

No. 44825-4-II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION TWO

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STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

CHADWICK PRITCHARD,

Appellant.

---

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE  
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KITSAP COUNTY

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OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred and deprived Mr. Pritchard of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense when it barred the admission of relevant evidence.

2. The trial court violated Mr. Pritchard's right to present a defense when it when it barred him from introducing evidence that connected another person to the crime charged and undermined the prosecution's theory of the case.

3. The sentencing court erroneously calculated Mr. Pritchard's offender score.

B. ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to present a defense and meet the charges against him. Here, the trial court barred Mr. Pritchard from introducing evidence relevant to another suspect's connection to, and acceptance of responsibility for, the crimes charged. Did the court deprive Mr. Pritchard of his right to present a defense?

2. In establishing the defendant's sentence, the State has the burden to prove the calculation of the offender score. When the sentence is challenged, it is the State's burden to prove the defendant's

calculated offender score. Here, the sentencing court found two of Mr. Pritchard's prior forgery convictions did not constitute the same course of criminal conduct. The court also counted a prior burglary conviction that had been reversed on appeal. Did the State fail to meet its burden at sentencing, and did the trial court err in calculating Mr. Pritchard's offender score?

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Chadwick Pritchard is a landscaper and tree removal expert. RP 88-90.<sup>1</sup> He has helped his father to operate the family business in Kitsap County, since he was a teenager. Id. In July 2010, Mr. Pritchard was hired by Kristopher Anderson, a homeowner in Olalla, to fell some trees. RP 49-52, 91-93. This is dangerous work, requiring Mr. Pritchard to climb high into the treetop, while leaving a co-worker on the ground to assist him. RP 89-90. (91-93)

A few days before July 4, 2010, Mr. Pritchard arrived at Mr. Anderson's home to fell the trees, as he had been hired to do. (91-93). Mr. Pritchard had been referred for this job by his roommate, Erik Christen, who was Mr. Anderson's best friend. RP 53-54. Mr. Pritchard

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<sup>1</sup> The Verbatim Report of Proceedings consists of one volume from the trial on March 27, 2013, which is referred to as RP \_\_\_\_\_. Reports from other proceedings are referred to specifically by date.

brought Jared Harvey with him to assist with the tree-work. RP 53-54, 91-93.

After the work in the yard was completed, Mr. Pritchard and Mr. Harvey left the Anderson property. RP 91-93. When Mr. Anderson returned from a vacation to Mt. Rainier a few days later, he found his home had been burglarized and several items of value were missing. RP 51-52. Mr. Anderson suspected Mr. Pritchard, so he called his friend Erik Christen, who shared a house with Mr. Pritchard, and set up a meeting amongst all four young men – Pritchard, Anderson, Christen, and Jared Harvey, who soon arrived as well. RP 56-61, 98-101.

At the meeting, Mr. Pritchard consistently denied involvement in the burglary of Mr. Anderson's home; Mr. Harvey, alone, had apparently broken into the house while Mr. Anderson was on vacation. RP 59-61, 94-101. Mr. Pritchard apologized for exposing Mr. Anderson to Mr. Harvey, and stated to Mr. Anderson that he would help in any way he could to assist in returning his belongings to him. RP 59-61, 98-101. Mr. Pritchard admitted that Mr. Harvey had asked for his assistance in pawning some pieces of jewelry and in breaking into a safe and discarding other items, accepting Mr. Harvey's explanation that these

items were related to Mr. Harvey's second job cleaning out storage units.  
RP 93-95, 98-101.

Mr. Pritchard was charged with one count of residential burglary and one count of trafficking in stolen property in the first degree. CP 12-13.

Following a jury trial, the jury convicted Mr. Pritchard of both offenses. CP 36.

#### D. ARGUMENT

##### 1. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED MR. PRITCHARD HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BY EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE.

a. The constitution guarantees an accused person the rights to present a defense and to receive compulsory process. The Sixth Amendment and article one, section 22 protect an accused person's right to obtain witnesses and present a defense. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 14-15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983); see also RCW 10.52.040; CrR 6.12.

A criminal defendant must receive the opportunity to present his version of the facts to the jury so that it may decide "where the truth lies." State v. Maupin, 128 Wn.2d 918, 924, 913 P.2d 808 (1996)

(quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)); State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has described the importance of this right:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19, cited with approval in State v. Smith, 101 Wn.2d 36, 41, 677 P.2d 100 (1984).

In Maupin, a witness claimed he saw the defendant take a young girl from her home in the middle of the night and she was later found dead. 128 Wn.2d at 921-22. The trial court barred the defense from introducing evidence that another person was seen carrying the victim the day after she had allegedly disappeared in Maupin's hands. Id. at 925-26. The trial court reasoned that there was inadequate evidence that this other suspect committed the charged crime and this evidence did not rule

out the prospect that Maupin was working in concert with this other person. Id. at 925.

In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind the rule limiting “other suspect” evidence. The mere claim that another person could have committed the crime simply because they had done similar things in the past and were in the area on the day of the offense is too speculative to constitute relevant evidence. Id. at 925, citing State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 663, 13 P.2d 1 (1932) (court barred evidence that known burglar was nearby at time of burglary where no evidence connected other suspect to burglary). Yet when there is a factual connection between the other suspect evidence and the charged crime, the right to present a defense mandates the admission of other suspect testimony. Maupin, 128 Wn.2d at 928.

The proffered testimony in Maupin was not merely a speculative claim that another disreputable person was in the area and could have been responsible, as in Downs. Id. at 925. Instead, the testimony involved an eyewitness whose observations cast doubt upon the prosecution’s theory of the case and raised the possibility that another person committed the crime. Id. at 928. Even if the witness’s observations did not exculpate the defendant, “at least it would have

brought into question the State's version of the events..." Id. at 928.

Notably, here, as in Maupin, the trial court excluded evidence of other suspect testimony due to the State's argument that the two individuals could have acted in concert. Id. at 925; RP 72-76. Since, however, the evidence of Jared Harvey as the other suspect pointed directly to someone else as the party guilty of the burglary, and undercut the State's theory of events, it met the threshold for admissibility and should have been allowed. Id.

b. The court's exclusion of relevant evidence denied Mr. Pritchard his right to present a defense. At trial, Mr. Pritchard made an offer of proof that Jared Harvey had taken responsibility for the burglary and had pled guilty before trial; the trial court specifically excluded this evidence. RP 72, 76.<sup>2</sup>

First, the evidence that another suspect had committed the burglary and had pled guilty was relevant. Relevant evidence tends to make a material fact more or less probable. ER 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. ER 402. Evidence of another suspect's

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<sup>2</sup> Mr. Harvey was initially charged with residential burglary but according to the prosecutor, agreed to plead guilty to felony possession of stolen property. RP 75-76. He was also unavailable to testify due to his sudden death shortly before trial; Mr. Pritchard sought to introduce Mr. Harvey's plea through his judgment and sentence. RP 71-76; <http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2012/sep/04/jared-j-harvey-28/#axzz2igJOFkAy>.

culpability, as well as his admission and guilty plea, was plainly relevant. Maupin, 128 Wn.2d at 925, 928.

Due to the trial court's ruling excluding the certificate of conviction or the judgment and sentence of Jared Harvey, however, the jury was left with the impression that Mr. Pritchard was the only suspect charged or held accountable for the crime. This was not an accurate impression of events, as the trial court was well aware, but due to the court's ruling, the jury was left with a false sense of Mr. Pritchard's culpability, and therefore the context in which he made the offer to assist the alleged victim in gathering his stolen items from the pawn shop and from the woods. Particularly due to Mr. Harvey's unavailability to testify at trial, this evidence of his guilty plea was the only evidence available to the jury that Mr. Harvey had taken responsibility for his actions; the evidence was highly relevant and should have been admitted. ER 401; Maupin, 128 Wn.2d at 925, 928.

More recently, in State v. Jones, our Supreme Court considered a defendant whose consent defense was excluded at his sexual assault trial. 168 Wn.2d at 721. The Jones Court held that for evidence of high probative value, "it appears no state interest can be compelling enough to preclude its introduction consistent with the Sixth Amendment and

Const. art. 1, § 22.” Id. at 720 (quoting Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d at 14). The Jones Court held that where the trial court had excluded “essential facts of high probative value,” the defendant was “effectively barred ... from presenting his defense,” in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 721.

c. The trial court’s refusal to admit relevant evidence requires reversal of Mr. Pritchard’s conviction. Because the trial court’s exclusion of relevant evidence denied Mr. Pritchard his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, the error requires reversal of Mr. Pritchard’s conviction unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it “did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 724. The State cannot meet this burden in this case.

There were inconsistencies in the accounts given by the alleged victim and by Mr. Pritchard, and the burglary alleged in this case occurred years before the arrest of Mr. Pritchard. The alleged victim’s testimony lent credence to the State’s theory that Mr. Pritchard had been alerted to the homeowner’s upcoming vacation during his yard work at the property. RP 56. Without the evidence of Mr. Harvey’s guilty plea, the jury could draw no other conclusion but that Mr. Pritchard had

individually committed the acts of which he was accused. But had evidence of Mr. Harvey's guilty plea been presented to the jury, the jury would have understood that Mr. Harvey had taken responsibility for the crime, and the impact of the victim's testimony would have been greatly reduced. The jury would have been presented with another explanation for the alleged victim's allegations – the defense theory – that Mr. Harvey had burglarized Mr. Anderson's home and Mr. Pritchard had only been responsible for helping with the stolen goods.

The State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of relevant evidence was harmless. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. at 9. This court must reverse Mr. Pritchard's conviction.

2. THE TRIAL COURT MISCALCULATED MR. PRITCHARD'S OFFENDER SCORE, REQUIRING REMAND FOR RESENTENCING

a. Mr. Pritchard properly challenged the same course of criminal conduct determination below. An appellant can waive his right to raise on appeal an erroneous offender score based on a determination whether his crimes constituted the same course of criminal conduct, if he fails to raise the issue before the sentencing court. State v. Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. 512, 523, 997 P.2d 1000 (2000).

In Nitsch, the defendant affirmatively stated his standard range was correct at sentencing. 100 Wn. App. at 522. In contrast, at sentencing in the instant case, Mr. Pritchard stated on the record that some of his prior convictions constituted the same course of criminal conduct.

4/26/13 RP 2-5.

Mr. Pritchard argued that under the SRA (Sentencing Reform Act), the court was required to count multiple prior convictions served concurrently as one offense when calculating an offender score. 4/26/13 RP 2-5. Mr. Pritchard argued his 1998 forgery convictions from Jefferson County Cause Number 98-1-00011-9 constituted the same course of criminal conduct. 4/26/13 RP 5.<sup>3</sup> He alleged that these

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<sup>3</sup>Multiple crimes constituting the same course of criminal conduct are counted as one offense for the purpose of determining the defendant's criminal history at sentencing. RCW 9.94A.360(5)(a)(i); RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a) (Recodified in 2001 as RCW 9.94A.589. Laws of 2001, ch. 10, sec. 6).; State v. Young, 97 Wn. App. 235, 240, 984 P.2d 1050 (1999). Crimes are considered the same course of criminal conduct if they involve the same criminal intent, were committed at the same time and place, and were committed against the same victim. Young, 97 Wn. App. at 240.

RCW 9.94A.360(5)(a)(i) (Recodified in 2001 as RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a). Laws of 2001, ch. 10, sec. 6) provides:

In the case of multiple prior convictions, for the purpose of computing the offender score, count all convictions separately, except: ...  
(i) Prior offenses which were found, under RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a), to encompass the same criminal conduct, shall be counted as one offense, the offense that yields the highest offender score. The current sentencing court shall determine with respect to other prior adult offenses for which sentences were served concurrently ... whether those offenses shall be counted as one offense or as separate offenses using the "same criminal conduct" analysis found in RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a), and if the court finds that they shall be counted as one offense, then the offense that yields the highest offender score shall be used. The current

forgeries involved checks written on the same date, and from the same person's account – that the same victim was involved was verified by the judgment and sentence filed by the State. 4/26/13 RP 2-5; CP 73-75. Accordingly, Mr. Pritchard challenged the State's offender score calculation. Id.

The deputy prosecutor argued the statutory presumption is that the prior convictions do not constitute the same course of criminal conduct unless the prior sentencing court specifically found the convictions constituted the same course of criminal conduct. 4/26/13 RP 2-3. The prosecutor noted he had "looked through the J and S's and I can find no affirmative finding of same criminal conduct." Id. at 3. The prosecutor apparently missed the designation on the judgment and sentence signed on March 20, 1998, in which the Jefferson County sentencing court had

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sentencing court may presume that such other prior offenses were not the same criminal conduct from sentences imposed on separate dates, or in separate counties or jurisdictions, or in separate complaints, indictments, or informations[.]

The statute referred to in RCW 9.94A.360(5)(a)(i) above provides:

[W]henver a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses, the sentence range for each current offense shall be determined by using all other current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions for the purpose of the offender score: PROVIDED, That if the court enters a finding that some or all of the current offenses encompass the same criminal conduct then those current offenses shall be counted as one crime.... "Same criminal conduct," as used in this subsection, means two or more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim. (emphasis added).

specifically found the same criminal conduct for two of the forgery counts. CP 77.

Because the sentencing court relied upon the deputy prosecutor's mistaken representations that the 1998 sentencing court failed to find the same course of criminal conduct, the Kitsap County sentencing court counted each prior forgery count separately, resulting in a miscalculated offender score. 4/26/13 RP 2-6; CP 73-77.

b. Because the State bears the burden of proof at sentencing, once Mr. Pritchard challenged his offender score and made a prima facie showing, the State failed to refute that Mr. Pritchard's prior convictions did not constitute the same course of criminal conduct. In establishing the defendant's criminal history for sentencing purposes, the State has the burden to prove prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 168, 868 P.2d 179 (1994). "Where the defendant disputes material facts, the court must either not consider the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the point." RCW 9.94A.370. While the best evidence of prior convictions is a certified copy of the judgment, the State may introduce other comparable documents of record or transcripts of prior proceedings to establish criminal history." State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 480, 973 P.2d 452

(1999) (citing Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. at 168); State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 914-15, 287 P.3d 584 (2012).

“A criminal defendant is simply not obligated to disprove the State’s position, at least insofar as the State has failed to meet its primary burden of proof. The State does not meet its burden through bare assertions, unsupported by evidence.” Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 482.

In State v. Lopez, the jury found Lopez guilty of two counts of first degree assault, two counts of the lesser-included offense of second degree assault, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. 147 Wn.2d 515, 518, 55 P.3d 609 (2002). At sentencing the prosecution asked the court to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), but failed to provide evidence of Lopez's prior convictions. Id. Lopez objected, and when asked to respond, the prosecution replied it did not have the judgment and sentences. Id. Rather than order the State to obtain copies of the judgments and sentences, the judge proceeded with sentencing and imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Id.

The Court of Appeals overturned the persistent offender finding, and remanded for sentencing before a different judge on the existing

record. 147 Wn.2d at 519. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review “on the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded for sentencing without providing the state an opportunity to present evidence of Lopez's prior convictions on remand.”

Id.

The Supreme Court found the State alleged prior convictions but failed to provide any supporting evidence. Id. at 520. Accordingly, “the sentencing court erred when it considered these unproved convictions.”

Id. The State argued it should be entitled to submit evidence of Lopez's prior convictions on remand because Lopez did not provide a specific objection. Id.

Citing Ford, the Court ruled the State was completely unprepared to prove prior offenses and “does not meet its burden through bare assertions, unsupported by evidence.” Lopez, 147 Wn.2d at 520 (citing Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 482). The Lopez Court concluded remand without the prior convictions was proper because allowing the State to have a second opportunity to prove its allegations after the defendant objected at the first sentencing would send the wrong message to the trial courts, defendants and the public. 147 Wn.2d at 523.

Here, Mr. Pritchard specifically challenged the State’s calculation

of his offender score, arguing the five forgery convictions arose from the same cause number and constituted the same course of criminal conduct. 4/26/13 RP 2-5. Specifically, he argued that the incident involved writing checks on the same date, from the same person's account. 4/26/13 RP 5. In addition, the prior judge made a specific finding of same criminal conduct as to at least two of the five forgeries. CP 77.

The State produced no evidence the prior convictions involved separate victims, places, or different intent. Although Mr. Pritchard did not produce evidence to prove the convictions constituted the same course of criminal conduct, other than the prior judgment and sentence which was already before the court, he had no duty to do so. The State produced no evidence or minimally reliable facts upon which the court could make its decision – the evidence the State did produce, the State and the sentencing court both misinterpreted. Because the State had the burden to prove the prior convictions did not constitute the same course of criminal conduct, the sentencing court erred in ruling against Mr. Pritchard.

c. Remand for imposition of a sentence based on an offender score counting the prior 1998 convictions as one point based on the same course of criminal conduct is required. Where a defendant specifically objects to a sentencing calculation, the sentencing court

should conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow the State to adduce additional evidence to prove its calculation. If the State then fails to prove the requisite felony classifications, the State will not have another opportunity to prove the classifications on remand following appeal. State v. McCorkle, 88 Wn. App. 485, 500, 945 P.2d 736 (1997), aff'd, 137 Wn.2d 490 (1999).

Although the McCorkle Court applied this rule to a felony classification and not to a same course of criminal conduct argument, McCorkle clearly holds the State does not get a second chance to meet its burden if it fails to do so at trial after a specific objection is made. State v. Gill, 103 Wn. App. 435, 450, 13 P.3d 646 (2000), citing McCorkle, 137 Wn.2d at 497 (“where the State fails to carry its burden of proof after a specific objection, it [will] not be provided a further opportunity to do so.”); see also Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 915-16. The State was aware of Mr. Pritchard’s objections, but it failed to correctly interpret the prior judgment and sentence and information, indicating the prior convictions encompass anything other than the same course of criminal conduct. Instead, the deputy prosecutor admitted that he had sought prior findings and had failed to find any. 4/26/13 RP 3. Accordingly, Mr. Pritchard’s sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing with

the prior convictions counted as one point. McCorkle, 88 Wn. App. at 500.<sup>4</sup>

d. Because Mr. Pritchard properly challenged his offender score based upon a prior reversal on appeal, remand and resentencing is required. As discussed above, Mr. Pritchard stated on the record at sentencing that another of his prior convictions had been reversed on appeal and should not be counted in his offender score. 4/26/13 RP 4.

Once Mr. Pritchard challenged his 1996 burglary conviction (Cause No. 96-8-00048-6), it became the State's burden to prove the prior conviction in order to establish Mr. Pritchard's criminal history. RCW 9.94A.370; Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 480 (citing Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. at 168); Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 914-15. The State failed to produce any evidence that this prior conviction was valid and should be counted in Mr. Pritchard's offender score. In fact, a simple search reveals that the conviction was, indeed, reversed on appeal. State v. Pritchard, 89 Wn. App. 1046, 1998 WL 97207 (1998).

Because it was error to count this prior conviction in Mr.

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<sup>4</sup>Because Mr. Pritchard asserts that the 1998 forgeries involved crimes committed on the same date, against the same victim, the forgeries should be counted as one conviction. Although the prior Jefferson County finding was that counts I and IV should constitute the same criminal conduct, the State failed to meet its burden at Mr. Pritchard's sentencing to show that all five counts were not the same criminal conduct, as Mr. Pritchard argued at sentencing. 4/26/13 RP 5; Lopez, 147 Wn.2d at 520 (citing Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 482); Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 914-15.

Pritchard's offender score, the matter must be remanded for resentencing.

E. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Mr. Pritchard respectfully asks this Court to reverse his conviction and grant a new trial. In the alternative, Mr. Pritchard's sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.

Respectfully submitted this 25<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2013.



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**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION TWO**

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|----------------------|---|----------------|
| STATE OF WASHINGTON, | ) |                |
|                      | ) |                |
| Respondent,          | ) |                |
|                      | ) |                |
| v.                   | ) | NO. 44825-4-II |
|                      | ) |                |
| CHADWICK PRITCHARD,  | ) |                |
|                      | ) |                |
| Appellant.           | ) |                |

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**DECLARATION OF DOCUMENT FILING AND SERVICE**

I, MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, STATE THAT ON THE 25<sup>TH</sup> DAY OF OCTOBER, 2013, I CAUSED THE ORIGINAL **OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT** TO BE FILED IN THE **COURT OF APPEALS – DIVISION TWO** AND A TRUE COPY OF THE SAME TO BE SERVED ON THE FOLLOWING IN THE MANNER INDICATED BELOW:

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| PORT ORCHARD, WA 98366-4681        |     |                       |
| <br>                               |     |                       |
| [X] CHADWICK PRITCHARD             | (X) | U.S. MAIL             |
| 779285                             | ( ) | HAND DELIVERY         |
| AIRWAY HEIGHTS CORRECTIONS CENTER  | ( ) | _____                 |
| PO BOX 2049                        |     |                       |
| AIRWAY HEIGHTS, WA 99001           |     |                       |

**SIGNED** IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON THIS 25<sup>TH</sup> DAY OF OCTOBER, 2013.

X \_\_\_\_\_ 

**Washington Appellate Project**  
701 Melbourne Tower  
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# WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

**October 25, 2013 - 3:53 PM**

## Transmittal Letter

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Case Name: STATE V. CHADWICK PRITCHARD

Court of Appeals Case Number: 44825-4

**Is this a Personal Restraint Petition?** Yes  No

### The document being Filed is:

Designation of Clerk's Papers                      Supplemental Designation of Clerk's Papers

Statement of Arrangements

Motion: \_\_\_\_

Answer/Reply to Motion: \_\_\_\_

Brief: Appellant's

Statement of Additional Authorities

Cost Bill

Objection to Cost Bill

Affidavit

Letter

Copy of Verbatim Report of Proceedings - No. of Volumes: \_\_\_\_

Hearing Date(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Personal Restraint Petition (PRP)

Response to Personal Restraint Petition

Reply to Response to Personal Restraint Petition

Petition for Review (PRV)

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

### Comments:

No Comments were entered.

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