

SUPREME COURT NO. 901325

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

FILED
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CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DANIEL CRAIG WILSON,

Petitioner.

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DIVISION TWO

Court of Appeals No. 42989-6-II
Kitsap County No. 11-1-00744-6

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Petitioner, DANIEL CRAIG WILSON, by and through his attorney, CATHERINE E. GLINSKI, requests the relief designated in part

B.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Barry seeks review of the March 11, 2014, unpublished decision of Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction and sentence.

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Trial counsel was unable to contact material witnesses prior to trial and sought a continuance to do so. Where there had been no previous continuances and there was no indication the State's witnesses would be unavailable if the continuance were granted, did appellant's due process rights to present a defense and to a fair trial outweigh the court's concern regarding the timing of the motion?

2. Appellant was convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle. The State's case rested on testimony from a car salesman that appellant failed to return the car after driving it to a bank to obtain a down payment. Where trial counsel discovered evidence after trial which seriously challenged the credibility of the State's witness, did the court err in denying appellant's motion for a new trial?

3. Do the issues raised in Wilson's statement of additional grounds for review and personal restraint petition warrant reversal?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 23, 2011, Daniel Wilson was arrested in Bremerton, when he was found in possession of a car that had been reported stolen. 1RP¹ 38-39. Wilson told the arresting officers that he had bought the car in Spokane. He had paid some money but was supposed to return to pay the tax, title, and license fee and finish the paperwork. 1RP 41-42. Wilson said he was planning to take care of that, and he asked the officers to call the car dealership to verify the arrangements. 1RP 44. The car was impounded, and Wilson was charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. 1RP 42; CP 1; RCW 9A.56.068.

The case was set for trial in Kitsap County Superior Court before the Honorable Russell Hartman. Prior to jury selection, Wilson's trial counsel moved for a continuance on the grounds that the defense investigator had been unable to contact witnesses Wilson identified the day before. 1RP 3-4. Counsel stated she believed the witnesses were relevant to the case and important to the defense. 1RP 4. She explained that the State's position was that Wilson took the car for a test drive in Spokane and did not return it, and he was found in possession of the car in

¹ The Verbatim Report of Proceedings is contained in two volumes, designated as follows: 1RP—11/2, 3, 4/11; 2RP 12/23/11.

Bremerton a few days later. The witnesses identified by Wilson would establish that Wilson had the car with permission before the date the State's witness would say it was taken. 1RP 4. Counsel argued that these witnesses were material to the case, since the issue was whether Wilson had authority to possess the car in question, and she needed time to contact the witnesses. 1RP 5, 9.

The State opposed the motion for continuance, saying it would be inconvenient to the witness traveling from Spokane. 1RP 5. The State also argued that Wilson should have spoken to counsel about the witnesses sooner. 1RP 6. The court agreed and denied the requested continuance. It stated that Wilson should have disclosed the witnesses to counsel earlier, he had had sufficient time to prepare his case, and there was no basis to continue. 1RP 11. The case proceeded to trial.

Ryan Steele is the sales manager at Affordable Motors in Spokane. 1RP 53-54. He testified he had met Wilson when Wilson helped his daughter buy a car. 1RP 59-61. Steele said he next saw Wilson on Saturday, August 20, 2011, when Wilson spoke to him about purchasing a black 1998 Cadillac. 1RP 59. Wilson took the Cadillac on a test drive and returned, saying he wanted to purchase it. 1RP 62-63. According to Steele, he then let Wilson drive the Cadillac to the bank to get the down payment, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, but Wilson never returned. 1RP

65, 67, 77. Two days later Steele told the owner of the car lot what had happened. The owner located the Cadillac in Bremerton using the car's GPS, and he called the police. 1RP 68-69.

On cross examination, Steele testified that Wilson had taken the Cadillac for a test drive on a Saturday, and he was certain Wilson had not been in earlier in the week. 1RP 74. He denied letting Wilson take the car before August 20, 2011. 1RP 81. He also denied that Wilson had paid any part of the purchase price of the Cadillac. 1RP 81.

Wilson's sister then testified that Wilson had been with her on August 20, 2011. There were four birthdays in the family that weekend, and there was a party in Tacoma on Saturday. Wilson came over for the party, arriving at her house in Seattle between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. 1RP 101-02.

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Wilson moved for a new trial. CP 60, 199-202. Counsel informed the court that critical impeachment evidence had been discovered. 2RP 2-3. Evidence came to counsel's attention after trial that Wilson had been involved in a traffic stop in Spokane on August 18, 2011. 2RP 3-4. Wilson did not recall the traffic stop until after trial, when he was speaking with the person who had been in the car with him. 2RP 4. Since then, counsel had learned that the incident report from that stop indicates Wilson was driving a car with the

same dealer license plate from Affordable Motors that was on the Cadillac at the time of Wilson's arrest. 2RP 5-6; Supp. CP (Sub. No. 31, Affidavit of Jeniece LaCross, filed 12/23/11). Counsel argued that, although the report did not indicate the make and model of the car, the evidence undermined the basis of the State's case, because Steele had testified that Wilson did not test drive any vehicle prior to August 20. 2RP 6. Since the State's case rested on Steele's testimony, new evidence that he was not a credible witness could affect the verdict. 2RP 11.

The court denied the motion for a new trial. It found that because it was within Wilson's knowledge that he had been involved in the traffic stop, the evidence could have been discovered prior to trial. 2RP 13. The court also found that the new evidence was not material, because the traffic incident report did not indicate that Wilson was driving the Cadillac. 2RP 13-14. The court imposed a standard range sentence of 48 months. CP 208, 218.

On appeal, Wilson argued that the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for a continuance violated his right to a fair trial and his right to present a defense and that the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Wilson also filed a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review arguing that the court violated his right to a fair trial by making him appear before the jury in prison garb and that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel. He also raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a personal restraint petition. On March 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming Wilson's conviction and dismissing the personal restraint petition.

E. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION FROM THIS COURT AND PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

“One of the most basic constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant is the right to have witnesses appear in this behalf.” State v. Watson, 69 Wn.2d 645, 651, 419 P.2d 789 (1966); see also U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wash. Const. art. I, § 22; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 14-15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983). And counsel must be given adequate time to prepare the defense. State v. Hartwig, 36 Wn.2d 598, 601, 219 P.2d 564 (1950). Denial of a request for a continuance may violate the defendant's right to present a defense if the denial prevents the defendant from producing a material witness. State v. Downing, 151 Wn.2d 265, 275, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004).

Here, defense counsel informed the court that she had not had time to locate witnesses Wilson identified as possessing information material to the

defense. Although the trial court opined that this was a straight-forward case with a focused fact pattern², Wilson nonetheless had a due process right to present his version of events to the jury, and the court's refusal to grant a continuance interfered with that right. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)(“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.”)

The right to compel witnesses is limited to those witnesses who are material to the defense, and materiality is established where there is a colorable need for the person to be summoned. State v. Smith, 101 Wn.2d 36, 41-42, 677 P.2d 100 (1984). Here, the State's case depended on testimony from Steele that Wilson test drove the Cadillac on the afternoon of August 20, 2011, and failed to return the car as required before closing that day. Testimony from witnesses that Wilson was driving that very car, with permission, prior to August 20 would undermine the heart of the State's case. The possible impact of this evidence on the trial was enormous, and the witnesses defense counsel needed time to locate were clearly material to the defense.

² 1RP 11.

Finally, while the trial court seemed primarily concerned with the timing of the requested continuance³, there is no indication that the need for orderly procedure outweighed Wilson's right to present a defense. As this Court has noted,

While efficient and expeditious administration is, of course, a most worth-while objective, the defendant's rights must not be overlooked in the process through overemphasis upon efficiency and conservation of the time of the court.

Watson, 69 Wn.2d at 651. The State did not indicate that its witnesses would be unavailable if a continuance were granted, only that it might be inconvenient for the witness traveling from Spokane to reschedule. 1RP 5. Given that the motion was made before jury selection, no testimony was scheduled to be presented that day, and no previous continuances had been required, the requested continuance would not have so disrupted the proceedings as to outweigh Wilson's right to present a defense.

Where the defense is prejudiced by improper denial of a continuance, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Watson, 69 Wn.2d at 651. Wilson was clearly prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. The requested continuance would have allowed his attorney to interview witnesses identified by Wilson as material to the case, whom counsel had previously been unable to contact. The Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary conflicts with the principles

³ 1RP 11.

set forth in Watson and impacts Wilson's constitutional rights. Review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (3).

2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING WILSON'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

Under CrR 7.5(a)(3), the court may grant the defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of "[n]ewly discovered evidence material for the defendant, which the defendant could not have discovered with reasonable diligence and produced at the trial[.]" A new trial should be granted where the defendant shows the newly discovered evidence (1) will probably change the result of the trial, (2) was discovered since trial, (3) could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence, (4) is material, and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching. State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d 215, 222-23, 634 P.2d 868 (1981).

A trial court's decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Roche, 114 Wn. App. 424, 435, 59 P.3d 682 (2002). The denial of a new trial is entitled to less deference by a reviewing court than a decision to grant a new trial, however. State v. Slanaker, 58 Wn. App. 161, 163, 791 P.2d 575 (1990); State v. Briggs, 55 Wn. App. 44, 60, 776 P.2d 1347 (1989).

The incident report regarding the traffic stop on August 18, 2011, was newly discovered evidence that counsel could not have discovered before trial with the exercise of diligence. Although the traffic stop was within Wilson's knowledge, since he was there, he did not remember the incident until after trial when his memory was jogged while talking to the person who had been with him. CP 201. Neither Wilson nor the other witness had mentioned the traffic stop to counsel or the defense investigator before trial, and thus counsel did not know an incident report existed or that she should try to obtain a copy. Id.

Furthermore, this evidence was material and would probably have changed the result of the trial. The incident report indicates that the car Wilson was driving during the traffic stop on August 18, 2011, had the same license plate as the car he was convicted of possessing on August 23, 2011. Supp. CP (Sub. No. 31 at 1-2). While the trial court felt the new evidence was not material because there was no indication of the make and model of the car Wilson was driving during the traffic stop, it overlooked the significance of this evidence. See 2RP 3. At trial, Steele had insisted that Wilson took the Cadillac on August 20 and that Wilson had not been to the car lot any earlier than that date. 1RP 80-81. With new evidence clearly contradicting Steele's testimony, along with the evidence that Wilson said he had permission to drive the Cadillac and

asked the arresting officer to call the car lot to verify this⁴, the jury would likely have a reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness of Steele's testimony and thus the State's case.

Finally, although the new evidence would clearly be used to impeach Steele's testimony, a new trial is nonetheless warranted. Impeaching evidence warrants a new trial if it devastates a witness's uncorroborated testimony establishing an element of the offense. State v. Savaria, 82 Wn. App. 832, 838, 919 P.2d 1263(1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604 (2003). In Savaria, the defendant was convicted of felony harassment and intimidating a witness, where the only evidence of a threat came from the alleged victim and was denied by the defendant. Because the victim's credibility was crucial to the State's case, new evidence that she did not call her father after the alleged threat, as she claimed, warranted a new trial. Id.

Here, as in Savaria, Steele's credibility is crucial to the State's case. The only evidence the State presented that the Cadillac was stolen or that Wilson could have known it was stolen came from Steele. Wilson denied any such knowledge when he was arrested. New evidence that seriously challenges Steele's credibility not only impeaches him, it devastates the State's case.

⁴ IRP 41-42, 44.

The newly discovered evidence of Wilson's traffic stop was material, was not merely cumulative or impeaching, and probably would have changed the outcome of trial. The trial court's denial of the motion for new trial was unreasonable and must be reversed.

3. ISSUES IN THE STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL
GROUNDS AND PERSONAL RESTRAINT PETITION


Wilson raised several arguments in his statement of additional grounds for review and personal restraint petition, which the Court of Appeals rejected. Those arguments are incorporated herein by reference.

F. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, this Court should grant review and reverse Wilson's conviction.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2014.

Respectfully submitted,



CATHERINE E. GLINSKI
WSBA No. 20260
Attorney for Petitioner

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
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Craig Wilson, Supreme Court No. _____, Court of Appeals Cause No.

42989-6-II as follows:

Daniel Craig Wilson
223 S. Browne St.
Spokane, WA 99201-3617

I certify under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington
that the foregoing is true and correct.



Catherine E. Glinski
Done in Port Orchard, WA
April 10, 2014

GLINSKI LAW OFFICE

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STATE OF WASHINGTON

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,

v.

DANIEL CRAIG WILSON,
Appellant.

In re Personal Restraint Petition of

DANIEL CRAIG WILSON,
Petitioner.

No. 42989-6-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

(Consolidated with No. 43352-4-II)

JOHANSON, J. — Daniel C. Wilson challenges his jury conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle. On direct appeal, Wilson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying (1) his motion for a continuance due to newly disclosed defense witnesses, and (2) his motion for a new trial based on “new evidence” that he remembered after trial. In his statement of additional grounds (SAG), Wilson argues that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by making him appear before the jury in prison garb and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Wilson again claims ineffective assistance of counsel and he asserts that a witness for the State committed perjury at trial.

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson's motion for a continuance or his motion for a new trial, and Wilson cannot show that the trial court required him to appear before the jury in prison garb, that his counsel was ineffective, or that the State's witness committed perjury, we affirm the conviction and dismiss the PRP.

FACTS

The State charged Wilson with knowing possession of a stolen vehicle, occurring on or about August 23, 2011, contrary to RCW 9A.56.068. The day before trial, Wilson's attorney moved for a trial continuance because Wilson had told her the day before and that morning of two potential defense witnesses. The newly disclosed witnesses were expected to testify that Wilson possessed the vehicle with permission *before* August 20, the date that Ryan Steele, the used car lot's sales manager, alleged that it was taken and that this would impeach Steele's testimony. Wilson's attorney was unable to explain how the testimony from the new witnesses might be different from the testimony of the previously disclosed witnesses or how it might be material to the defense case. The State objected to the continuance because its witnesses were traveling from out of town that morning for trial. The State also argued that Wilson could have disclosed the witnesses to his attorney earlier. The court concluded that the newly disclosed witness testimony would not likely add to Wilson's already scheduled witnesses' testimony in a material way, and denied the motion because Wilson had months to prepare his alibi defense and that he should have disclosed the witnesses to his attorney earlier.

That same day, Wilson complained that he was dissatisfied with his counsel's representation. The court held an *in camera* proceeding to hear Wilson's concerns. During the proceeding, Wilson alleged that his attorney had failed to provide him with street clothes to wear and so "[t]his officer had to give me some clothes to wear." Report of Proceedings (RP) (Nov. 2,

2011, in camera hearing) at 3. Wilson's attorney responded that clothes were brought "to Mr. Wilson and they were brought yesterday to the jail." RP (Nov. 2, 2011, in camera hearing) at 6. There is no record of what Wilson wore during trial. Wilson also alleged he had only seen his attorney twice since she was assigned to his case and she failed to contact two witnesses that he wanted to testify. The first potential witness was a female friend, but Wilson did not tell the court what the female friend could testify to. He also said that his attorney's investigator had the phone number and address of his younger sister who could "give [Wilson] an alibi [about the car] that was supposedly stolen." RP (Nov. 2, 2011, in camera hearing) at 3. However, his attorney could not remember Wilson ever telling her about the friend or his younger sister being potential witnesses. The trial court determined that Wilson's attorney was not ineffective.

At trial, Steele, the State's witness, testified that on August 20, 2011, Wilson came into Affordable Motors in Spokane and spoke with Steele, the lot's sales manager, about a 1998 Cadillac Eldorado coupe. After obtaining a copy of Wilson's identification, Steele allowed Wilson to test drive it. The Cadillac had dealer license plates on it. Wilson returned with the Cadillac and discussed a final price with Steele. Steele allowed Wilson to drive the Cadillac to the bank to get money for a down payment. Steele told Wilson that he must return before 5:45 PM because the lot closed at 6:00 PM. However, Wilson did not return. Steele closed the lot without noticing that the Cadillac was missing. About an hour later, he attempted to call Wilson, but Wilson did not answer his phone.

On August 23, the vehicle was located in Bremerton using its global positioning tracker. The Bremerton Police Department found the vehicle in a parking lot and arrested Wilson, the driver. Although Wilson had no sales paperwork, Wilson told the police that he had purchased

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the car in Spokane and that he was supposed to go back later to finish paying for it, but he had not done so yet.

After the State rested its case, Betty Jimerson testified that Wilson had picked her up at home in Seattle around 9:00 AM on August 20 and drove her to family birthday parties in Tacoma that day. No other witnesses testified on Wilson's behalf. The jury found Wilson guilty.

Later, Wilson moved for a new trial pursuant to CrR 7.5(a)(3) and (8). Wilson argued that newly discovered evidence—that he was driving the same vehicle during an August 18 traffic stop—entitled him to a new trial. Wilson's attorney explained that Wilson told her of the traffic stop after the trial and that she had contacted the Spokane Police Department who verified that there was an incident report involving Wilson on August 18. The incident report did not identify the type of vehicle that Wilson was driving, but the police officer who conducted the stop told Wilson's attorney that the vehicle had a temporary plate with the same plate number as the Cadillac. Wilson sought a new trial to call the Spokane police officer to testify that Wilson was driving a vehicle with the same plates on August 18. Wilson argued that this was newly discovered evidence because Wilson did not remember the traffic stop until he spoke with a friend after trial who reminded him of it. Wilson claimed that the evidence was impeachment evidence that would contradict Steele's testimony that the first time Wilson drove the car was on August 20. The trial court denied Wilson's motion, citing the factors from *State v. Savaria*, 82 Wn. App. 832, 919 P.2d 1263 (1996), *overruled on other grounds by State v. C.G.*, 150 Wn.2d 604, 611, 80 P.3d 594 (2003)), that entitle a defendant to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence.

The court sentenced Wilson and gave him notice of his right to appeal and to collateral attack. Wilson acknowledged receiving the notice and understanding it. On January 20, 2012, Wilson's trial attorney filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

MOTION TO CONTINUE

Wilson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance. Because Wilson waited until the day before trial to tell his attorney about the witnesses, he failed to act with due diligence, and the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the continuance motion.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. *State v. Kenyon*, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135, 216 P.3d 1024 (2009). We will not disturb the trial court's decision "unless there is a clear showing it is 'manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" *Kenyon*, 167 Wn.2d at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *State v. Flinn*, 154 Wn.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005)).

B. DISCUSSION

In exercising its discretion, the trial court may consider the party's diligence, due process, the need for an orderly procedure, the possible impact on the trial, and whether it had granted any prior continuances. *State v. Early*, 70 Wn. App. 452, 458, 853 P.2d 964 (1993), *review denied*, 123 Wn.2d 1004 (1994). Impeaching and cumulative testimony are generally not significant enough such that a trial court must grant a continuance when requested. *State v. Simonson*, 82 Wn. App. 226, 234 n.17, 917 P.2d 599, *review denied*, 130 Wn.2d 1012 (1996); *State v. Eller*, 84 Wn.2d 90, 98, 524 P.2d 242 (1974).

Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and considered Wilson's lack of due diligence and the impact the new witnesses would likely have on the trial. The trial court specifically asked what the new witnesses would testify about; Wilson's attorney did not know exactly, but she expected them to testify that Wilson possessed the vehicle before August 20. The court concluded this testimony was not material and denied the motion, explaining that Wilson had months to prepare his alibi defense and that he should have disclosed the witnesses to his attorney earlier. Because the State had to prove Wilson unlawfully possessed the vehicle on August 23, not whether Wilson possessed the vehicle before that date, the evidence that the witnesses may have provided was insufficient to require a continuance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Wilson's motion for continuance.

Wilson argues that his attorney was diligent by trying to contact the witnesses as soon as Wilson told her about them. But the proper inquiry is whether *the party* acted with diligence, not just whether the attorney did. *Early*, 70 Wn. App. at 458. Wilson should have told his attorney about the witnesses far earlier and he offers no explanation why he did not do so.

Next, Wilson argues that he had a due process right to present his version of the events to the jury and baldly asserts that he was prejudiced as a result of the court's denial. But the only prejudice he asserts is that the witnesses may have testified that he was in possession of the Cadillac before August 20 and that this would impeach Steele's testimony. But Jimerson's testimony was also aimed at undermining Steele's credibility. Therefore, the newly disclosed witnesses' testimony was cumulative as well as immaterial. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it determined that the newly disclosed witnesses' testimony would have little impact on the trial outcome and that Wilson did not exercise due diligence in securing his witnesses.

NEW TRIAL

Wilson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We disagree. The trial court properly exercised its discretion because Wilson fails to show that the evidence was material and not discoverable before trial.

We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for clear abuse of discretion. *State v. Mullen*, 171 Wn.2d 881, 905, 259 P.3d 158 (2011); *State v. Marks*, 71 Wn.2d 295, 302, 427 P.2d 1008 (1967). A defendant seeking a new trial must prove that the new evidence ““(1) will probably change the result of the trial; (2) was discovered after the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.”” *Mullen*, 171 Wn.2d at 906 (quoting *State v. Macon*, 128 Wn.2d 784, 800, 911 P.2d 1004 (1996)). The defendant must show all five factors. *Mullen*, 171 Wn.2d at 906.

Here, the trial court properly considered the five factors and concluded that Wilson could not meet them all. The trial court primarily relied on the third factor, reasoning that Wilson failed to show that the evidence was not discoverable before trial since Wilson was aware that he received the traffic infraction. Also relying on the fourth factor, the trial court noted that the new evidence was not material because the traffic infraction did not identify the car Wilson was driving on August 18 and would not help Wilson establish he had permission to possess the Cadillac on August 23.

Wilson argues that his trial attorney could not have discovered the evidence because Wilson did not tell her about it. But our focus is not solely on the attorney's due diligence but on Wilson's due diligence as well. Wilson failed to exercise due diligence by neglecting to tell his

attorney about the infraction until after trial. Next, Wilson argues that the evidence was material because it would have contradicted Steele's testimony that Wilson took the Cadillac on August 20 and that Wilson had not been to the car lot any earlier than that date. But this argument concedes that the evidence was only impeaching. In order to establish the fifth factor, Wilson must show that the evidence was not merely cumulative or impeaching. This Wilson fails to do.

Finally, relying on *Savaria*, Wilson argues that the new evidence devastates Steele's uncorroborated testimony establishing an element of the offense. There, the defendant discovered new evidence that directly contradicted an element of the crime. *Savaria*, 82 Wn. App. at 838. Accordingly, in *Savaria*, the new evidence warranted a new trial. Wilson's case is distinguishable because the new evidence was not nearly as significant. To convict Wilson of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle on August 23, the State had to show that Wilson unlawfully possessed the Cadillac on that date. So whether Wilson may have had permission to drive a vehicle with the same dealer plates on August 18 was immaterial to whether Wilson unlawfully possessed the Cadillac on August 23. Unlike *Savaria*, the new evidence here does not directly contradict an element of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

In his SAG, Wilson asserts ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his appeal rights. In his PRP, Wilson asserts that his counsel failed to adequately investigate, failed to call, interview, or subpoena material witnesses, and failed to file a notice of appeal. We disagree and hold that Wilson received effective counsel.

A. SAG ASSERTION

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that his attorney's representation was deficient and that he was prejudiced. *Strickland v. Washington*,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In his SAG, Wilson asserts that his trial counsel failed to consult with him about his appeal rights and that he was entitled to an appeal bond under RCW 10.73.040. At the sentencing hearing, the court gave Wilson notice of his right to appeal and to collateral attack. Wilson acknowledged receiving the notice and understanding it. Wilson's attorney filed a notice of appeal a few weeks later. Wilson does not explain how his attorney's representation was deficient, or how the result of the trial would have been different if he had been released on bond. Accordingly, Wilson fails to show that counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced at trial as a result of his counsel's representation.

B. REFERENCE HEARING

In a PRP, a petitioner alleging constitutional errors must meet a heightened standard of showing actual prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence before we will grant relief. *In re Pers. Restraint of Yates*, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). We will dismiss where a petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing of actual prejudice. *In re Yates*, 177 Wn.2d at 17. A petitioner seeking a reference hearing must offer "the facts underlying the claim of unlawful restraint and the evidence available to support the factual allegations." *In re Yates*, 177 Wn.2d at 18 (quoting *In re Pers. Restraint of Rice*, 118 Wn.2d 876, 885-86, 828 P.2d 1086, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992)). A petitioner's bald assertions and conclusory allegations are insufficient to justify a reference hearing. *In re Yates*, 177 Wn.2d at 18. The petitioner must demonstrate that he has competent, admissible evidence to establish the matters outside the existing record that entitle him to relief. *In re Yates*, 177 Wn.2d at 18. Speculation or conjecture is insufficient. *In re Yates*, 177 Wn.2d at 18.

Here, Wilson asserts that he is entitled to a reference hearing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to investigate and failure to call

witnesses to testify on his behalf. Wilson identifies two witnesses: Marcus Fletcher and Tomika Bates. But Wilson does not present affidavits from Fletcher or Bates or any other evidence of what their testimony would reveal if subpoenaed. Wilson's bald assertions and conclusory allegations are insufficient to justify a reference hearing.

REMAINING SAG AND PRP ASSERTIONS


In his SAG, Wilson asserts he was denied a fair trial because during jury selection proceedings, the jury saw him wearing prison garb. An appellant is required to provide all information necessary for our review of an issue, and we may refuse to decide an issue where the record is incomplete. RAP 9.2(b); *State v. McFarland*, 127 Wn.2d 322, 338, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (appellate court will not consider matters outside the record). Here, the record is incomplete. Jury selection occurred on November 2. On that day, the court held an in camera proceeding to hear Wilson's concerns. Wilson expressed concern that his attorney had failed to provide him with street clothes to wear and so "[t]his officer had to give me some clothes to wear." RP (Nov. 2, 2011, in camera hearing) at 3. Wilson's attorney responded that clothes were brought to Wilson the day before. There is no other reference to what Wilson was wearing. Without a record of Wilson's clothing that day, we cannot determine whether he was dressed in prison garb in front of the jury. Accordingly, we will not address this issue.

Finally, in his PRP, Wilson baldly asserts that one of the State's witnesses committed perjury and refers us to "see transcripts." PRP at 3. Wilson does not identify which witness or why he believes that the witness committed perjury. Without additional information, we cannot address this assertion and Wilson cannot show actual prejudice. RAP 10.3(a)(6), 16.10; *In re Yates*, 177 Wn.2d at 17.

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
We affirm the conviction and dismiss the PRP.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.




JOHANSON, J.

We concur:



WORSWICK, C.J.



BJORGEN, J.