

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN RE: PERSONAL RESTRAINT OF ROBERT BONDS

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	No. 80995-0
Petitioner,)	
)	STATEMENT OF
v.)	ADDITIONAL
)	AUTHORITIES
ROBERT BONDS,)	(RAP 10.8)
Respondent.)	

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STATE OF WASHINGTON
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J. CARPENTER

Pursuant to RAP 10.8, Respondent, Robert Bonds, submits the following statement of additional authority for the consideration of the Court in the above-captioned matter:

RAP 13.5A(a)(1); (c) (mandating that the procedure for filing motions for discretionary review of Court of Appeals decisions deciding personal restraint petitions "shall be the same as specified in rule 13.5(a) and (c) (copy attached as Appendix A);

RAP 13.5(a) ("A party seeking review by the Supreme Court . . . must file a motion for discretionary review in the Supreme Court and a copy in the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the decision is filed.") (copy attached as Appendix B).

Beckman v. DSHS, 102 Wn.App. 687, 692, 11 P.3d 313 (2000)
(specific terms in court rule govern general terms) (copy attached as
Appendix C).

DATED this 1st day of July 2008.

Respectfully submitted,



NANCY P. COLLINS (WSBA 28806)
Washington Appellate Project-91052
Attorneys for Respondent

APPENDIX A

RULE 13.5A
MOTIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF SPECIFIED FINAL DECISIONS

(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs motions for discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the following decisions of the Court of Appeals:

(1) Decisions dismissing or deciding personal restraint petitions, as provided in rule 16.14(c);

(2) Decisions dismissing or deciding post-sentence petitions, as provided in rule 16.18(g);

(3) Decisions on accelerated review that relate only to a juvenile offense disposition, juvenile dependency, or termination of parental rights, as provided in rule 18.13(e); and

(4) Decisions on accelerated review that relate only to an adult sentence, as provided in rule 18.15(g).

(b) Considerations Governing Acceptance of Review. In ruling on motions for discretionary review pursuant to this rule, the Supreme Court will apply the considerations set out in rule 13.4(b).

(c) Procedure. The procedure for motions pursuant to this rule shall be the same as specified in rule 13.5(a) and (c).

[Adopted effective September 1, 2006.]

APPENDIX B

RULE 13.5
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF INTERLOCUTORY DECISION

(a) How To Seek Review. A party seeking review by the Supreme Court of an interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeals must file a motion for discretionary review in the Supreme Court and a copy in the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the decision is filed.

(b) Considerations Governing Acceptance of Review. Discretionary review of an interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeals will be accepted by the Supreme Court only:

(1) If the Court of Appeals has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; or

(2) If the Court of Appeals has committed probable error and the decision of the Court of Appeals substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or

(3) If the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a trial court or administrative agency, as to call for the exercise of revisory jurisdiction by the Supreme Court.

(c) Motion Procedure. The procedure for and the form of the motion for discretionary review is as provided in Title 17. A motion for discretionary review under this rule, and any response, should not exceed 20 pages double spaced, excluding appendices.

(d) Effect of Denial. Denial of discretionary review of a decision does not affect the right of a party to obtain later review of the Court of Appeals decision or the issues pertaining to that decision.

References

Form 3, Motion for Discretionary Review.

APPENDIX C

9 of 10 DOCUMENTS

**DAMON R. BECKMAN, ET AL., Respondents, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL., Appellants.**

No. 25982-6-II

COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION TWO

102 Wn. App. 687; 11 P.3d 313; 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1915

September 12, 2000, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [*1]**

Order to Publish Order Denying Appellants' Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal and Granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal September 12, 2000, Reported at: *2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 2095*.

SUMMARY:

Nature of Action: Motion to extend time to file notice of appeal and motion to dismiss appeal of a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs for injuries suffered in a state-licensed adult care facility. The State filed its notice of appeal more than 30 days after the judgment had been entered in the case.

Court of Appeals: Holding that the plaintiffs did not have a duty to notify the State of entry of final judgment in the case and that the State's late filing of its notice of appeal was not excused on the grounds of extraordinary circumstances, the court *denies* the motion to extend time to file the notice of appeal and *grants* the motion to dismiss the appeal.

HEADNOTES

WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES

[1] Courts -- Rules of Court -- Construction -- Purpose A court rule is construed in accord with its purpose as if it were drafted by the Legislature.

[2] Courts -- Rules of Court -- Construction -- Rules of Statutory Construction A court rule is interpreted by application of the rules of statutory construction.

[3] Statutes -- Construction -- Meaning of Words -- Eiusdem Generis Under the principle of *eiusdem generis*, general terms in a statute, when used in conjunction with specific terms, incorporate only those things

that are similar in nature or comparable to the specific terms.

[4] Pleading -- What Constitutes -- Final Judgment For purposes of *CR 5(a)*, which describes the documents that must be served in an action, neither the term "pleading" nor the term "similar paper" includes final judgments.

[5] Appeal -- Notice of Appeal -- Timeliness -- Accrual of Limitation Period -- Service of Judgment -- Necessity The 30-day period of *RAP 5.2(a)* for filing a notice of appeal of a judgment begins to run from the date the judgment is entered by the trial court. Under *CR 58*, a judgment is "entered" when it is delivered to the clerk of the court for filing. There is no requirement that a conformed copy of the final judgment be served on all parties before the 30-day period begins to run. *CR 54(f)* requires only that a proposed judgment be served on opposing counsel; the rule does not address conformed copies of final judgments.

[6] Judgment -- Final Judgment -- Conformed Copy - Service -- Necessity *CR 5(a)*, which describes the documents that must be served in an action, does not require service of conformed copies of final judgments.

[7] Appeal -- Notice of Appeal -- Timeliness -- Extension of Time -- Extraordinary Circumstances -- What Constitutes For purposes of *RAP 18.8(b)*, under which the time for filing a notice of appeal may not be extended except in extraordinary circumstances or to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice, the phrase "extraordinary circumstances" refers to instances where the filing, despite reasonable diligence, was defective due to excusable error or circumstances beyond the party's control. Whether the respondent would be prejudiced by the granting of an extension is irrelevant to the inquiry; it is

the legal system and litigants generally who would be prejudiced by such an extension.

[8] Appeal -- Notice of Appeal -- Timeliness -- Extension of Time -- Extraordinary Circumstances -- Lack of Notice of Final Judgment The failure of a prevailing party at trial to provide the nonprevailing party with notice of entry of final judgment does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" within the meaning of *RAP 18.8(b)*, under which the time for filing a notice of appeal may be extended only in extraordinary circumstances or to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. Once the prevailing party has provided notice to the nonprevailing party of presentation of the proposed judgment, as required by *CR 52(c)*, the nonprevailing party is obligated on its own behalf to monitor the case for actual entry of the final judgment; the prevailing party does not have a further duty to do so.

[9] Appeal -- Notice of Appeal -- Timeliness -- Extension of Time -- Extraordinary Circumstances -- Failure To Route Papers -- Negligent Failure An attorney's negligent failure or lack of reasonable diligence in routing a notice of presentation of a proposed judgment under *CR 52(c)* to another attorney in the same office who is responsible for monitoring the case file or acting in the case does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" within the meaning of *RAP 18.8(b)*, under which the time for filing a notice of appeal may be extended only in extraordinary circumstances or to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice, especially if the office lacks appropriate case management procedures for calendaring hearings or for noting critical dates.

[10] Appeal -- Notice of Appeal -- Timeliness -- Extension of Time -- Extraordinary Circumstances -- Failure To Route Papers -- Intentional Failure An attorney's alleged intentional failure to route a notice of presentation of a proposed judgment under *CR 52(c)* to another attorney in the same office who is responsible for monitoring the case file or acting in the case does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" within the meaning of *RAP 18.8(b)*, under which the time for filing a notice of appeal may be extended only in extraordinary circumstances or to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice, if the office lacks appropriate case management procedures for calendaring hearings or for noting critical dates.

COUNSEL: *Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Loretta M. Lamb and Michael E. Tardif, Assistants; and Howard M. Goodfriend and Catherine W. Smith (of Edwards, Sieh, Smith & Goodfriend, P.S.), for appellants.*

*Charles K. Wiggins and Kenneth W. Masters (of Wiggins Law Offices, P.L.L.C.); and Stephanie B. Bloomfield, David P. Moody, [***2] and J. Richard Creatura (of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson & Daheim), for respondents.*

Steven B. Frank (of Frank & Rosen), for other party.

Karl B. Tegland, amicus curiae.

JUDGES: ARMSTRONG, C.J., BRIDGEWATER, J., HUNT, J.

OPINION

[314] [*690] ON MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL.**

Armstrong, C.J., and Bridgewater and Hunt, JJ.--

BACKGROUND

Damon Beckman, William Coalter, and Eric Busch (Plaintiffs) are developmentally disabled adults who claim they suffered injuries while living in a state-licensed adult care facility. They sued the State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services, its caseworker-employees, and the operator of the facility. On March 23, 2000, a jury awarded them \$ 17.76 million in damages, including substantial punitive damages.

Sometime before April 4, 2000, Plaintiffs' counsel spoke to the trial judge's assistant to schedule a time for presentation of the judgment documents for each Plaintiff. The hearing was scheduled for April 14, 2000.

On April 4, 2000, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a confirming letter to the trial court judge with a copy to "Opposing Counsel." At the same time, Plaintiffs' counsel prepared a "Note [***3] for Motion Docket," with proposed judgment attached for each Plaintiff's case and with each addressed to "Janet L. Capps, Loretta M. Lamb" at the Attorney General's Office in Seattle. *See CR 54(f)*. All of these documents were sent by courier to the Attorney General's Office and all bear a "Received" [**315] filing stamp of April 4, 2000, from the Attorney General's Office.

No one from the Attorney General's Office appeared at the April 14 hearing. The trial court entered the judgments, and they were filed on the same day. However, neither the court nor Plaintiffs' counsel sent conformed copies of the final judgment documents to the Attorney General's Office.

On May 24, Plaintiffs' counsel wrote the Attorney General's Office, asking that the State pay the judgments. The [**691] next day, 10 days late, the State filed a No-

tice of Appeal. At the same time, the State moved to allow the late filing; Plaintiffs responded with a motion to dismiss the appeal.

The State contends *CR 5(a)* and *RAP 18.8* allow such a late filing under the circumstances presented here. They do not.

DISCUSSION

I. *CR 5(a)*

CR 5(a) describes the documents that a party must serve:

[E]very order required by its terms to be served, every pleading [***4] subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.

(Emphasis added.)

[1] [2] The State asks us to broadly construe the language of *CR 5(a)* and hold that the rule requires service of conformed copies of the final judgment on the nonprevailing party.¹ The State argues that because it was not served with conformed copies of the final judgment, its appeal is timely. However, the language of *CR 5* and the related civil rules are plain. *CR 5(a)* does not require service of conformed copies of the final judgment.

¹ We construe court rules in accord with their purpose "as though they were drafted by the Legislature." *Nevers v. Fireside, Inc.*, 133 Wn.2d 804, 809, 947 P.2d 721 (1997) (citation omitted). And we interpret court rules by reference to rules of statutory construction. *State v. Greenwood*, 120 Wn.2d 585, 592, 845 P.2d 971 (1993) [***5]; *Heaney v. Seattle Mun. Court*, 35 Wn. App. 150, 154, 665 P.2d 918 (1983), review denied, 101 Wn.2d 1004 (1994) (citing 3 C. DALLAS SANDS, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 67.10 (4th ed. 1974)).

[3] [4] Here, the terms "pleading" and "similar paper" do not include final judgments. A final judgment is not a "pleading" requiring service under *CR 5(a)*. *CR*

7(a) defines [*692] "pleadings," and that definition does not include judgments. See also *Tiffin v. Hendricks*, 44 Wn.2d 837, 843, 271 P.2d 683 (1954).² Rather, the civil rules treat judgments differently than pleadings. Compare *CR 7-16* (pleadings or motions) with *CR 54-63* (judgments).

² "The term "pleadings" has a technical and well-defined meaning. Pleadings are written allegations of what is affirmed on one side, or denied on the other, disclosing to the court or jury having to try the cause the real matter in dispute between the parties." *Tiffin*, 44 Wn.2d at 843 (quoting *Black's Law Dictionary* 1312 (4th ed. 1951)).

A final judgment is not a "similar paper." Even assuming ambiguity in *CR 5(a)*, the rule of statutory construction ejusdem generis dictates this conclusion. That rule provides that general terms, when used in conjunction with specific [***6] terms, should be deemed to incorporate only those things similar in nature or "comparable to" the specific terms. *John H. Sellen Constr. Co. v. Department of Revenue*, 87 Wn.2d 878, 883-84, 558 P.2d 1342 (1976); *Davis v. State ex rel. Dep't of Licensing*, 137 Wn.2d 957, 970, 977 P.2d 554 (1999); *Port of Seattle v. Department of Revenue*, 101 Wn. App. 106, 113, 1 P.3d 607 (2000). In *CR 5(a)*, the generic phrase "similar paper" must be read in conjunction with the terms "every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal." Only those "papers" that are "comparable to" written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, or designation of record on appeal [***316] fall within the category of "similar paper." The specifically listed "papers" in *CR 5(a)* are documents prepared by a party that generally state a party's claim or allegation. On the other hand, a final judgment, although it may be drafted by a party, is the formal record of a jury's verdict or judge's decision. A judgment does not state a party's claim or allegation. It is not, therefore, a "similar paper" as that phrase is used in *CR 5(a)*.³

³ The civil rules do provide for notice of the proposed [***7] findings, which are generated by the prevailing party. Notice of presentation of findings of fact and conclusions of law, including copies of the proposed findings and conclusions, must be served on the opposing party five days before their presentation to the court. *CR 54(f)*. Plaintiffs' counsel provided such notice here.

[5] This reading of *CR 5(a)* is strengthened by reference [*693] to the rules regarding actual filing of the judgment. *RAP 5.2(a)* requires that notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment in the trial court. *CR 58* states that a judgment is "entered" when it

is delivered to the clerk for filing. *See Malott v. Randall*, 83 Wn.2d 259, 517 P.2d 605 (1974). Requiring service of the judgment before the start of the running of the 30-day appeal period would effectively amend CR 58 and RAP 5.2(a) to require both the filing of the judgment with the clerk and service of conformed copies of the judgment before the 30 days begin to run. This is not what the rules say, nor what the rules contemplate.

Finally, CR 54(f) provides in part: "No order or judgment shall be signed or entered until opposing counsel have been given 5 days' notice of presentation and served [***8] with a copy of the proposed order or judgment. . . ." Thus, the rule specific to judgments requires only that the proposed judgment, not a conformed copy of the entered judgment, be served on opposing counsel.

[6] The plain meaning of CR 5(a) is clear; its terms do not require service of conformed copies of the final entered judgment on the nonprevailing party. CR 5(a) does not afford the State the relief it seeks.

II. RAP 18.8

In contrast to the liberal application we generally give the Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP), RAP 18.8 expressly requires a narrow application:

The appellate court will only in *extraordinary circumstances and to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice* extend the time within which a party must file a notice of appeal. . . . The appellate court will ordinarily hold that the desirability of finality of decisions outweighs the privilege of a litigant to obtain an extension of time under this section. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

[7] The phrase "extraordinary circumstances" was defined in *Reichelt v. Raymark Indus., Inc.*, 52 Wn. App. 763, 765, 764 P.2d 653 (1988). There, the Court of Appeals refused to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal that [*694] was filed, as here, [***9] 10 days late. The appellant argued that "extraordinary circumstances" existed because one of the two trial attorneys left the firm during the 30 days following entry of judgment, and the firm's appellate attorney had an unusually heavy work load. The court rejected the argument and summarized the cases allowing late filings:

In each case, the defective filings were upheld due to "extraordinary circumstances," *i.e.*, circumstances wherein the filing, despite reasonable diligence, was defective due to excusable error or circumstances beyond the party's control. In such a case, the lost opportunity to appeal would constitute a gross miscarriage of justice because of the appellant's reasonably diligent conduct. RAP 18.8(b).

Reichelt, 52 Wn. App. at 765-66; *see also Shumway v. Payne*, 136 Wn.2d 383, 394-97, 964 P.2d 349 (1998) (reiterating and reemphasizing stringent standard of RAP 18.8(b) noted in *Reichelt*); *Schaefco, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n*, 121 Wn.2d 366, 849 P.2d 1225 (1993); ⁴ *Pybas v. Paolino*, 73 Wn. App. 393, 401, 869 P.2d 427 (1994). ⁵ The court found the lack of prejudice to the respondent irrelevant and noted that the prejudice of granting an extension of time would be [***10] "to the appellate system and to litigants generally, who are entitled to an end to their day in court." *Reichelt*, 52 Wn. App. at 766 n.2.

4 In *Schaefco*, 121 Wn.2d at 368, the court said:

Schaefco has not provided sufficient excuse for its failure to file a timely notice of appeal, nor has it demonstrated sound reasons to abandon the preference for finality.

We recognize that Schaefco raises many important issues. . . . However, it would be improper to consider these questions given the procedural failures of this case. *See RAP 18.8(b); RAP 18.9(b)*. . . . Schaefco's appeal is dismissed.

5 [***317]

In *Pybas* the court stated:

RAP 18.8(b), by limiting the extension of time to file a notice of appeal to those cases involving "extraordinary circumstances and

to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice," expresses a public policy preference for the finality of judicial decisions over the competing policy of reaching the merits in every case.

See also State v. One 1977 Blue Ford Pick-Up Truck, 447 A.2d 1226 (Me. 1982) (State's negligent office procedures, which resulted in late filing of appeal of adverse civil judgment, were insufficient grounds upon which to allow a late filing).

[*695] [8] The State first contends [***11] "extraordinary circumstances" are present here because Plaintiffs' counsel failed to give it notice that the judgments had been entered. However, as noted above, Plaintiffs' counsel gave the State notice of presentation of the proposed judgments. *See CR 52(c)*. This was all Plaintiffs' counsel was required to do; the State was then obligated to monitor the actual entry of the judgments. Plaintiffs' counsel was not legally obligated to bring the State's mistake, if any, to the State's attention. Thus, Plaintiffs' failure to give the State notice beyond that required by *CR 52(c)* does not demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances."

[9] The State next contends that Janet Capps' intentional failure to protect the State's interests amounts to "extraordinary circumstances." However, in her declaration, Capps states that she has "no recollection" of the notice documents and asserts that she did not "knowingly, intentionally or recklessly fail to act" on the same. Further, there is no reasonable inference from the evidence before this court that Capps acted "intentionally" by ignoring the notice documents or failing to bring them to the attention of others. Rather, at best, the evidence was [***12] that Capps was not "reasonably diligent" in ensuring that the documents were timely routed to the responsible attorneys in the Attorney General's Office. Negligence, or the lack of "reasonable diligence," does not amount to "extraordinary circumstances." *Shumway*, 136 Wn.2d 383, 964 P.2d 349; *Reichelt*, 52 Wn. App. 763, 764 P.2d 653; *State v. One 1977 Blue Ford Pick-Up Truck*, 447 A.2d 1226. Thus, Capps' conduct does not demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances."

[10] But even if Capps intentionally failed to respond to the April 14 notice, this would not constitute "extraordinary circumstances." Capps' conduct impaired the State's timely filing of an appeal only because the Attorney General's Office lacked any reasonable proce-

cedure for calendaring hearings. The State's own internal investigation, which it asked us to consider, details the problems: The attorneys individually managed and calendared their own cases; the [*696] office had no central system for calendaring hearings; ⁶ the staff was inexperienced and lacked training; there was no coordination between the responsible attorneys and no system for "catching" administrative errors such as the one here. As noted in *One 1977 Blue Ford [***13] Pick-Up Truck*:

We find nothing in the nature of an event or circumstance so extraordinary in this case as to excuse the neglect of appellant's counsel to provide suitable office procedures to cause the judgment to be brought to counsel's attention once it was delivered into the custody and control of counsel's office. It is incumbent upon any attorney to institute internal office procedures sufficient to assure that judgments are properly dealt with once they are delivered into the custody of office personnel subject to the control of counsel. The failure to take necessary steps, to that end, even during periods of unusual circumstances in an attorney's office, is not an acceptable excuse for any resulting failure to obtain personal [**318] knowledge of the entry of judgment on the part of counsel.

447 A.2d at 1231. This language aptly describes the problem here. The Attorney General's office lacked office management procedures that could have prevented what occurred here.

6 The independent investigator concluded that "to the extent notices for court hearings are served on the office, they should be automatically calendared by someone independently assigned the task."

The State was not "reasonably [***14] diligent" in attempting to file a timely appeal. *Reichelt*, 52 Wn. App. at 765-66. It fails to demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" and "a gross miscarriage of justice" that would allow this court to overlook the late filing. *RAP 18.8*. Therefore, "the desirability of finality of decisions outweighs the privilege of a litigant to obtain an extension of time." The State's motion to extend time to file its notice of appeal is DENIED, and Respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal is GRANTED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	
)	
PETITIONER,)	NO. 80995-0
)	
v.)	
)	
ROBERT BONDS,)	
)	
RESPONDENT.)	

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, ANN JOYCE, DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THAT THE FOLLOWING IS TRUE AND CORRECT:

ON THE 1ST DAY OF JULY, 2008, I CAUSED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE **STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES** TO BE SERVED ON THE PARTY / PARTIES DESIGNATED BELOW BY DEPOSITING SAID DOCUMENT IN THE UNITED STATES MAIL:

- PAMELA LOGINSKY
WASHINGTON ASSOC. OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
206 10TH S.E.
OLYMPIA, WA 98501-1399

- MICHELLE LUNA-GREEN
PIERCE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
930 TACOMA AVE. S., ROOM 946
TACOMA, WA 98402-2171

SIGNED IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON THIS 1ST DAY OF JULY, 2008.

x *Ann Joyce*