2005)8, 9

Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
151 Wn.2d, 203, 210-211, 87 P.3d 757 (2004)12

Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. V. Ahlborn
164 L. Ed. 2d 459,126 S. Ct. 1752, (2006)14

Wody's Olympic Lumber, Inc. v. Roney
9 Wn.App. 626, 513 P.2d 849 (1973)15

Marriage of Brown
100 Wn.2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984)15

Presbytery of Seattle v. King County
114 Wn.2d 320, 787 P.2d 907
cert. Denied 498 U.S. 911 (1990)15, 16, 18

Rafn Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.
104 Wn.2d 947, 17 P.3d 711 (2001).....16

Davis v. Bendix
82 Wn.App. 267, 917 P.2d 586 (1996)17

Bellevue v. Hellenthal
144 Wn.2d 425, 429, 28 P.3d 744 (2001)19

City of Moses Lake v. Grant County Boundary Review Bd.
104 Wn. App. 388, 391, 15 P.3d 716 (2001)19

STATUTES

RCW 51.24.0601, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 21, 22

RCW 51.52.1154

RCW 51.12.0104

RCW 515

RCW 51.24.060(c)5, 17

RCW 51.24.060(1)9, 11, 12, 13, 14

RCW 51.24.030(5)9, 10, 11

RCW 51.24.060(1)(e)15

RCW 4.08.08015

RCW 51.52.13020, 22

REGULATIONS AND RULES

RAP 10.3(a)(8)18, 20

RAP 10.4(c)18

RAP 18.120, 22

OTHERS

Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1914 (1986).....7

Final Legislative Report, 54th Leg.
(Wash. 1995), at 219 (SB 5399)10

I. ISSUE

Whether it was proper for the Department to assert a right to distribute the entirety of Mr. Tobin's third party recovery, including the portion for pain and suffering, when the Department has not and will not pay any benefits for pain and suffering under the claim?

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Court based upon an appeal by the Department of Labor and Industries to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment entered by Pierce County Superior Court Judge Stephanie A. Arend on March 2, 2007. Judge Arend reversed a prior decision by the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals [hereinafter "Board"] that affirmed a September 29, 2005 order issued by the Department of Labor and Industries [hereinafter "Department"]. In the September 29, 2005 Department order, the Department asserted a right to distribute under RCW 51.24.060 the entire amount of Mr. Tobin's third party recovery. (See CP, 40 – 46). Judge Arend, in reversing the Board and Department orders stated

I think that the analysis by the Supreme Court in the Flanigan case with respect to loss of consortium applies equally to pain and suffering. RCW 51.24.060 provides specifically that the Department would get recovery only to the point necessary to reimburse the Department for benefits paid. They don't pay for pain and suffering. There's no way I can see a distinction between the Flanigan

decision for loss of consortium and, in this case, pain and suffering, and I'm finding in favor of Mr. Tobin.

(Verbatim Report of Proceedings, pp. 13 – 14).

The facts in this case were stipulated to by the parties in a Stipulation of Facts and are, therefore, not in dispute. (See Certified Appeal Board Record [hereinafter CABR], pp. 69 – 72).

Mr. Tobin was injured on June 11, 2003 in the course of his employment with Saybr Contractors, Inc. He filed a claim and it was allowed under claim number Y-647899. Because he was unable to work, he received time loss (wage loss) benefits and eventually, effective March 16, 2005, was placed on a total permanent disability pension. The Department also paid medical benefits under the claim. (CABR, pp. 69 – 70).

Because Mr. Tobin's injuries were caused by the negligence of a third party, he pursued a third party claim, electing to pursue the claim through an attorney, David Snell of Small, Snell, Weiss & Comfort, P.S. (CABR, p. 70).

In September 2005, a third party settlement was reached between Mr. Tobin and the third party. Pursuant to the settlement, Mr. Tobin settled his third party claim for a gross amount of \$1,400,000.00. This amount was allocated as follows:

Medical Expenses:	\$29,326.84
Future Medical Expenses:	\$14,647.00
Total wage loss (past & future):	\$562,943.00
Pain and Suffering:	\$793,083.16

This settlement agreement was signed by Mr. Tobin and by a representative of the Department. (CABR, p. 70).

As of the date of the Department's third party distribution order, the Department had paid a total of \$80,501.40 in benefits. Of these benefits, \$25,208.93 were for medical bills, \$42,893.89 were for time loss compensation, and \$12,398.58 were for pension benefits. No other benefits were paid on this claim, and because Mr. Tobin received a total permanent disability pension, he is not entitled to an award for permanent partial disability. (CABR, p. 71).

The Department's September 29, 2005 distribution order included in its calculation the entire third party settlement amount, including the pain and suffering portion. It distributed the third party settlement proceeds as follows:

Attorney's share:	\$472,262.44
Claimant's share:	\$874,391.25
Department's share:	\$53,346.31

Of Mr. Tobin's \$874,391.25 share, \$425,735.63 was determined to be

excess recovery and subject to offset against any future claim benefits that would otherwise be paid by the Department. That means that Mr. Tobin would not receive any further pension benefits until the Department would have otherwise paid him \$425,735.63 in benefits. (CABR, p. 71).

III. ARGUMENT

In an appeal of a Board order to Superior Court, the trial is de novo, but is based upon the evidence presented before the Board. RCW 51.52.115; *Kingery v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus.*, 132 Wn. 2d 162, 937 P.2d 565 (1997); *Hanquet v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus.*, 75 Wn. App. 657, 879 P.2d 326 (1994).

In this case the parties stipulated to the facts. There is, therefore, no factual dispute and the only issue is a question of law. In such cases, there is no presumption that the Board's decision is correct. *Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 26 Wn.2d 550, 174 P.2d 957 (1946).

This case requires interpretation of the Industrial Insurance Act [hereinafter "Act"]. When interpreting the Act it is important to remember that the Act is to "be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment." RCW 51.12.010. To that end, "all doubts as to the meaning of the Act are to be resolved in favor of

the injured worker.” *Clauson v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 130 Wn.2d 580, 584, 925 P.2d 624 (1996); Citing *Kilpatrick v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 125 Wn.2d 222, 883 P.2d 1370 (1994); *Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 109 Wn.2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). This means that “where reasonable minds can differ over what Title 51 RCW provisions mean, in keeping with the legislation's fundamental purpose, the benefit of the doubt belongs to the injured worker...” *Cockle v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 142 Wn.2d 801, 811, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).

A. THE ACT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE DEPARTMENT TO REIMBURSE ITSELF FROM THE PORTION OF DAMAGES STEMMING FROM PAIN AND SUFFERING BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT AND WILL NOT PAY SUCH DAMAGES UNDER THE CLAIM.

The rules for distributing third party recoveries are set out in RCW 51.24.060. It provides that once the attorneys’ fees and costs are paid, and the claimant is paid twenty-five (25) percent of the remainder,

The department and/or self-insurer shall be paid the balance of the recovery made, but only to the extent necessary to reimburse the department and/or self-insurer for benefits paid...

RCW 51.24.060(c).

(1) The Flanigan case.

The Washington Supreme Court delved into the meaning of this section at length in the case of *Flanigan v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 123

Wn.2d 418, 869 P.2d 14 (1994), a case in which the Department asserted a right to include loss of consortium damages in the calculations under RCW 51.24.060.

In *Flanigan*, the Court noted that, in understanding the meaning of this statute, it was important to understand the historic background of and the compromises associated with the Act. The Court noted that under this compromise, injured workers do not receive full compensation, and are not compensated for non-economic damages such as their pain and suffering or their spouse's loss of consortium. *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 423.

The Court then turned to exploring the purpose of allowing third party recoveries under the Act. The Court noted that there are two general purposes for allowing such actions. First, it spreads responsibility for compensating the injured worker to third parties who are at fault for the injury. Second, it permits the worker to increase his or her compensation beyond the Act's limited benefits. *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 424.

The Court also noted that allowing the Department to obtain reimbursement from the proceeds of a third party recovery serves two roles. First, it reduces the burden on the accident and medical funds for damages caused by a third party. Second, it prevents the worker from receiving a double recovery. The Court stated, “[i]n other words the

worker, under [the third party statute], cannot be paid compensation and benefits from the Department and yet retain the portion of damages which would include those same elements.” (Italics in original) *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 425; citing *Maxey v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 114 Wn.2d 542, 549, 789 P.2d 75 (1990).

The Court noted that workers’ compensation benefits do not compensate workers for non-economic damages. To the extent that a worker recovers such damages from a third party, this recovery, therefore, would not constitute a double recovery. *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 425.

The Court also looked at the plain language of the statute, noting that RCW 51.24.060 was phrased in terms of “reimbursing” the Department. The Court, citing *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 1914 (1986), noted that “reimburse” means “to pay back (an equivalent for something taken, lost, or expended) to someone: REPAY.” The Court pointed out that one cannot be “paid back” compensation one never paid in the first place. *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 426.

The Court concluded that allowing the Department to reach such recoveries would give an unjustified windfall to the State at the expense of individual beneficiaries. They noted that this would give the Department a share of damages for which it has provided no compensation. The Court rejected this interpretation stating that the Court did not “interpret statutes

to reach absurd and fundamentally unjust results.” *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 425 – 426. The Court ruled that the statutory right to reimbursement under RCW 51.24.060 does not reach such recoveries. *Flanigan*, 123 Wn.2d at 426.

While the Court in *Flanigan* was dealing with loss of consortium damages rather than pain and suffering damages, the Court’s interpretation and conclusions can be extended to third party recoveries of pain and suffering damages. Like loss of consortium damages, pain and suffering damages are non-economic damages. The Department does not compensate injured workers for either of these types of damages and it, therefore, should have no right to reimbursement under RCW 51.24.060 for such non-economic damages recovered in a third party action.

(2) The *Gersema* case.

Division II of the Court of Appeals was asked to deal with the issue of whether the Department or a self-insured employer has a right to reimbursement from the amount recovered under a third party claim for pain and suffering damages.

The Court in this case, *Gersema v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, 127 Wn. App. 687, 112 P.3d 552 (2005), pointed out that Mr. Gersema’s third party settlement agreement failed to allocate damages to delineate which portion of the recovery was for pain and suffering. The Court concluded that Mr.

Gersema's entire recovery was, therefore, subject to RCW 51.24.060. The Court noted, however, that

If Gersema's settlement with Titus Will had clearly allocated some or all of the damages to his pain and suffering, we might agree with his contention that these general damages are not "excess" and, therefore, should receive the same treatment as loss of consortium damages in *Flanigan*.

Gersema, 127 Wn.App. at 556.

Unlike in *Gersema*, Mr. Tobin's third party recovery did allocate a portion of the recovery to his pain and suffering, and the Department signed-off on this allocation. The pain and suffering portion of his recovery should, therefore, not be subject to the Department's reimbursement rights under RCW 51.24.060.

B. RCW 51.24.030(5) DOES NOT CHANGE FLANIGAN'S INTERPRETATION OF RCW 51.24.060(1).

The Department asserts that Mr. Tobin's argument and the reasoning of the Court in *Flanigan* is contrary to RCW 51.24.030(5) that was enacted in 1995 after the *Flanigan* decision. This argument is simply untrue.

In 1995, the Department petitioned the legislature for a legislative fix in response to the *Flanigan* decision. In proposing the legislation the Department noted, "The department believes that there are several technical changes to the workers' compensation statutes that would

improve administration [including:]... The term ‘recovery’ does not include damages for loss of consortium.” Final Legislative Report, 54th Leg. (Wash.1995), at 219 (SB 5399) (See CP 39).

In the background section of the legislative history for the bill enacting RCW 51.24.030(5), it was noted that the change in the law was necessary because, “The state Supreme Court ruled last year that the department’s right to reimbursement does not extend to amounts awarded for loss of consortium.” *Id.* The legislature was responding to a specific judicial holding that stated that the Department did not have a right to the loss of consortium portion of a third party recovery. There is no mention in the legislative history of pain and suffering or any other form of damages other than loss of consortium.

The fact that the legislature did not intend to change the law beyond dealing with the loss of consortium issue is made even clearer by the summary section of the bill’s history. In this section, in which the bill’s effects are discussed, it simply says “The term ‘recovery’ does not include damages for loss of consortium.” *Id.*

While there may have been some discussion of general damages by witnesses before the committees, there does not appear to have been any discussion of such issues before the full House or Senate, nor does such a discussion appear in the Legislative Report from the bill. *Id.*

To interpret the enactment of RCW 51.24.030(5) to allow the Department to be reimbursed from the pain and suffering portion of a third party recovery when there is no indication of such a legislative intent would be directly contrary to the purpose of the Act and the rule that the Act is to be liberally construed.

Furthermore, the Court in *Flanigan* was not even looking at the meaning of the term “recovery” in reaching its decision. Rather, the Court focused on the term “reimburse,” a term used in RCW 51.24.060(1), and concluded that the Department could not be “reimbursed” for damages for which it has paid no compensation. The Court concluded that the Department, therefore, had no right to be “reimbursed” from the portion of damages (in that case, loss of consortium) that were of a type for which the Department had not paid benefits. Nothing about the enactment of RCW 51.24.030(5) would change this interpretation.

C. IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT THE AMOUNT THE DEPARTMENT WOULD RECEIVE, IF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THEIR REIMBURSEMENT CALCULATION, MIGHT NOT COVER ALL OF THEIR PAST AND ESTIMATED FUTURE COSTS.

The Department argues that if pain and suffering damages were excluded from the Department’s calculations of the offset and excess subject to offset, it would somehow defeat the purpose of the statute. This

simply is not true.

The Department, under RCW 51.24.060(1), is only entitled to the portion of the recovery necessary to “reimburse” it for benefits paid on the claim. Since no pain and suffering benefits were paid or will be paid on the claim, this portion of the third party settlement cannot be used to “reimburse” the Department.

The fact that the portion of Mr. Tobin’s third party recovery that pertained to his wage loss does not fully cover the potential pension costs is not at all surprising. The Department pays pension benefits to a claimant for the remainder of the claimant’s life. Conversely, in a third party action, wage loss damages can only be claimed for the period that the injured party would have likely worked if not for the injury. See *Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers*, 151 Wn.2d, 203, 210-211, 87 P.3d 757 (2004).

The difference between the amount that the Department would recover from the portion of the settlement related to medical and wage loss and the amounts that the Department has and will pay for these benefits is also a result of the statutory scheme.

RCW 51.24.060(1) dictates that the attorneys’ fees and costs from the third party recovery are taken off the top of any recovery. The statute then directs that twenty-five (25) percent of the remainder be given to the

claimant. Only after that is the Department entitled to take its share, less its proportionate share of the attorneys' fees and costs.

In fact, the Department's medical and estimated wage loss costs on the claim and the portion of Mr. Tobin's settlement resulting from his medical and wage loss are quite close. The Department's estimate of its past and future costs is \$643,233.40 (\$80,501.40 past and \$562,732.00 future). Meanwhile, Mr. Tobin recovered a total of \$606,916.84 for medical and wage loss (\$43,973.84 medical and \$562,943.00 wage loss).

The portion of the recovery dedicated to medical and wage loss would, therefore, cover nearly ninety-five (95) percent of the Department's costs if not for the statutory mandate that attorneys' fees and costs be deducted as well as the requirement that the claimant receive twenty-five (25) percent of the remainder.

The Department's argument that it would be unfair that it would not be "reimbursed" for the full amount of its damages if pain and suffering damages were excluded from the recovery calculation lacks merit since the very reason that the remainder of the damages would not fully reimburse the Department is largely a function of the statutory requirements of RCW 51.24.060(1).

The Department's argument, in fact, attempts to reverse the equity argument in an absurd way to try to distract from the harm being done to

the claimant by its interpretation of RCW 51.24.060(1). As the United States Supreme Court recently pointed out in citing *Flanigan*, “the department could not ‘share in damages for which it has provided no compensation’ because such a result would be ‘absurd and fundamentally unjust.’” *Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. V. Ahlborn*, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459, 126 S. Ct. 1752, (2006), citing *Flanigan v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 123 Wn.2d 418, 426, 869 P.2d 14 (1994).

D. THE DEPARTMENT’S ASSERTION OF A STATUTORY LIEN AGAINST MR. TOBIN’S PAIN AND SUFFERING RECOVERY IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING.

Article 1 Section 3 of the Washington State Constitution provides, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” This is a functional equivalent of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which provides, in relevant part, “nor shall any person...be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution similarly states, “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...”

- (1) Mr. Tobin’s third party recovery of pain and suffering damages is his private property, and is, therefore, constitutionally protected against a taking without due process of law.

A chose of action is property that may be sold or otherwise assigned. *See* RCW 4.08.080.

Case law has also established, unequivocally, that an individual's chose of action for damages against another is property. Most significantly for the case at hand, negligence claims, whether liquidated or reduced to judgment, constitute property. *Wody's Olympic Lumber, Inc. v. Roney*, 9 Wn.App. 626, 513 P.2d 849 (1973).

Our courts have recognized that a chose of action for personal injuries contains various, specifically identifiable categories of property. Elements of a negligence claim which relate to damages for pain and suffering are the separate property of the injured person whereas wage loss and injury-related expenses are damage components which are community property. *See Marriage of Brown*, 100 Wn.2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984).

Since a chose of action for personal injuries arising out of a claim based on negligence of another constitutes property, whether or not the claim is reduced to judgment, the protections of our Washington State Constitution Article I, Section 3, apply.

(2) Attaching a lien pursuant to RCW 51.24.060(1)(e) on Mr. Tobin's third party recovery pain and suffering damages constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property.

In *Presbytery of Seattle v. King County*, 114 Wn.2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert. Denied 498 U.S. 911 (1990), the state Supreme Court set out the

criteria for establishing a substantive due process violation in the context of a land use regulation. The Court explained:

To determine whether the regulation violates due process, the court should engage in a three-prong due process test and ask:

- (1) Whether the regulation is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose;
- (2) Whether it uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose; and
- (3) Whether it is unduly oppressive on the landowner.

Id. at 330.

The *Presbytery* substantive due process test has been applied in the workers' compensation context in *Rafn Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 104 Wn.2d 947, 17 P.3d 711 (2001).

In applying the *Presbytery* criterion to the facts in Mr. Tobin's case, element one, addressing a legitimate public purpose, is satisfied. Prevention of double recovery in tort claims is certainly an appropriate public goal as is the goal of reducing the burden on the accident fund by allowing the Department to be "reimbursed" for benefits paid from at fault third parties. It is on prong two, requiring use of reasonably necessary means to achieve the public purpose, and prong three, relating to undue oppression, by which the substantive due process violation in this case is triggered.

The Act provides no compensation in any form for an injured worker's pain and suffering sustained in an industrial injury. Even permanent partial disability awards are granted solely because such an award anticipates a certain lost earning capacity associated with a percentage of loss in any given bodily function. *See Davis v. Bendix*, 82 Wn.App. 267, 917 P.2d 586 (1996).

Under Mr. Tobin's worker's compensation claim, the Department has paid medical benefits. They have also paid wage loss benefits (time loss and pension) and will continue to pay these benefits. Mr. Tobin, however, will not be paid a permanent partial disability award or any other type of benefits other than wage loss benefits and medical benefits. There have not and will not be any benefits paid for pain and suffering.

The Department in this case is asserting that it has a right to include Mr. Tobin's third party pain and suffering damages recovery in its calculations under RCW 51.24.060(c). In other words, the Department is asserting a right to take a portion of these damages from Mr. Tobin. This is an unconstitutional taking and a substantive due process violation.

Since the Department never has paid and never will pay Mr. Tobin pain and suffering damages, there is no need for the Department to take these benefits from him to prevent a double recovery. Similarly, as the Supreme Court pointed out in *Flanigan*, since the Department did not pay

any such general damages, the Department cannot be “reimbursed” damages that it never paid in the first place. Both of the purposes of RCW 51.24.060 could be met by including the portion of the third party recovery relating to medical expenses and wage loss while excluding the pain and suffering portion from the calculation under RCW 51.24.060.

The Department’s use of RCW 51.24.060 to take from Mr. Tobin a portion of his pain and suffering damages is not reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of RCW 51.24.060. It, therefore, violates the second prong of the *Presbytery* test.

Since the Department is attempting to take from Mr. Tobin his property (his third party recovery) to “reimburse” itself for benefits that it never in fact paid, this is also “unduly oppressive” and violates the third prong of the *Presbytery* test.

E. ALL OF THE ITEMS INCLUDED IN THE APPENDIX TO THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, EXCEPT FOR THE TEXT OF THE STATUTES, SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RAP 10.3(a)(8).

RAP 10.3(a)(8) provides that a party may submit an appendix to their brief. The rule, however, states that “[a]n appendix may not include materials not contained in the record on review without permission from the appellate court, except as provided in Rule 10.4(c).” RAP 10.4(c)

allows for the party to type relevant portions of relevant statutes, rules, regulations, jury instructions, findings of fact, exhibits, or the like.

The Supreme Court has thus stricken items such as a Department of Licensing Manual that was not part of the record. *Bellevue v. Hellenthal*, 144 Wn.2d 425, 429, 28 P.3d 744 (2001). Similarly, a court of appeals determined that city documents showing that an annexation had occurred should be excluded since they were not part of the appellate record. *City of Moses Lake v. Grant County Boundary Review Bd.*, 104 Wn. App. 388, 391, 15 P.3d 716 (2001).

The items submitted by appellant, other than the text of the statutes, does not fall into any of the allowed categories and these items are not contained in the record. They should, therefore, be excluded. All references to these materials in Appellant's Brief should also be stricken from the record.

If the Court allows these items into the record, the respondent reserves the right to submit additional arguments to respond to these items.

F. MR. TOBIN'S ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES FOR WORK DONE AT SUPERIOR COURT AS WELL AS WORK DONE AT THE COURT OF APPEALS.

(1) The Superior Court's attorneys' fee award should be upheld.

Mr. Tobin's attorneys were awarded fees of \$12,375 for work done

at Superior Court (CP 44-46). The employer has not objected to this amount in this appeal. If the Superior Court's verdict is otherwise upheld, the awarding of these amounts should also be upheld.

(2) Mr. Tobin's attorneys should also be awarded fees for work done before the Court of Appeals.

Rule 18.1 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, "[i]f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review, the party must request the fees or expenses provided in this rule, unless a statute specifies that the request is to be directed to the trial court." RAP 18.1.

RCW 51.52.130 provides that in workers' compensation cases, if a party other than the worker appeals a decision of the Board to superior or appellate court and the worker's right to relief is sustained, the worker is entitled to attorneys' fees for the work done before that court. RCW 51.52.130.

Mr. Tobin's attorneys, therefore, request that should the Court uphold the Superior Court's decision, they be awarded reasonable fees for work done on this appeal before this Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

The documents included in the appendix to the Appellant's Brief, other than the statutes, should be stricken as they violate RAP 10.3(a)(8).

All references to these documents in the Appellant's Brief should also be stricken.

In interpreting the meaning of the Act, all doubts as to the meaning of the Act are to be resolved in favor of the injured worker. That means that if reasonable minds can differ over the meaning of provisions in the Act, the benefit of the doubt belongs to the injured worker.

Because the Department does not pay pain and suffering damages under the Act, allowing Mr. Tobin to keep this portion of his third party recovery will not result in a double recovery. Similarly, since the Department does not pay pain and suffering benefits they cannot be "reimbursed" by taking a portion of such damages out of the third party recovery. The Department, therefore, does not have a right to include the pain and suffering portion of Mr. Tobin's third party recovery in its calculations under RCW 51.24.060.

Mr. Tobin's third party recovery is property. The Department's interpretation of RCW 51.24.060, which would allow them to take a portion of Mr. Tobin's pain and suffering damages, is not reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of avoiding double recovery and allowing the Department to be "reimbursed" for payments it has made for the same injury. This taking of Mr. Tobin's property is, therefore, unconstitutional.

For the above reasons, the Superior Court judge's decision should be affirmed and the September 29, 2005 Department order should be reversed and the matter should be remanded to the Department to recalculate the distribution under RCW 51.24.060. In this recalculation, the Department should be directed to exclude the portion of the recovery, \$793,083.16, that was allocated as being for pain and suffering damages.

The respondent and his attorneys also request that appropriate fees be awarded in accordance with RAP 18.1 and RCW 51.52.130.

DATED this 27th day of September, 2007.

SMALL, SNELL, WEISS & COMFORT, P.S.
Attorneys for Respondent, Jim A. Tobin

By: David W. Lauman
David W. Lauman, WSBA #27343

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COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON

JIM A. TOBIN,)	
)	
Respondent,)	No. 36031-4-II
)	
v.)	
)	CERTIFICATE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR)	OF SERVICE
& INDUSTRIES OF THE)	
STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	
)	
Appellant.)	
_____)	

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
	: ss.
County of Pierce)


DAVID W. LAUMAN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1. That I am now and at all times herein mentioned was a citizen of the United States and resident of the State of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party to or interested in the above-entitled action, and competent to be a witness therein.
2. That on September 27, 2007, I personally filed the original and one copy of the Respondent's Brief in the above-captioned matter with the Court of Appeals, Division II, at 950 Broadway, Suite 300, Tacoma, Washington, 98402.

3. That on September 27, 2007, I sent a copy of Respondent's Brief in the above-captioned matter by United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, properly addressed envelopes addressed as follows:

Michael Hall, AAG
Office of the Attorney General
PO Box 40121
Olympia, WA 98401-0121


Jim A. Tobin
PO Box 1651
Milton, WA 98354



DAVID W. LAUMAN

SIGNED AND SWORN TO before me this 27th day of September, 2007.





NOTARY PUBLIC in and for
the State of Washington,
residing at Bonny Lake
My appointment expires: 3-30-09