

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II

2012 JUL 31 AM 9:29

STATE OF WASHINGTON

BY 
DEPUTY

No. 42868-7-II

COURT OF APPEALS, DIV. II
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Guardianship of BERNADYNE JACOBY, Deceased
and
In re the Estate of BERNADYNE JACOBY, Deceased

RANDAL JACOBY, Appellant,

GARY JACOBY, Respondent,

and

SHARON JOHNSON, Trustee.

TRUSTEE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Attorney for Trustee:

Jonete Rehmke
Sean Flynn
Rehmke & Flynn, PLLC
917 Pacific Avenue, Suite 407
Tacoma, WA 98402
(253) 460-3190
jonete@rehmkeandflynn.com
sean@rehmkeandflynn.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
STATEMENT OF FACTS	1
RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.....	4
ARGUMENT	5
I. Summary of Arguments.....	5
II. Authority of the Court.....	6
1. The Superior Court Had Authority to Issue Orders	6
2. The Superior Court Had Authority to Consolidate the Guardianship and Probate Actions	9
III. Removal and Appointment of Trustees	10
3. The Court Was Justified in Removing Randal as Trustee for Conflict of Interest	11
4. The Court Was Justified in Removing Randal as Trustee for Bad Will.....	11
5. The Court Had Grounds to Reject Alternate Trustees	11
6. The Superior Court as Justified in Appointing	12
IV. Communications	13
7. Communications Between Departments 19 and 20 Were Not Improper	14
8. The Court Did Not Consider Improper Unfiled Communications from Gary	14
ATTORNEY’S FEES	15
CONCLUSION.....	16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Chai v. Kong</i> , 122 Wn. App. 247, 93 P.3d 936 (2004).....	9
<i>Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr. v. Holman</i> , 107 Wn.2d 693, 732 P.2d 974 (1987).....	11
<i>In re Estate of Black</i> , 116 Wn. App. 492, 66 P.3d 678 (2003)	7
<i>In re Estate of Ehlers</i> , 80 Wn. App. 751, 911 P.2d 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).....	10
<i>In re Guardianship of Jacoby</i> , 153 Wn. App. 1048, 2009 WL 5067679 (Wash. App. Div 1) (<i>unpublished opinion</i>).....	1, 6
<i>In re Marriage of Kovacs</i> , 121 Wn.2d 795, 854 P.2d 629 (1993).....	10
<i>In re Marriage of Petrie</i> , 105 Wn. App. 268, 19 P.3d 443 (2001)	10
<i>Porter v. Porter</i> , 107, Wn.2d 43, 726 P.2d 459 (1986)	11
<i>State v. Roy</i> , 147 Wn. App. 309, 195 P.3d 967 (2008), <i>review denied</i> , 165 Wn.2d 1051, 208 P.3d 555 (2009).....	6
<i>State v. Schwab</i> , 163 Wn.2d 664, 185 P.3d 1151 (2008).....	6
<i>Waits v. Hamlin</i> , 55 Wn. App 193, 776 P.2d 1003 (1989).....	11

Statutes

RCW 11.96A.....	7
RCW 11.96A.020(1).....	7
RCW 11.96A.020(2).....	7
RCW 11.96A.060.....	7
RCW 11.96A.090(1).....	7
RCW 11.96A.090(2).....	7
RCW 11.96A.150.....	15
RCW 11.96A.230.....	7

Other Authority

Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.9 (1) 13

Model Code 15

Washington Civil Court Rule 42(a) 9

INTRODUCTION

At the insistence of Randal Jacoby, the issues in this case have already been appealed and decided in an unpublished opinion from Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals. *See In re Guardianship of Jacoby*, 153 Wn. App. 1048, 2009 WL 5067679 (Wash. App. Div 1) (*unpublished opinion*). In that decision, the Court examined many of the same issues present in this case and affirmed the decisions of the lower court, deciding that the lower court had authority to administer the Trust in the best interests of the beneficiaries when there had been ongoing conflict between the beneficiaries and the interests of the purported Trustee were in direct conflict with the interests of the other beneficiaries. Despite these previous decisions, Randal yet again appeals in an obvious attempt to drain the Trust assets.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1985, Bernadyne Jacoby (“Bernadyne”) created the Bernadyne E. Jacoby Trust (“the Trust”) to provide for her care during her lifetime. Bernadyne was the principal beneficiary during her lifetime and her sons, Randal Jacoby (“Randal”) and Gary Jacoby (“Gary”), are the primary beneficiaries after her death. Two charitable religious organizations are also remainder beneficiaries.

In early 2006, Bernadyne was diagnosed with Alzheimers and relinquished management of the Trust to Gary. Around that same time, Randal moved in with Bernadyne. Several months later, Bernadyne purportedly named Randal the successor trustee, replacing Gary.

After some disturbances between Randal and both Bernadyne’s friends and her doctor, Gary called Adult Protective Services who then contacted the

police to request a welfare check on Bernadyne. When the police arrived to conduct the check, Randal was arrested for obstruction.

Shortly thereafter Gary filed a petition for guardianship of his mother.

Ingrid Cameron was appointed Guardian of the Person and Estate of Bernadyne Jacoby on November 20, 2006 by the Pierce County Superior Court under Cause Number 08-4-00227-9. The court instructed Ms. Cameron to petition to be appointed successor Trustee of the Bernadyne Jacoby Trust. *CP 7*. The court found that the Trust was part of the guardianship assets and that the petition for appointment of successor trustee was incidental to the guardianship proceedings. *CP 9*.

Randal appealed the order appointing Ms. Cameron as successor Trustee. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision to remove Randal as Trustee and appoint Ms. Cameron as successor trustee in an unpublished opinion filed on December 28, 2009 by the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One. *CP 6-15*.

In that decision, the Court explicitly found that "questions relating to the Trust and Trust assets were at issue in the guardianship proceeding within the meaning of RCW 11.96A.100". *CP 9*. The Court of Appeals also found that the lower court's decision to remove Randal was supported by substantial evidence and that the court was within its discretion to remove him. *CP 10*. The only issue the Court remanded was the Superior Court's decision to redact Bernadyne's address. *CP 12-13*.

Bernadyne Jacoby passed away on August 16, 2010. A hearing to review the guardian/trustee's final reports was set for December 10, 2010 in front of Judge Van Doornick of Department 20. On November 24, 2010, Randal filed a Petition for Probate of the Estate of Bernadyne Jacoby under Pierce County Superior Court Cause Number 10-4-01656-5. That matter was set before Judge Lee of Department 19.

On December 10, 2010 Judge Van Doornick ordered that the guardian/trustee's final report not be entered until Judge Lee had made a ruling regarding the Trust assets under the probate cause of action.

Over the next few weeks, several motions were filed: Gary's Petition to Appoint Successor Trustee; Gary's Motion to Consolidate the Guardianship/Trust and Probate matters; and Randal's Petition for Probate of Bernadyne's estate.

On February 8, 2011, Randal filed his Opposition to Petition to Appoint Successor Trustee and Opposition to Motion to Consolidate in the guardianship.

Randal then filed a Motion Directing Guardian to Deliver Trust Assets on March 1, 2011 in the guardianship, requesting that the court issue an order directing Ms. Cameron to deliver the assets of the trust to him as purported successor Trustee.

On March 15, 2011, Gary filed his Motion Objecting to Trustee, which may have been more properly titled as a response to Randal's Motion. In that motion, Gary addresses the issue of consolidation.

Judge Van Doornick of Department 20 transferred the guardianship/trust matter to Judge Lee of Department 19 on April 28, 2011.

At the hearing on June 14, 2011 in Department 19, Judge Lee heard argument under both the probate and guardianship causes of action regarding Randal's Motion to Direct the Guardian to deliver assets to the Trustee as well as argument regarding consolidation and appointment of a successor trustee. After considering the issues, on August 1, 2010, Judge Lee entered an order: consolidating the Guardianship/Trust matter and Probate matter; removing Randal as Trustee; and appointing Sharon Johnson of Sunrise Guardianship Services as Successor Trustee.

Although many of the issues have already been decided repeatedly by both the Superior Court and the Appellate Court, Randal once again appeals.

RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Trustee responds to Randal's assignment of the following errors:

Response to Assignment of Error #1: The Superior Court did not err by issuing orders based on its plenary power and the power granted it under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, particularly when all parties had been heard on the issues.

Response to Assignment of Error #2: The court did not err by exercising its discretion to consolidate the guardianship and probate causes of action, particularly when they involve the same parties, identical facts, and all parties have been heard on the issue.

Response to Assignment of Error #3: The court did not err by exercising its discretion to remove Randal as successor Trustee based upon a clear conflict of interest and bad will, particularly in light of his previous removal under the guardianship which was affirmed by Division II of the Court of Appeals.

Response to Assignment of Error #4: The court did not err by exercising its discretion to remove the two named alternate successor Trustees when there was ill will and the previous appointment of a professional had been upheld by Division II of the Court of Appeals.

Response to Assignment of Error #5: The superior court did not err in exercising its discretion to appoint Sharon Johnson as successor Trustee, particularly when the appointment of a professional had been previously upheld by Division II of the Court of Appeals.

Response to Assignment of Error #6: Department 19 did not err by considering improper communications from Department 20 when there is no evidence to suggest that the communications were anything other than administrative and when Randal himself had alerted Department 19 to the accusations against him in the guardianship.

Response to Assignment of Error #7: The court did not err by considering improper communications from Gary when Randal has failed to point to any specific communications or demonstrate how those communications were damaging, and instead has only made broad, unsupported accusations.

ARGUMENT

I. Summary of Arguments

Division II of the Court of Appeals previously decided many of these issues and upheld the Superior Court's authority to administer the trust within its discretion. It held that the court had authority to remove Randal and to appoint a neutral, professional Trustee. As such, it is now the law of this case and should once again be affirmed.

The superior court had broad authority to administer trusts and estates and was well within its discretion to issue orders that were in the best interests of all of the Trust beneficiaries.

II. Authority of the Court

Law of the Case Doctrine

The “Law of the Case Doctrine” provides that once there is an appellate court ruling, its holding must be followed in all subsequent aspects of the litigation unless it is clearly erroneous. *State v. Roy* 147 Wn.App. 309, 314, 195 P.3d 967, review denied 165 Wash.2d 1051, 208 P.3d 555(2008); *State v. Schwab* 163 Wash.2d 664, 672, 185 P.3d 1151 (2008).

Many of the issues now appealed by Randal have already been decided in the unpublished opinion of Division I. See *In re Guardianship of Jacoby*, 153 Wn. App. (*unpublished opinion*). That appeal was from decisions made under the guardianship cause number, which has now been consolidated with the probate. This appeal addresses issues under the same cause number, involving the same parties, and identical facts. As such, the holdings of Division II must be followed here.

1. The Superior Court Had Authority to Issue Orders

Randal has been heard several times on these issues, both at the Superior Court and the Appellate Court levels, and every time the courts have affirmed the Superior Court’s authority to remove and appoint a successor Trustee in this matter. Yet again, Randal rehashes the same issues that have repeatedly been decided.

Plenary Power of the Court

In adopting the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) in 1999, the legislature found that was in the interest of the citizens of Washington to encourage prompt and efficient resolution of trust and estate matters by streamlining the statutory framework governing such matters. RCW 11.96A.230. While an action under TEDRA may be commenced by filing a petition, it may also be commenced incidental to a judicial proceeding relating to the same trust or estate. RCW 11.96A.090(2); *In re estate of Black*, 116 Wn. App. 492, 498, 66 P.3d 678 (2003). This matter involves just the type of trust and estate dispute that the legislature enacted TEDRA to address.

If there is any doubt about the applicability of TEDRA, the court nevertheless has full authority to proceed with the administration of the trust or estate in any manner that the court deems proper so that the matter may be expeditiously handled. RCW 11.96A.020(2). Even if there was a question about the applicability of the statute in this matter, the court still had authority to administer the trust and estate.

TEDRA is extremely broad and grants the Court plenary authority and “full and ample power and authority under this title to administer and settle” estate and trust matters. RCW 11.96A.020(1). Pursuant to RCW 11.96A.060, “(t)he court may make, issue, and cause to be filed or served, any and all manner and kinds of orders, judgments, citations, notices, summons, and other writs and processes that might be considered proper or necessary in the exercise of the jurisdiction or powers given or intended to be given by this title.”

A judicial proceeding under TEDRA is a special proceeding under the civil rules. RCW 11.96A.090(1). If there is any inconsistency between the civil rules and the provisions of RCW 11.96A, the provisions of 11.96A control.

In this case, the Court had wide latitude under TEDRA to issue any order it deemed proper and necessary, including the orders at issue in this matter: appointing a Successor Trustee; appointing a Personal Representative; and consolidating the trust and estate matters. The court recognized that, given the level of conflict between Randal and Gary, appointment of a neutral trustee would be appropriate and found so in the previous appellate decision.

Notice and the Opportunity to be Heard

Notice and the opportunity are essential elements of due process and Randal was afforded both in this matter. He received notice of the motions, he filed responses to those motions, and he was given the opportunity to argue his position in open court before any rulings were issued.

Randal complains about four (4) orders that were entered on August 1, 2011: the order appointing successor trustee; the order on his own petition for order probating will; the order consolidating the guardianship and trust and probate matters; and the order removing Randal as trustee.

- The Petition to Appoint Successor Trustee was filed on November 11, 2010. Randal filed his Opposition to Appoint Successor Trustee on February 8, 2011.
- The Petition for Order Probating Will was Randal's own motion.
- The Motion to Consolidate the Guardianship/Trust and Probate Matters was filed on November 30, 2010. Randal filed his Opposition to Motion to Consolidate on February 8, 2011.
- The Motion Objecting to Randal as Trustee was filed on March 15, 2011. Randal filed his Response to Motion Objection to Trustee on March 16, 2011.

Judge Lee heard argument by Randal's counsel on all of these matters on June 14, 2011. She then entered the orders on August 1, 2011.

Further, Randal's own motion necessitated that the Judge decide who should be Trustee. By moving the court for an order directing the guardian to deliver the trust assets to the successor Trustee, Randal forced the court to decide who the appropriate successor Trustee was. The court was well within its discretion to decide, based on the conflicts of interest and ill will generated by the litigation, that a neutral, professional trustee was the most appropriate successor Trustee.

As he tends to do, Randal once again misinterprets the case law he cites. Randal cites *Chai v. Kong*, 122 Wn. App 247, 93 P3d 936 (2004) for the holding that notice was improper because it did not include the time and place of the hearing. However the court actually vacated the order in *Chai v. Kong* because it found the aggrieved party had not received any notice, actual or constructive, of the motion - the exclusion of time and place on the notice was just one small piece the court considered. In this case, the Appellant admits he received notice of the motion and in fact responded to those motions and was heard in open court.

2. The Superior Court Had Authority to Consolidate the Guardianship and Probate Actions

Washington Civil Court Rule 42(a) grants the Court authority to consolidate matters that involve common questions of law or fact.

Again, under TEDRA, the Court has wide latitude to administer trust and estate matters.

Here, the matters involve the same parties and identical facts. After considering Randal's argument to the contrary, the Court explicitly found that the

two matters were so interconnected that it would be inefficient and impractical to hear them as separate matters. *Transcript of June 14, 2011 hearing, Pg. 3-4, 9-10*. The Court was well within its discretion to consolidate the matters.

Randal argues that the guardianship should have terminated upon the death of Bernadyne. However the Court had previously decided that the trust assets were part of the guardianship estate and chose, within its discretion, not to close the guardianship case until a decision had been made about how to handle the trust assets. *Transcript of June 14, 2011 hearing, Pg. 9-10*. In fact, since it had already determined – and been affirmed by the Court of Appeals – that the trust assets were part of the guardianship, pursuant to the Law of the Case Doctrine, the guardianship could not be closed until a decision had been made regarding the Trust. Since the Trust was already under the jurisdiction of the court as part of the guardianship, the court’s jurisdiction continued after Bernadyne’s death.

III. Removal and Appointment of Trustees

The trial court’s decision to remove a trustee will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. *In re Estate of Ehlers*, 80 Wash.App 751, 761, 911 P.2d 1017 (Div. 3, 1996). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. *In re Marriage of Kovacs*, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993).

Under TEDRA the Court has wide latitude to administer trusts, including the power to remove and appoint Trustees. The Court may remove a Trustee so long as there is a reasonable basis. *In re Marriage of Petrie*, 105 Wn. App 268, 274-75, 19 P.3d 443 (2001).

3. The Court Was Justified in Removing Randal as Trustee for Conflict of Interest

Conflict of interest between trustee beneficiary and other trust beneficiaries may constitute reasonable cause for removal of trustee-beneficiary and appointment of successor. *Waits v. Hamlin*, 55 Wash.App 193,198, 776 P.2d 1003 (1989); *Porter v. Porter*, 107 Wn.2d 43, 55,726 P.2d 459 (1986).

In this matter, as a named beneficiary, Randal's interests are clearly in conflict with the other beneficiaries. The extensive litigation further evidences the conflicting interests of Randal and the other beneficiaries.

In the previous appeal, the appellate court already held that Randal was not an appropriate Trustee and that the Superior Court had discretion to remove him. This litigation is directly related to the previous appeal and that holding was not erroneous. Pursuant to the Law of the Case Doctrine, the previous appellate court holding must be followed, namely that there is substantial evidence to support Randal's removal and the court was well within its discretion to remove him.

4. The Court Was Justified in Removing Randal as Trustee for Bad Will and

5. The Court had Grounds to Reject Bernadyne's Two Named Alternate Trustees

Bad will generated by litigation alone is enough to justify removal of a trustee. *Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center v. Holman*, 107 Wn.2d 693, 716, 732 P.2d 974 (1987).

Here, the parties have been engaged in almost constant litigation that has been contentious and emotionally charged. At the June 1, 2011 hearing, Judge Lee found that there was clearly conflict between Randal and Gary.

The two alternate named trustees in this matter were also involved in the litigation that created the ill will. Mary Jurlin and her daughter, Camille Hutchison, the purported alternate trustees, have clearly supported Randal throughout this litigation and the court made the decision to reject them both after reading declarations they submitted on behalf of Randal. CP 73-80

Again, this issue was already decided by appellate court and is now the law of the case. The superior court decided, within its discretion, not to appoint either of the successor Trustees who had been involved in the litigation and instead appointed a neutral, professional Trustee. The appellate court affirmed this decision, as was the law of the case, and it should again be upheld.

6. The Superior Court was Justified in Appointing Johnson as Successor Trustee

Under the Court's broad authority to administer trusts and estates, the Court was well within its discretion to appoint a neutral, professional as trustee, particularly in light of the heated and contentious litigation between the beneficiaries and given the involvement of the alternate trustees in that litigation.

In the first appeal, Division II upheld the superior court's authority to exercise its discretion in appointing a professional, and that decision is now the law of this case. As such, it should be affirmed.

IV. Communications

Randal is grasping at straws with regard to his arguments about ‘improper communications’. He makes only general statements and does not point to any specific allegations to demonstrate which parts of the communications he believes were improper, nor does he demonstrate how he was injured by any such communications.

7. Communications between Departments 19 and 20 Were Not Improper

Judicial departments must be able to communicate to carry out the administration justice and the rules allow such communication. The Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.9 (1) allows that “when circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters...is permitted...”. CJC Rule 2.9 (1)

So long as he makes reasonable efforts not to receive factual information that is not part of the record or abrogate the responsibility of deciding the matter a judge may “consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges...”.. CJC Rule 2.9(3)

Randal argues that he was entitled to have a new judge – untainted by the accusations in the guardianship – hear his motion to be appointed Personal Representative of Bernadyne’s estate. Regardless of any communications between the departments, the court in the probate matter was already aware of the accusations that Randal exploited Bernadyne because Randal himself put those accusations in front of the court in his Motion to Release APS Records on

December 8, 2012. That motion was filed prior to any of the communications cited by Randal. He cannot now complain that the judge was aware of facts which he put before the court himself.

In his brief, Randal only alleges that communications occurred, but has failed to show how those communications were improper or that he was prejudiced in any way. Randal points to two instances of “communication” between the departments – the Request for Reassignment filed in Department 19 on April 27, 2011 and the Minutes of Proceeding from the December 10, 2010 hearing that were filed on December 15, 2010 in Department 19. Neither of these documents addresses any substantive issues nor contains any substantive facts. The only information provided by these documents is procedural and administrative in nature. Nothing in the communications cited by Randal prejudiced him in any way and, in fact, nowhere does Randal even allege that he was prejudiced.

The cases in this matter were properly consolidated into one matter. Randal was not prejudiced by communications between the departments.

8. The Court Did Not Consider Improper Unfiled Communications from Gary

Again, Randal has failed to show that he was in any way prejudiced by this alleged error. He simply makes the blanket statement that Judge Lee ‘appeared’ to consider the unfiled documents without providing any support for that claim. He has failed to point to which communications were improper and has failed to show how those communications were improper.

Even if it was an error, Randal has failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the hearing on June 14, 2011 and order entered on August 1, 2011 would have

been different. Even without the letters and documents provided by Gary on May 3, 2011 and May 5, 2011, Judge Lee had more than enough other evidence to find that it was appropriate to consolidate the cases and to remove Randal and appoint a neutral successor Trustee, as already upheld by Division I.

Randal has not alleged that he was unaware of these communications or that he was not given the opportunity to respond.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The court "may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to be awarded to any party ... in such amount and in such manner as the court determines to be equitable." RCW 11.96A.150. Randal has continuously created the litigation and the attorney's fees that litigation has given rise to. He should bear the cost of his own attorney's fees for continuing to create more extensive and expensive litigation.

RAP 18.9(a) allows for sanctions if a party uses these rules to create delay or files a frivolous appeal. The issues raised by Randal in this appeal have previously and repeatedly been decided. The court acted well within its discretion and his appeal is without merit. Appellant's insistent and continual use of the legal system is an attempt to delay the distribution of the trust funds so that he can bleed it dry with continual, baseless litigation. His further appeal is frivolous and unreasonable. As such, the other beneficiaries should not bear the cost of Randal's insistent and pointless litigation. Randal himself should be liable for the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Trust in defending against Randal's continual attacks.

CONCLUSION

The lower court was well within its discretion to enter the orders: consolidating the guardianship/trust matter and probate matter; removing Randal as Trustee; and appointing a neutral, successor Trustee. Randal has failed to show that there were any improper communications or that he was in any way prejudiced. Accordingly, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Randal's appeal and deny his motion to have his attorney's fees and costs paid by the Trust.

The Trustee further requests that the Court order Randal to pay its attorney's fees and costs incurred during the frivolous and unreasonable litigation created by Randal.

July 30, 2012



Jonete W. Rehmke, WSBA #28970
Sean E. Flynn, WSBA #43386
Attorneys for Trustee

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II

2012 JUL 31 AM 9:29

STATE OF WASHINGTON

BY _____
DEPUTY

In the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington
Division II

In Re the Guardianship:
BERNADYNE E. JACOBY,
An Incapacitated Person.

NO. 42868-7-II

Proof of Service of Trustee's Response to
Appellant's Opening Brief

I declare under penalty of perjury under Washington State law the today I served a copy of Trustee's Response to Appellant's Opening Brief, being filed electronically today, on each of the below named parties by email at the address indicated below, along with this Proof of Service which will be e-filed in the Court today.

Thomas D. Lofton
Brislawn Lofton PLLC
5555 Lakeview Dr. Ste. 201
Kirkland, WA 98033-7444
thomas.lofton@brislawnlofton.com

Marie Jurlin
3312 45th Street NW
Gig Harbor, WA 98335
inseine56@comcast.net

Douglas Schaefer
Schaefer Law Firm
950 Pacific Avenue, Suite 1050
Tacoma, WA 98401
schafer@pobox.com

ORIGINAL

Dated this 30 day of July, 2012



Alisson H. Wall, WSBA # 43105
Attorney for Trustee

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25