

NO. 93900-4

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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In the Matter of the Detention of:

TROY BELCHER,

Petitioner.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE  
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR COWLITZ COUNTY

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PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

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## A. INTRODUCTION

Social science overwhelmingly shows that juvenile sex offending is not indicative of adult sex offending. Troy Belcher is an example of this truth. He has not been diagnosed with a sexual disorder or exhibited sexually dangerous behavior as an adult. Like all young persons, Mr. Belcher has grown up. He may suffer from an antisocial personality disorder, but he does not suffer from a mental abnormality that makes it likely he will commit a sexually violent act if released. With no evidence of sexually dangerous misconduct as an adult, Mr. Belcher's commitment violates due process.

## B. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Mr. Belcher's sexual misconduct stopped before he became an adult. Without adult sexually dangerous misconduct, does indefinite commitment under RCW 71.09 violate due process for a person whose predicate offenses occurred as a juvenile?

2. Due process requires proof that Mr. Belcher is likely to commit a sexually violent offense in the future. Because no actuarial instruments exist which can predict future sexual violent behavior for juvenile sex offenders, the government was only able to establish future dangerousness. Does proof of Mr. Belcher's likelihood to commit a

violent crime, rather than a sexually violent offense, satisfy due process?

3. Due process requires proof a RCW 71.09 detainee has a mental abnormality that causes serious difficulty controlling sexually violent behavior. Does evidence a juvenile offender has been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder as an adult satisfy this requirement?

### C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Troy Belcher was thirteen and fifteen years old when he committed his sex offenses. CP 848. The other sexual misconduct Mr. Belcher committed also occurred when he was under eighteen. CP 848-49. Mr. Belcher's sexual activity as an adult has been with age-appropriate, consenting adults. 5A RP 898.

Mr. Belcher had a difficult childhood. He had no relationship with his father and was physically abused by his alcoholic mother. 5A RP 915. He lacked a fixed address, which resulted in school instability and no ability to build relationships with teachers. 5A RP 915. He supported his younger sisters through drug dealing. 5A RP 915.

Mr. Belcher has been in custody since he was fifteen years old, more than half his life. CP 848-9. When he was twenty-three, the government moved to commit him indefinitely under RCW 71.09. He

was initially committed, but was granted a new trial when the court found he had presented prima facie evidence that he no longer met the conditions of RCW 71.09. CP 847.

The government's expert did not diagnose Mr. Belcher with a paraphilic disorder at his new trial. 2B RP 430. The expert instead found Mr. Belcher had an antisocial personality disorder, although the expert also believed Mr. Belcher had a high score for psychopathy. 2A RP 359. Psychopathy is not defined in the current edition of the American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 5th ed., 659 (2013) (Hereafter DSM-5). Instead, it is listed as a synonym for antisocial personality disorder. *Id.* at 659.

The expert's assessment that Mr. Belcher did not suffer from a paraphilic disorder was corroborated by the government's evidence. 2B RP 432-33. According to both polygraphs and penile plethysmograph tests conducted upon Mr. Belcher, he did not present with deviant sexual interests. 2B RP 432. This was consistent with his self-reporting. 2B RP 433. The court found Mr. Belcher had never acted out in a sexually violent way as an adult. CP 856 (Finding of Fact 27).

As Mr. Belcher reached full maturity, the government's expert described his behavior as "an absolute improvement." 3 RP 615. Mr.

Belcher had not received a negative behavior management report in over two years. 2B RP 526. Mr. Belcher lived in the least restrictive environment on McNeil Island. 3 RP 650. He was able to identify dynamic risk factors. 3 RP 612. He was treatment compliant. 2B RP 527. He was no longer the impetuous child who was unable to appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions.

The scientific evidence presented at trial showed how a juvenile like Mr. Belcher would mature. 5A RP 1025. Mr. Belcher presented expert testimony that “most adult sex offenders do not have a history of offending as juveniles.” 5A RP 1026. Child sex offenders grow up, gaining developmental maturity in the prefrontal cortex of their brains. 5A RP 1025. This maturity is a factor to the decreasing rates of sexual recidivism for adolescent sex offenders, as they gain better impulse control, reason, and judgment skills. 5A RP 1025.

Because Mr. Belcher was so young when he committed his sexual misconduct, no actuarial tests exists which can predict his likelihood to commit a future sexually violent offense. 2B RP 468. The government’s expert instead applied a test known as the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide Revised, or the VRAG-R, which only assesses the likelihood a person may commit a future violent offense, without

distinguishing between sexual and non-sexual offenses. 3 RP 675. The government's actuarial evidence showed Mr. Belcher was generally likely to recidivate if released from custody, but could not distinguish between general reoffending and recidivism for a sexually dangerous offense. 2B RP 546.

#### D. ARGUMENT

**1. Due process requires proof a juvenile sex offender has demonstrated sexually dangerous misconduct as an adult in order for indefinite commitment to be constitutional.**

The overwhelming evidence that juveniles are different from adults is even more true for juveniles who commit sex offenses. Juveniles have fluid personalities, a propensity for risk taking, and difficulty appreciating consequences. *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). Juvenile sex offenders rarely become adult sex offenders and their misconduct as youths cannot predict their future likelihood to commit a sexually dangerous offense. Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, *ATSA Practice Guidelines for Assessment, Treatment, and Intervention with*

*Adolescents Who Have Engaged in Sexually Abusive Behavior*, 5 (2017) (Hereafter *ATSA Practice Guidelines*).<sup>1</sup>

While juvenile offenses may be a predicate for future indefinite commitment, due process demands there be evidence of sexually dangerous misconduct committed by the juvenile sex offender after they have become an adult. Commitment under RCW 71.09 is a significant deprivation of liberty. *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979); *see also* U.S. Const. amend. 14; Const. art. I, § 3. When the government seeks to commit a juvenile sex offender, due process requires proof the juvenile offender has demonstrated sexually dangerous misconduct as an adult. With no evidence Mr. Belcher has acted in a sexually deviant way as an adult, his commitment is a violation of due process.

*a. Children are different from adults.*

Children are different, even when they commit serious crimes. *State v. Houston-Sconiers*, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 391 P.3d 409, 414 (2017) (citing *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, \_\_\_, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). Because juveniles lack the maturity and

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.atsa.com/pdfs/Adolescent/ATSA\\_2017\\_Adolescent\\_Practice\\_Guidelines.pdf](http://www.atsa.com/pdfs/Adolescent/ATSA_2017_Adolescent_Practice_Guidelines.pdf).

experience of an adult, procedures put in place for adults must be adapted to the attributes of youth. *J.D.B. v. North Carolina*, 564 U.S. 261, 272-74, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011); *see also State v. O'Dell*, 183 Wn.2d 680, 692, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

Juveniles tend to be immature, irresponsible and impulsive, which is why they are “overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 569; *O'Dell*, 183 Wn.2d at 692. The “hallmark features” of youth are immaturity, impetuosity, and the failure to appreciate risks and consequences. *Miller*, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Children lack the education, judgment, and experience of adults and are not simply “miniature adults.” *J.D.B.*, 564 U.S. at 274.

The differences between adults and juveniles are both physiological and developmental. *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). It is difficult for even expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects “transient immaturity” and “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 569.

Juveniles also have less control over their environment and are not as able to extricate themselves from a dangerous situation. *Roper*,

543 U.S. at 569. Lack of supervision can place a child at risk for problem behaviors and delinquency. Alan Kazdin, *Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of Delinquent Youths*, in *Youth on Trial* 33, 47 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz, eds., 2000).

Finally, the character of a juvenile has not yet developed. *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 570. Juvenile personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. *Id.* Many juveniles engage in risky, antisocial and even criminal behavior. *Id.* For most of them, these behaviors “cease with maturity as individual identity becomes settled.” *Id.*

*b. Juvenile sex offenders are different from adult sex offenders.*

The attributes of youthful misbehavior are even more pronounced for juveniles who commit sex offenses. Juvenile offending is not predictive of adult sexual misconduct. Sue Righthand & Carlann Welch, *Juveniles Who Have Sexually Offended: A Review of the Professional Literature*, 30 (March 2001).<sup>2</sup> The vast majority of juvenile sex offenders do not recidivate as adults. *In re W.Z.*, 194 Ohio

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<sup>2</sup> Available at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/184739.pdf>.

App. 3d 610, 625, 957 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011); *see also* *ATSA Practice Guidelines*, at 5.

Most juveniles who commit sexual offenses as adolescents cease doing so as adults because the psychosocial deficits of adolescence, including poor impulse control, gradually resolve upon maturation. *United States v. Juvenile Male*, 590 F.3d 924, 940 (9th Cir. 2010), *vacated as moot*, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 180 L. Ed. 2d 811 (2011). It is “the exception rather than the rule” for an adolescent sex offender to become an adult sex offender. Ian A. Nisbet, et al., *A Prospective Longitudinal Study of Sexual Recidivism Among Adolescent Offenders*, 16 *Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment* 223, 232 (2004); *see also* Righthand, at 30.

Mr. Belcher is no exception. All of his sexually misconduct occurred when he was a child. CP 856. He was thirteen and fifteen years old when he committed his offenses. CP 848. The only other allegations of sexual misconduct also occurred when he was under eighteen. CP 848-49. There are no instances of Mr. Belcher attempting to commit a sexually violent or overt sexual act as an adult. 5A RP 898. He does not suffer from a paraphilic or sexual disorder. 2B RP 430. Mr. Belcher’s only recognized diagnosis is for antisocial personality

disorder, which is not a sexual disorder. 2A RP 359; *DSM-5* at 645. He has not exhibited signs of “rape behavior” as an adult. 2B RP 431-32. Mr. Belcher’s only sexual activity as an adult has been consensual. 5A RP 898. He has shown no evidence he is likely to engage in sexually dangerous behavior as an adult.

Mr. Belcher’s history is in contrast to *In Re Det. of Anderson*, in which this Court recently held that juvenile sexual behavior can be a predicate for indefinite commitment. 185 Wn.2d 79, 85, 368 P.3d 162 (2016). Unlike Mr. Belcher, Mr. Anderson was diagnosed with pedophilia and sexual sadism. *Id.* at 91. He has trouble controlling his impulses. *Id.* at 85. There were at least four times during his commitment where he committed overt sexual acts. *Id.* at 92. Most importantly, Mr. Anderson’s sexual misconduct continued after he had matured and had become an adult. *Id.* at 91. Unlike Mr. Anderson, Mr. Belcher’s only sexual misconduct occurred when he was a juvenile, and his only psychological diagnosis is no a sexual disorder, but antisocial personality disorder. Mr. Belcher’s confinement cannot be justified, as it is based only on juvenile sexual misconduct.

c. *Due process requires proof Troy Belcher is likely to commit a sexually violent offense if released from total confinement.*

Civil commitment proceedings are of such weight and gravity that due process requires each of the required elements for civil commitment to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. RCW 71.09.060(1). As a matter of substantive due process, the government must establish that, as a result of his mental condition, Mr. Belcher will likely commit a sexually violent offense if released from custody. *Kansas v. Crane*, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S. Ct. 867, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2002); *see also* RCW 71.09.020(18).

Due process is only satisfied where the government is able to demonstrate a likelihood of future sexually violent behavior if the person is not confined. *See Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 357, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997). Indefinite civil commitment must be premised upon a showing of sustained impairment of volitional control. *In re Det. of Young*, 122 Wn.2d 1, 26-27, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (citing *Addington*, 441 U.S. at 426). This requirement necessitates proof “sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him [or her] to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in

an ordinary criminal case.” *In re Det. of Thorell*, 149 Wn.2d 724, 732, 72 P.3d 708 (2003) (citing *Crane*, 534 U.S. at 413).

Proof of sexually violent behavior as an adult cannot be based only upon acts committed as a child. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that children lack the ability to exercise volitional control, even when they commit a serious crime. *Miller*, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; *Houston-Sconiers*, 391 P.3d at 420. As youths mature, their desire to engage in risky behavior diminishes and their propensity for committing juvenile delinquency, including sexual misconduct, stops. “The vast majority of adolescents who have engaged in sexually abusive behavior do not continue to sexually abuse and are not on a life trajectory for repeat offending.” *ATSA Practice Guidelines*, at 5. An indefinite commitment based upon conduct which occurred when a person was a child, without evidence of sexually dangerous misconduct as an adult, fails to satisfy due process.

*d. There is no reliable evidence to demonstrate Troy Belcher is likely to commit a sexually violent offense as an adult.*

Juvenile sex offending does not translate into a likelihood to commit future sex offenses as an adult. *Juvenile Male*, 590 F.3d at 940. Courts and social scientists who have examined this question doubt

tools exist that can be used to evaluate a youthful offender's risk of recidivism for adult sex offenses when all of the evidence of sexually violent acts occur when the offender is a youth. *See e.g. In re J.P.*, 339 N.J. Super. 443, 455, 772 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Inga Hempel, et al., *Review of Risk Assessment Instruments for Juvenile Sex Offenders: What Is Next?* International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology Vol. 57, pp. 208–228 (2011).

In fact, most adult sex offenders do not have a history of offending as juveniles. 5A RP 1027. Juvenile sex offenders grow up and gain developmental maturity in the prefrontal cortex of the brain as they mature into their mid-twenties. 5A RP 1027. These developments help account for the decreasing rates of sexual recidivism of adolescents as their brains develop and they gain better impulse control, reason and judgment skills. 5A RP 1027.

Like all youth, Mr. Belcher matured as he grew up. There is no dispute that all of Mr. Belcher's sexually violent acts occurred when he was a child. CP 856 (Finding of Fact 27). Mr. Belcher was only thirteen and fifteen years old when he committed his crimes. CP 848. All other allegations of sexual misconduct occurred when he was a child. CP 848. There are no instances of him acting in a sexually violent way as

an adult. 5A RP 898. The only adult sexual activity Mr. Belcher has engaged in is described by the government as consensual. 5A RP 898.

Mr. Belcher's overall behavior demonstrates the same pattern of maturation. Mr. Belcher engaged in highly risky and illegal activity as a child. He committed crimes while in juvenile detention and continued to act out even after he was civilly committed. CP 849. As a young person, Mr. Belcher received a number of behavior management reports in the commitment center. 2B RP 481. He also engaged in deception and had anger issues. 5B RP 1097, 2B RP 403.

Then, Mr. Belcher grew up. According to the government's expert, there has been an "absolute improvement" in Mr. Belcher's behavior as he has matured. 3 RP 615. In the two years prior to his trial, there had been no misbehavior reports. 3 RP 614. He became treatment compliant, living in the least restrictive environment in the commitment center. 2B RP 527, 3 RP 650.

Most important, there is no evidence Mr. Belcher has ever had an interest in committing a sexually violent act as an adult. Mr. Belcher has never acted out in a sexually violent way as an adult. CP 856 (Finding of Fact 27). The tests the government conducted on Mr. Belcher, including the penile plethysmograph, indicated Mr. Belcher is

not aroused by deviant sexual behavior. 3 RP 636. The polygraph examiner who interview Mr. Belcher also concluded that Mr. Belcher is uninterested in violent sexual behavior. 3 RP 642.

The overwhelming social science demonstrates that juvenile sex offenders are unlikely to become adult sex offenders. *ATSA Practice Guidelines*, at 5. Mr. Belcher is not an exception to this rule. Mr. Belcher has grown out of his juvenile sex offending. He has matured and is able to act in age appropriate ways. Due process requires proof of current likelihood to commit a sexually violent offense. Because Mr. Belcher has demonstrated no interest in sexual offending as an adult, his commitment order violates due process and should be dismissed.

**2. Tools designed to determine the likelihood an adult will commit a sexually violent act are insufficient for juvenile sex offenders.**

There are no reliable scientific instruments which can measure the likelihood a youth will sexually reoffend as an adult. 2B RP 468. Tools normed for adults are heavily dependent upon past adult conduct to predict future risk and have been rejected for use on juveniles by courts and the scientific community. 2B RP 486; *see also J.P.*, 339 N.J. Super. at 461; *ATSA Practice Guidelines*, at 5; Hempel, at 208.

For Mr. Belcher, this is an especially important question because all of his sexual misconduct occurred when he was a child. The government's expert did not diagnose Mr. Belcher with a sexually paraphilic disorder or find current evidence of "rape behavior." 2B RP 431-32. The expert instead relied on historical information, examining Mr. Belcher's "history in the community as a child" and his "behavior as a juvenile at Green Hill [School]." 2B RP 522; CP 851.

Nevertheless, the government's expert justified his position Mr. Belcher was likely to commit a future sexually violent offense by relying upon an actuarial instrument called the VRAG-R. 2B RP 466, CP 854 (Finding of Fact 18, 19). The VRAG-R is not a tool designed to demonstrate that a person is likely to commit a new sexually violent assault. 3 RP 675. Instead, it is designed to predict whether a person is likely to commit *any* violent offense. 2B RP 536, 545, CP 854 (Finding of Fact 20).

Actuarial evidence that only demonstrates a future likelihood to commit a violent offense does not satisfy due process. *Thorell*, 149 Wn.2d at 732; *see also Crane*, 534 U.S. at 413. Due process requires proof "sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him [or her] to

civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” *Id.* Determining that Mr. Belcher is likely to commit some a future crime if released from custody, is not enough. Without proof that Mr. Belcher is likely to commit a future sexually violent act, his continued confinement is in violation of due process.

**3. Troy Belcher’s diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is insufficient to justify indefinite commitment.**

In addition to failing to demonstrate Mr. Belcher had an interest in sexual violence as an adult, and erroneously relying on an actuarial instrument normed for adult general violence to demonstrate future sexual dangerousness, the government’s expert only diagnosed Mr. Belcher with a disorder of antisocial personality traits. No matter how much a person suffers from antisocial personality disorder, this diagnosis is not enough for indefinite commitment under RCW 71.09.

Due process instead requires the government to prove Mr. Belcher has a severe mental disorder that causes him serious difficulty in controlling his sexually violent behavior. *Thorell*, 149 Wn.2d at 736, 740-41. This requirement necessitates proof “sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him [or her] to civil commitment from

the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” *Id.*, at 732 (citing *Crane*, 534 U.S. at 413).

Although states have considerable leeway to define when a mental abnormality or personality disorder makes an individual eligible for commitment as a sexually violent person, the diagnosis must be medically justified. *See Crane*, 534 U.S. at 413; *Hendricks*, 521 U.S. at 358; *Thorell*, 149 Wn.2d at 732, 740-41. Other states have found that without other clear evidence of mental abnormality, “evidence that a respondent suffers from antisocial personality disorder cannot be used to support a finding that he has a mental abnormality.” *State v. Donald DD.*, 24 N.Y.3d 174, 177, 21 N.E.3d 239, 996 N.Y.S.2d 610 (2014); *see also* N.Y. MHY. LAW § 10.03.

A growing body of literature also demonstrates that evidence of antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy is not a good or consistent predictor of sexual recidivism. 5A RP 950. While a person diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder with a high “psychopathy” score may engage in more frequent offending than a person without antisocial personality behavior, this does not mean that person is likely to engage in sexual violence. 5A RP 970-71, *see also* Stephen Porter, et al, *Crime Profiles and Conditional Release*

*Performance of Psychopathic and Non-Psychopathic Sexual Offenders*,  
14 Legal and Criminological Psychology 109–18 (2009).

In *Donald DD.*, the court found antisocial personality disorder “simply does not distinguish the sex offender whose mental abnormality subjects him to civil commitment from the typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” 24 N.Y.3d at 190. This diagnosis may be “[in]sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” *Crane*, 534 U.S. at 413. Mental illnesses like antisocial personality disorder are just “too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified.” *Hendricks*, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

The government’s expert agreed with the general consensus that antisocial personality disorder is generally insufficient for commitment. 3 RP 584. But because he could not justify this diagnosis for commitment, the expert argued Mr. Belcher’s personality disorder was actually something else. 2A RP 358-59, 377, 3 RP 565. The expert described a classification not found in the scientific literature, finding

Mr. Belcher had a mental abnormality the expert described as antisocial personality disorder with a “high level” of psychopathy. 2B RP 464, CP 851 (Finding of Fact 12).

While the government’s expert argued there is a distinction between antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, this is not a consensus opinion. In fact, the American Psychiatric Association categorizes these personality disorders as the same thing. DSM-5 at 659. The DSM-5 finds antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy have essentially the same “pattern” and are described as synonyms of each other. *Id.* at 660.

This misdiagnosis is why the government’s expert was only able to state Mr. Belcher was likely to engage in future violent offenses, which might include sexually violent offenses. 2B RP 536, 546. This important distinction should not be ignored. Likelihood to commit a new offense is not the same as likelihood to commit a sexually violent offense. *Thorell*, 149 Wn.2d at 732. When social science has established that very few youthful sex offenders like Mr. Belcher commit adult sex offenses, this Court cannot be satisfied that the government satisfied due process by only establishing Mr. Belcher has an antisocial personality disorder.

E. CONCLUSION

RCW 71.09 cannot be constitutionally applied to a child sex offender when there is no evidence of adult sexually dangerous misconduct. The government's reliance on acts Mr. Belcher committed as a child, without evidence of sexually dangerous misconduct as an adult, violate Mr. Belcher's due process.

DATED this 10 day of May 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. Stearns', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

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**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

IN RE THE DETENTION OF )  
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TROY BELCHER, ) NO. 93900-4  
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PETITIONER. )

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**SIGNED** IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON THIS 10<sup>TH</sup> DAY OF MAY, 2017.

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# WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

May 10, 2017 - 4:17 PM

## Transmittal Information

**Filed with Court:** Supreme Court  
**Appellate Court Case Number:** 93900-4  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** In re the Detention of: Troy Belcher  
**Superior Court Case Number:** 07-2-02187-7

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