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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In Re the Dependency of D.L.B., a Minor Child,

STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES,

Respondent,

v.

EDELYN SAINT-LOUIS,

Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

In amending RCW 13.34, the legislature referred to incarceration in two, distinct ways. Some statutes state that “current or prior” incarceration may be considered. *E.g.*, RCW 13.34.145. Others state that considerations must be made “if the parent is incarcerated,” and do not direct the court to look at prior incarceration. *E.g.*, RCW 13.34.067(3). The language of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) falls into the latter category. In deciding whether continuing a parent-child relationship will impede a child’s prospects for integrating into a stable home, RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) lists considerations the trial court must make if the parent “is incarcerated.” Because Saint-Louis was not incarcerated, the statute’s plain language did not require the trial court to explore the additional considerations.

In addition, the trial court properly determined that Saint-Louis was provided all of the services ordered by the court. Despite repeated chances, she did not remedy her parental deficiencies related to a lack of parenting skills, chemical dependency, and mental health issues, or demonstrate an ability to provide a safe home for D.L.B.

II. ISSUES

1. When a parent “is incarcerated,” RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the trial court to make additional considerations before terminating parental rights. Was the court required to make the added considerations for a parent who was not incarcerated, but had been incarcerated in the past?

2. Does substantial evidence support the trial court finding that Saint-Louis was offered or provided all services as ordered by the court?

3. Does substantial evidence support the findings that the mother is unfit, is unable or unwilling to correct her deficiencies, and that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can return to the parent in the near future?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

D.L.B. was born on November 1, 2008, to Edelyn Saint-Louis and Kendrick Bryant.¹ Ex. 8. When he was just three years old, a referral was filed with the Department reporting that the police were called multiple times to investigate physical abuse and domestic violence concerns. Ex. 1; CP at 349. Throughout the housing complex, screaming and vulgar language directed at the child was heard frequently. Ex. 1 at 2. Loud slapping sounds also were heard—followed by a child screaming “No mommy! Don’t!”—and more slapping sounds. *Id.* When a social worker met her face-to-face, Saint-Louis appeared to be using drugs and alcohol. *Id.*

In February 2012, less than a month after the Department’s first investigation, Saint-Louis left the toddler home alone for several hours. *Id.* Saint-Louis was arrested and the police took D.L.B. into protective custody. *Id.* Saint-Louis admitted that this was not the first time she had

¹ Mr. Bryant’s rights were terminated by default. CP at 130, 172-75; RP at 324.

left the three-year-old home alone. She said she left him without care multiple times when she left to do her laundry. *Id.*

After the arrest, Saint-Louis entered a voluntary agreement temporarily placing D.L.B. in foster care. Exs. 1, 17. In an effort to return D.L.B. to Saint-Louis, the Department provided intensive family preservation services, including parenting classes and drug testing. Ex. 1 at 3. Saint-Louis rejected the parenting classes. CP at 350. She said they were not needed because she had previously gone to a YWCA program that addressed parenting. *Id.*

In addition to parenting classes, she was offered domestic violence services. *Id.* At the time of the foster care agreement, Saint-Louis was in a violent relationship with her then-boyfriend, Martell Thomas. Ex. 10 at 4; CP at 351. She said she was fully aware of Thomas' criminal history, drug use, and domestic violence issues before she got involved with him. Ex. 1 at 4. She admitted he was violent, but did not consider the relationship to be domestic violence because he did not throw things directly at her and the police had not gotten involved. RP at 91; CP at 351. Prior to Thomas, she had an extensive history of domestic violence perpetrated by D.L.B.'s father, Kendrick Bryant. Ex. 10 at 3. During the first three years of his life, D.L.B. witnessed his father assaulting his mother on multiple occasions. RP at 31-32, 494, 502. Despite the risk this created for D.L.B. and Saint-Louis, she rejected the domestic violence services. Ex. 10 at 1, Ex. 1 at 3.

Because D.L.B. could not safely return to his mother after the voluntary placement, a dependency order was entered on May 11, 2012.

Ex. 1. The order required Saint-Louis to obtain a psychological evaluation with a parenting component, and follow the recommended treatment; participate in a domestic violence support group; and participate in random urinalysis (UAs) for 90 days. Ex. 1 at 9-10.

A psychological evaluation was performed by Dr. Steve Tutty, in October 2012. Ex. 16; CP at 352. Dr. Tutty noted that Saint-Louis had attempted suicide, experienced anxiety or panic attacks, and had been hospitalized three times for emotional problems. Ex. 16 at 6. He diagnosed Saint-Louis with Bipolar II disorder, alcohol and marijuana abuse, a panic disorder, and learning disorder with a rule out of Histrionic personality disorder. Ex. 16 at 10-11; CP at 352. Dr. Tutty concluded that Saint-Louis requires “extensive psychiatric treatment,” and presents a “high risk” to her son’s welfare. Ex. 16 at 15. He recommended that she obtain a drug evaluation, a medical consultation to explore additional psychotropic medications targeting her mental health issues, participate in the Incredible Years parenting program, and attend a domestic violence support group.

Id.

A reunification assessment was completed by the Foster Care Assessment Program. Ex. 17. During the evaluation, Saint-Louis described D.L.B. as a child who wants attention all the time and is “manipulative.” Ex. 17 at 5. She wanted his foster parents to know the three-year-old has “an attitude” and they need to be “aggressive back to him.” *Id.* Like Dr. Tutty, the Foster Care Assessment Program evaluator recommended against reunification. Ex. 17 at 10. She recommended enrollment in the

Incredible Years parenting program and that visitation with D.L.B. be closely supervised. Ex. 17.

Saint-Louis began mental health services in December 2012. CP at 353. Sound Mental Health provided mental health treatment and medication management, and addressed chemical dependency issues. *Id.* Saint-Louis began the Incredible Years program in 2013, but missed classes and was discharged. *Id.* Despite the program being offered to her four times, she never completed it. *Id.* At the time of the termination trial, she had restarted the 18-week program and completed one week. *Id.* Saint-Louis also enrolled in a chemical dependency treatment program to address her cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol use. Ex. 15. Although she completed the inpatient program, she did not complete ninety days of clean tests. *Id.* In addition to testing positive for alcohol, she refused to take the UA test on multiple dates. *Id.*; RP at 396-97.

During the dependency, Saint-Louis was allowed to visit D.L.B. Although she attended some visits, her social worker testified that “there was always some sort of excuse or reason why” she would fail to appear. RP at 345. For example, she missed D.L.B.’s fifth birthday party. RP at 346. A makeup visit was scheduled for the next week, but Saint-Louis cancelled the visit. RP at 347. Although the visit was rescheduled a second time, she was incarcerated before it could take place. RP at 348.

In addition to missing parenting services, skipping visits with D.L.B., and relapsing, Saint-Louis launched into a string of criminal acts. In January 2014, she was convicted of vehicular assault, taking a car

without permission, and a hit and run. CP at 9. She was convicted and sentenced to 15 months incarceration, followed by 24 months of probation. Exs. 21, 22. In addition, she was arrested for forgery, and later convicted of two counts of attempted forgery. Ex. 25; CP at 354.

Although Saint-Louis was allowed to serve her time on work release, it was revoked after just five days. Exs. 22, 23. Work release was reinstated in April 2014. Despite being a form of incarceration, work release provided her an opportunity to resume visitation with D.L.B. and restart the Incredible Years parenting classes. RP at 437. Saint-Louis rejected the opportunity, choosing instead to return to jail to complete her sentence. RP at 153, 333, 349. She was released less than two months later. While in jail, Sound Mental Health met with her privately twice a week. RP at 153, 156. Domestic violence classes were also available. RP at 152.

While Saint-Louis struggled during the dependency, D.L.B. made progress. When he moved in with his foster family, he had night terrors almost every night, and would cry out "No! Stop! No! Don't!" Ex. 1 at 3. He met with therapist Amy Barker for twenty sessions. RP at 208. He was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, based on his past history of trauma, reactions to anxiety and anger, ability to be triggered quickly, and explosive reactions to his triggers. *Id.* He made good progress in therapy, did well with his foster parents, and had no need for further visits with the therapist. RP at 360.

When Saint-Louis finished her criminal sentence in June 2014, and visits resumed, D.L.B.'s social worker reported that he "regressed a great deal." RP at 360. He began wetting the bed, and became aggressive and defiant. *Id.* During visits, there was little interaction between D.L.B. and Saint-Louis. D.L.B. sat at a table, across from his mother, and spent 75 percent of the visit playing games on a cell phone. RP at 437-38. In describing the visits, the social worker stated: "They're not looking at each other. They're not talking to each other. And they're not engaging with each other. They don't touch each other. . . . And there's just no affection or bonding or anything that a parent and child should be doing." RP at 438.

The termination trial began in July 2014. RP at 1. At the time of trial, Saint-Louis was beginning a relapse prevention program, but had not completed 90 days of clean UAs. CP at 353; RP at 332. She had attended some mental health counseling, but had not completed a full course of mental health treatment. RP at 364, 366, 424. She had attended domestic violence counseling, but was unable to incorporate the lessons she learned into her own life. RP at 332, 362. To the contrary, she was living with a convicted domestic violence perpetrator and was pregnant with his child. CP at 353.

At the close of trial, Saint-Louis' parental rights were terminated. The court noted that: "One thing that the Court was most concerned about in this case was the credibility of the mother," which the court found to be minimal. RP at 602; CP at 354. The mother admitted she did not tell the

truth and “[u]nder the circumstances, it was very difficult for the Court to take her testimony as true.” RP at 602. The trial court concluded that the Department proved its case by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and that the order was in D.L.B.’s best interest. CP at 348-57; RP at 603-04.

On appeal, Division I upheld the trial court’s findings. *In re Dependency of D.L.B.*, 188 Wn. App. 905, 908, 355 P.3d 345 (2015). The court concluded that all reasonable services had been offered, but Saint-Louis’ uncorrected parenting deficiencies, chemical dependency issues, and unresolved domestic violence issues made her “a serious risk to D.L.B.” and prevented her from meeting his basic needs. *Id.* at 922. The court also held that under the plain language of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), additional considerations are made only if the parent is incarcerated at the time of the hearing. *In re Dep. of D.L.B.*, 188 Wn. App. at 917.

IV. ARGUMENT

Although parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for their children, the right is not absolute. *In re Welfare of Sumey*, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980). Parental rights may be terminated if the six factors listed in RCW 13.34.180(1) are proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. *In re Dep. of K.N.J.*, 171 Wn.2d 568, 576-77, 257 P.3d 522 (2011). Because Saint-Louis was released from jail a month before the termination trial, the trial court was not required to consider the additional statutory factors applicable to a parent who “is incarcerated.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

The trial court also correctly held that Saint-Louis was offered all necessary services and was incapable of correcting her parenting deficiencies. The record conclusively demonstrates that Saint-Louis did not correct her parenting, substance abuse, mental health, or safety issues. As a result, the trial court properly held that she was not fit to safely parent D.L.B. and accordingly terminated her parental rights.

A. The Plain Language of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) Only Applies to Incarcerated Parents

RCW 13.34.180(1) establishes the factors that must be proved at a termination trial. Under subsection (1)(f), additional considerations must be made “if the parent is incarcerated.” Saint-Louis was not incarcerated. The plain language of the statute indicates that this requirement applies only when the parent is incarcerated at the time of the termination trial, not if she was incarcerated at some point in the past. The plain language is supported by the overall statutory scheme and the legislative history.

1. The plain language only applies to parents incarcerated at the time of the termination trial

RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) unambiguously states that additional factors must be considered “if the parent is incarcerated.” The plain meaning is ascertained by considering the ordinary meaning of the words, basic grammar, and the statutory context. *Darkenwald v. State Emp’t Sec. Dep’t*, 183 Wn.2d 237, 244-45, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). Here, the statute is written in the present tense: “is incarcerated.”

If the parent is incarcerated, the court shall consider whether a parent maintains a meaningful role in his or her

child's life based on factors identified in RCW
13.34.145(5)(b)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals recognized, under ordinary English grammar, the present tense phrase "is incarcerated" does not refer to parents who were previously incarcerated. *In re Dep. of D.L.B.*, 188 Wn. App. at 917.

The ordinary meaning of "is incarcerated" is supported by looking to "the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." *Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n*, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). The language at issue was added to RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) in 2013, as part of an act addressing the rights of incarcerated parents. Laws of 2013, ch. 173 (amending RCW 13.34.067, .136, .145, .180). The legislature referred to incarceration in two, distinct manners. In some of the amended statutes, the court may consider factors relating to a parent's "current or prior incarceration." *E.g.*, RCW 13.34.145(5)(c), (a)(iv). In other provisions, the legislature opted not to include prior incarceration, and imposed a condition only if the parent "is incarcerated." *See, e.g.*, RCW 13.34.136(2)(b)(i)(A), .067(3).

In amending the six factors courts consider before termination, the legislature used both types of language. For example, when the trial court determines whether there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child return to the parent in the near future, the trial court may examine the parent's receipt and completion of treatment for drug use, completion of treatment for psychological issues, and whether

the parent failed to have contact with the child for an extended time. RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Current or prior incarceration may be considered as a mitigating factor if it created a barrier for the parent in receiving services or visiting the child. RCW 13.34.180(2).² But in factor (1)(f), the legislature requires consideration of incarceration only if the parent “is” incarcerated—not if the parent was previously incarcerated. “When the legislature uses two different terms in the same statute, courts presume the legislature intends the terms to have different meanings.” *E.g., Densley v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys.*, 162 Wn.2d 210, 219, 173 P.3d 885 (2007).

In her petition, Saint-Louis contends that RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) does not state the point in time to which it applies, and therefore the Court should rewrite the statute to apply: “if the parent is incarcerated [during the dependency].” Motion at 11. But Saint-Louis’ requested amendment demonstrates that the plain language does not encompass incarceration prior to the termination trial. First, RCW 13.34.180 addresses the elements required for termination. In subsection (1)(f), the present tense phrase “if the parent is incarcerated,” refers to the time of the termination trial, not other stages such as the shelter care hearing, the dependency hearing, disposition hearing, or permanency planning hearing. Rather than making a blanket requirement that present or prior incarceration be considered in all phases of the dependency and termination process, the legislature

² Saint-Louis does not contend she was denied the benefit of RCW 13.34.180(2).

separately amended the statutes within chapter 13.34 to distinguish how incarceration is considered in each proceeding.

Second, although the legislature could have expanded RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) to require consideration of incarceration before the termination hearing, it did not. The court “[is] not obliged to discern an ambiguity by imagining a variety of alternative interpretations.”

W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 140 Wn.2d 599, 608, 998 P.2d 884 (2000). Nor is it appropriate to add language to create a new meaning. *E.g., State v. Cooper*, 156 Wn.2d 475, 480, 128 P.3d 1234 (2006).

The legislature used precise terms when it intended a particular provision to apply to parents who are currently incarcerated, and it used different terms when it intended a provision to apply to parents who were incarcerated at some time during the dependency. The plain language of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) applies only to parents incarcerated at the time of the termination trial.

2. RCW 13.34 logically considers incarceration differently during the stages of dependency and termination cases

Contrary to Saint-Louis’ argument, reading the statute as written does not lead to absurd results by depriving parents of protection if they are incarcerated prior to the termination trial. Motion at 13-14. When the court looks back in time to determine what caused the parental deficiencies, impeded services, or contributed to the need for foster care, it considers current and prior incarceration. RCW 13.34.145(5)(a)(iv), (c), .180(2). This allows the court to ensure that incarceration—during the

dependency or before the dependency order—does not lead to automatic termination of parental rights.

RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) does not look back. It focuses at the present circumstances, and whether “continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home.” Because RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is focused on the present circumstances, it was logical for the legislature to limit consideration of incarceration to present incarceration.

3. The legislative history supports the present tense, plain language of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)

Saint-Louis’ argues that the Court should reject the statute’s plain language and mine the legislative history for a contrary intent. Since RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is unambiguous, legislative history is irrelevant. *Five Corners Family Farmers v. State*, 173 Wn.2d 296, 306, 268 P.3d 892 (2011). At any rate, the history comports with the plain language.

As Saint-Louis notes, the Final Bill Report states: “[i]n determining whether a parent has failed to complete court-ordered treatment, the court must consider . . . current or past incarceration.” Motion at 15 (citing Final Bill Report SHB 1284 at 3). Her argument, however, ignores the context in which the quotation appears. The Final Bill Report is referring to the considerations made under RCW 13.34.145 before the court directs the Department to file a petition for termination of parental rights. If a dependency was entered, and the child has been in out-of-home care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, the court must

order a termination petition to be filed, unless there is a good cause exception. The 2013 amendment allows the court to consider whether the parent's current or prior incarceration is a significant reason for the child being out of the home. RCW 13.34.145(5)(a)(iv), formerly RCW 13.34.145(4)(a)(iv). Nothing in the Bill Report indicates that the legislature intended to say "current or prior" incarceration when it limited RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) to a parent who "is incarcerated."

In sum, the legislative history supports the plain language of the law. The legislature deliberately chose to address current and prior in some statutes, and in others limited the statute to present incarceration.

B. All Required Services Were Provided

On appeal, Saint-Louis requested that the Court of Appeals expand review of the termination order and consider the permanency plan orders. Because the permanency plan orders were not appealed, the Court of Appeals declined to review them. *In re Dep. of D.L.B.*, 188 Wn. App. at 921 n.10. This Court should do the same.

The issue properly before the Court is whether services required by the permanency plan orders were provided. This was part of the trial court's consideration of the termination factor found in RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), which requires that "the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided." Pursuant to RCW 13.34.136, two permanency plan orders were entered, requiring the Department to offer services. In December 2012, the first permanency plan order was entered. Ex. 4. At that point, the goal was

to return D.L.B. home within a year. *Id.* To make that possible, the court ordered the Department to provide the services required by the dispositional order and make referrals for the Incredible Years program and the UAs. *Id.* Saint-Louis was also required to submit to random UAs, connect with a domestic violence advocate, and complete the recommendations in her psychological evaluation. Ex. 4. In November 2013, the court updated the permanency plan. Ex. 6. It found that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide the required services, but Saint-Louis had not made progress toward correcting the problems that necessitated placing D.L.B. in foster care. *Id.* As a result, the Department was instructed to file a termination petition. *Id.*

Saint-Louis claims she was not allowed to participate in the community-based Incredible Years parenting program, or offered random UAs, while she was in custody. This argument fails for two reasons. First, before she went to jail, she had almost 20 months to participate in these services, but she chose not to follow through. CP at 352-54. She received a psychiatric evaluation, mental health counseling, random UAs following treatment for chemical dependency, referral to domestic violence advocacy groups, parenting classes, and bus passes to enable her to get to these services. CP at 352-54. As the trial court stated in its oral ruling, there was “plenty of evidence . . . that the State went out of its way” to provide the required services.” RP at 603. But she chose not to follow through. *Id.*

Second, while she was in custody, the Department offered her all of the required services. Saint-Louis' period of custody included time served on work release, and the time she chose to serve in jail. *See State v. Ammons*, 136 Wn.2d 453, 458-59, 963 P.2d 812 (1998) (holding that "custody" includes a 30-day order to report to a work crew). When she was on work release, she was given an opportunity to restart the Incredible Years parenting program—a program that is only offered in the community. She was also given the opportunity to submit to random UAs, and have visits with D.L.B. RP at 153, 333, 434-35. Instead, she chose to spend the remaining two months of her sentence in jail, where she continued to receive mental health counseling. RP at 156-57.

Because the services ordered were all offered during the nearly two-year period of dependency prior to incarceration, and while Saint-Louis served her sentence, RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) was satisfied.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court Findings

Contrary to Saint-Louis' argument, she did not remedy her parental deficiencies related to a lack of parenting skills, chemical dependency, and mental health issues, or demonstrate an ability to provide a safe home. Motion at 19-20. The trial court correctly found that the State proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Saint-Louis was unfit to parent and there was little likelihood of conditions being remedied so that he could return home in the near future. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i), .180. Evidence is clear, cogent, and convincing "when the ultimate fact in issue is shown by the evidence to be highly probable." *In re Dep. of K.D.S.*,

176 Wn.2d 644, 653, 294 P.3d 695 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Saint-Louis' substantial problems were not remedied during the two year dependency. She squandered multiple opportunities to complete the Incredible Years parenting program recommended by Dr. Tutty and required in the permanency plan order. CP at 353. When she did enroll, she was dropped from the program after missing four weeks of class. *Id.*; RP at 71. Given the chance to reenroll while on work release, she rejected the opportunity and voluntarily returned to jail. RP at 436-37. At the time of trial, she had just restarted the 18-week program. RP at 306-307.

To address her chemical dependency, Saint-Louis entered inpatient treatment. But after release, she was unable and unwilling to complete 90 days of clean UAs. CP at 353. She tested positive for marijuana and alcohol. *Id.* Although she knew that a missed UA is considered positive, she refused to submit six requested samples. RP at 425. Her decisions gave the trial court ample reason to conclude that her chemical dependency issues were not resolved.

In addition to her chemical dependency, Saint-Louis still requires mental health treatment. During her psychological evaluation, Dr. Tutty noted her attempted suicide, anxiety and panic attacks, and three hospitalizations for emotional problems. Ex. 16 at 6. She was diagnosed with a bipolar disorder, substance abuse, a panic disorder, and a learning disorder with a rule out of Histrionic personality disorder. CP at 352. Although Dr. Tutty concluded that Saint-Louis requires "extensive

psychiatric treatment,” she has not consistently engaged in therapy. CP at 355. The trial court found that “there is [no] evidence that she has made progress in correcting this deficiency that directly impacts her ability to parent” her son. *Id.*

Finally, Saint-Louis attended domestic violence support groups, but was unable to apply what she learned to her own life. She testified that she knew the signs of impending domestic violence and knew she should avoid contact with domestic violence perpetrators. RP at 177, 59. Yet at the time of trial, she was living with a man who had four domestic violence related convictions, and a protection order entered against him prohibiting contact with his prior partner. CP at 353; Ex. 26-29. D.L.B. is a seven-year-old boy with post-traumatic stress disorder and behavioral difficulties, and a permanent and stable home was of “utmost importance.”

The record soundly establishes that Saint-Louis was unfit to parent D.L.B., was unwilling or unable to complete the services offered to her, and little likelihood existed that she could remedy the situation in the near future. Given the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence regarding Saint-Louis’ deficiencies and lack of progress during the two-year dependency, the finding of parental unfitness was appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

The Department respectfully requests that the termination order be upheld.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of April, 2016.

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Dated this 8th day of April 2016, at Olympia, Washington.


KRISTIN D. JENSEN
Confidential Secretary

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Subject: 92448-1, In re Dep. of D.L.B., Supplemental Brief

Dear Clerk:

Please find for filing in matter no. 92448-1, *In re the Dependency of D.L.B.*, the attached Supplemental Brief of Respondent State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services.

Respectfully,
Kristin
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