

72310-3

NO. ~~723103-3-I~~

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION I

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

JOHNATHAN WALKER,

APPELLANT,

and

JENNIFER JOHNSON,

RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
CAUSE NO. 13-3-08138-9 KNT

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Johnathan Walker, Pro Se
1514 210th Avenue East
Lake Tapps, WA 98391
(253) 753-8006

2015 JUL 29 AM 11:17
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF WASHINGTON
JIM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.....1

II. Assignments of Error2

1. The trial court erred in entering the order of June 20, 2014,
violating Mr. Walker’s constitutional right to due process under the
law.....2

2. The trial court erred in entering the order of June 20, 2014,
violating Mr. Walker’s constitutional right to equal protection under
the law.....2

3. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Walker his right to proper
notice of what was being presented and argued during the June 20,
2014 hearing.....2

4. The trial court erred by not reading orders prior to signing/entering
orders.....2

5. The trial court erred by denying Mr. Walker his right to be heard on
issues argued during the June 20, 2014
hearing.....2

6. The trial court erred by including findings not based in testimony or
evidence at trial, and by entering orders, which included
typographical errors.....2

III. Issues Pertaining to Assignments of Error.....3

1. Does Mr. Walker have a substantial right to fair treatment under the due process of law during a trial, especially as a pro se litigant?.....3

2. Does Mr. Walker have a substantial right to equal protection under the law during a trial, especially as a pro se litigant?.....3

3. Did the trial court fail to comply with Court Rules 5 (a) and 52 (c), and Local Court Rule 7 (4)(A)?.....3

4.

a. Did the trial court lack authority to sign orders prepared by opposing counsel, which were never served on this pro se litigant?.....3

b. If the trial court abused its authority, was Mr. Walker prejudiced by the resulting inability to represent himself in a meaningful way?.....3

5. Did the trial court abuse it’s authority when it denied Mr. Walker any opportunity to speak in reply to the testimony and arguments of opposing counsel on the issues decided during the June 20th hearing?.....3

6. Did the trial court have a responsibility to read proposed orders prior to signing to ensure the final orders' calculations are correctly based on facts, testimony and evidence?.....	3
7. Should this Court exercise its equitable powers to allow Mr. Walker a fair trial, equal treatment under the law and an opportunity to represent himself in a meaningful way?.....	3
IV. Statement of the case.....	4
V. Argument.....	5
1. Standard of Review.....	6
2. Mr. Walker had a substantial right to due process and equal protection.....	7
3. Equity requires Mr. Walker be afforded his constitutional right to equal protection under law.....	9
4. Mr. Walker was severely prejudiced by the trial court's error.....	10
5. The trial court admittedly did not read orders prior to entering.....	13
Conclusion.....	17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Washington Cases:

Fazelinia v. DSHS, 113 Wn. App. 716, 54 P.3d 716
(2002).....14

In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. 657, 663-64, 50 P.3d 298
(2002).....6

Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909, 919, 296 P.3d 860
(2013).....6

Morris v. Maks, 69 Wn. App. 865, 868, 850 P.2d 1357
(1993).....6

State v. Neal, 144 Wn.2d 600, 609, 30 P.3d 1255 (2001)..... 6

Cases from other jurisdictions:

1234 Broadway LLC v. Feng Chai Lin, 25 Misc.3d 476, 883 N.Y.S.2d 864
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2009).....9

Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915)..1

Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, 111 U. S.
708.....8

Haines v. Keaner, et al. 404 U.S. 519,92 s. Ct. 594,30 L. Ed. 2d 652.....2

Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22.....9

Rabin v. Dep't of State, No. 95-4310, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15718.....16

Revised Code of Washington:

RCW 26.19.071.....12

Other:

U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV.....1, 6, 9, 17

CR 5: Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.....7

CR 52: Decisions, findings and conclusions.....7

LCR 7: Civil motions.....8

I. Introduction

“Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase ‘due process of law’ there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard.” -Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., *Frank v. Magnum*, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915).

The very foundation of our justice system is anchored by this principle: due process. It is the duty of the court to protect this constitutional right, ensure fairness and equality of treatment under the law, and apply the law consistently. The court has authority to adjudicate legal matters in accordance with the rule of law. Thus, if the trial court exceeds that authority by denying anyone due process and equal protection under the law, it is the duty of this Court to remedy that injustice.

Here, the trial court abused its authority by overt, demonstrable violation of Mr. Walker’s right to due process and equal protection under the law. This was gross error of the trial court, which resulted in serious prejudice to pro se Mr. Walker. He is entitled to a fair trial with the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. Mr. Walker never waived his right to due process, and the court has authority and charge to ensure that right.

Mr. Walker asks that this Court follow the direction of our U.S. Supreme Court regarding his pro se status as it pertains to the form of this brief:

“Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” *Haines v. Keaner, et al.* 404 U.S. 519.

II. Assignments of Error

1. The trial court erred in entering the order of June 20, 2014, violating Mr. Walker’s constitutional right to due process under the law.
2. The trial court erred in entering the order of June 20, 2014, violating Mr. Walker’s constitutional right to equal protection under the law.
3. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Walker his right to proper notice of what was being presented and argued during the June 20, 2014 hearing.
4. The trial court erred by admittedly not reading orders prior to signing/entering orders.
5. The trial court erred by denying Mr. Walker his right to be heard on issues argued during the June 20, 2014 hearing.
6. The trial court erred by including findings not based in testimony or evidence at trial, and by entering orders, which included typographical errors.

III. Issues Pertaining to Assignments of Error

1. Does Mr. Walker have a substantial right to fair treatment under the due process of law during a trial, especially as a pro se litigant?
2. Does Mr. Walker have a substantial right to equal protection under the law during a trial, especially as a pro se litigant?
3. Did the trial court fail to comply with Court Rules 5 (a) and 52 (c), and Local Court Rule 7 (4)(A)?
4.
 - a. Did the trial court lack authority to sign orders prepared by opposing counsel, which were never served on this pro se litigant?
 - b. If the trial court abused its authority, was Mr. Walker prejudiced by the resulting inability to represent himself in a meaningful way?
5. Did the trial court abuse its authority when it denied Mr. Walker any opportunity to speak in reply to the testimony and arguments of opposing counsel on the issues decided during the June 20th hearing?
6. Did the trial court have a responsibility to read proposed orders prior to signing to ensure the final orders' calculations are correctly based on facts, testimony and evidence?
7. Should this Court exercise its equitable powers to allow Mr. Walker a fair trial, equal treatment under the law and an opportunity to represent himself in a meaningful way?

IV. Statement of the Case

Appellant Jon Walker and Jennifer Johnson are the parents of MJW¹. Their relationship ended when MJW was a year old. CP 36. Mr. Walker filed a petition for a parenting plan in King County Superior Court in 2004 when MJW was 3 years old, the petition was dismissed due to pro se Mr. Walker not properly complying with the rules of process of King County Superior Court. CP 2. Mr. Walker filed another petition for parenting plan in King County Superior Court in 2013. CP 1. Mr. Walker hired an attorney, who withdrew a few weeks prior to trial commencement. RP V.1 - 2². Witness testimony and closing arguments concluded on May 15, 2014. RP 103. Mr. Walker represented himself for the entire duration of the trial. RP V.1 – 1, V.3 – 1. The Court sent a letter on June 9, 2014 to parties following conclusion of witness testimony and closing statements. CP 87. The letter contained the Superior Courts decision on issues pertaining to the residential schedule only. CP 87-89. This oral ruling directed opposing counsel to draft orders based on the ruling in the letter and gave parties notice of a final hearing on June 20, 2014 where orders would be presented and signed. CP 89. Mr. Walker attended the hearing. RP V.3 – 1. Opposing counsel gave Mr. Walker all the proposed orders a few minutes before the hearing commenced on June 20, 2014, Mr. Walker

¹ M.J.W. is a minor and referred to by her initials.

² Report of Proceedings includes three volumes: V.1 – May 5, 2014; V.2 – May 15, 2014; V.3 – June 20, 2014. References to the RP are in this format: RP V.1 – 1-51(page number), RP V.2 – 1-52, RP V.3 – 1-6.

had not received any copies of these proposed orders prior to the hearing. RP V.3 – 1. None of these pleadings were served on Mr. Walker. RP V.3 – 2-3. Mr. Walker informed the Court he had not been served opposing counsel’s proposed orders, and that he was unprepared to represent himself regarding these additional issues during the hearing. RP V.3 – 2-3. After alerting the trial court to this violation of due process Mr. Walker was not permitted to speak for the duration of the hearing and trial. RP V.3 – 3-6. Opposing counsel offered testimony as well as facts not in evidence and facts contrary to evidence. RP V.3 – 3-4. The trial court indicated it had not reviewed the presented orders prior to hearing that day. RP V.3 – 5. The trial court did not permit Mr. Walker any reply to the testimony and multiple assertions made by opposing counsel. RP V.3 – 3-6. After conferring with opposing counsel and excluding Mr. Walker from further comment, all orders proposed and presented by opposing counsel were signed in their entirety on June 20, 2014. RP V.3 – 1-2 & 5. Mr. Walker timely filed a notice of appeal.

V. Argument

This appeal addresses the question of whether the rules of process are rights of a pro se litigator, or whether the court can waive that right over Mr. Walker’s express objection. This brief will examine the obligation of the court to apply the rule of law fairly and consistently. This brief will

also examine the trial court's duty to the rule of law, and how failure in that duty violates individual constitutional rights and results in prejudice and injustice. Because Mr. Walker received no notice of the proposals opposing counsel presented at the hearing on June 20th he was unprepared to cite the record or specific exhibits, or refer to the rules and statutes supporting his argument. Mr. Walker was also denied the opportunity to reply to the arguments made by opposing counsel regarding child support. The rules of process are in place to protect litigants from these very inequities. The trial court did not ensure opposing counsel's compliance with the rules of process, and Mr. Walker voiced the violation but the court did not cure the breach.

1. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court's actions during trial for an abuse of discretion. *Morris v. Maks*, 69 Wn. App. 865, 868, 850 P.2d 1357 (1993). "A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds." *In re Marriage of Fiorito*, 112 Wn. App. 657, 663-64, 50 P.3d 298 (2002). It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to act contrary to established law. *Lahey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc.*, 176 Wn.2d 909, 919, 296 P.3d 860 (2013). Additionally, "[f]ailure to enforce the requirements of rules can constitute an abuse of discretion." *State v. Neal*, 144 Wn.2d 600, 609, 30 P.3d 1255 (2001).

2. Mr. Walker had a substantial right to due process and equal protection

There is no ambiguity in the law regarding individual right to due process of the law. That being true, this question is raised: was Mr. Walker denied his due process under the laws of our great state of Washington? In a civil proceeding the rules governing what constitutes due process as it applies to notice is clearly defined in state and local rules of law. Civil Rule 5(a) in pertinent part reads as follows:

(a) Service--When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, [...] every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.

Civil Rule 52 requires notice specifically when the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are required:

(a) Presentation. When the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are required either by rule or statute, the prevailing party, within fifteen (15) days of the decision being rendered, shall file along with proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Proposed Judgment/Order and deliver a copy of same to the Court and to all other parties with a timely notice of presentment setting the matter for a date certain.

King County Superior Court Local Civil Rule 7(4)(A) requires the following:

(4) Dates of Filing, Hearing and Consideration.

(A) Filing and Scheduling of Motion. The moving party shall serve and file all motion documents no later than six court days before the date the party wishes the motion to be considered.

None of the preceding rules of law of the State or the County were enforced during the hearing on June 20th.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the oral ruling rendered June 9, 2014 where the trial court specifically ordered service: "Respondent's Counsel, Mr. John Stocks, will *prepare the final orders and provide a copy to the petitioner, Johnathan Walker prior to the presentation date.*" CP 89. The trial court's careless attitude toward this pro se litigant during the June 20th hearing shows negligence as well as plain error.

Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, 111 U. S. 708, US

Supreme Court defines individual rights of due process in unambiguous language:

"By 'due process' is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the law, it must be adapted to the end to be attained, and wherever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. The clause in question therefore means that there can be no proceeding against life, liberty, or property which may result in the deprivation of either without the observance of those general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights."

Mr. Walker has a constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Before he could be divested of his rights he needed to be afforded due process. *1234 Broadway LLC v. Feng Chai Lin*, 25 Misc.3d 476, 883 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2009)

3. Equity requires Mr. Walker be afforded his constitutional right to equal protection under law

In 2004 he filed a petition for residential schedule, but his petition was dismissed for his failure to comply with the rules of process. CP 2. The dismissal was the result of superior court enforcing these rules, protecting the opposing party's right to due process. Ten years later Mr. Walker sought the same protections under the law and was denied. *Missouri v. Lewis*, 101 U. S. 22, says this:

"No person or class of person shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or classes in the same place and under like circumstances."

The situations were identical: the parties to the action were the same, the nature of petition was the same, the rule of law was the same, yet Mr. Walker was denied his rights in this matter being reviewed.

As the trial court's actions were contrary to its own oral ruling, local and state law, and the US Constitution, the trial court abused its discretion by failure to enforce the rule of law and failure to protect this pro se litigant's right to due process and equal protection under the law.

4. Mr. Walker was severely prejudiced by the trial court's error

Mr. Walker received the trial court's oral ruling dated June 9, 2014. That letter from the trial court designated the date and time for presentation of orders, as well as specific orders pertaining only to the residential schedule. CP 87-89. Mr. Walker received no other documents or pleadings prior to the hearing on June 20, 2014. (Superior Court Docket for Case # 13-3-08138-9 KNT) As such, he was prepared only for what he'd received in the oral ruling. On June 20, 2014 attorney for the opposing party presented orders for the trial court to sign, handing a copy of these 6 separate, lengthy pleadings to the pro se Mr. Walker minutes before the hearing began. RP 104. Mr. Walker was confused as to what he'd been handed. RP V.3 – 2-3.

Without knowing what opposing counsel was presenting Mr. Walker's right to represent himself in a meaningful way was impossible. Mr. Walker, with only a high school education, no experience in legal language and a work history in manual labor, relied on his right to notice. He needed to have opportunity to object, find specific exhibits from trial, notes he'd taken during witness testimony, and to research the rules and statutes supporting his objections.

No reason was offered by the trial court why Mr. Walker's right to notice under the law was denied. The result was severe prejudice to Mr. Walker. When the oral ruling and the orders presented are compared, each proposed order included significant components not offered by the trial

court's oral ruling. To avoid excessive length in this section, specific examples are outlined rather than an exhaustive list:

Parenting Plan:

2.1 and 2.2 (CP 75) under parental conduct, opposing counsel included multiple "other factors" not addressed in the trial court's oral ruling and which were not supported by evidence or testimony:

- Neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting functions
- A long-term emotional or physical impairment which interferes with the performance of parenting functions...
- The absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties between the parent and child
- The abusive use of conflict by the parent which creates the danger of serious damage to the child's psychological development

6.3 under Other Provisions (CP 81), opposing counsel includes language specifying the parties have in person or telephone contact on a regular basis. This would not be congruent with the level of conflict between these parties in this matter. Additionally, it would be unnecessarily problematic to have no record of any communication between the parties.

Order of Child Support:

1.1 Judgment summary for Non-medical Expenses (CP 54) includes \$23,680 in attorney fees and "other recovery amount", neither mentioned in the trial court's letter/oral ruling of June 9th.

3.2 under C. (CP 56) states, “The Petitioner’s income is imputed at \$3,448.00, because he is voluntarily underemployed.” This is contrary to both evidence and testimony. In fact, the temporary Order on child support dated June 12, 2013 includes, handwritten in section 3.2 (CP 21), “For purposes of this Order of Child Support, the support obligation is based upon the following income: A. Actual Monthly Net Income: \$2,341.00.” The imputed income inserted by opposing counsel John Stocks was incorrectly computed and was grossly unfair.

3.9 Starting date and date to be paid (CP 57) gives a start date of April 1, 2013. Temporary orders were in place, which Mr. Walker was complying with. The temporary orders had a start date of May 1, 2013. CP 23. It is unusual practice for a final order to re-litigate a temporary order, especially without any specific motion or reason specified. The temporary orders were based on Mr. Walker’s “actual net income.” CP 22. Opposing counsel inserted an imputed amount to cover a time period when Mr. Walker was employed full time, in the position he’d held for over 7 years. CP 118-128. This is contrary to RCW 26.19.071 (6.), which reads in pertinent part, “A court shall not impute income to a parent who is gainfully employed on a full-time basis,” which Mr. Walker was for the period covered by the temporary orders.

3.15 Payment for Expenses Not Covered in the Transfer Payment lists a multitude of luxury expenses: extracurricular activities, camps, etc. CP 59. Mr. Walker was made responsible for paying 78% of these luxury

expenses when his family of 6 was receiving state benefits based on verified income of the entire household. EX 120.

The overwhelming weight of the rules of law, which define and ensure the rights of all litigants in court, proves Mr. Walker had rights only he could waive. There is no evidence here that Mr. Walker ever waived his rights; the evidence is in fact all to the contrary. Thus, the trial court erred when it signed the orders, violating Mr. Walker's rights.

Mr. Walker had no opportunity to read through all the additions opposing counsel inserted in these proposed orders, let alone object to specific points. During the June 20th hearing the trial court asked if there were any questions. Mr. Walker replied that he "...didn't know about this, about the stuff being submitted." RP V.3 – 2. The trial court didn't ensure service had been executed, as the law required, and made no effort to ensure Mr. Walker knew what was being proposed. RP V.3 – 3-6.

5. The trial court admittedly did not read orders prior to entering

During the June 20th hearing the trial court specifically indicated it had not read through the proposed orders signed minutes later:

(RP V.3 – 3)

Mr. Stocks: "So, comparing today's number of around 787 imputes income to Mr. Walker, because I didn't – I don't believe he complied with Local Rule LFLR 10 by providing any financial information, pay stubs, historical pay stubs, tax returns. So I think our numbers are appropriate."

(pg. 5)

Judge Gain: "*Mr. Stocks, the figures that you have provided in the worksheet are based on imputed income?*" (emphasis added)

Mr. Stocks: “Yes, your Honor.”

Judge Gain: “Okay. First of all, with regard to the worksheet and the child support order, I am going to sign those,”

Please note the trial court’s question clearly indicating the proposed orders hadn’t been read, even the most important particulars used for calculations. If they had been read the trial court would have known the numbers were based on imputed income. The orders state imputed income was used for calculations in numerous places. CP 56, 66. The orders under review here resulted in significant prejudice to Mr. Walker.

Because the trial court “rubberstamped” opposing counsel’s orders without first reading what was being signed, the trial court essentially delegated its authority and responsibility to a non-judge, and worse, the delegated party was the opposing side’s counsel. That is obvious error. A court cannot delegate its powers to any third party. *Fazelinia v. DSHS*, 113 Wn. App. 716, 54 P.3d 716 (2002).

Mr. Walker alerted the trial court of his specific objections to the numbers used to calculate the proposed order of support, that they were much higher than any historical income and that he’d been working full time when the temporary orders were put in place.

(RP V.3 – 3)

Mr. Walker: “I don’t agree with the financial side of it, because what’s been drawn up, by the amounts that are in there – I never made those amounts. The monthly child support that’s been put in there is even higher than when I was still working, and the temporary order was put in place, and I was paying child support through the State.”

Additionally, after Mr. Walker had voiced his objections and pointed out the error, the trial court allowed opposing counsel to argue for the proposals he'd submitted, and to offer testimony without allowing Mr. Walker to respond. RP V.3 – 3-4. In fact, Mr. Walker was not permitted to speak for the remainder of the proceedings while the trial court and opposing counsel discussed the proposals in question. RP V.3 – 3-6. The trial court allowed opposing counsel to testify regarding his “beliefs” about what had been filed and submitted by Mr. Walker.

(RP V.3 – 3)

Mr. Stocks: “...Comparing today’s number of around 787 imputes income to Mr. Walker, because I didn’t – I don’t believe he complied with Local Rule LFLR 10 by providing any financial information, pay stubs, historical pay stubs, tax returns. So I think our numbers are appropriate.”

His “beliefs” were incorrect, and grossly so. Mr. Walker did comply with LFLR 10 exactly as opposing counsel’s client had. He filed his 2011 and 2012 tax returns and W2s, pay stubs and bank statements (CP 118-128), his financial declaration (EX 104), 2013 W2 and social security earnings history (EX 105). Opposing counsel continued to argue and offer testimony.

(RP V.3 – 3)

Mr. Stocks: “...We never received an objection to this presentation motion. It was sent to Mr. Walker last week; he’s had seven days to review this.”

The trial court refused Mr. Walker any opportunity to respond and made no effort to verify Mr. Stocks’ erroneous claims. RP V.3 – 5-6. Mr.


Walker had already explained that he had not seen these documents prior to the hearing. Judge Gain had directly explained his courtroom's rules of procedure to Mr. Walker. RP V.2 – 44. The trial court outright denied Mr. Walker his promised opportunity for rebuttal argument. RP V.2 – 44, V.3 – 2-6. Mr. Walker heard opposing counsel's claim that he'd been given these documents a week prior to the hearing, and he waited for his rebuttal opportunity he'd been assured of to tell the court again that he never got any paperwork at all from opposing counsel prior to the hearing. This is another example of grossly unfair unequal opportunity to be heard as well as unequal application and protection of the law.

Judge Gain was the trier of fact, yet he gave no direction in his oral ruling regarding the order of child support. CP 87-89. Instead he deferred to opposing counsel's wishes and disregarded rule of law. RP V.3 – 1-6. The trial court had the responsibility of deciding every aspect of the signed orders. That responsibility required the trial court's full and careful attention. In *Rabin v. Dep't of State*, No. 95-4310, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15718 the court noted that *pro se plaintiffs* should be afforded "special solicitude." Additionally, the court's oral ruling had no indication of the mind of the trial court regarding any financials. It was the trial court's duty to read through the orders in detail. Its failure to do so was a monumental miscarriage of justice for this father and his family, all affected by the trial court's gross error. Mr. Walker implores this Court cure the error.

VI. Conclusion

The Constitution of the United States was designed to protect the rights of all citizens of this nation. Here, however, instead of protecting Jon Walker, the trial court refused him the rights afforded by our very constitution, the rule and guide for all laws in our country. He was denied his due process in a matter most personal and fundamental concerning the intimate matters of parenting and familial financial support. Mr. Walker did not waive his rights, and in fact attempted to exercise those rights during the June 20th hearing. The trial court denied him due process and equal treatment under the law. This Court should reverse the trial court's unlawful entry of the June 20th orders and remand this case for fair trial.

Respectfully submitted this the 24th day of July, 2015,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jon Walker". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Johnathan Walker, Pro Se Appellant

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF KING

WALKER ET ANO

vs.

JOHNSON

No. 72310-3

Case No.: 13-3-08138-9 KNT

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE

(AFSR)

I, Annette Baughman Walker, certify that I initiated electronic service of the following document(s) on the parties listed below who have consented to accept electronic service via the King County eFiling Application. Service was initiated on July 24, 2015 at 09:59:47 PM.

Document(s):

1. BRIEF

Parties:

1. Jon Walker, Petitioner/Plaintiff
email: shuvlhead76@yahoo.com
2. Alice Ramos, Attorney for Respondent/Defendant
email: aramos@vansiclen.com

Executed this 24th day of July, 2015.

s/ Annette Baughman Walker

WSBA #:

1514 210th Ave. E.

Lake Tapps, WA 98391

253-686-8798

annette.walker@ms.com

2015 JUL 29 AM 11:17
COUNTY OF KING
STATE OF WASHINGTON