

NO. 43853-4 -II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION TWO

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STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY SUMAIT  
Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE  
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY

The Honorable Mark McCauley, Judge

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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sumait committed assault with a deadly weapon.
2. Mr. Sumait was denied his right to a public trial by the use of a sidebar that was not placed on the record.

Issues Presented on Appeal

1. Did the state fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sumait committed assault with a deadly weapon?
2. Was Mr. Sumait denied his right to a public trial by the use of a sidebar that was not placed on the record?

B. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Anthony Sumait was charged with assault with a deadly weapon as a principle and as an accomplice. CP 1-2. The state did not allege substantial bodily injury in the charging document but did provide a jury instruction on substantial bodily injury; however, the to-convict instruction only required an intentional assault with a deadly weapon. Jury instructions 8, 15; CP 1-2; 17-24.

Following the state's case, the defense moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence. RP 27-29. The Court denied the motion and Mr.

Sumait was convicted as charged. CP 25. This timely appeal follows. CP 46-47.

Mr. Sumait was located and arrested one quarter of a mile from a shooting. RP 39-41. Mr. Sumait admitted that he went to look at a truck with the man shot, Mr. Holcomb. RP 16. Mr. Sumait was unaware of a confrontation but indicated that he had asked Mr. Burnett, the truck owner for a cigarette and was refused and left the area. Shortly thereafter Mr. Sumait heard gunshots. RP 16-17.

Mr. Burnett shot Mr. Holcomb claiming that after a man asked him for a cigarette and Mr. Burnett told the men to come back tomorrow, Mr. Burnett was struck in the head with an object. RP 67, 71. The Washington State crime lab analyzed a stick with a metal end found at the scene and matched the blood type on the end of the stick to Mr. Burnett, who had a lot of blood on his head, and the handle to Mr. Holcomb's DNA. RP 49-51, 93. Mr. Sumait's DNA was not on the stick or any other item analyzed by the crime lab. Mr. Burnett did not see who struck him and could not identify the men from the attack and did not identify Mr. Sumait as one of the attackers. RP 73.

Jennifer Minkler, Mr. Burnett's girlfriend saw four men walk around the corner near her house and heard two men ask Mr. Burnett

about a truck for sale. RP 56-57, 59. According to Ms. Minkler after a 5-10 minute discussion, Mr. Burnett turned around and 2 men started to hit Mr. Burnett with clubs. Mr. Burnett pulled out his gun and shot one of the men; the other three men ran off before the shooting. RP 56-57, 63. Ms. Minkler did not get a good look at the men who ran but said all three men were wearing dark clothes. RP 63. Ms. Minkler indicated that one of the men who did not get shot was wearing a dark sweatshirt. RP 61. Mr. Burnett believed one of the men was wearing a dark hoody. RP 66.

Mr. Sumait was wearing a dark hoody when he was approached by the police and fit the general description of a white male wearing dark clothes. RP 40-41. No witness identified Mr. Sumait as the man at the shooting or as an assailant and no witness identified the sweatshirt that he wore as the same sweatshirt worn by the man at the scene.

C. ARGUMENT

1. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

The test for determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a defendant's conviction is whether, "after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” *State v. Kintz*, 169 Wn.2d 537, 551, 238 P.3d 470 (2010). In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the Court draws all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State. *Kintz*, 169 Wn.2d at 551. “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” *State v. Salinas*, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).

Mr. Sumait was charged with assault in the second degree with a deadly weapon as a principle or as an accomplice. The assault charges required the state to prove intent to assault with a deadly weapon. RCW (A.36.021)(c). *State v. Abuan*, 161 Wn.2d 135, 156, 158, 257 P.3d 1 (2011); *State v. Byrd*, 125 Wn.2d 707, 712-13, 887 P.2d 396 (1995); *State v. Elmi*, 166 Wn.2d 209, 215, 207 P.3d 439 (2009). The trial court provided a jury instruction defining “substantial bodily harm as: ”a bodily injury involving a temporary but substantial disfigurement, a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any body part or organ, or a fracture of any body part. RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b). *State v. McKague*, 170 Wn.2d 802, 805- 806,

262 P.3d 1225 (2011). The to convict instruction did not however include substantial bodily harm as an element of assault. CP 17-24.

RCW 9A.36.021(c) assault in the second degree

with a deadly weapon provides:

(1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree:

.....

(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or

The state presented evidence that Mr. Sumait was with Mr. Holcomb when he went to see Mr. Burnett about buying a used truck. RP 16. Mr. Burnett testified that two men approached him and started to beat him when he refused to give them a cigarette. RP 66-70. Ms. Minkler testified that there were four men present and three had on dark clothing and ran from the area. RP 59, 63. Ms. Minkler also stated that the man/men with Mr. Holcomb ran before the shooting began. RP 61. Mr. Sumait admitted to being present and asking for a cigarette. He denied participating in the assault of Holcomb with sticks or any other object. Mr. Sumait in his statement to police indicated that he left after Mr. Burnett refused to give him a cigarette and as he left he heard a scuffle and gun shots. EX 47; RP 16, 31, 96. Mr.

Burnett shot Mr. Holcomb multiple times. RP 6.

No one identified the other men with Mr. Holcomb, and in court neither Mr. Burnett nor Ms. Minkler identified Mr. Sumait as the person who struck Mr. Burnett. The witnesses believed that the person with Mr. Holcomb wore a black hoody with white designs. RP 41, 74. Officer Loughleed arrested Mr. Sumait one quarter mile from the shooting because he was a white male and he was wearing a black hoody with while markings. RP 40-41.

According to the police Mr. Sumait has minor cuts on his hands. The WSP forensic lab performed DNA and blood analysis of the metal tipped stick and it contained neither Mr. Sumait's DNA nor his blood. The DNA analysis revealed that Mr. Burnett's blood was on the end of the stick and Mr. Holcomb's DNA was on the handle of the stick. RP 48-49.

Since there was no evidence that Mr. Sumait actually struck Mr. Burnett, the state was required to prove Mr. Sumait acted as an accomplice. This means the state was required to prove that Mr. Sumait was not merely present, but was ready to assist with knowledge of the crime. *Waddington v. Sarausad*, 77 U.S.4056, 129 S. Ct. 823, 832, 172 L.Ed.2d 532 (2009). The state cannot prove

these elements because no one identified Mr. Sumait as being present during the altercation. RP 41, 73. The fact that someone was present and that Mr. Sumait was one quarter mile from the shooting is insufficient to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is possible that Mr. Sumait was present, but this is not the standard. *State v. Asaeli*, 150 Wn.App. 543, 569-570, 208 P.3d 1136, *review denied*, 167 Wn.2d 1001 (2009).

To prove accomplice liability, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sumait acted with knowledge that his conduct would promote or facilitate the commission of the murder. *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.App. at 569-570; *Sarausad*, 77 U.S.4056, 129 S. Ct. at, 832. Jury instruction # 6 defined accomplice liability as follows:

.....

A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he or she is legally accountable. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when he or she is an accomplice of such person in the commission of the crime.

A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime, if with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime [murder], he or she either:

(1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime [murder]; or

(2) aids or agrees to another person in planning or committing the crime.

The word “aid” means all assistance whether given by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is present at the scene and ready to assist by his presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of another must be shown to establish that a person is an accomplice.

CP 17-24.

In Mr. Sumait’s case, there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Sumait did anything with knowledge that it would facilitate an assault, or that he in any manner solicited, aided, encouraged or planned an assault.

*Asaeli, supra* is analogous. In *Asaeli*, Mr. Vaielua a co-defendant, was charged with felony murder in the second degree by direct and accomplice liability. *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 549. As in Mr. Sumait’s case, there was no evidence of direct involvement in the fight, rather in both cases, the state presented evidence that someone was merely present. *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 568-570

In *Asaeli*, the evidence established that Vaielua went to a bar with his codefendants, that he was present at the park where the

shooting took place, that he drove Williams, the person who approached Blaac Fola (the deceased) and asked him to fight, and that Vaielua was aware that some members of the group he was with were was trying to locate Fola. As Williams, sought out Fola, and challenged him to a fight, Asaeli, believing Fola was going to shoot Williams, shot Fola and killed him. Vaielua was standing nearby talking to a friend of Fola's. *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 568-70.

The Court held that this evidence failed to show that Asaeli was planning to kill Blaac or that Vaielua was present at the scene with more than mere knowledge of some potential interaction with Fola. *Asaeli* 150 Wn2d at 568.

At best, this evidence is sufficient to suggest that Vaielua and the others agreed to meet at the park after the bar closed and that Vaielua may have known that someone from his group was trying to locate Fola. But the record contains no evidence, direct or indirect, establishing that Vaielua was aware of any plan, by Asaeli, Williams, or anyone else, to assault or shoot Fola.

*Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 568-570.

The Court in *Asaeli* affirmed that the "law is well settled that mere presence is not sufficient to prove complicity in a crime." *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 568-570; *State v. Roberts*, 80 Wn.App. 342, 355-56,

908 P.2d 892 (1996). The state's theory that Vaielua was acting as a guard to prevent Fola from entering the fight was rejected. Rather, Vaielua was merely present at the scene with knowledge that others who were with him were looking for Fola. This evidence was not sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Vaielua was an accomplice to an underlying assault. *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 568-570.

In Mr. Sumait's case, Mr. Sumait had contact with the shooter before the shooting but there was no evidence that anyone in either case planned a fight, although the state in *Asaeli* made that argument, as did the prosecutor in Mr. Sumait's case. In *Asaeli*, the Court of Appeals rejected that the fight was planned. *Asaeli*, 150 Wn.2d at 568-70. Here the state too argued the fight was a "setup", but there was no evidence to suggest this was true. RP 107-108. The only evidence suggesting that Mr. Sumait was involved came from speculation that he was the other person who struck Mr. Burnett even though the eyewitness testified that there were four men present and none were identified as Mr. Sumait. RP 56-57. This evidence is like the evidence deemed insufficient in *Asaeli* where Vaielua drove the accomplices to the park and knew that they were looking for Blaac and stood nearby while the shooting took place.

In this case however, there was no evidence that Mr. Sumait drove the car or suggested the encounter or did anything but ask for a cigarette and then leave the scene before the fighting began. The state speculated, without evidence that Mr. Sumait was involved in the fight as an accomplice. As in *Asaeli*, here the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sumait participated in the fight as a principal or as an accomplice; or that he was just present.

Speculation based on scant evidence does not fit within the meaning of a “reasonable inference”. ”Reasonable” means:

Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances, for and appropriate to the end in view. Having faculty of reason; rational governed by reason; under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason.

Henry Black, *Black’s Law Dictionary*, p. 1138 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979).

“Inference”, means:

In the law of evidence, a truth or proposition drawn from another which is supposed or admitted to be true. A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted. . . Inferences are deductions or conclusions which with the reason and common sense lead the jury to draw from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case.

*Black’s Law Dictionary*, p. 700 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979).

In *State v. Ray*, 130 Wn.2d 673, 680, 926 P.2d 904(1996), a child molestation case involving the corpus delecti rule, the court held that the following facts were insufficient to permit a reasonable inference of guilt:

At approximately one in the morning, three-year-old L.R. came to her parents' bedroom and asked for a glass of water. Ray, probably nude, accompanied his daughter back to her room. Ray later returned to his room upset and crying. Ray awakened his wife and talked to her. His wife became upset and rushed to check on L.R. After further discussion with his wife, Ray, who was still upset, placed an emergency call to his sexual deviancy counselor.

Id. The Court held that one could only speculate that something criminal occurred rather than reasonably infer criminality. *Ray*, 130 Wn.2d at 680-681. The Supreme Court dismissed the charges. *Ray*, 130 Wn.2d at 682. Similarly, in *Miller v. Likins*, 109 Wn. App. 140, 147, 34 P.3d 835 (2001), the court held that a mere possibility that guardrails could have prevented a pedestrian car accident (“might”) was no more than mere speculation and not a reasonable inference. Id.

In Mr. Sumait’s case the evidence of his involvement in the fight was mere speculation as in *Ray*, where the evidence was

insufficient to establish molestation where a sex offender got up during the night and went to his daughter's bedroom and returned upset and called his sex offender therapist.

In Mr. Sumait's case the fact that some unidentified man hit Mr. Burnett does not establish, even in the light most favorable to the state, a fair, proper, just, or logical inference that Mr. Sumait was that man.

The truth of the state's case is that an unidentified man hit Mr. Burnett. The only reasonable inference from this evidence is that an unidentified man hit Mr. Burnett. This evidence like the minimal evidence in *Asaeli*, and *Ray* was insufficient to establish that Mr. Sumait was a principle or an accomplice to assault in the second degree with a deadly weapon

The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sumait is guilty of assault by any means or under any analysis. To serve justice and satisfy due process, this Court must reverse the charges and dismiss with prejudice.

2. THE TRIAL COURT'S USE OF A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE NOT PLACED ON THE RECORD DENIED APPELLANT HIS A PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT.

The prosecutor asked for a sidebar at the beginning of trial after the jurors had been sworn in for the trial proceeding. RP 5. The sidebar matter was not put on the record and the clerk's minutes do not reflect the nature of the sidebar. (See appendix A for copy of clerk's minutes). Whether a violation of the public trial right exists is a question of law reviewed de novo. *State v. Momah*, 167 Wn.2d 140, 147, 217 P.3d 321 (2009)<sup>1</sup>. A criminal defendant has a right to a public trial under the federal and state constitutions. *State v. Lormor*, 172 Wn.2d 85, 90–91, 257 P.3d 624 (2011). Likewise, the public has a complementary right to open proceedings under the federal and state constitutions. *Lormor*, 172 Wn.2d at 91.

The state Supreme Court in *Momah* has recognized that although the public trial right is not absolute and a trial court may close the courtroom under certain circumstances, it cannot do so without first apply the *Bone–Club* guidelines. *Momah*, 167 Wn.2d at 148-149, 217 P.3d 321; *State v. Strode*, 167 Wash.2d 222, 226, 217

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<sup>1</sup> The United States Supreme Court's decision applying the federal constitution in *Presley v. Georgia*, 558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010), sub silentio overruled the state Supreme Court's decision in

P.3d 310 (2009) (plurality opinion). The *Bone-Club* guidelines are as follows:

- “1. The proponent of closure or sealing must make some showing [of a compelling interest], and where that need is based on a right other than an accused's right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a serious and imminent threat to that right.
2. Anyone present when the closure motion is made must be given an opportunity to object to the closure.
3. The proposed method for curtailing open access must be the least restrictive means available for protecting the threatened interests.
4. The court must weigh the competing interests of the proponent of closure and the public.
5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose.”

*State v. Bone-Club*, 128 Wn.2d at 254, 258–59, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry*, 121 Wn.2d 205, 210–11, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993)).

However, not all violations of the public trial right result in structural error requiring a new trial. *Momah*, 167 Wn.2d at 149–50. For example, in *Momah*, the defendant affirmatively assented to,

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*Moma*.

participated in, argued for the expansion of, and benefitted from an in-chambers voir dire of jurors. The Court held this decision was tactical designed to assist the defendant to advance his own interests and thus did not violate the public trial right. *Momah*, 167 Wn.2d at 153, 155–56.

Since *Presley v. Georgia*, 558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010), however, which overruled sub silentio overruled *Momah*, stating “where the trial court fails to sua sponte consider reasonable alternatives [to closure] and fails to make the appropriate findings, the proper remedy is reversal of the defendant's conviction.” *State v. Slert*, 169 Wn. App. 766, 776, 282 P.3d 101 (2012); quoting, *State v. Paumier*, 155 Wn.App. at 673, 685, 230 P.3d 212 (2010) (citing *Presley*, 130 S.Ct. at 725.

In *Strode*, the record contained no indication that the trial court held a *Bone-Club* hearing, considered the defendant's right to a public trial, or balanced this right with competing interests before closing the courtroom. *Strode*, 167 Wn.2d at 224 (plurality opinion), 235, 217 P.3d 310 (Fairhurst, J., concurring)). The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial for violation of Strode's right to a public trial.

In *State v. Bowen*, 157 Wn.App. 821, 239 P.2d 1114 (2010), this Court applied these principles and stated that the trial court, not defense counsel, proposed individual in-chambers voir dire of jury pool members. The defense attorney did not actively participate in the in-chambers voir dire; the trial court judge asked all the questions and asked the attorneys only whether they wanted to inquire further or objected to the excusal of jurors. The record also did not indicate circumstances requiring individual questioning of jurors in chambers, as opposed to another public location. Finally, the trial court did not indicate that either it or the parties considered his right to a public trial or explained that right to the defendant. *See Momah*, 167 Wn.2d at 152 (defendant's right to impartial jury and right to public trial are distinct from each other). This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial concluding that the trial court did not adequately safeguarded the defendant's public trial right or that the defendant made deliberate, tactical choices precluding him from relief. *Bowen*, 157 Wn.App. at 832–33. Accordingly, this Court held that the closure in *Bowen* constituted structural error. *Bowen*, 157 Wn.App. at 833.

In *Skert*, this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial holding that as in *Strode* and *Bowen* the record did not contain any

indication that Sler't's counsel proposed the in-chambers portion of jury selection. The record did not contain any indication that circumstances required an in chambers conference or that the trial court considered reasonable, public alternatives. Nor did the record contain any indication that either the trial court or the parties considered Sler't's public trial right or explained that right to him before agreeing to the dismissal of the four jurors. *Sler't*, 169 Wn. App. at 779.


In Mr. Sumait's case as in *Sler't*, *Strode* and *Bowen*, the record did not contain any indication that circumstances required a private sidebar conference or that the trial court considered reasonable, public alternatives. Nor did the record contain any indication that either the trial court or the parties considered Mr. Sumait's public trial right or explained that right to him before agreeing to the sidebar. For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court violated Mr. Sumait's public trial rights.

D. CONCLUSION

Mr. Sumait respectfully requests this Court reverse and dismiss his conviction based on insufficient evidence, or in the alternative reverse and remand for a new trial.

DATED this 26<sup>th</sup> day of January 2013

Respectfully submitted,



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LISE ELLNER  
WSBA No. 20955  
Attorney for Appellant

I, Lise Ellner, a person over the age of 18 years of age, served the Grays Harbor County Prosecutor's Office [Gfuller@co.grays-harbor.wa.us](mailto:Gfuller@co.grays-harbor.wa.us) and Anthony Sumait Anthony Sumait 1114 Stockwell St. Aberdeen, WA 98541 true copy of the document to which this certificate is affixed on February 26, 2013. Service was made by electronically to the prosecutor and to Mr. Whalen by depositing in the mails of the United States of America, properly stamped and addressed.



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Signature

## APPENDIX A

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Plaintiff,  
VS.  
Anthony Sumait

Defendant,

CAUSE NO: 11-1-00403-4  
Court convenes at: 10:48 am  
DATE: 07-31-2012  
HON. JUDGE: F. MARK MCCAULEY

COURT REPORTER: Randi Hamilton  
COUNTY CLERK: CHERYL BROWN  
DEPUTY CLERK:  
BRIGITTE MCNEALLEY

1<sup>st</sup> Day Criminal Jury Trial

Cause comes on regularly for trial at 10:48. Plaintiff is represented by Kraig Newman. Defendant is appearing in person and is represented by counsel Harold Karlsvik

Bailiff Mary Sweeney and the jurors are present in the courtroom.  
The jurors are sworn to true answers give.  
The Court gives additional instruction to the jurors regarding the day's procedures.

The State begins presentation of opening statements at 10:55 am.  
At 11:01 am Mr. Karlsvik presented opening statements.  
At 11:04 am notepads are handed out to the jury.  
At 11:07 am **Sidebar**.  
The jury is excused at 11:08 am.

The jury returns to the courtroom at 11:41 am.  
At 11:42 am the State called **Hoquiam Police Officer Brian Dayton**, duly sworn in and testified.  
The witness identified **Plaintiff's ID #44 -Map**.  
The witness identified **Plaintiff's ID #24 -Club**, offered, no objection, admitted.  
At 11:48 am Mr. Karlsvik commenced cross examination of the witness.  
At 11:50 am Mr. Newman commenced re-direct examination of the witness  
The witness identified **Plaintiff's ID #6 -Photo**, offered, objection, further foundation is given, re-offered, no objection, admitted and published to the jury.

At 11:53 am the State called **Grays Harbor Sheriff Deputy Brad Johansen**, duly sworn in and testified.  
The witness identified **Plaintiff's ID #1 thru #4 -Photos**.  
At 11:57 am Mr. Karlsvik commenced cross examination of the witness.  
At 12:01 pm Mr. Newman commenced re-direct examination.

At 12:02 pm the State called **Hoquiam Officer David Blundred**, duly sworn in and testified.  
The witness identified **PI ID #44**.  
The witness identified **PI Ex #24**.  
The witness identified **Plaintiff's ID #47 -Statement of Anthony Sumait**, offered, no objection, admitted.  
The witness identified **PI ID #1 thru #4**.  
The State offered **PI ID #2**, no objection, admitted.  
The State offered **PI ID #1**, no objection, admitted.  
The State offered **PI ID #3 and PI ID #4**, no objection, admitted.  
At 12:11 pm Mr. Karlsvik commenced cross examination of the witness.  
Mr. Newman declined re-direct examination.  
The jury is excused at 12:17 am and ordered to return to begin at 1:30 pm.

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# ELLNER LAW OFFICE

**February 26, 2013 - 4:26 PM**

## Transmittal Letter

Document Uploaded: 438534-Appellant's Brief.pdf

Case Name: State v. Sumait

Court of Appeals Case Number: 43853-4

**Is this a Personal Restraint Petition?**  Yes  No

### The document being Filed is:

- Designation of Clerk's Papers  Supplemental Designation of Clerk's Papers
- Statement of Arrangements
- Motion: \_\_\_\_\_
- Answer/Reply to Motion: \_\_\_\_\_
- Brief: Appellant's
- Statement of Additional Authorities
- Cost Bill
- Objection to Cost Bill
- Affidavit
- Letter
- Copy of Verbatim Report of Proceedings - No. of Volumes: \_\_\_\_\_  
Hearing Date(s): \_\_\_\_\_
- Personal Restraint Petition (PRP)
- Response to Personal Restraint Petition
- Reply to Response to Personal Restraint Petition
- Petition for Review (PRV)
- Other: \_\_\_\_\_

### Comments:

No Comments were entered.

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A copy of this document has been emailed to the following addresses:  
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