

NO. 45315-1

**COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON**

STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT

v.

ISAIAH STEVEN SUMMERS, APPELLANT

Appeal from the Superior Court of Pierce County
The Honorable Linda CJ Lee

No. 12-1-04268-5

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

MARK LINDQUIST
Prosecuting Attorney

By
KATHLEEN PROCTOR
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
WSB # 14811

930 Tacoma Avenue South
Room 946
Tacoma, WA 98402
PH: (253) 798-7400

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A. ISSUES PERTAINING TO APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when, after determining that defendant could rationally assist his counsel at trial, it ruled that defendant had not overcome his presumption of competence?

B. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

1. Procedure

On November 14, 2012, the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office charged appellant, Isaiah Steven Summers ("defendant"), by Information with robbery in the first degree (Count I); burglary in the first degree (Count II); assault in the second degree (Count III); and theft in the second degree (Count IV). CP 1–3. The State sought a firearm enhancement on each count. CP 1–3.

On March 22, 2013, defense counsel obtained a psychological evaluation of defendant by Dr. Joseph R. Nevotti. CP 41–78 ("Appendix A"). The State requested that defendant be evaluated at Western State Hospital by its own mental health expert. 3/22/13 RP 2.¹ Dr. Marilyn A.

¹ The State will refer to the six sequentially paginated volumes of the verbatim report of proceedings, designated as volumes 1–6, as RP. All other volumes will be referred to as RP with the date of the hearing preceding the RP.

Ronnei examined defendant and completed her report on April 25, 2013.

CP 41–78 ("Appendix B"); CP 27–37.

The court held a competency hearing on May 29, 2013 and concluded that defendant had not overcome his presumption of competence. 5/29/13 RP 71; CP 89–93.

On July 30, 2013, the case proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Linda CJ Lee. 1 RP 1.

The jury convicted defendant on all counts. 5 RP 196; CP 145 (Count I); CP 154 (Count II); CP 156 (Count III); CP 157 (Count IV). The jury returned special verdicts finding defendant was armed with a firearm at the time of the commission of each crime. 5 RP 196–97; CP 159 (Count I); CP 160 (Count II); CP 161 (Count III); CP 162 (Count IV).

At sentencing, the court merged defendant's convictions for robbery in the first degree and assault in the second degree. 6 RP 234; CP 165–167 (Conclusion of Law I). The court also merged defendant's convictions for robbery in the first degree and theft in the second degree. 6 RP 234; CP 165–167 (Conclusion of Law III). The court determined that defendant's convictions for robbery in the first degree and burglary in the first degree were the same criminal conduct. 6 RP 234; CP 165–167 (Conclusion of Law V).

On September 6, 2013, the Court sentenced defendant to 151 months total confinement, 120 months of which is flat time based upon robbery and burglary firearm enhancements of 60 months each. CP 173–183. Defendant's offender score was a zero. CP 173–183.

Defendant filed his timely notice of appeal on September 6, 2013. CP 184.

2. Facts

a. Facts at Competency Hearing

Defense expert Dr. Joseph Nevotti determined that defendant suffers from bipolar disorder, substance abuse, and a narcissistic personality disorder. 5/29/13 RP 23. These mental illnesses cause defendant to be very grandiose, which in turn, renders defendant highly irrational and confrontational. 5/29/13 RP 8. According to Dr. Nevotti, defendant's grandiosity borders on delusional behavior and, at times, he has difficulty connecting with reality. 5/29/13 RP 11–12.

Defendant understood his charges and outlined specific trial strategy for Dr. Nevotti.² 5/29/13 RP 13, 16–17, 20. Dr. Nevotti interpreted defendant's trial strategy as an example of defendant's grandiosity, and claimed that defendant's own opinions were so strong that it prevented him from assisting defense counsel in presenting a defense. 5/29/13 RP 13, 17, 20–21.

State expert Dr. Marilyn Ronnei testified that parts of defendant's presentation were not credible. 5/29/13 RP 42. For example, despite creating a Bible study group in prison, defendant allegedly could not remember the word "Bible." 5/29/13 RP 42. Dr. Ronnei explained that defendant probably felt confident that his current charges will be dismissed because, five of the six times he has been arrested, charges were dismissed or never filed. 5/29/13 RP 44.

² Defendant wanted to show the jury that the victim's testimony was inconsistent. This strategy was implemented at trial. *See, e.g.*, defense counsel's closing argument: "But she had those little inconsistencies" (4 RP 162); "The evidence shows in this case that Ms. Greeno's story is full of inconsistencies and untruths, many of which were clearly pointed out to you on my cross examination" (4 RP 166); "So where are the inconsistencies? You heard from my cross examination where they were" (4 RP 167); "[...] and you know these inconsistencies are there" (4 RP 167); "Every time you confronted her with an inconsistency or an untruth, you had an explanation. She had some excuse for it" (4 RP 168); "She had an excuse for every inconsistency" (4 RP 169); "An excuse and explanation for every inconsistency and every lie" (4 RP 170); "The inconsistencies in her story, the evidence support my client's story and doesn't support hers" (4 RP 177). The State suggested that, given its understanding of the facts in the case, impeaching the victim was one of the ways for the defense to argue the case and that there was nothing illogical about that defense. 5/29/12 RP 61.

Dr. Ronnei did not find the defendant to be grandiose, but that he had a mildly inflated sense of self-worth. 5/29/13 RP 44. Dr. Ronnei did not observe symptoms of psychosis or a major affective disorder that would interfere with his ability to work with his attorney. 5/29/13 RP 45.

The court accepted Dr. Ronnei's conclusions based upon her testimony and written report. CP 89–93 (Finding VII). The court found that Dr. Nevotti's testimony contradicted his written report, and that Dr. Nevotti "offers conclusions but no substance to support it." CP 89–93 (Finding VIII). The court concluded that defendant had the capacity to assist his counsel if he chose to do so. 5/29/13 RP 65–71; CP 89–93 (Conclusion III).

b. Facts at Trial

Defendant and Ms. Tyrsha Greeno met on an online dating website and their relationship progressed from sporadic text messages to day-long phone conversations. 2 RP 31–32. Ms. Greeno told defendant which apartment complex she and her two children lived in, but did not tell him which specific unit. 2 RP 35. On November 12, 2012, defendant drove to Ms. Greeno's apartment complex and, while intoxicated, went door to door in search for Ms. Greeno's apartment. 2 RP 36, 68–69; 3 RP 110–11. Defendant found Ms. Greeno's unit and asked to use her phone. 2 RP 36.

Without inviting defendant into her apartment, Ms. Greeno agreed and shut her door. 2 RP 36. Ms. Greeno returned to her front door to see defendant in her hallway, pointing a gun at her. 2 RP 37–38. Defendant then ripped Ms. Greeno's 60 inch television from the wall and carried it out to his car.³ 2 RP 39.

Police detained defendant at his mother's residence approximately 45 minutes after defendant left Ms. Greeno's apartment. 3 RP 77, 119. Defendant's mother gave police consent to search her residence. 3 RP 88. Deputy Jeffrey Jorgenson located the jacket defendant wore to Ms. Greeno's apartment and found a handgun in its pocket. 3 RP 89.

Defendant claimed that he was only guilty of residential burglary. 4 RP 167. He testified that he was invited to Ms. Greeno's apartment, that he did not bring a gun, and that he stole the television on impulse. 3 RP 108, 112, 115.

³ Ms. Greeno paid \$2,100 for the television which was only a few months old. 2 RP 45.

C. ARGUMENT

1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN, AFTER DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT COULD RATIONALLY ASSIST HIS COUNSEL AT TRIAL, IT RULED THAT DEFENDANT HAD NOT OVERCOME HIS PRESUMPTION OF COMPETENCE.

a. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal.

Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. *State v. Rodgers*, 146 Wn.2d 55, 61, 43 P.3d 1 (2002); *State v. Hill*, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994); *State v. Neeley*, 113 Wn. App. 100, 105, 52 P.3d 539 (2002); *see also* RAP 10.3(g) ("A separate assignment of error for each finding of fact a party contends was improperly made must be included with reference to the finding by number.").

Defendant has not assigned error to any of the Findings of Fact regarding the competency hearing. Therefore, all of these findings are verities. Included in the unchallenged findings are Finding of Fact VII:

[...] Dr. Ronnei opines in her report and her testimony that the defendant is capable of assisting his counsel at trial. Dr. Ronnei concluded that during her examination of the defendant that the defendant was not fully cooperating with her and that he was purposely doing so. The Court accepts Dr. Ronnei's factual observations and conclusions based

upon the written report and the verbal testimony of Dr. Ronnei.

CP 89–93.⁴

And Finding of Fact VIII:

[...] Dr. Nevotti opines that the defendant may lack the ability to choose whether or not the defendant will cooperate with his attorney. This contradicts Dr. Nevotti's written report which does not appear to support this conclusion. Dr. Nevotti himself could offer nothing really to support this conclusion and admits that it is "a judgment call." Dr. Nevotti offers conclusions but no substance to support it.

CP 89–93.

- b. Challenged findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.

A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. *State v. Dobbs*, 180 Wn.2d 1, 10, 320 P.3d 705 (2014); *In re Sego*, 82 Wn.2d 736, 743, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). "Substantial evidence exists where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding." *State v. Hill*, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).

"A finding of fact incorrectly denominated as a conclusion of law is reviewed as a finding [...]." *Valentine v. Dep't of Licensing*, 77 Wn.

⁴ Corresponding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached, in entirety, to the end of the State's brief.

App. 838, 846, 894 P.2d 1352 (1995); *see also State v. Luther*, 157 Wn.2d 63, 78, 134 P.3d 205 (2006); *State v. Kilburn*, 151 Wn.2d 36, 52, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004). "If a determination concerns whether evidence shows that something occurred or existed, it is properly labeled a finding of fact, but if the determination is made by a process of legal reasoning from facts in evidence, it is a conclusion of law." *State v. Niedergang*, 43 Wn. App. 656, 658–59, 719 P.2d 576 (1986).

Defendant assigns error to "Conclusion of Law III," which states as follows:

That the defendant in this matter has the capacity to assist his counsel if he chooses to do so. The defendant in this matter has the ability to make that choice.

CP 89–93; Br. App. at 1. "Conclusion of Law III"—essentially a verbatim recitation of Dr. Ronnei's "clinical opinion"—is actually a finding of fact. CP 41–78 ("Appendix B"); CP 27–37 ("Page 10" of report). Dr. Ronnei's opinion regarding defendant's capacity was based upon empirical observations and not legal reasoning. As such, "Conclusion of Law III" is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence supports that defendant could choose to assist his counsel. Per unchallenged Finding of Fact VII, the Court accepted Dr. Ronnei's factual observations and conclusions. CP 89–93. One of these observations was that defendant did not exhibit symptoms of a disorder

that would interfere with his ability to work with his attorney. 5/29/13 RP 45. In fact, Dr. Ronnei observed that defendant "demonstrate[d] the capacity to [...] communicate appropriately with his attorney regarding the decisions and eventualities involved in his case." CP 41–78 ("Appendix B"); CP 27–37 ("Page 10" of report). Even defense expert Dr. Nevotti found "fairly good" evidence that defendant was competent. 5/29/13 RP 34 (interpreting results of the "MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool" (MCAT)). Defendant also scored within normal limits on the "Montreal Cognitive Assessment" (MoCA) tool for concentration, executive functioning, memory, language, conceptual thinking, calculations, and orientation.⁵ CP 41–78 ("Appendix A" at p. 4 of 13); 5/29/13 RP 66–67. Given the above evidence, a fair-minded, rational person could determine that defendant had the ability to choose to assist his counsel.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant had not overcome his presumption of competence.

"No incompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues." RCW 10.77.050. "Incompetency" means "a person lacks the capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her or to assist in

⁵ Defendant scored below normal in only one MOCA category: visual-spatial relations. CP 41–78 ("Appendix A" at p. 4 of 13); 5/29/13 RP 66–67.

his or her own defense as a result of mental disease or defect." RCW 10.77.010(15), *unchanged by* S. 6312, 63rd Leg. § 58 (2014).

"The standard for competency to stand trial [is] a 2–part test which requires that the defendant (1) understand the nature of the charges and (2) be capable of assisting in his defense."⁶ *State v. Hahn*, 106 Wn.2d 885, 894, 726 P.2d 25 (1986); *see also State v. Lewis*, 141 Wn. App. 367, 381, 166 P.3d 786 (2007); *State v. Gwaltney*, 77 Wn.2d 906, 907, 468 P.2d 433 (1970). The "ability to assist" requirement is minimal. *State v. Harris*, 114 Wn.2d 419, 428, 789 P.2d 60 (1990). A defendant is not required to be capable of choosing or suggesting trial strategy, or even recalling past events. *Harris*, 114 Wn.2d at 428–29; *State v. Benn*, 120 Wn.2d 631, 662, 845 P.2d 289 (1993). Defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and assist in his own defense. *State v. Coley*, No. 88111–1, slip op. at 7 (2014); *State v. Bastas*, 75 Wn. App. 882, 886, 880 P.2d 1035 (1994).

Although the court must give considerable weight to defense counsel's representations concerning his client's competence, such representations are not dispositive. *State v. Israel*, 19 Wn. App. 773, 779, 577 P.2d 631 (1978); *see, e.g., State v. Hicks*, 41 Wn. App. 303, 309, 704 P.2d 1206 (1985) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant competent to stand trial even where defendant's attorney

maintained that it was "absolutely impossible to work with" his client); *State v. Crenshaw*, 27 Wn. App. 326, 331, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980), *aff'd*, 98 Wn.2d 789, 659 P.2d 488 (1983) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant competent to stand trial even though defense counsel expressed reservations about defendant's competency).

"[T]he law [...] vests in each trial judge a wide discretion in judging the mental competency of every defendant to stand trial [...]."
State v. Dodd, 70 Wn.2d 513, 514, 424 P.2d 302 (1967), *cert. denied*, 387 U.S. 948, 87 S. Ct. 2086, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1338 (1967). "The trial judge may make his determination from many things, including the defendant's appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal and family history, past behavior, medical and psychiatric reports and the statements of counsel."
Dodd, 70 Wn.2d at 514.

A trial court's determination of a defendant's competency to stand trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Sisouvanh*, 175 Wn.2d 607, 622, 290 P.3d 942 (2012); *see also State v. Crenshaw*, 27 Wn. App. 326, 331, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980). "A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable reasons or grounds." *State v. C.J.*, 148 Wn.2d 672, 686, 63 P.3d 765 (2003). A discretionary decision is manifestly unreasonable if it "is

⁶ Defendant challenges only the second prong of this test. Br.App. at 9.

outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard.” *State v. Lamb*, 175 Wn.2d 121, 128, 285 P.3d 27 (2012) (quoting *State v. Powell*, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995)). A discretionary decision “is based on ‘untenable grounds’ or made for ‘untenable reasons’ if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached in applying the wrong legal standard.” *State v. Rohrich*, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (quoting *State v. Rundquist*, 79 Wn. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)); see also *State v. Dye*, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).

Here, defendant fails to show that the court applied incorrect legal standards in determining that defendant failed to overcome his presumption of competence. CP 89–93 (Conclusion of Law II). When defense counsel opined in a declaration that defendant was incompetent, the trial court correctly recognized that, "as we know from the case law, [defense counsel's views regarding competency] must be given considerable weight in determining the defendant's competency to stand trial." 5/29/13 RP 69. The court weighed counsel's declaration accordingly, even speaking highly of defense counsel: "he is always very level, never prone to exaggeration, [... and] always well prepared[.]" 5/29/13 RP 68–69, 70. The court also correctly identified that it was permitted to consider the defendant's appearance, demeanor, conduct,

personal and family history, past behavior, and medical and psychiatric reports. 5/29/13 RP 69. There is simply no evidence of the court applying an incorrect legal standard on the record below.⁷

Defendant also fails to show that the trial court's conclusion was unsupported by facts or outside the range of acceptable choices. Unchallenged Finding of Fact VII indicates that the trial court accepted the facts contained in Dr. Ronnei's report and testimony. Several of these facts indicate defendant's competence. *Supra* pp. 8–9. Unchallenged Finding of Fact VIII shows that it was *defendant's own expert* who offered conclusions unsupported by facts. That defendant had not overcome his presumption of competence was perhaps the *only* reasonable conclusion in light of Dr. Nevotti's flawed report and Dr. Ronnei's credible conclusions.

The trial judge had wide discretion in judging defendant's mental competence. Defendant fails to challenge that Dr. Nevotti's report was contradictory, but asks this Court to agree with its conclusion. Such a request is unreasonable given the quantum of evidence indicating defendant's competence. Defendant fails to show that the trial court

⁷ Defendant claims that *Dr. Ronnei* incorporated an incorrect legal standard into her analysis, but never accuses the trial court of doing the same. Br.App. at 12–13. The complained of portion of Dr. Ronnei's report was offered in context of diagnosing defendant with a mental illness, not identifying a standard of competence to stand trial. Dr. Ronnei addressed the competency to stand trial in a separate section of her report. CP 41–78 ("Appendix B"); CP 27–37 (pp. 8–9, compare section headings "**DIAGNOSTIC FORMULATION**" with "**COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL**" (emphasis in original)).


abused its discretion in ruling that he had not overcome his presumption of competence.


D. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons stated above, the State respectfully requests this court to affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

DATED: June 24, 2014

MARK LINDQUIST
Pierce County
Prosecuting Attorney


KATHLEEN PROCTOR
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
WSB # 14811


Chris Bateman
Rule 9


Certificate of Service:

The undersigned certifies that on this day she delivered by U.S. mail or ABC-LMI delivery to the attorney of record for the appellant and appellant c/o his attorney true and correct copies of the document to which this certificate is attached. This statement is certified to be true and correct under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington. Signed at Tacoma, Washington, on the date below.

Date Signature



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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

CAUSE NO. 12-1-04268-5

vs.

ISAIAH STEVEN SUMMERS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RE: COMPETENCY HEARING

Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come on before the Honorable Linda CJ Lee, Judge of the above entitled court, for a hearing on the 29th day of May, 2013, to determine the competency of the defendant to stand trial, the defendant, ISAIAH STEVEN SUMMERS, having been present and represented by attorney DINO G. SEPE, and the State being represented by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney DOUGLAS J. HILL, and the court having observed the demeanor and heard the testimony of the witnesses and having considered all the evidence and the arguments of counsel and being duly advised in all matters, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

That on November 14, 2012, an Information was filed charging the defendant with Robbery in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, Assault in the Second Degree and Theft in the Second Degree.



ORIGINAL

II.

1 That Dino Sepe of the Pierce County Department of Assigned Counsel (DAC) was
2 appointed to represent the defendant. Mr. Sepe and DAC hired Dr. Joseph Nevotti a licensed
3 psychologist to evaluate the defendant for the dual purpose of competency to stand trial and a
4 potential diminished capacity defense. Dr. Nevotti evaluated the defendant and authored a report
5 dated March 15, 2013, which is on file and has been reviewed by the Court.
6

III.

7
8 That the State requested and the Court ordered that the defendant be evaluated by an
9 expert from the Department of Social and Health Services at Western State Hospital for the same
10 issues. An evaluation was performed and a report authored by Dr. Marilyn A. Ronnei, a licensed
11 psychologist dated April 25, 2013, which has been reviewed by the Court.
12

IV.

13 That there has been no previous finding of lack of competency as to this defendant to
14 stand trial in this case nor any previous court matters under any other cause numbers in this state
15 or any other state. The evidentiary hearing was dedicated to the issue of the defendant's
16 competency to stand trial and not the issue of diminished capacity.
17

V.

18
19 That defense counsel Dino Sepe filed a Declaration with the court on May 28, 2013,
20 outlining his experiences/interactions with the defendant and how Mr. Sepe believed those
21 experiences related to the defendant's competency to stand trial. The Court has reviewed that
22 document. The Court gives Mr. Sepe's declaration considerable weight.
23
24
25

12-1-04268-5

VI.

1 That Dr. Nevotti and Dr. Ronnei both testified during the May 29, 2013, competency
2 hearing in this matter. Both witnesses concluded that the defendant satisfies the first prong for a
3 finding of competency in that the defendant has the capacity to understand the legal system and
4 does appear to understand the legal system.
5

VII.

6
7 That as to the second prong of the test Dr. Ronnei opines in her report and her testimony
8 that the defendant is capable of assisting his counsel at trial. Dr. Ronnei concluded that during
9 her examination of the defendant that the defendant was not fully cooperating with her and that
10 he was purposely doing so. The Court accepts Dr. Ronnei's factual observations and conclusions
11 based upon the written report and the verbal testimony of Dr. Ronnei.
12

VIII.

13 That as to the second prong of the test Dr. Nevotti opines in his report and his testimony
14 that the defendant is not capable of assisting his counsel at trial. Dr. Nevotti's testimony was that
15 the reason the defendant might not be able to assist counsel is because the defendant's sense of
16 his own grandiosity which borders on the delusional. Therefore the defendant might act out at
17 trial in a physically or verbally violent manner and might refuse to listen to his attorney as he has
18 previously done during attorney/client meetings. Dr. Nevotti opines that the defendant may lack
19 the ability to choose whether or not the defendant will cooperate with his attorney. This
20 contradicts Dr. Nevotti's written report which does not appear to support this conclusion. Dr.
21 Nevotti himself could offer nothing to really support this conclusion and admits that it is "a
22 judgment call." Dr. Nevotti offers conclusions but no substance to support it.
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24
25

1 From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following Conclusions of Law.

2 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3 I.

4 That a two-prong test must be met for the Court to find the defendant to be competent to
5 stand trial. The first prong that must be present is that the defendant must be capable of
6 understanding the legal proceedings, The second prong is that the defendant must be capable of
7 assisting his own attorney in the legal proceedings. The parties have argued and the Court agrees
8 that the current state of the law appears to place the burden of proof to demonstrate a lack of
9 competency by a preponderance of the evidence upon the defendant in this case because there
10 has been no prior finding of a lack of competency as to this defendant. The parties agree and the
11 Court agrees that the first prong of the test is met in this case.

12 II.

13 That there is a presumption of competency to stand trial in this matter and the defendant
14 has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacks competency to stand trial in
15 this matter.
16

17 III.

18 That the defendant in this matter has the capacity to assist his counsel if he chooses to do
19 so. The defendant in this matter has the ability to make that choice.
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IV.

That the defendant, ISAIAH STEVEN SUMMERS, is competent to stand trial in this matter.


DONE IN OPEN COURT this 7th day of June, 2013.



JUDGE


LINDA CJ LEE

Presented by:



DOUGLAS J. HILL
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
WSB # 11850

Approved as to Form:



DINO G. SEPE
Attorney for Defendant
WSB # 15879



PIERCE COUNTY PROSECUTOR

June 25, 2014 - 9:21 AM

Transmittal Letter

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Case Name: St. v. Summrs

Court of Appeals Case Number: 45315-1

Is this a Personal Restraint Petition? Yes No

The document being Filed is:

Designation of Clerk's Papers Supplemental Designation of Clerk's Papers

Statement of Arrangements

Motion: _____

Answer/Reply to Motion: _____

Brief: Respondent's

Statement of Additional Authorities

Cost Bill

Objection to Cost Bill

Affidavit

Letter

Copy of Verbatim Report of Proceedings - No. of Volumes: _____

Hearing Date(s): _____

Personal Restraint Petition (PRP)

Response to Personal Restraint Petition

Reply to Response to Personal Restraint Petition

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Other: _____

Comments:

No Comments were entered.

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