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I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves an appeal by the Department of Ecology of a Superior Court decision, overturning a Shoreline Hearings Board decision. The dispute involves the status of Shoreline permits for the Twin Bridge Development/Marina in Skagit County, which everyone agrees is now fully permitted, inspected, and approved for occupancy and operation.

During 2001, the local permitting jurisdiction, Skagit County, approved final construction and operation of the dry stack storage marina after years of disputes, appeals, revised designs, and extensive litigation. Although fully aware of Skagit County's final approval, Ecology asserted that the final construction violated the Shoreline Management Act even though the County had issued final construction permits. Rather than appeal or challenge the County permits and approvals under the Land Use Petition Act, Ecology allowed the permits to become final and construction to proceed and then independently commenced enforcement procedures against the project assessing fines and ordering that the construction cease. With Skagit County's concurrence, construction did proceed and was completed, and later accepted by Ecology. What remained, however, were penalties assessed by Ecology and appealed by Twin Bridge.

Twin Bridge appealed Ecology's enforcement orders to the Shoreline Hearings Board on the same basis before this Court

today – under the Land Use Petition Act. Twin Bridge asserts that the Land Use Petition Act applies to Ecology as well as other State agencies, and any challenge to an approved land use action must be a challenge to the local jurisdiction's approval, and not a separate "enforcement" action.

At the hearing before the Shoreline Hearings Board, Ecology argued that the Shoreline Management Act granted it independent enforcement authority over all shoreline activities, and not just shoreline activities requiring Ecology approval.

During July, 2002, the Shoreline Hearings Board issued its ruling, partly in favor of Twin Bridge and upholding portions of Ecology's enforcement orders. The Board determined that activities more than 200 feet from the high water line were not subject to Ecology enforcement, but did find that certain activities within 200 feet of the high water line, notwithstanding Skagit County approval, violated the SMA and as such were prohibited. The Board affirmed penalties totaling \$59,000.

The Board decision was timely appealed, and proceeded to trial on March 15, 2004.

At the Superior Court hearing/trial, additional evidence was submitted (additional project approvals), first opposed and then stipulated to by Ecology, and relied upon by the Court in making its final order.

The additional evidence submitted to the trial court did not conflict with the Board's findings, but rather added additional evidence and allowed the Court to conclude that the dispute concerned only "substantial development permits", and not "conditional use permits."

Accordingly, the Court entered its own findings, conclusions and order, overturning the Shoreline Hearings Board decision.

Ecology timely appealed, without specifically identifying the Court's decision, over the objection of Ecology, to enter findings and conclusions as compared to simply "overturning" the Board decision.

Ecology's opening brief ignores the Superior Court's findings, conclusions and order, as if they had not been entered, and then argues from the Board's conclusions and rulings. Furthermore, Ecology ignored the Court's findings and conclusion that the dispute in this matter involved substantial development permits, and not conditional use permits ("CUP's").

Shoreline CUP's require Ecology approval. Shoreline substantial development permits do not. Ecology's opening brief, ignoring the Superior Court findings, conclusions and order and adding "facts" not found in the Board's findings or rulings, attempts to convert this case into a "CUP" dispute when it is not.

In response, on October 29, 2004 Twin Bridge filed its Motion on the Merits to affirm, or, in the alternative, to strike

portions from appellants' opening brief. Respondents requested that all references to "CUP's" be stricken, and all references to the Board's conclusions.

Ecology replied, arguing its position that the Court's entry of findings and conclusions was improper even though additional evidence was submitted, stipulated to, and added to the record.

Twin Bridge replied, addressing Ecology's arguments.

After consideration of all pleadings, the Commissioner denied Twin Bridge's Motion on the Merits, and forwarded all remaining issues for consideration by the Panel.

Twin Bridges' Motion and Reply addressed all issues set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, with the exception of the general issue as to whether or not the Land Use Petition Act applies to the Shoreline Management Act on any issue other than a dispute between a local permitting jurisdiction and Ecology on the exact location of the physical boundary on the ground between jurisdictional "shorelands" and non jurisdictional "uplands."

This brief addresses that remaining issue.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

All relevant facts were set forth in Twin Bridges' Motion on the Merits, the Shoreline Hearing Board's findings of fact (CP6-26), and the Superior Court's Finding of Fact. The sole issue before the Court is whether or not Ecology can ignore the Land Use Petition Act and independently levy penalties and/or prohibit development

otherwise fully permitted by the local jurisdiction with the final decision making authority to approve the development.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Twin Bridge's Motion to Strike Should Be Granted

Pursuant to the decision of the Commissioner, dated January 26, 2005, Twin Bridge's previously filed Motion to Strike abides this matter's hearing before the Court.

Because this matter is appealed from the decision of the Skagit County Superior Court, and because that court took additional evidence in this matter pursuant to RCW 34.05.562(1), the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are properly before this court on appeal.

Ecology, however, treats this matter as if this Court can simply affirm the decision reached in this matter by the SHB, and ignore the determinations of fact and law the trial court made on the appeal to that level.

B. The Land Use Petition Act Required Ecology to Timely Appeal the Issuance by Skagit County of Twin Bridge's Construction Permits.

Despite its denial that this matter is solely about Ecology's impermissible collateral attack on the building permits Twin Bridge received from Skagit County, that was the only issue on Twin Bridge's appeal to the Superior Court, and the only issue that can be considered by this Court.

Ecology claims on this appeal, as it did before the SHB, that Twin Bridge “constructed. . . within Shoreline jurisdiction with no permit authorizing that development.” That statement is, as it was before the SHB, and as the trial court correctly found, simply wrong. Similarly and equally wrong is Ecology’s assertion that its collateral attack on Twin Bridge’s building permits, made via its imposition of the Notices and Orders at issue on this appeal, is permitted under Washington law.

When the Legislature enacted the Land Use Petition Act in 1995, it defined its purpose as:

To reform the process for judicial review of land use decisions made by local jurisdictions, by establishing uniform, expedited appeal procedures and uniform criteria for reviewing such decisions, in order to provide consistent, predictable, and timely judicial review.

RCW 36.70C.010.

LUPA defines “land use decision” as:

a final determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination, including those with authority to hear appeals, on:

(a) An application for a project permit or other governmental approval required by law before real property may be improved, developed, modified, sold, transferred, or used, but excluding applications for permits or approvals to use, vacate, or transfer streets, parks, and similar types of public property; excluding applications for legislative approvals such as area-wide rezones and annexations; and excluding applications for business licenses;

(b) [a]n interpretive or declaratory decision regarding the application to a specific property of zoning or other ordinances or rules regulating the improvement, development, modification, maintenance, or use of real property.

RCW 36.70C(1)(a)-(b).

The building permits issued by Skagit County to Twin Bridge meet the definition of final land use decision, because Skagit County had the sole jurisdiction to have issued them, and to have made the threshold determinations regarding the need for prerequisite or additional shoreline permits under its Shoreline Master Plan (“SMP”).

Under LUPA, judicial relief from a local authority’s land use decision is reserved for those with standing to bring an action for relief because of their position as “person aggrieved or adversely affected by the land use decision.” 36.70C.060(2). LUPA defines “person” as “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization, or governmental entity or agency.” RCW 36.70C.020(3). Unquestionably, Ecology is a “person” under LUPA with standing to seek judicial relief from a local authority’s final land use decision.

Such judicial relief is available to “aggrieved persons from a court if the complaining party can demonstrate that the “land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law” (RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b)) or “a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts.” RCW 36.70C.130(1)(d). Again, if Ecology asserts that

Skagit County should have required new or additional shoreline permits for Twin Bridge's development, it was free under LUPA to have filed a petition, and appealed the issuance of the building permits. However, it did not do so.

"Final decision" has been defined by Washington courts interpreting the Administrative Procedures Act, RCW 34.04 et seq., as a decision that "imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes a legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process." *Dep't of Ecology v. City of Kirkland*, 84 Wn.2d 25, 30, 523 P.2d 1181 (1974).

Our courts have also said that a "final decision" is "one which leaves nothing open to further dispute and which sets at rest cause of action between the parties." *Samuel's Furniture, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology*, 147 Wn.2d 440, 452, 54 P.3d 1194 (2002), *amended upon denial of reconsideration, citing*, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 567 (5th ed. 1979).

The threshold determination of whether new or additional shoreline permits were required in this matter was left to the County under the SMA. The SMA provides that once a county has developed an approved Shoreline Management Program, as Skagit County has done, "administration of the system so established shall be performed exclusively by the local government." RCW 90.58.140(3).

Therefore, when Skagit County, having determined that Twin Bridge's development was consistent with the County's SMP and Twin Bridge's existing Shoreline permits, its issuance of the Twin Bridge building permits was a "final land use decision," subject only to appeal under LUPA.

"Aggrieved persons" must timely file and serve a LUPA petition in order to have their challenge considered by the court. RCW 36.70C.040(2). The statute provides that such petition "is timely if it is filed and served on all parties . . . within twenty-one days of the issuance of the land use decision." RCW 36.70C.040(3). It is not disputed by Ecology that it failed to timely file such petition in this matter. As an "aggrieved person" as defined by LUPA, it was incumbent on Ecology to have adhered to LUPA's provisions, and make a timely appeal of the County's issuance of the building permits, if it was to challenge that issuance.

Because Ecology ignored the requirements of timely appeal required by the Land Use Petition Act, recent Washington decisions are crystal clear that it is precluded from the kinds of enforcement actions it attempts to take in this matter.

C. Washington Authority Leaves No Question That Ecology's Notices and Orders Are Impermissible Collateral Attacks on a Final Land Use Decision.

At the time it made its decision in this matter in 2002, the SHB relied on *Samuel's Furniture v. Dep't of Ecology*, 105 Wn.

App. 278, 19 P.3d 474 (2001), *pet. rev. granted*, 145 Wn.2d 1001 (2001) as the sole authority supporting its ruling that Ecology is granted independent authority allowing it to enforce the provisions of the Shoreline Management Act (“SMA”), should “a local government fail to do so.”

Though Twin Bridge asserted at that time that the Board’s decision was an error of law, authority subsequent to that ruling solidifies the position Twin Bridge took and has maintained since this matter’s inception: the Land Use Petition Act prevents the kinds of independent enforcement actions undertaken by Ecology in this matter. The Superior Court found exactly that, and that decision must be affirmed.

Since 2000, the Washington Supreme Court has decided a quartet of cases, all of which stand for the proposition that an “aggrieved person” must file a timely appeal of that land use decision if it is to be challenged at all.

Beginning with *Wenatchee Sportsmen v. Chelan County*, 141 Wn.2d 169, 4 P.3d 123 (2000) and *Skamania County v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n*, 144 Wn.2d 30, 26 P.3d 231 (2001), the Washington Supreme Court established a clear line of authority that holds that when a statutory scheme requires a timely appeal of authority having jurisdiction’s final land use decision, unless such appeal is undertaken, the land use decision is vested, and cannot be collaterally attacked.

Wenatchee Sportsmen involved an attempt to challenge development permits issued for a subdivision, on property rezoned to allow such development. The plaintiffs asserted that the rezone violated local growth management regulations, and that on that basis the County had to rescind the permits. The trial court agreed, and ruled that the permits should be rescinded.

The Supreme Court held, however, that the rezone was itself a final land use decision requiring a timely LUPA appeal. The court held that rights in a land use decision are “vested” at the expiration of the LUPA appeal period, and can no longer be challenged, even if erroneously granted. The court noted that “if there is no challenge [to the rezone] decision, the decision is valid, [and] the statutory bar against untimely petitions must be given effect.” On this basis, the court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to timely challenge the rezone was fatal to the attempt to defeat the development permits.

Similarly, in *Skamania County v. Columbia River Gorge Commission*, the Washington Supreme Court analyzed a situation in which the Columbia River Gorge Commission (the “Commission”) asserted that by statute it enjoyed co-jurisdiction with Skamania County over the issuance of building permits within the Columbia River Gorge Scenic Area. Based on that assertion, the Commission sought to invalidate a building permit issued by Skamania County for the construction of a private residence within

the Scenic Area. Though the statute at issue in *Skamania County* was neither the SMA nor a local authority's SMP, the statutes at issue analogize well to the SMA.

Just as the SMA requires counties to enact a Shoreline Management Plan consistent with the provisions of the SMA, that Ecology must then approve, Skamania County was required to enact a local land use ordinance covering development within the Scenic Area that was consistent with the provisions of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 USC §§ 544, et seq.¹ In 1993, Skamania County enacted that ordinance, which required notice of an application for development within the Scenic Area be provided to interested parties including the Commission, and also required, much like LUPA, that a decision of the County becomes "final" unless that decision is appealed within 20 days.² Following such appeal and a decision from the County Board of Adjustment, the ordinance provided for another level of appeal to the Gorge Commission, so long as such appeal was filed within 30 days.³

After the County approved the permits for the construction of the residence, no appeals were filed within the timeframes for such appeals. However, after construction began, the Commission became concerned that the decision made by the County violated the

¹ See, 144 Wn.2d at 36.

² *Id.*, at 36-37.

³ *Id.*

Scenic Area Act and the ordinance.⁴ Thereafter, the Commission began an “enforcement action” against the County, much as Ecology did in this matter against Twin Bridge.

Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court held in *Skamania County* much as it later held in its decision in *Samuel’s Furniture*, that when a statutory scheme requires a timely appeal of a final land use action, such appeal is a pre-requisite requirement for any action to challenge that land use decision. The Washington Supreme Court’s summary of its decision in *Skamania County*, albeit in regard to another statute, makes for a striking analogy of how the issue in the instant case must be addressed under LUPA:

The Act does not authorize the Gorge Commission to collaterally invalidate final county land use decisions. Rather, any Gorge Commission to modify, terminate or set aside a final county decision must be take pursuant to the Ordinance and the Act and in the form of a timely appeal.

Skamania County, 144 Wn.2d at 57.

Perhaps the most illustrative of the “quartet” of cases is *Chelan County v. Nykreim*, 146 Wn.2d 904, 53 P.3d 1 (2002). *Nykreim* stands for the proposition that even if the sovereign’s final land use decision is made in error, that decision vests unless a timely LUPA appeal is made by applicable “aggrieved persons,” which includes even the governmental agency that made the erroneous decision.

⁴ 144 Wn.2d at 38.

Nykreim involved Chelan County's erroneous grant of a boundary line adjustment ("BLA"), the effect of which was to create a building lot that failed to conform with the County's own Code in regard to subdivision of property.⁵ More than a year after the grant of the BLA, Chelan County filed an action for declaratory relief, seeking to invalidate the BLA.⁶ The trial court granted that relief on the bases that the BLA decision failed to comport with the County's Code, and was "arbitrary, capricious, unlawful and exceeded lawful authority with was known or should have been known by its agents."⁷

The matter was appealed to Division III of the Washington Court of Appeals, where the plaintiffs/petitioners asserted that LUPA barred the County's action, taken more than a year after the BLA was approved by it. The Court of Appeals ruled that LUPA was applicable only to "quasi-judicial" decisions, and not to the kinds of "ministerial decision" that the BLA was. The court's reasoning was that since LUPA replaced the writ of certiorari formerly available to appeal quasi-judicial land use decisions, LUPA had a similar limitation, and was inapplicable to ministerial decisions.⁸

Liberally citing both *Wenatchee Sportsmen* and *Skamania County*, the Washington Supreme Court saw the issue quite differently, however. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and

⁵ *Nykreim*, 146 Wn.2d at 913.

⁶ *Id.* at 914.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Nykreim*, 146 Wn. 2d at 916.

found that the issue of “finality” in land use decisions was centrally and importantly addressed by LUPA, such that a structured timeframe for resolution “if there were not finality [in land use decisions], no owner of land would ever be safe in proceeding with the development of his property.”⁹

In its analysis of who is an “aggrieved person” under LUPA, the *Nykreim* court specifically determined that LUPA’s definition of “person” (which includes “governmental entity or agency”)¹⁰ applied to Chelan County. Therefore, the court found that Chelan County was not exempt from the need to file a timely land use petition in order to challenge even its own erroneous land use decision.

Applicable to the instant matter, the *Nykreim* court specifically found that “building permits”, though ministerial land use determinations, are specifically subject to judicial review under LUPA.¹¹

LUPA does not distinguish between quasi-judicial and ministerial decisions. LUPA does indeed apply to this land use decision; the Act being the “exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions” . . . It therefore makes no difference whether the boundary line adjustment decision by the Chelan Count Planning Director was quasi-judicial or ministerial. An appeal from that action may be brought only under LUPA and within the 21 day time limit specified in the Act.¹²

⁹ *Id.* at 931, quoting, *Skamania County*, 144 Wn.2d. at 49.

¹⁰ *Nykreim*, 144 Wn.2d at 934, citing, RCW 36.70C.020(3).

¹¹ *Id.* at 929, citing RCW 36.70B.020(4).

¹² *Id.* at 940.

Under *Nykreim*, all “aggrieved persons”, including even the sovereign who issues a building permit under must challenge any issuance of such permit – including an erroneous or unlawful one – under LUPA. Given that like Chelan County, Ecology is an “aggrieved person” under LUPA; it too must undertake a timely LUPA appeal in order to challenge any final land use decision – including the issuance of a building permit – if it cares to challenge that decision.

Finally, the Washington Supreme Court removed all doubt from a case like the instant one when it issued its decision in *Samuel’s Furniture v. Dep’t of Ecology*, 147 Wn.2d 440, 54 P.3d 1194 (2002). In that opinion, the court succinctly indicated the decision’s central holding – the applicability of LUPA to Ecology’s enforcement powers over the SMA – when it observed, “(T)his case presents the intersection of the SMA and LUPA.”¹³ As “intersected” statutes, the court ruled that the SMA and LUPA must be read as complimentary, with the provisions of LUPA applying to the kinds of final land use decisions that touch on the SMA.

Since the inception of this matter, Ecology has asserted that it enjoys some over-reaching powers of enforcement over the SMA such that it was not required to have timely appealed Skagit County’s

¹³ *Samuel’s Furniture*, 147 Wn.2d at 448.

issuance of Twin Bridge's building permits, and that it can simply ignore any Skagit County final land use decision.

Ecology's position in this matter has always been that it has the right, given that the land use decision touches the SMA, to take whatever enforcement measures it deems appropriate, and that the SMA grants it such power. Certainly, the lesson of *Nykreim* that any "aggrieved person" who has standing to make a timely LUPA appeal must do so, or the land use decision of the local authority vests, was lost on both Ecology and the SHB. Instead, despite overwhelming judicial indication to the contrary, each asserted that since none of the previous decisions had specifically reconciled Ecology's enforcement powers over the SMA with LUPA, the only competent authority remained the Court of Appeals' decision in *Samuel's Furniture, supra*.

However, nothing can justify Ecology's (and the SHB's) ultimate rejection of the Washington Supreme Court's decision in *Samuel's Furniture*, which as the trial court found, is a clear error of law.

In *Samuel's Furniture*, the Washington Supreme Court determined that Ecology is, in fact, an "aggrieved person" and that LUPA unquestionably applies to any enforcement action it would take in regard to a local authority's permit issuance. Ecology has argued that *Samuel's Furniture* is limited to the jurisdictional dispute that arose in that case over whether the project in question was or was not within Shoreline jurisdiction, and that Ecology enjoys enforcement

powers under the SMA that allow it to invalidate a decision made by a local authority, if that decision violates the SMA. The Washington Supreme Court rejected that contention.

In keeping with the concept that the decision is the “intersection” of the SMA and LUPA, the *Samuel’s Furniture* court echoed the *Nykreim* determination that LUPA’s central purpose was to provide predictable finality to an applicant’s request for a land use decision. However, in so doing the Court simultaneously rejected what the court termed Ecology’s position that it “had free rein to unilaterally overturn decisions made by local governments”¹⁴, which is precisely what Ecology attempted to do in this matter.

In contrast with the authority sought by Ecology, LUPA is consistent with the policy in favor of finality of land use decisions. It specifically authorizes a system of “uniform, expedited appeal procedures and uniform criteria for reviewing such decisions, in order to provide consistent, predictable and timely judicial review.”¹⁵

Ultimately, the *Samuel’s Furniture* Court found that the LUPA policy strongly favoring finality in land use matters, though not trumping the SMA, requires all aggrieved parties to adhere to LUPA’s timely appeal requirements. In a passage absolutely on point to the dispute in this matter, the *Samuel’s Furniture* court said:

Although review by the SHB may promote uniform development of the state’s shorelines, we find this rationale insufficient to overcome the strong public policy in favor of finality in land use decisions and

¹⁴ *Samuel’s Furniture*, 147 Wn.2d at 458.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 459.

because of the burden it places on land owners and developers. Ecology's position fails to provide land owners and developers with any assurance that they may proceed with a project without rise of later action by Ecology.¹⁶

The position asserted by Ecology and rejected by the *Samuel's Furniture* court is precisely the same position taken by Ecology in this matter. Further, this statement by the *Samuel's Furniture* court is in no way qualified and limited solely to matters involving jurisdictional disputes. When read in concert with the balance of the "quartet" of cases, and in particular with the *Nykreim* decision, there is no doubt but that the law in Washington is that no collateral attack on a local authority's land use decision is available to an "aggrieved person" who has failed to file a timely LUPA appeal. And *Samuel's Furniture* clearly states that in matters involving the SMA, Ecology is not excused from that requirement.

Despite its knowledge that Skagit County had issued and then later reinstated the development permits for Twin Bridge's project, and despite not having made a timely LUPA appeal, Ecology issued Notices and Penalties that under *Nykreim* and *Samuel's Furniture* it had no jurisdiction to do, because it had not complied with LUPA's requirement for timely appeal. As such, the permits issued to Twin Bridge by Skagit County were vested, and could not be collaterally attacked as Ecology did and continues to contend it had the power to do.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 460-61.

The trial court found in its memorandum decision that this matter was factually indistinguishable from *Samuel's Furniture*, and therefore correctly overturned the decision of the Shoreline Hearings Board.

It can no longer be questioned that state and other governmental agencies are bound to comply with the provisions of LUPA. Neither Ecology nor the SMA is exempted from such requirement. Because Ecology never filed a LUPA appeal in this matter prevents it from taking the collateral enforcement actions it did.

Ecology and the SHB have repeatedly ignored controlling authority in this matter, raising the specter of just what the *Samuel's Furniture* court feared would come if such collateral attack were allowed, that land owners and developers would never be assured that "they may proceed with a project without risk of later action by Ecology."¹⁷

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court's findings and conclusions in this matter are correct, as was its decision to overturn the SHB decision. Under the quartet of cases, there remain no bases on which Ecology, having made no LUPA appeal, can collaterally attack the building permits issued to Twin Bridge by Skagit County. Further, because


¹⁷ 147 Wn.2d at 460-61.

those decisions were vested after the LUPA appeal period expired, Ecology was completely without authority or jurisdiction to issue the Notices and Orders.

Ecology, despite its assertions to the contrary, has no power to overcome the requirements of LUPA. Like any concerned neighbor, citizen or private land use organization, it must timely adhere to LUPA's appeal process in order to have properly challenged the Twin Bridge building permits.

DATED this 23~~rd~~ day of March, 2005.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION I

54277-0-1

DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, a department of the
State of Washington,

Appellant

v.

TWIN BRIDGE MARINE PARK, ET AL.,


Respondent

APPEALED FROM SKAGIT COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
THE HONORABLE SUSAN K. COOK

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

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2005 MAR 24 PM 12:03



I, Benita K. Palachuk, under penalty of perjury and in accordance with the laws of the State of Washington, declare that on the 23rd day of March, 2005, caused true and correct copies of the following documents:

1. RESPONDENTS' BRIEF;
2. and this DECLARATION OF SERVICE.

to be delivered by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following parties of record:

Thomas J. Young
PO Box 40117
Olympia, WA 98504-0117

DATED this 23rd day of March, 2005 at Seattle, WA.


Benita K. Palachuk