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STATE OF WASHINGTON  
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No. 89693-3

**THE SUPREME COURT  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,**

---

In the Personal Restraint Petition of

ROLAND SPEIGHT, Petitioner.

---

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS NO. 59995-0-1

**THE STATE OF WASHINGTON'S SUPPLEMENTAL  
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PERSONAL  
RESTRAINT PETITION**

---

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## INTRODUCTION

This personal restraint petition involves two competing public rights. On the one hand, the public has a right to an open courtroom. Wash. Const., Article I § 10 ("justice in all cases shall be administered openly"). This Court has underscored the public's right to attend trial, regardless of the litigants' wishes. "Be it through members of the media, victims, the family or friends of a party, or passersby, the public can keep watch over the administration of justice when the courtroom is open." State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 5-6, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012).

On the other hand, the public has a right to finality in criminal cases. Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 77 Wn.2d 660, 691, 466 P.2d 485 (1970) (Hale, J., concurring) ("when a judicial system never lets the judgment become final, it gives no judgment at all"). This is especially so on collateral review.

Collateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders. There are significant costs and they require that collateral relief be limited in state as well as federal courts.

In re Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 824, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982).

Defendant Roland Speight asks this Court to reverse his conviction on collateral review, arguing that the trial court closed the courtroom for individual voir dire without considering the Bone-Club factors. The State respectfully requests the Court to deny defendant's petition for two reasons. First, defendant Speight did not suffer actual and substantial prejudice from a court closure he requested to ensure a fair trial. Second, because the public's right to finality outweighs the limited violation of the public's right to an open trial, the Court should not presume prejudice on defendant's behalf.

**I. ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF.**

Defendant's petition presents two issues: (1) did the trial court deprive defendant and the public of the right to an open trial by allowing counsel to voir dire individual jurors in chambers, and if so (2) did defendant suffer actual and substantial prejudice from the limited court closure? The State has submitted three briefs on the first issue, an original response to defendants' petition and two supplemental responses that the Court of Appeals requested. (10/23/07 Response; 4/26/10 First Supplemental Response; 6/12/13 Second Supplemental Response).

In these three briefs, the State detailed how the facts in this case match those in State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009). Defendant Speight “affirmatively accepted the closure, argued for expansion of it, actively participated in it, and sought benefit from it.” Momah, 167 Wn.2d at 156. By requesting the limited court closure, defendant Speight waived his right to a fully open voir dire and invited the trial court error that he now raises.

The State’s supplemental brief to this Court addresses the second issue: the lack of actual and substantial prejudice from a limited court closure that defendant requested. In both In re Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) and In re Morris, 176 Wn.2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012), this Court did not decide whether a petitioner must prove actual and substantial prejudice, ruling instead that ineffective assistance of counsel justified relief. Morris, 176 Wn.2d at 166 (“we need not address whether a public trial violation is also presumed prejudicial on collateral review”).

Because defendant Speight has not alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has the opportunity to decide the issue. The State respectfully requests the Court require defendant -- like all other personal restraint petitioners -- to prove actual and

substantial prejudice. Here, defendant cannot suffer prejudice from a trial judge granting his request for a limited courtroom closure.

## **II. Defendant Cannot Prove Actual and Substantial Prejudice**

The right to an open public trial arises from two constitutional provisions, Article I § 10 and Article I § 22. As this Court described in State v. Easterling, 157 Wn.2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006), these two clauses create overlapping rights, but for separate beneficiaries.

Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution each guarantee a criminal defendant a right to a public trial. Additionally, article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." This latter provision gives the public and the press a right to open and accessible court proceedings. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).

Easterling, 157 Wn.2d at 174; State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254, 259, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) ("the section 10 guaranty of public access to proceedings and the section 22 public trial right serve complementary and interdependent functions in assuring the fairness of our judicial system").

Here, defendant Speight's right under section 22 gave way to a more compelling interest: selecting an impartial jury. State v.

Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 151-152, 217 P.3d 321 (2009) (“trial judge closed the courtroom to safeguard Momah's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, not to protect any other interests”). Defendant requested individual voir dire to protect his right to a fair trial. The day before his trial, defendant submitted a proposed juror questionnaire to the court. It began:

[t]he purpose of this questionnaire is to allow you to answer questions about your personal experiences that may relate to the current trial and to do so in a way that reduces embarrassment and maintains some privacy. The attorneys in the case may ask you about your answers to the questions in individual voir dire, *without the public and other jurors present*, to further maintain your privacy if you prefer. Please answer these questions as fully and honestly as you would any other voir dire questions.

(5/24/05 Juror Questionnaire at 1; emphasis added) (Attached as Appendix A). At the end of defendant's questionnaire, a juror could check a box and “request individual questioning”. (5/24/05 Juror Questionnaire at 5).

Island County Superior Court Judge Alan Hancock accepted defendant's questionnaire verbatim, attaching a cover sheet that repeated the jurors' option to request private voir dire. “If you feel that your answer to any questions may invade your privacy or be embarrassing to you, you may so indicate on the form that you

would prefer to discuss your answer in private." (5/24/05 Juror Questionnaire Cover Sheet) (Appendix A).

At defendant Spelght's May 25, 2005 trial, 11 prospective jurors requested private voir dire. Judge Hancock allowed defense counsel to interview the prospective jurors in chambers and on counsel's motion, excused six for cause. (2RP 14, 17, 35, 40, 43, and 72; Appendix H to 5/4/07 Petitioner's Supplemental Brief). Defendant was present throughout the private voir dire. (2RP 10; Appendix H) ("it is required that the attorneys and the defendant be present for this process"). The trial judge did not address the Bone-Club factors on the record before holding voir dire in chambers.

Defendant cannot reasonably claim actual and substantial prejudice from the trial court granting his request for limited, private individual voir dire. To obtain relief in a personal restraint petition, "in the context of a constitutional error, a petitioner must satisfy his threshold burden of demonstrating actual and substantial prejudice." In re Stockwell, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 316 P.3d 1007, 1012 (2014) (quoting In re Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 810, 792 P.2d 506 (1990)). Actual and substantial prejudice means the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993).

Here, defendant obtained a limited courtroom closure to successfully interview and eliminate biased prospective jurors.

If anything, in-chambers voir dire *protects* the defendant's right to a fair and unbiased trial. Empirical studies have shown that prospective jurors often do not reveal sensitive information if required to do so in open court. See Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court Policies and Procedures, 85 *Judicature* 18, 23 (2001). Interviewing certain jurors in-chambers encourages a fair trial by eliciting this information and allowing counsel to root out potential bias and prejudice. This is true even where there has been no Bone-Club analysis prior to closure.

State v. Paumier, 176 Wn.2d 29, 51, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012) (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Defendant Speight's request led directly to securing a fair trial. This is the antithesis of actual and substantial prejudice.

Defendant may argue that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to keep all voir dire open. The Court currently has review of two cases involving the standard for waiver. See State v. Frawley, No. 80727-2 and State v. Applegate, No. 86513-2. Regardless of the outcome of these cases, however, defendant must still prove actual and substantial prejudice from

what happened during voir dire. "An error that does not actually and substantially prejudice a personal restraint petitioner does not warrant the granting of the personal restraint petition-if an error did not harm the petitioner, it is not a legally cognizable error in a personal restraint petition." In re Fawcett, 147 Wn.2d 298, 301, 53 P.3d 972 (2002).

Defense counsel had defendant's agreement and consent at every stage of litigation. And defendant has not alleged his trial or appellate counsel was deficient. Defendant requested limited private voir dire for good reason: it was essential to his seating an unbiased jury and receiving a fair trial.

### **III. This Court Should Not Presume Prejudice.**

Because he cannot show actual and substantial prejudice from his requested court closure, defendant Speight must instead ask the Court to presume prejudice on his behalf. This Court in State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012) and State v. Paumier, 176 Wn.2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012) concluded that Bone-Club violations are per se prejudicial on direct appeal. "Violation of the public trial right, even when not preserved by objection, is presumed prejudicial to the defendant on direct appeal." Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 16. The question before the Court is

whether it should extend the rule in Wise and Paumier to include collateral review.

The Court should refuse to expand the rule of per se prejudice for four reasons. First, collateral review is fundamentally different from a direct appeal. As this Court recently explained in Stockwell,

collateral review is distinct from a direct appeal because collateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders...[U]nder federal habeas standards, the burden is on the petitioner to show not merely that the errors at his trial created a *possibility* of prejudice, but that they worked to his *actual* and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. We held that the same burden should be met in PRPs challenging trial error.

Stockwell, \_\_\_ Wn.2d at \_\_\_, 316 P.3d at 1012. (citations and quotations omitted); In re St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 329, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (“we decline to adopt any rule which would categorically equate per se prejudice on collateral review with per se prejudice on direct review”).

Second, the public’s right to finality outweighs any public trial rights under Article I § 10 and residual rights under Article I § 22. When a defendant raises a Bone-Club violation on direct review, all

parties understand that a retrial is likely. The appellate process exists to remedy trial errors like this. But when a defendant waits, allows the conviction to become final, and then raises the Bone-Club issue on collateral review, the social costs from reopening the case and retrying it become untenable.

The right to a public trial is not a magic wand granting new trials to all who would wield it. Openness is a crucially important value in our criminal justice system, but so is finality...We require personal restraint petitioners to show actual and substantial prejudice because we value finality and seek to avoid outcomes of this nature.

In re Morris, 176 Wn.2d 157, 186-187, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012) (Wiggins, J., dissenting).

As in Morris, retrying this case would require a rape victim to relive the trauma nine years after the crime. Evidence is gone, memories are diminished and witnesses may be impossible to locate. Writing for this Court in a civil case, Justice Hale explained why legal claims must come to an end.

Stale claims, from their very nature, are more apt to be spurious than fresh; old evidence is more likely to be untrustworthy than new. Time dissipates and erodes the memory of witnesses and their abilities to accurately describe the material events. In time witnesses die or disappear, and the longer the time the more likely this will happen. With the passing of time, minor grievances may fade away, but they may grow to outlandish proportions, too. Finally, and not to

be ignored, is the basic philosophy underlying the idea that society itself benefits, except in capital cases, when there comes a time to everyone, be it long or short, that one is freed from the fears and burdens of threatened litigation.

Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660, 665, 453 P.2d 631 (1969);  
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721, (1993) ("expenditure of additional time and resources for all the parties involved, the erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that accompany the passage of time and make obtaining convictions on retrial more difficult, and the frustration of society's interest in the prompt administration of justice").

Third, even structural error does not justify granting defendant a windfall on collateral review. In Wise and Paumier, the Court concluded that Bone-Club violations are structural error, undermining the reliability of the trial process. Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 14; Paumier, 176 Wn.2d at 37. The Court held this is so even when the court closure benefited defendant.

We recognize that any one deprivation of the public trial right will not likely devastate our system of justice or even necessarily cause a particular trial to be unfair (though of this latter part we can never be sure). But letting a deprivation of the public trial right go unchecked affects the framework within which the trial proceeds. To allow such deprivations would erode our open, public system of justice and could ultimately result in unjust and secret trial proceedings. It is the

framework of our system of justice that we must protect against erosion of the public trial right. It is this sturdy framework that in turn allows us to review trial error for harmlessness because we know that the structure in which trial errors occur is sound.

Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 17-18 (citation omitted).

The Court appropriately makes these systemic adjustments on direct review. The consequences of vacating a conviction, although significant, are less severe when the Court remands the case on appeal. The appellate process develops the body of law governing all criminal defendants, not simply the named defendant in the appeal.

In contrast, collateral review focuses entirely on the facts of the individual defendant. Its purpose is to correct only the most egregious errors that cause actual harm to the named defendant. By using collateral review to protect against the erosion of the public trial right, the Court undermines the primacy of trial and direct appeal. Defendant need not raise a Bone-Club violation at trial or on direct appeal, but rather may wait until collateral review to vacate his conviction.

If the Court presumes prejudice, defendant Speight will prevail for being in the right place at the right time, not for the merits of his arguments. "The petitioner's burden to establish actual and

substantial prejudice may be waived where the error gives rise to a conclusive presumption of prejudice." In re St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 328, 823 P.2d 492 (1992). The conclusive presumption of prejudice here is not from defendant Speight requesting and receiving limited, private voir dire; it is from the framework of our system of justice eroding when trial courts grant these motions without a Bone-Club analysis.

This systemic concern should not be the reason for vacating a specific conviction on collateral review. Morris, 176 Wn.2d at 182 ("the "higher standard" on collateral review is met, in the absence of an actual showing of prejudice, only where, in light of the essential purpose of the constitutional right at issue, a violation of the right would necessarily prejudice the defendant") (Wiggins, J., dissenting). The petitioner, not the judicial system, must suffer actual and substantial prejudice.

Fourth, the public's right to an open trial, Article I section 10, does not entitle defendant Speight to remedy. "A defendant should not be able to assert the right of the public or the press in order to overturn his conviction when his own right to a public trial has been safeguarded as required under Bone-Club or has been waived." State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222, 236, 217 P.3d 310 (2009)

(Fairhurst, J., concurring). Defendant Speight's right to an impartial jury is directly adverse to the public's right to open proceedings. He cannot advocate for the public's right on collateral review when he asked for and received a closed courtroom at trial.


### **CONCLUSION**

In the ten years following In re Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2004), this Court has not held that a Bone-Club violation is per se prejudicial on collateral review. The Court has, however, repeatedly underscored the fundamental value of open courts. "A public trial helps assure that the trial is fair; it allows the public to see justice done, and it serves to hold the justice system accountable." Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 17. Through opinions on direct appeal, the Court has made the systemic corrections necessary to protect open courtrooms. Given the severe consequences to the trial and appellate process, and public's right to finality, the Court should not use collateral review for the same purpose.

The State of Washington respectfully requests the Court to deny defendant Roland Speight's personal restraint petition. Defendant has not and cannot prove actual and substantial prejudice from the limited courtroom closure.

DATED this 21st day of February, 2014.

RANDALL K. GAYLORD  
San Juan County Prosecuting Attorney

By 

Phillip J. Burl, WSBA #17637  
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#### DECLARATION OF SERVICE

The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, that on the date stated below, I mailed or caused delivery of **The State of Washington's**

#### Supplemental Brief to:

Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC  
1908 E Madison St  
Seattle WA 98122

DATED this 21<sup>st</sup> day of February, 2014.

  
HEIDI MAIN

# APPENDIX A

MAY 24 2005

TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS

MARY JEAN CAHILL  
SAN JUAN COUNTY WASHINGTON

This questionnaire is designed to elicit information with respect to your qualifications to sit as a juror in a pending case. This questionnaire will substantially shorten the process of jury selection.

This questionnaire is part of the jury selection process. You must answer the questions to the best of your ability and you must fill out the questionnaire by yourself. As you answer the questions that follow, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers, only complete and incomplete answers. Complete answers are far more helpful than incomplete answers because they make long questioning unnecessary and by doing that, they shorten the time that it takes to select a jury.

Please make every effort to answer each one of the questions. During the questioning by the attorneys and the court, you will be given an opportunity to explain or expand any answers if necessary. If you wish to make further comments regarding any of your answers, or if you feel that there is something important that we failed to ask, please include this information on the final sheet of the questionnaire.

Some of these questions may call for information of a personal nature that you may not want to discuss in public. If you feel that your answer to any questions may invade your privacy or be embarrassing to you, you may so indicate on the form that you would prefer to discuss your answer in private. The court will give you an opportunity to explain your request for confidentiality outside the presence of the other jurors.

After you have completed the questionnaire, please hand it to the Bailiff.

Thank you for your cooperation.

5/24/05



Hon. Alan R. Hancock, Judge  
San Juan County Superior Court

58  
8W

JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE

Juror Number \_\_\_\_\_

Introduction

The purpose of this questionnaire is to allow you to answer questions about your personal experiences that may relate to the current trial and to do so in a way that reduces embarrassment and maintains some privacy. The attorneys in the case may ask you about your answers to the questions in individual voir dire, without the public and other jurors present, to further maintain your privacy if you prefer. Please answer these questions as fully and honestly as you would any other voir dire questions.

Fill out the questionnaire and hand it to the bailiff when you are done. If a question does not apply, please indicate "N/A".

1) a) Have you ever been charged with, or arrested for, any sex crime or crime committed with "sexual motivation"?

Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

b) If yes, please list the crime(s) below.

c) How was the case above closed (e.g., charges dropped, arrested but never charged, acquitted at trial, found guilty at trial, case being appealed, etc.)?

d) If the charges were dropped or not filed, why?

e) How do you feel about the above experience?

2) a) Have you ever been privately accused of a sexual assault or other sexual impropriety (e.g., sexual harassment, etc.)?

Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

b) If yes, please describe the circumstances below.

c) Was any legal action suggested or mentioned by anyone on the matters in 2)b)?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Please explain below.

d) How was the accusation resolved (e g , accuser left town, I denied it, got fired, accuser's parents kept it quiet, etc.)?

e) How do you feel about the above experience?

3) a) Do you personally know anyone who has been accused of any sex crime or other sexual impropriety, either officially or privately?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

b) Please describe the circumstances below

c) What do you think about the above circumstances?

4) a) If you answered yes to any of the above, do you think that you could be fair in deciding similar issues in this case?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Please explain below

5) a) Are you ever concerned that someone would accuse you or a friend or loved one?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_

b) Why?

6) a) Are you concerned that a sexual offense may be committed against you, a friend, or a loved one?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

b) Why?

7) Do you believe that these topics should be kept more private?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_ Please explain below.

8) Have you ever been the victim of a sexual assault, rape or other sexual impropriety?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

9) If the answer to #8 is yes, do you know who committed the act?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

10) If the answer to #9 is yes, was the act committed by a relative of the victim (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
a friend of the victim \_\_\_\_\_  
an acquaintance of the victim \_\_\_\_\_  
a stranger to the victim \_\_\_\_\_

11) If you were sexually assaulted, etc., please indicate how old you were at the time. Age \_\_\_\_\_

12) If you were sexually assaulted, etc., please indicate if you were assaulted more than once and/or if by more than one person.

13) If you were sexually assaulted, etc., did you report the incident to anyone (e.g , a parent, counselor, friend or the police)  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

14) If the answer to #13 is yes, to whom did you report the incident and what were the circumstances of your disclosure?

15) If you did report the act, was anyone ever prosecuted?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

16) If they were prosecuted, were they' convicted?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Please explain below.

17) If you were sexually assaulted, etc., did you suffer any physical injury as a result of the incident?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

18) If you were sexually assaulted, etc., did you suffer any emotional distress as a result of the incident?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

19) If you were sexually assaulted, etc., and if you did report the incident, do you believe you were treated fairly or reasonably by those to whom you reported the assault (e.g., relatives, friends, counselors, the police, etc.)?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

20) Do you know if any friend, relative or acquaintance of yours has ever been sexually assaulted, raped or subjected to any sexual impropriety?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Please explain below.

21) If the answer is yes, do you know who committed the assault?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

22) If the answer is yes, was the assault committed by \_\_\_\_\_  
a relative of the victim \_\_\_\_\_  
a friend of the victim \_\_\_\_\_  
an acquaintance of the victim \_\_\_\_\_  
a stranger to the victim \_\_\_\_\_

23) How old was the victim when he or she was sexually assaulted?

24) Do you know if the victim of the sexual assault, etc. was assaulted more than once and/or by more than one person?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_

25) Was the sexual assault reported to anyone?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_

26) Was the perpetrator of the sexual assault ever prosecuted?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_

27) Was the perpetrator of the sexual assault ever convicted?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_

28) Was the victim of the sexual assault physically injured?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_

29) a) Did the victim of the sexual assault suffer emotional distress?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_ Please explain below

30) Do you believe the victim of the sexual assault was treated fairly and reasonably by the authorities?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Do not know \_\_\_ Please explain below.

31) Do you believe you have any special training, knowledge or expertise in the subject matter of sexual assaults?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Please explain below

32) If you were the victim of a sexual assault, etc., and/or if you know a relative, friend or acquaintance who was a victim of sexual assault, etc., do you believe you would tend to favor or be prejudiced against either party to this case?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_ Please explain below

33) Have you ever contacted or had Child Protective Services, the police, or any social welfare agency come to your home regarding a child?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

34) Have you ever participated in any juvenile court proceeding involving a child?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

35) Do you belong to any organizations involved in protecting the rights of abused children or parents of abused children?  
Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

If you have answered "Yes" to any of the above questions, would you prefer that the attorneys question you individually in court, or would you be comfortable discussing your answers in front of others?

\_\_\_ I request individual questioning.  
\_\_\_ I do not request individual questioning.



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---

**To:** Heidi Main  
**Subject:** RE: Case # 89693-3 - In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Roland Arthur Speight

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**Sent:** Friday, February 21, 2014 1:43 PM  
**To:** OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK  
**Cc:** Philip Buri  
**Subject:** Case # 89693-3 - In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Roland Arthur Speight

Case Name: PRP of Speight  
No. 89693-3  
Filer: Philip J. Buri, WSBA# 17637, Attorney for Respondent State of Washington  
360-752-1500  
[Philip@burifunston.com](mailto:Philip@burifunston.com)

Attached for filing is the State of Washington's Supplemental Brief in Opposition of PRP with declaration of service.

\*\*\*\*\*  
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**MY OFFICE HOURS ARE TUESDAY-FRIDAY 7AM-5PM.**

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