FILED . Mar 25, 2015 Court of Appeals Division III State of Washington

No. 91510-5

(Court of Appeals No. 32109-6-III)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Petitioner

v.

JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ, Respondents,

PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW



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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Patriot General Insurance Company asks this Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review designated in Part B of this petition.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

In a published opinion filed February 24, 2015, Division III of the Court of Appeals ruled that Javier Gutierrez was an insured under the underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance policy issued by Patriot to Javier's father, Jorge Gutierrez.¹ The opinion is in the Appendix.

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

If review is accepted, the Court will be presented with these issues:

1. The Patriot policy provides UIM coverage only to the named insured, Jorge, and to certain relatives. The policy's definition section provides that any relative who is age 14 or older must be listed on the application or policy endorsement. Javier was 19 and not listed on the application or in any endorsement. Is Javier an "insured person" under the UIM coverage?

2. Under Washington law an insurer and an insured are free to define who is insured by a UIM policy, as long as the scope of the liability

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¹ For clarity, the remainder of this petition will refer to the respondents by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

and UIM coverage is the same. The scope of liability and UIM coverage under the Patriot policy is the same, but the policy defines Javier as not being an "insured person." Does the Patriot policy conform to this law?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Patriot issued a UIM policy to Jorge Gutierrez.

Jorge Gutierrez completed an application for a policy with Patriot on August 11, 2010.² It identifies Jorge Gutierrez as the named insured,³ and it lists two drivers, Jorge Gutierrez and Maria Recarmona.⁴ Jorge also initialed a paragraph stating that he had listed on his application everyone living with him age 14 or over:

> I also certify that all persons age 14 or over who live with me temporarily or permanently and all persons who are regular operators of any vehicle to be insured have been listed on this application and reported to the Company. I declare that there are no operators of the vehicle(s) described in this application unless their names and ages are shown above or are provided in writing to the Company within 14 days of when they begin driving the vehicle(s) described in this application.⁵

Jorge never asked his agent or Patriot to add his son, Javier, to the policy.⁶

² Declaration of Tomas Miranda ¶ 2, Appx. at 38; Application, Appx. at 41-46.

³ Application, Appx. at 41.

⁴ Appx. at 42.

⁵ Application, Appx. at 45.

⁶ Miranda Decl. ¶ 6, Appx. at 39.

Patriot issued a personal automobile policy to Jorge with a policy period of October 29, 2010 to April 29, 2011.⁷ The policy includes several forms, one of which is titled "Underinsured Motorists Coverage Endorsement – Washington." Its insuring agreement provides that Patriot will pay damages that an "insured person" is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured vehicle. The policy defines "insured person," to mean "you", which includes the named insured and any "relative" residing in the same household. "Relative" is specifically defined as follows:

(3) "**Relative**" means a person living in **your** household related to **you** by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. **Relative** includes a minor under **your** guardianship who lives in **your** household. Any **relative** who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.⁸

The Policy Declarations list the insured as Jorge and lists two drivers: Jorge and Maria Carmona. Javier is not listed on the application, the Policy Declarations, or any endorsement to the policy.⁹

2. Jorge's son, Javier Gutierrez, filed a UIM claim with Patriot.

Jorge's 19-year-old son, Javier was living in Jorge's household, when he was a passenger in an automobile that was involved in an

⁷ Policy, Appx. at 16.

⁸ Appx. at 19.

⁹ Appx. at 17.

accident in Walla Walla on January 9, 2011.¹⁰ He alleges that he suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident.

Javier filed a UIM claim with Patriot under his father's policy.¹¹ Patriot denied the claim because Javier was not an "insured person" under that policy.¹²

3. Patriot sought a declaration of no coverage.

Patriot submitted the coverage questions to the Walla Walla County Superior Court, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to pay UIM benefits to Javier because he did not meet the definition of "relative" and thus was not an "insured person" under the policy. Javier counterclaimed for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act, alleging that Patriot had not only erred but also had acted unreasonably by denying Javier's claim.¹³

¹⁰ See Javier Gutierrez's Response to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 3, Appx. at 56–57, 59; Jorge Gutierrez's Response to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 3, Appx. at 64.

¹¹ Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker ¶ 3, Appx. at 47.

¹² May 22, 2012 letter from Kyle Mosbrucker to Jorge Gutierrez, Appx. at 50–51.

¹³ Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Counterclaims, Appx. at 145–54.

Patriot moved for summary judgment, seeking a ruling that Javier was not an "insured person" covered by the policy.¹⁴ Javier and Jorge opposed the motion, claiming that the definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 included members of a named insured's household, such as Javier, and that this definition applied to the UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030. The Court Commissioner denied Patriot's motion and entered partial summary judgment for defendants regarding UIM coverage.¹⁵ The Superior Court denied Patriot's motion for revision. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Javier and Jorge. However, the court did not base its decision on RCW 48.22. Rather, the court ruled that the policy definition of "relative," i.e. "[a]ny relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss" functioned as an exclusion, rather than as a definition of who is an "insured person."¹⁶ It further ruled that this policy language could be

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¹⁴ Summary Judgment Motion, Appx. at 1–12.

¹⁵ Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike, Denying Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment and Establishing UIM Coverage for Defendant Javier Gutierrez, Appx. at 159–62.

¹⁶ Appendix at 231.

interpreted to merely impose on Jorge a duty to cooperate.¹⁷ Consequently, the court ruled that Javier qualified as a "relative" and thus an "insured person."

E. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

1. The Court of Appeals decision conflicts with decisions from this court and Divisions of the Court of Appeals recognizing the distinction between permissible limitations on coverage grants and impermissible exclusions from coverage. (RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2)).

By characterizing the language of the policy's definition of a term as an "exclusion," the Court of Appeals has cast the basic framework for all insurance-policy analysis into disarray. And in so doing, it has placed itself in conflict with numerous decisions both from this court and from the Court of Appeals. Review is therefore proper under both RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2).

Division III saw no difference between a limitation on a grant of coverage by defining who is an insured and an exclusion from coverage.¹⁸ But the courts of this state treat grants of coverage very differently from exclusions, both in general and in the context of the UIM statute. In all insurance policies, the grant of coverage and exclusions serve different

¹⁷ Id.

¹⁸ *Id.* ("Patriot General does not explain the practical difference between a limitation on coverage and an exclusion from coverage.").

purposes. "'Exclusion clauses do not grant coverage; rather, they subtract from it."¹⁹ An insured has the initial burden of showing that the loss falls within the scope of the policy's insured losses. If that burden is met, the insurer then has the burden to show that the loss is excluded by specific policy language.²⁰ Yet another distinction is that Washington courts strictly and narrowly construe exclusions.²¹

This court and divisions of the Court of Appeals have emphasized the critical distinction between a grant of coverage and an exclusion when interpreting the UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030. Washington courts have long held that the statute "does not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy."²² As this court has explained,

The policy of RCW 48.22.030 requires that insurers make available uninsured motorist coverage to a class of 'insureds' that is at least as broad as the class in the primary liability sections of the policy. *It does not preclude the*

¹⁹ Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Nw. Youth Servs., 97 Wn. App. 226, 231, 983 P.2d 1144 (1999) (quoting Harrison Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 37 Wn. App. 621, 627, 681 P.2d 875 (1984)).

²⁰ McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 731, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).

²¹ Campbell v. Ticor, 166 Wn.2d 466, 472, 209 P.3d 859 (2009).

²² Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83, 904 P.2d 749 (1995); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 75, 549 P.2d 9 (1976).

parties from reaching agreement as to the scope of the class in the first instance.²³

The Court of Appeals reiterated this holding in March 2013:

Underinsured motorist coverage is limited personal accident insurance chiefly for the benefit of the named insured. Limiting the scope of the definition of who else is an "insured" does not run afoul of the public policy behind Washington's UIM statute.²⁴

A total of seven Washington cases spanning almost forty years supports this holding.²⁵

²⁴ Vasquez v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 174 Wn. App. 132, 138, 298 P.3d 94 (citing Smith, 128 Wn.2d at 83), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1006, 308 P.3d 641 (2013).

²³ Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wn.2d 439, 443, 563 P.2d 815 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 337, 494 P.2d 479 (1972)), abrogated in other part by statute as stated in Vadheim v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 836, 844, 734 P.2d 17 (1987).

²⁵ See Fin. Indem. Co. v. Keomaneethong, 85 Wn. App. 350, 353, 931 P.2d 168 (1997) ("[W]hen the question revolves around the initial extension of coverage, that is, the definition of who is and is not an insured, public policy is not violated so long as insured persons are defined the same in the primary liability and UIM sections of the policy."); see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Uhls, 41 Wn. App. 49, 53, 702 P.2d 1214 (1985) (""[T]he parties may agree to a narrow definition of insured so long as that definition is applied consistently throughout the policy[.]"") (quoting Raynes, 88 Wn.2d at 444); Wheeler v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 124 Wn. App. 868, 874, 103 P.3d 240 (2004) (stating that insurer may choose not to include certain persons in definition of "insured" in UIM policies).

Washington law does, by contrast, place limits on the type of exclusions in a UIM policy. For instance, a UIM policy cannot set forth an exclusion based on the identity of a victim injured by an insured driver.²⁶

This distinction between the extension or grant of coverage and exclusions from coverage is perhaps best illustrated by this court's decision in *Farmers Insurance Co. v. Miller*.²⁷ In that case, Lane Miller obtained an auto policy, which included uninsured motorist coverage, from Farmers. Miller's son was later killed while riding as a passenger in an uninsured vehicle. Farmers rejected Miller's uninsured motorist claim because his son was not an insured. The policy stated that Farmers would provide uninsured motorist coverage to "the insured or a relative," and the policy defined "relative" to include a relative of the named insured who was a resident of the same household and who did not own a motor vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment to Farmers because Miller's son owned a car and thus did not come within the definition of insured. On appeal, Miller argued that the public policy expressed in RCW 48.22.030 prohibited this type of clause. This court rejected the argument because the statute "does not mandate any particular scope for the

²⁶ See Tissell v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 107, 112, 795 P.2d 126 (1990).

²⁷ 87 Wn.2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976).

definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy." Cases invalidating exclusions were not on point because the issue before the court was the scope of the policy's initial grant of coverage, and not an exclusionary clause, and because the insured was defined consistently throughout the policy.

By disregarding the distinction between a coverage grant and an exclusion, Division III's decision conflicts with prior Washington law as set forth in *Miller* and subsequent cases.

2. The lower court's decision conflicts with Washington law regarding an insured's duty to cooperate.

Review is appropriate under RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2) because the decision also conflicts with Washington case law regarding an insured's duty to cooperate with its insurer. The court held that the critical policy language, which provides that "[a]ny relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss," could be interpreted as merely imposing a duty to cooperate, rather than defining who is or is not an insured. By implication, the court also ruled that Jorge's failure to disclose Javier on the application justified denial of coverage only if Patriot could show it was prejudiced by

that failure.²⁸ Both rulings conflict with decisions from this court and the Court of Appeals.

An insured's duty to cooperate arises from a condition in most insurance policies explicitly requiring an insured to cooperate with the insurer's handling of claims.²⁹ No Washington case has held that the definition section of a policy, which does not mention cooperation, imposes a duty to cooperate in disclosing who is to be insured under a policy. Yet Division III's opinion now does just that.

Washington courts also have never imposed a prejudice requirement on a policy's definition of insured. The need to show prejudice has only been applied to procedures for handling a claim after a loss: the duty to notify the insurer of a claim,³⁰ the duty to cooperate with the insurer's investigation and defense of the claim,³¹ and the duty not to

²⁸ See Appx. at 233 ("Patriot General forwarded no evidence before the trial court that Jorge Gutierrez knew of any false statement. Nor did it provide evidence that Jorge's risk rating would change based on the fact that his two teenage children resided with him.").

²⁹ Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Wn. 2d 404, 410, 295 P.3d 201 (2013).

³⁰ Canron, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 82 Wn. App. 480, 485, 918 P.2d 937 (1996).

³¹ Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wn.2d 372, 377, 35 P.2d 816 (1975).

settle a claim without authorization.³² Division III's opinion is alone in extending the prejudice requirement to policy definitions determining who is insured by a policy. Now any policy definition can be parsed as merely imposing a "condition" subject to the prejudice requirement rather than imposing a bright-line definition. Under Division III's decision, consistent policy interpretation will disappear.

3. This case presents an issue of substantial public interest applicable to auto insurance policies in this state. (RAP 13.4(b)(4)).

Finally, review should be granted under RAP 13.4(b)(4) because interpretation of this policy involves an issue of substantial public interest. Because the definition at issue is included in a standard policy form rather than a manuscript policy, Division III's opinion has a broad impact on a large number of automobile insurance policies now in effect throughout the state.³³ A ruling from this court would bring clarity to all such policies.

³² Pub. Util Dist. No. 1 of Klickitat Cnty. v. International Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 803–04, 881 P.2d 1020 (1994).

³³ In accordance with RCW 48.18.100, Patriot obtained the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner's approval of the form before it was issued to policyholders in this state. Documents regarding OIC's approval of the form, known as PAP1, can be found at https://fortress.wa.gov/oic/onlinefilingsearch/.

F. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals' decision contradicts the decisions of this court as to the distinction between a coverage grant and an exclusion, as well as the distinction between language in an insuring agreement defining who is insured and the cooperation clause.

This court should accept discretionary review under RAP 13.4 and, on acceptance of review, reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment for respondents and its denial of summary judgment to Patriot.

Dated this $\underline{\mathcal{A}}_{day}^{\underline{r}}$ day of March, 2014.

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6	6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR WALLA WALLA COUNTY		
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3	
9	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION	
10	v .	FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,		
12	Defendants.		
13			
14	I. Relief Requested		
15	Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Comp	any moves under CR 56 for an order declaring	
16	that it does not have a duty to pay underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits to Javier Gutierre		
17	under the automobile insurance policy it issued to Javier's father, Jorge Gutierrez. Javie Gutierrez is not entitled to UIM benefits because he is not a named insured under the policy. The policy complies with the statute governing UIM, RCW 48.22.030, because that statute does no		
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19			
20	limit the ability of insurers and insureds to define who is covered by a UIM policy. And contrar		
21	to the defendants' position, another statute, RC	W 48.22.005, does not require UIM policies to	
22 23	cover a named insured's relatives.		
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PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\MSJ.docx

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II.	Statement	of Facts
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2	Jorge Gutierrez completed an application for a policy with Patriot on August 11, 2010. ¹		
3	identifies Javier Gutierrez as the named insured, ² and its lists two drivers, Javier Gutierrez and		
4	Maria Recarmona. ³ Jorge also initialed a paragraph stating that he had listed on his application		
5	everyone living with him age 14 or over:		
6			
7	I also certify that all persons age 14 or over who live with me temporarily or permanently and all persons who are regular operators of any vehicle to be		
8	insured have been listed on this application and reported to the Company. I declare that there are no operators of the vehicle(s) described in this application		
9	unless their names and ages are shown above or are provided in writing to the Company within 14 days of when they begin driving the vehicle(s) described in		
10	this application. ⁴		
11	Jorge never asked his agent or Patriot to add Javier to the policy. ⁵		
12	Patriot issued a personal automobile policy to Jorge Gutierrez with a policy period of		
13	October 29, 2010, to April 29, 2011. ⁶ The Policy Declarations list the insured as Jorge Gutierrez		
14	and list two drivers: Jorge and Maria Carmona. Jorge's son, Javier Gutierrez, is not listed on the		
15	Policy Declarations or any endorsement to the policy. ⁷		
16	Javier Gutierrez was a passenger in an automobile that was involved in an accident in		
17	Walla Walla on or about January 9, 2011. ⁸ At the time, Javier was 19 years old. ⁹ He alleges that		
18			
19			
20	¹ Declaration of Tomas Miranda ¶ 2; Application, exhibit 1 to Miranda Decl. ² Application at 1, exhibit 1 to Miranda Decl.		
21	$\frac{3}{4}$ Id. at 2.		
	⁴ Application, exhibit 1 to Miranda Decl.		
22	 ⁵ Miranda Decl. ¶ 6. ⁶ Policy, exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Amy Brunner. 		
22	 ⁵ Miranda Decl. ¶ 6. ⁶ Policy, exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Amy Brunner. ⁷ Id. ⁸ See Javier Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 3, exhibit 1 to 		
	 ⁵ Miranda Decl. ¶ 6. ⁶ Policy, exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Amy Brunner. ⁷ Id. 		
23	 ⁵ Miranda Decl. ¶ 6. ⁶ Policy, exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Amy Brunner. ⁷ Id. ⁸ See Javier Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 3, exhibit 1 to Declaration of Matthew Munson; Jorge Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for 		
23 24	 ⁵ Miranda Decl. ¶ 6. ⁶ Policy, exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Amy Brunner. ⁷ <i>Id.</i> ⁸ See Javier Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 3, exhibit 1 to Declaration of Matthew Munson; Jorge Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 3, exhibit 2 to Munson decl. 		

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1	he suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident.	
2	Javier filed a UIM claim with Patriot under his father's policy. ¹⁰ Patriot denied the claim	
3	because Javier was not an insured under that policy. ¹¹	
4	The Patriot policy issued to Jorge Gutierrez includes several forms, one of which is titled	
5	"Underinsured Motorists Coverage Endorsement – Washington." It reads in part as follows:	
6	We will not demonst for he dilts in immediate the demonstration which as increased	
7	We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury or property damage must be caused by a car	
8	accident and result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.	
9	•••	
10	Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only	
11	As used in this Part:	
12	(1) "Insured Person" means:	
13	(A) You.	
14	(B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.	
15	(C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you or another occupant of your car . ¹²	
16	Part I of a form titled "Personal Auto Policy" defines the liability coverage as follows:	
17	We will pay damages for which any insured person is legally liable because of	
18	bodily injury and/or property damage caused by a car accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a car or utility trailer	
19		
20		
21	⁹ See Javier Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 2, exhibit 1 to	
22	Munson decl.; Jorge Gutierrez's Responses to Patriot General's Request for Admission No. 2, exhibit 2 to Munson decl.	
23	¹⁰ Declaration of Kyle Moshnuker ¶ 3	
24	¹² See exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Amy Brunner.	
25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE	
26	COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\MSLdocx 1325 FOURTH AVENUE	
	3 SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755	

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1	Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only		
2	As used in this Part:		
3	(1) "Insured Person" or "insured persons" means:		
4	(A) You,		
5	(B) Any person using your insured car. ¹³		
6	The Personal Auto Policy form also sets forth definitions that are used throughout the policy:		
7 8	(2) "You" and "your" mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your also means any relative of that person if they reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a motor vehicle.		
9	(3) "Relative" means a person living in your household related to you by blood,		
10	marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor		
11			
12	Patriot filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration it that has no duty to pay UIM		
13	benefits to Javier because he is not insured under the policy.		
14	III. Statement of Issues		
15	1. The Patriot policy provides UIM coverage only to the named insured, Jorge		
16	Gutierrez, and to his relatives age 14 and over who are listed on the application or policy		
17	endorsement. Javier Gutierrez was 19 and not identified in the application or in any endorsement.		
18	Does the policy provide UIM coverage to Javier?		
19	2. An insurer and insured are free to define the scope of who is insured by a UIM		
20	policy, so long as the scope of the liability and UIM coverage is the same. The Patriot policy		
21	defines coverage so that it does not include persons in the position of Javier Gutierrez. Does the		
22	Patriot policy comply with the UIM statute?		
23			
24	¹³ Id. ¹⁴ Id.		
25 26	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\MSJ.docx		
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3. RCW 48.22.030 requires automobile insurance policies to provide UIM coverage to "persons insured thereunder," and RCW 48.22.005 defines "insured" to include the named insured or a resident of the named insured's household. RCW 48.22.005 was enacted as part of a PIP statute, and no case has applied it in a UIM dispute. Does the definition of insured in RCW 48.22.005 modify RCW 48.22.030 such that UIM policies must cover residents of a named insured's household?

IV. Evidence Relied Upon

This motion relies on the declarations of Matthew Munson, Tomas Miranda, Kyle Mosbrucker, and Amy Brunner, the exhibits attached to those declarations, and the pleadings and other documents on file.

V. Legal Authority

1. The policy does not cover Javier Gutierrez because he is not an insured person under the policy.

Determining whether coverage exists is a two-step process. In the first step, the insured must show the loss falls within the scope of the policy's insured losses. To avoid coverage, the insurer must then show the loss is excluded by specific policy language.¹⁵ It is the first step that is at issue here: the defendants must show that Javier is an insured under the policy.

Insurance policies are contracts, and rules of contract interpretation apply.¹⁶ Washington courts will enforce unambiguous insurance policy language.¹⁷ If policy language is clear, a court must enforce it as written and may not create an ambiguity where none exists.¹⁸

¹⁵ McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 Wn. 2d 724, 731, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).
¹⁶ Hall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 133 Wn. App. 394, 399, 135 P.3d 941 (2006).
¹⁷ Id.

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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98100 (200) 386-7755

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Javier Gutierrez is not entitled to UIM coverage because that coverage applies only to an		
"insured person" and he does not come within that definition. The policy defines "insured		
person" as "you." "You" is defined as the named insured and any relative residing in the same		
household who does not own a car. "Relative" in turn is defined as a person related by blood age		
14 or older who is listed on the application or endorsed on the policy before a car accident. Jorge		
does not qualify as "you" because the Declarations Page does not identify him as a named		
insured, and he is over the age of 14 and not listed on the application or any endorsement. Javier		
has no coverage under the UIM provision, and Patriot properly denied his UIM claim.		
2. The UIM statute does not mandate a definition of insured that includes a named insured's relatives.		
The UIM statute did not require Patriot to include Javier among the class of persons		

insured by the Patriot policy. Washington courts have long held that the UIM statute "does not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy."¹⁹ As the Supreme Court has explained,

The policy of RCW 48.22.030 requires that insurers make available uninsured motorist coverage to a class of 'insureds' that is at least as broad as the class in the primary liability sections of the policy. It does not preclude the parties from reaching agreement as to the scope of the class in the first instance.²⁰

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83, 904 P.2d 749 (1995); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 75, 549 P.2d 9 (1976).

²⁰ Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wn.2d 439, 443, 563 P.2d 815 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 337, 494 P.2d 479 (1972)), abrogated in other part by statute as stated in Vadheim v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 836, 844, 734 P.2d 17 (1987).

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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

1	The Court of Appeals reiterated this holding in March of this year:		
2 3	Underinsured motorist coverage is limited personal accident insurance chiefly for the benefit of the named insured. Limiting the scope of the definition of who else		
4	is an "insured" does not run afoul of the public policy behind Washington's UIM statute. ²¹		
5	Other Washington cases also support this holding. ²²		
6	Here, the scope of who is insured is consistent in the UIM and liability coverages because		
7	each applies to "you," which is defined the same way throughout the policy. The Patriot policy		
8	therefore fully complied with the UIM statute.		
9 10	3. RCW 4.22.005 does not require automobile insurance policies to provide UIM coverage to a named insured's family members.		
11	The defendants have argued that the policy's definition of "insured person" is invalid		
12	because it conflicts with RCW 48.22.005. They contend that RCW 48.22.005 defines "insured"		
13	as all residents of the named insured's household, and that this definition is incorporated into the		
14	UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030. This argument is, however, unsupported by the statutes, the		
15	legislative history, or the case law.		
16 17	A. The definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 does not include the insured's relatives.		
18	RCW 48.22.005 defines "insured" and "named insured" as follows:		
19	²¹ Vasquez v. American Fire & Cas. Co., Wn. App, 298 P.3d 94, 98 (2013).		
20	²² Fin. Indem. Co. v. Keomaneethong, 85 Wn. App. 350, 353, 931 P.2d 168 (1997) ("[W]hen the question revolves around the initial extension of coverage, that is, the definition of who is and is		
21	not an insured, public policy is not violated so long as insured persons are defined the same in		
22	the primary liability and UIM sections of the policy."); see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Uhls, 41 Wn. App. 49, 53, 702 P.2d 1214 (1985) ("[T]he parties may agree to a narrow definition of insured so long as that definition is applied consistently throughout the policy[1"") (austing		
23 24	<i>Raynes</i> , 88 wh.20 at 444); <i>Wheeler V. Rocky Mountain Fire and Casually</i> Co., 124 wh. App.		
25	definition of "insured" in UIM policies).		
26	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\M5J.docx G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\M5J.docx		
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1 Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter. 2 3 (5) "Insured" means: 4 (a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's 5 household and is either related to the named insured by blood, marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild; or 6 7 (b) A person who sustains bodily injury caused by accident while: (i) Occupying or using the insured automobile with the permission of the named insured; or (ii) a 8 pedestrian accidentally struck by the insured automobile. 9 10 (9) "Named insured" means the individual named in the declarations of the policy and includes his or her spouse if a resident of the same household. 11 The word "or" throughout the definition of "insured" in subsection (5) indicates that the term has 12 more than one meaning. "Insured" may mean "[1] [t]he named insured or [2] a person who is a 13 resident of the named insured's household ... or [3] the named insured's ward, foster child, or 14 stepchild...²³ By using the disjunctive "or",²⁴ the statute does not mandate that the insured 15 16 always include residents of the named insured's household; instead, the term may refer only to 17 the named insured and certain relatives, as with the Patriot policy. 18 The disjunctive nature of the definition of "insured" becomes even more apparent when 19 compared to the statutory definition of "named insured." RCW 48.22.005(9) defines "named 20 insured" as "the individual named in the declarations of the policy and includes his or her spouse 21 ²³ RCW 48.22.005(5)(a) (emphasis added). 22 ²⁴ Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 164 Wn.2d 310, 319, 190 P.3d 28 (2008) ("[T]he word 'or' does not mean 'and' unless legislative intent clearly indicates to the 23 contrary."); Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wn.2d 748, 752, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979) ("The use of 24 the word 'or' is disjunctive."). 25 PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE **THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH** COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 26 A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION JUDGMENT - 8 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\MSJ.docx SEATTLE, WA 98101

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if a resident of the same household."²⁵ By using the conjunctive phrase "and includes," the statute clearly indicates that "named insured" also encompasses a named insured's spouse if living in the same household. If the legislature had intended to define "insured" in the same manner—that is, conjunctively—then it would have used "and"; instead, it used "or." Because the legislature used different terms in the same statute, we must assume the legislature intended to convey different meanings.²⁶

B. RCW 48.22.005's definition of "insured" is not incorporated into the UIM statute.

⁹ Even if the definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005(5) were not disjunctive, that
¹⁰ definition would not modify the UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030, because the latter statute does not
¹¹ use the term "insured" standing alone. Rather, the critical subsection of RCW 48.22.030,
¹² subsection (2), uses the terms "person insured thereunder" and "named insured":

No new policy or renewal of an existing policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death, or property damage, suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of *persons insured thereunder* who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles, hit-and-run motor vehicles, and phantom vehicles because of bodily injury, death, or property damage, resulting therefrom, except while operating or occupying a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, and except while operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned or available for the regular use by the *named insured* or any family member, and which is not insured under the liability coverage of the policy. The coverage required to be offered under this chapter is not applicable to general liability policies, commonly known as

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²⁵ RCW 48.22.005(9) (emphasis added).

PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
 COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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 ²⁶ See Whatcom Cnty. v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996)
 ("Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.").

umbrella policies, or other policies which apply only as excess to the insurance directly applicable to the vehicle insured.²⁷

If the legislature had intended "insured" in RCW 48.22.005(5) and "persons insured thereunder" in RCW 48.22.030(2) to mean the same thing, it would have used the same term in both statutes.²⁸

The legislative history of RCW 48.22.005 also makes it clear that that statute applies only 6 7 to personal injury protection (PIP) coverage, and not UIM coverage. To the extent the statutory 8 language is ambiguous, that legislative history is relevant.²⁹ The bill passed in 1993 that was 9 later codified in part as RCW 48.22.005 was entitled "Motor Vehicle Insurance-Personal Injury 10 Protection Benefits."30 That bill makes many references to PIP, but does not once mention 11 "underinsured" or "UIM."³¹ Moreover, the House Bill Report describes the bill as one 12 "[r]egulating the mandatory offering of personal injury protection insurance."³² The Report also 13 makes no mention of UIM. A 2003 amendment to RCW 48.22.005 also pertained exclusively to 14 PIP coverage.³³

21 31 Id.

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²⁷ RCW 48.22.030(2) (emphasis added).

²⁸ See Whatcom Cnty., 128 Wn.2d at 546.

 ²⁹ Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228, 232 (2007) ("If the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then a court may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent.").

³⁰ See Laws of 1993, ch. 242, exhibit 3 to Munson Decl.

^{22 &}lt;sup>32</sup> House Bill Report for Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1233 (1993), exhibit 4 to Munson Decl.

 ³³ See Laws of 2003, ch. 115, exhibit 5 to Munson Decl.; House Bill Report for House Bill 1084 (2003), exhibit 6 to Munson Decl. (stating in summary that bill "[m]akes technical amendments to the insurance code involving the clarification of existing statutory language pertinent to personal injury protection coverage").

A review of case law also shows that the definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 is not incorporated into the UIM statute. Not one of the scores of cases interpreting the UIM statute³⁴ relies on RCW 48.22.005 to define "insured" or any similar term in the UIM statute. Instead, as discussed above, cases interpreting the UIM statute—including one decided less than four months ago—hold that it does not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy.³⁵ Indeed, only four published Washington cases even cite RCW 48.22.005, and only one of those cases refers to that statute's definition of "insured."³⁶ In sum, not a single legal authority supports the defendants' position regarding RCW 48.22.005.

VI. Conclusion

The policy that Patriot issued to Jorge Gutierrez does not cover relatives of the named insured who are 14 or over. Jorge's son Javier was 19 when the accident occurred, so he is not entitled to UIM coverage. Under the UIM statue, Patriot was free to define the scope of UIM coverage so as not to include relatives such as Javier. Finally, RCW 48.22.005 does not require

19 ³⁴ The statute's annotations have 82 sections.

 ³⁵ Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83, 904 P.2d 749 (1995) (quoting Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 75, 549 P.2d 9 (1976)); Vasquez v. American Fire & Cas. Co., ____ Wn. App. ___, 298 P.3d 94, 98 (2013).

 ³⁶ Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bolin, 122 Wn. App. 717, 721 n.6, 94 P.3d 1010 (2004) (citing RCW 48.22.005(1)(b) for definition of "automobile"); Boag v. Farmers Ins. Co., 117 Wn. App. 116, 122 n.4, 69 P.3d 370 (2003) (referring in PIP case to definition of "income continuation")

²² 122 n.4, 69 P.3d 370 (2003) (referring, in PIP case, to definition of "income continuation benefits" in RCW 48.22.005(3)); *Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 86 Wn. App. 346, 355, 936 P.2d

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PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
 COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
 JUDGMENT - 11
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1	UIM coverage for a named insured's relatives. The Court should therefore enter an order that	
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4	DATED this 1/th day of June, 2013.	
5	Matthew plumson	
6	Patrick M. Paulich, WSBA #10951 Matthew Munson, WSBA #32019	
7	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General	
8	Insurance Company	
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
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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR WALLA WALLA COUNTY		
7 8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3	
9	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF AMY BRUNNER	
10	v.	IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR	
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
12	Defendants.		
13			
14	I, Amy Brunner, declare as follows.		
15	1. I am more than 18 years of age, and I have personal knowledge of the matters set		
16	forth herein. I am employed by Sentry Insurance a Mutual Company ("Sentry") as the Director		
17	of Compliance/Development. Patriot General Insurance Company is a wholly owned subsidiary		
18	of Middlesex Insurance Company, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sentry.		
19	2. Attached as exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the automobile insurance policy		
20	that Patriot General Insurance Company issued to Jorge Gutierrez.		
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24	DECLARATION OF AMY BRUNNER IN SUP	PORT	
25 26	OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURA COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 C:\Users\070199\Desktop\Declaration of Amy Brunner -asb edits.docx		
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1	I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Washington that the
2	foregoing is true and correct.
3	Executed at Freeport, Illinois on this 1st day of February, 2013.
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5	Amy Brunner
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25	DECLARATION OF AMY BRUNNER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH
26	COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 C:\Users\070199\Desktop\Declaration of Amy Brunner -asb edits.docx THORSKUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION UND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (2000) 356-7755

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EXHIBIT 1

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Nothing contained in this declaration agge changes thereflectly a detesticited on any oursending bill or cancel notice sentition you.

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his policy provides only those cove	rages where a charge is shown	n in the pre	mium col	umns below.			
ODILY INJURY LIABILITY	S25,000 EACH PERSON S50,000 EACH ACCIDENT	*		51.12	66.00	60.12	53.5
NDERINSURED MOTORIST BODILY INJURY	\$25,000 EACH PERSON \$50,000 EACH ACCIDENT	•		36.06	42.90	36.06	43.8
NDERINSURED MOTORIST PROPERTY DAMAGE	\$10,000 EACH ACCIDENT	*		4.08	4.86	4.08	4.9
ERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION	REJECTED						
ROPERTY DAWAGE LIABILITY	\$25,000 EACH ACCIDENT	*		49.08	55.98	48.00	55.2
* Limit of Liability each accident of	r occurrence as indicated by t	he insuring	Agreeme	nt			
	VEHICLE PRE		TALS	140.34	169.74	148.26	157.56
PREMIUMISUMMARY						······	
			TO	TAL TERM	AMOUNT 🛊	\$6	515.90
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Driver # Driver Name	Birtlı Date	Gender		SR22 MVR	DD Course Dat	0	
001 GUTIERREZ, JORGE	08/07/1956	M	M	N Y	00/00/0000		
002 CARMONA, MARIA D	03/15/1960	F	M	N Y	00/00/0000		
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This policy is effective on the date shown on the face of these declarations. These declarations form a part of the policy and replace all previously issued declarations for this policy. If these declarations are accompanied by a new policy, this policy replaces any which may have been issued previously with the same policy number.



Important. This insurance policy is a legal contract between you and us.

Read Your Policy Carefully. This index of policy provisions provides a brief outline of some of the important features of your policy, but it is not the insurance contract. Only the actual policy provisions will control. The policy sets forth in detail the rights and obligations of both you and us.

PERSONAL AUTO POLICY

Agreement

What To Do In Case Of A Car Accident or Loss Notice of Car Accident or Loss Other Duties

Definitions Used Throughout This Policy

Part I – Liability Coverage

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only Additional Payments Exclusions Conformity with Financial Responsibility Laws Out of State Insurance Limits of Liability Separate Application of This Coverage Other Insurance

Part II - Medical Payments Coverage Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only

Exclusions Limits of Liability Other Insurance Part III – Uninsured Motorists Coverage Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only Exclusions

Limits of Liability Other Insurance Arbitration

Part IV – Car Damage Coverage

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only Your Deductible Settlement of Loss Appraisal Transportation Expenses Exclusions Limits of Liability No Benefit to Bailee Other Insurance

Part V – General Provisions Territory Changes

Two or More Cars Insured Lawsuit Against Us Our Recovery Rights Assignment Bankruptcy Out of State Insurance Renewal of This Policy Cancellation or Nonrenewal of This Policy Misrepresentations

Notice of Our Information Practices

AGREEMENT

In return for **your** premium payment and subject to the terms and conditions of this policy, **we** will insure **you** for the coverages up to the limits of liability for which a premium is shown on the Declarations Page of this policy. This insurance applies only to **car accidents** and losses which happen while this policy is in force. This policy is issued by **us** in reliance upon the statements which **you** made in **your** application for insurance. If **you** have made any false statement in **your** application, this policy may not provide any coverage.

WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF A CAR ACCIDENT OR LOSS

Notice of Car Accident or Loss

In the event of a **car accident** or loss, notice must be given to **us** promptly. The notice must give the time, place and circumstances of the **car accident** or loss, including **your** name and address and that of any involved persons and witnesses. The information which **you** give to **us** must be truthful and accurate.

Other Duties

Any person claiming any coverage under this policy must also:

- (1) Cooperate with us and assist us in any matter concerning a claim or lawsuit.
- (2) Immediately send us any legal papers or other papers received relating to claim or lawsuit.

- (3) Submit to physical examinations at our expense by doctors we select as often as we may reasonably require.
- (4) Authorize us to obtain medical, wage and other records.
- (5) Individually submit to examinations under oath or provide such sworn statements as often as we may reasonably require.
- (6) Avoid making any voluntary payments except at your own expense, or making any obligation or incurring any expense other than for first aid for others necessary at the time of the car accident.
- (7) Promptly complete and return any forms we send to you.
- (8) Permit us to retrieve information from the event data recorder of the vehicle involved in the car accident.

Any person claiming Uninsured Motorists Coverage must notify the police within twenty-four (24) hours of the accident if a hit-and-run driver is involved.

A written statement telling us the facts of the car accident and the extent of any injuries or damages must be filed within thirty (30) days after the car accident has been reported. If any claim is presented due to a hit-and-run accident involving your insured car, you must make the car available for our inspection before its repair or disposal.

Any person claiming Car Damage Coverage must also:

- Provide us with sworn proof of loss within ninety (90) days from the date of loss unless more time is allowed by us in writing if we require it.
- (2) Take reasonable steps after loss to protect your insured car and its equipment from further loss. We will pay reasonable expenses incurred in providing that protection. If you fail to take reasonable steps to protect your insured car, any additional loss because of your failure will not be covered.
- (3) Immediately report any theft or vandalism of your insured car or its equipment to the police.
- (4) Allow us to inspect and appraise the damage to your insured car before its repair or disposal. If you do not comply with this duty, we may have the right to refuse to provide such coverage, or your loss payment may be substantially reduced.

If any person claiming any coverage under this policy fails to perform any of the duties required by this policy, we may refuse to provide any protection or coverage.

DEFINITIONS USED THROUGHOUT THIS POLICY

- (1) "We", "us" and "our" mean the Company shown on the Declarations Page providing this insurance.
- (2) "You" and "your" mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your also means any relative of that person if they reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a motor vehicle.
- (3) "Relative" means a person living in your household related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor under your guardianship who lives in your household. Any relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.
- (4) "Regular operator" means any person age fourteen (14) or older and a resident of your household or any person who drives your insured car while it is furnished or available for their regular use.
- (5) "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, or sickness, disease or death.
- (6) "Property damage" means damage to or destruction of tangible property, including loss of its use.
- (7) "Car" means:

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(A) A four-wheeled land motor vehicle weighing five thousand (5,000) pounds or less of the private passenger sedan, station wagon, mini van or jeep type, licensed for use on public roads; or

- (B) A four-wheeled land motor vehicle with a rated load capacity of two thousand (2,000) pounds or less of the pickup, sport utility, van, or panel truck type, licensed for use on public roads, provided it is not used for any commercial purposes.
- (8) "Utility trailer" means a vehicle designed to be towed by a car. It includes a farm implement or a farm wagon while towed on public roads by a car. It does not include a utility trailer while used as a home office, store, display, or passenger trailer.
- (9) "Your insured car" means:
 - (A) Any car you own that is described on the Declarations Page and any car you replace it with. A replacement car will have the same coverage as the car it replaced. If you want coverage to apply to a replacement car, you must notify us within fourteen (14) days of its acquisition. You must pay any additional premium charges for coverage for the replacement car.
 - (B) Any additional car of which you acquire ownership during the policy period, provided we insure all other cars you own on the date

you acquire the additional car. For coverage to apply under Part I – Liability coverage, you must, however, notify us within fourteen (14) days of its acquisition. Car Damage Coverage will apply to the additional car only if you ask us to provide such coverage and we agree to do so. You must pay any additional premium charges for coverage for the additional car.

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- (C) Except for collision or comprehensive coverage under Part IV - Car Damage Coverage of this policy, any car not owned by you while being used temporarily with the permission of the owner as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in the Declarations Page because of its withdrawal from normal use due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.
- (D) Any utility trailer you own, or any utility trailer not owned by you while being used with permission of the owner, except for collision or comprehensive under Part IV - Car Damage Coverage of this policy.

For the purpose of this policy, a **car** shall be deemed to be owned by a person if leased under a written agreement to that person for a continuous period of at least six (6) months.

- (10) "Motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or a utility trailer, but does not mean a vehicle:
 - (A) Operated on rails or crawler-treads.
 - (B) Which is a farm type tractor or equipment designed for use principally off public roads when not used on public roads.
- This coverage applies only if a premium is shown for this coverage on the Declarations Page.

We will pay damages for which any insured person is legally liable because of bodily injury and/or property damage caused by a car accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a car or utility trailer. We will settle any claim or defend any lawsuit which is payable under the policy, as we deem appropriate.

We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for **bodily injury** or **property damage** not covered under this policy.

Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been paid.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

As used in this Part,

- (1) "insured person" or "insured persons" means:
 - (A) You,

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(B) Any person using your insured car.

- (C) Which is an all-terrain or other recreational vehicle type, not licensed for use on public roads and is designed for use principally off public roads, when not used on public roads.
- (D) Being used as a residence or premises.
- (11) "Auto Business" means the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, parking, transporting, delivering, testing, road testing or repossessing cars.
- (12) "Occupying" means in, on, getting in or on, or getting off or out of.
- (13) "Car Accident" means an unexpected and unintended event that causes **bodily injury** or **property damage** and arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a car or motor vehicle.
- (14) "Loss" means direct, sudden and accidental theft of or damage to your insured car, including its covered equipment.
- (15) "State" means the District of Columbia, and any state, territory or possession of the United States.
- (16) "Misrepresent" or "Misrepresentations" mean representation of information to us during the application for coverage and during the policy period that is known by you to be false or misleading and affects either the eligibility for coverage and/or the premium that is charged. This also includes concealment of such information relevant to the application and the maintenance of coverage once the policy is in force.

PART I - LIABILITY COVERAGE

- (C) Any person or organization with respect only to legal liability for acts or omissions of:
 - (1) Any person covered under this Part while using your insured car; or
 - (2) You under this Part while using any car or utility trailer other than your insured car if the car or utility trailer is not owned or hired by that person or organization.

No person shall be considered an **insured person** if the person uses a **car** or **utility trailer** without the permission of the owner or outside the scope of that permission.

The following persons are not **insured persons** for this coverage:

- The United States Government or any other government or civil authority, or any other level of the government; and
- (2) Any person operating a motor vehicle as an employee of the United States Government when the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act apply.

(2) "Contamination" means any unclean, unsafe, damaging, injurious, or unhealthy condition arising from

the presence of **pollutants**, whether permanent or transient.

(3) "Pollutants" means smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, sounds alkalis, chemicals liquids, solids, gases, thermal substances, or any other irritants and impurities.

Additional Payments

We will pay, in addition to our limit of liability:

- (1) All costs we incur in the settlement of any claim or defense of any lawsuit.
- (2) Interest on damages awarded in any lawsuit we defend accruing after entry of judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in court that portion of the judgment which is not more than our limit of liability.
- (3) Premiums on appeal bonds and attachment bonds required in any lawsuit we defend. We will not pay the premium for an attachment bond that is more than **our** limit of liability. We have no duty to apply for or furnish bonds.
- (4) Up to \$200 a day that **you** actually lose when **you** miss work, but not other income, when **we** ask **you** to attend trials or hearings.
- (5) Necessary expenses incurred for first aid for others at the time of the car accident because of bodily injury covered by this Part.
- (6) Any other reasonable expenses incurred at **our** specific request.

Exclusions

This coverage and our duty to defend does not apply to:

- (1) Bodily injury or property damage resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle when used to carry persons or property for compensation or a fee, including, but not limited to, delivery of newspapers, magazines, food, or any other products. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools.
- (2) **Bodily injury** or **property damage** caused intentionally by or at the direction of an **insured person**.
- (3) Bodily injury or property damage with respect to which any person is an insured under nuclear energy liability insurance or that results from nuclear reactions, radiation or fallout. This exclusion applies even if the limits of that insurance are exhausted.
- (4) Bodily injury to an employee or a fellow employee of an insured person arising during the course of employment. This exclusion does not apply to bodily injury to a domestic employee unless workers' compensation benefits are required or available for that domestic employee.
- (5) Bodily injury or property damage resulting from the ownership maintenance or use of any vehicle, including your insured car, in the course of any business other than an auto business, farming or

ranching, unless the business use is infrequent or is disclosed to and accepted by us.

- (6) Bodily injury or property damage resulting from auto business operations. This exclusion does not apply to you, or anyone associated as agent for, or employed by you, with respect to the operation of your insured car.
- (7) Damage to property owned by, rented to, or being transported by, used by, or in the charge of an insured person, except damage to a private residence or garage you rent. A motor vehicle operated by an insured person shall be considered to be property in the charge of an insured person.
- (8) Bodily injury or property damage assumed by an insured person under any contract or agreement.
- (9) Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of your insured car while it is being leased or rented to others.
- (10) **Bodily injury** or **property damage** resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle other than **your insured car**, which is owned by, or furnished or available for regular use by **you**.
- (11) Bodily injury to you.
- (12) Bodily injury or property damage caused while your insured car is used in or preparing for any racing, speeding, stunt, performance or demolition activity, regardless of whether such activity is prearranged or organized.
- (13) **Bodily injury** resulting from, arising out of or related to **pollutants** and/or **contamination** whether by vehicle or an **insured person**.
- (14) Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the loading or unloading of any car. This exclusion does not apply to you or a lessee or bailee of any car or employee of any such person.
- (15) **Bodily injury** or **property damage** resulting from the use of a vehicle for snow removal.
- (16) Punitive or exemplary damages.

Conformity with Financial Responsibility Laws

If we certify this policy as proof of compliance under any financial responsibility law, it will comply with that law to the extent of the coverage required by the law. You must reimburse us if we have to make a payment that we would not have had to make if this policy were not certified.

Out of State Insurance

If an **insured person** becomes subject to the financial responsibility law or the compulsory insurance law or similar laws of another state because of the ownership, maintenance or use of **your insured car** in that state, we will interpret this policy to provide any broader coverage required by those laws. Any broader

coverage so afforded shall be reduced to the extent that other automobile liability coverage applies. No person may, in any event, collect more than once for the same elements of **loss**.

Limits of Liability

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Subject to all the provisions below, the limits of liability shown in the Declarations Page are the maximum amounts we will pay in damages for any one car accident.

- (1) The bodily injury liability limit for "each person" is the maximum limit for all claims by all persons for damages from bodily injury to one person.
- (2) Subject to the bodily injury liability limit for "each person", the bodily injury liability limit for "each accident" is the total limit for all claims for damages from bodily injury to two or more persons in any one car accident.
- (3) The property damage liability limit for "each accident" is the limit for all claims for damages, direct or indirect, by all persons for damage to property in any one car accident.

We will pay no more than these maximums regardless of:

- (1) The number of vehicles described or premiums shown on the Declarations Page.
- (2) The number of insured persons.
- (3) The number of claims made or lawsuits filed.
- (4) The number of claimants making claims.

- (5) The number of policies issued by us.
- (6) The number of vehicles involved in the car accident.

Any amount payable to an **insured person** under this part will be reduced by any amount paid or payable for the same expense under Part II - Medical Payments or Part III - Uninsured Motorist Coverage.

No one will be entitled to duplicate payments under this policy for the same elements of damages.

If this policy provides coverage that exceeds the limits required by the applicable Financial Responsibility laws, then such excess coverage shall not apply to the operation, maintenance or use of **your insured car** by any person other than **you**, but this limitation shall not apply to liability incurred by **you**.

Separate Application of This Coverage

This coverage applies separately to each **insured person** against whom a claim is made or lawsuit is brought, except with respect to the limits of liability.

Other Insurance

If there is other applicable coverage on a loss covered by this Part, we will pay only our share of the damages. Our share is the proportion that the limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. For coverage afforded under this Part for a car or utility trailer you do not own, this coverage is excess over any other applicable insurance.

PART II - MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE

This coverage applies only if a premium is shown for the coverage on the Declarations Page.

This coverage does not apply at all if there is any Personal Injury Protection Coverage in effect at the time of the car accident.

We will pay the usual and customary charge for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred within one year from the date of car accident for medical and funeral services because of bodily injury sustained by an insured person and caused by a car accident.

Reasonable medical expenses do not include expenses:

- (1) For treatment, services, products or procedures that are experimental in nature, for research, or not primarily designed to serve a medical purpose; or are not commonly recognized throughout the medical profession and within the United States as appropriate treatment of **bodily injury**;
- (2) Incurred for the use of thermography or other related procedures of similar nature;
- (3) Incurred for the use of acupuncture or other related procedures of a similar nature; or
- (4) Incurred for the purchase or rental of equipment not primarily designed to serve a medical purpose.

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As used in this part

- (1) "Insured person" or "insured persons" means:
 - (A) You while occupying your insured car.

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- (B) You as a pedestrian when struck by a motor vehicle or utility trailer.
- (C) Any other person while occupying your insured car while the car is being used by you or another person with your permission.
- (2) "Usual and customary charge" means an amount which we determine as a customary charge for services in the geographical area in which the service is rendered. We may determine this charge through the use of independent sources of our choice.

Exclusions

This coverage does not apply to **bodily injury** to any person:

(1) Sustained while occupying your insured car when used to carry persons or property for compensation or a fee, including, but not limited to, delivery of newspapers, magazines, food, or any other product. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools.

- (2) Sustained while occupying any vehicle being used as a residence or premises.
- (3) Sustained while occupying a motor vehicle with less than four wheels.
- (4) Sustained while occupying or when struck by any vehicle, other than your insured car, which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you.
- (5) Sustained while your insured car is being leased or rented to others.
- (6) Sustained while occupying any vehicle while the vehicle is being used in the business or occupation of an insured person. This exclusion does not apply while occupying your insured car if business use is disclosed to and accepted by us.
- (7) Occurring during the course of employment if benefits are payable or required to be provided under a workers' compensation law, disability benefits or other similar laws.
- (8) Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, riot, nuclear reaction, radiation or radioactive contamination, or by any consequence of these.
- (9) Sustained while occupying any vehicle being used in or to prepare for any racing, speed, stunt, performance or demolition activity, regardless of whether such activity is prearranged or organized.
- (10) Intentionally caused by an **insured person** or at the direction of an **insured person**.
- (11) Sustained while your insured car is being used in the commission of a felony or for any other purpose which is legally recognized to be criminal.
- (12) Sustained while your insured car is being operated by a regular operator who was not

This coverage applies only if there is a premium shown for the coverage on the Declarations Page.

We will pay damages for bodily injury which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by a car accident and result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.

Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought without **our** consent is not binding on **us**.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

As used in this Part:

(1) "Insured Person" means:

(A) You.

reported to **us** on the original application for insurance or otherwise disclosed to **us** and listed on the declarations page before the **car accident**.

Limits of Liability

We will pay no more than the limits of liability shown for this coverage on the Declarations Page for each person injured in any one **car accident** regardless of:

- (1) The number of vehicles described or premiums shown on the Declarations Page.
- (2) The number of insured persons.
- (3) The number of claims made or lawsuits filed.
- (4) The number of claimants making a claim.
- (5) The number of policies issued by us.
- (6) The number of vehicles involved in the car accident.

Any amount payable to an **insured person** under this part will be reduced by any amount paid or payable for the same expense under Part I - Liability or Part III - Uninsured Motorists Coverages.

No one will be entitled to duplicate payments under this policy for the same elements of damages.

Other Insurance

This Medical Payments Coverage is excess over any other applicable insurance.

Our Rights To Recover Payment

If we make payment under this Part, we shall be entitled, to the extent of such payment, to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment recovered from, or on behalf of, any responsible party.

In the event **you** recover payment from the responsible party, to the extent **you** recover payment from the responsible party, to the extent of such recover, any rights to payment under this Part no longer exist.

PART III – UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE

- (B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.
- (C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of **bodily injury** to **you** or another occupant of **your car**.

No person shall be considered an **insured person** if that person uses a **motor vehicle** without permission of the owner.

- (2) "Uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle which is:
 - (A) Not insured by a **bodily injury** liability bond or policy at the time of the accident.
 - (B) Insured by a liability bond or policy at the time of the accident, but which provides bodily injury liability limits less than the minimum bodily injury limits required by the financial

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responsibility law of the state in which your insured car is principally garaged.

- (C) A hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner is unknown and which strikes:
 - (i) You.
 - (ii) A vehicle which you are occupying.
 - (iii) Your insured car.

There must be actual physical contact with the hitand-run vehicle.

(D) Insured by a **bodily injury** liability bond or policy at the time of the accident but the insurer denies coverage or is or becomes insolvent.

"Uninsured motor vehicle" does not mean a vehicle:

- (A) Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you.
- (B) Owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any similar law except if that self-insurer is or becomes insolvent.
- (C) Owned by a governmental unit or agency.
- (D) Designed mainly for use off public roads, while not on public roads.
- (E) Operated on rails or crawler treads.
- (F) While used as a residence or premises.

Exclusions

This coverage does not apply to **bodily injury** sustained by an **insured person**:

- (1) While occupying or when struck by a motor vehicle owned by you for which insurance is not afforded under this Part.
- (2) While occupying a motor vehicle with less than four wheels.
- (3) If that person or the legal representative of that person agrees to any settlement without our written consent.
- (4) While occupying your insured car when used to carry persons or property for compensation or a fee, including, but not limited to, delivery of newspapers, magazines, food, or any other products. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools.
- (5) While occupying any vehicle while the vehicle is being used in the business or occupation of an insured person. This exclusion does not apply while occupying your insured car if business use is infrequent or is disclosed to and accepted by us.
- (6) While any vehicle is being used in or to prepare for any racing, speed, stunt, performance, or demolition activity, regardless of whether such activity is prearranged or organized.
- (7) While your insured car is being operated by a regular operator who was not reported to us on the original application for insurance or otherwise

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disclosed to us and listed on the declarations page before the car accident.

This coverage shall not apply to punitive or exemplary damages.

Limits of Liability

Subject to all the provisions below, the limits of uninsured motorists insurance shown on the Declarations Page are the maximum amounts we will pay in damages for any one **car accident**:

- (1) The **bodily injury** limit for "each person" is the maximum limit for all claims by all persons for damages from **bodily injury** to any one person.
- (2) Subject to the bodily injury limit for "each person", the bodily injury liability limit for "each accident" is the total limit for all claims for damages from bodily injury to two or more persons in any one car accident.

We will pay no more than these maximums regardless of:

- (1) The number of vehicles described or premiums shown on the Declarations Page.
- (2) The number of insured persons.
- (3) The number of claims made or lawsuits filed.
- (4) The number of claimants making a claim.
- (5) The number of policies issued by us.
- (6) The number of vehicles involved in the car accident.

Any amounts payable to an **insured person** will be reduced by:

- (1) Any payments made by or on behalf of the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle, or any other person or organization which may be legally liable.
- (2) Any amount paid or payable for the same expense under Part I - Liability Coverage or Part II - Medical Payments.
- (3) Any payments made or payable because of **bodily** injury under any workers' compensation law or disability benefits law or similar law.

No one will be entitled to duplicate payments under this policy for the same elements of damages.

Other Insurance

If there is other applicable coverage on a loss covered by this Part, we will pay only our share of the damages. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. When an insured person is occupying a car or utility trailer you do not own, this coverage is excess over any other applicable insurance. This coverage shall apply only in the amount by which the limits of liability for this

coverage exceed the applicable limits for such other Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take insurance. place in the county in which the insured person resided at the time the policy was purchased. Local rules of Arbitration procedure and evidence will apply. A decision agreed to If we and an insured person claiming coverage under by two of the arbitrators, or the single arbitrator, shall be this Part do not agree: binding as to: (1) On the legal liability of the operator or owner of an (1) The legal liability of the operator or owner of an uninsured motor vehicle; or uninsured vehicle; and/or (2) As to the amount of damages; (2) The amount of damages. The arbitrators shall have no authority to award an amount in excess of the then the matter may be arbitrated upon written limits of liability or which includes punitive or agreement between both parties. In this event, each exemplary damages. party will select an arbitrator unless the parties agree in writing on the use of a single arbitrator. If two arbitrators The decision of the arbitrators is binding only for the are used, they will select a third. If the two arbitrators amount of the award that does not exceed our limits of cannot agree on the third within thirty (30) days, then on liability or does not include punitive or exemplary joint application by the insured and us, the third damages. arbitrator will be appointed by a judge or court having jurisdiction. If an award does exceed our limits of liability, or includes punitive or exemplary damages, either party Disputes concerning coverage under this Part may not may demand the right to trial. Such demand must be made within sixty (60) days of the arbitrator's decision, be arbitrated. or such lesser time as provided by the rules of civil Each party will: procedure for the jurisdiction where the arbitration (1) Pay the expenses they incur; and occurs. (2) Bear the expenses of the single arbitrator, equally. We will not pay the punitive or exemplary damages which the insured person may be legally entitled to (3) Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator, equally, if two arbitrators are used and a third is selected. collect. No valid arbitration award shall include amounts for punitive or exemplary damages.

PART IV - CAR DAMAGE COVERAGE

We will pay for loss to your insured car which is:

- (1) Caused by **collision**, but only if a premium is shown for the coverage on the Declarations Page.
- (2) Caused by comprehensive, but only if a premium is shown for the coverage on the Declarations Page.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

As used in this Part:

- (1) "Collision" means actual physical contact between your insured car and another object or upset of your insured car.
- (2) "Comprehensive" means loss to your insured car not caused by collision. The following is considered loss caused by comprehensive, including, but not limited to:
 - (A) Missiles or falling objects;
 - (B) Fire;
 - (C) Theft or larceny;
 - (D) Explosion or earthquake;
 - (E) Windstorm;
 - (F) Hail, water or flood;
 - (G) Malicious mischief or vandalism;
 - (H) Riot or civil commotion;
 - (I) Contact with bird or animal; or

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(J) Breakage of glass

If breakage of glass results from a **collision**, you may elect to have it treated as a **loss** caused by **collision**.

- (3) "Covered Equipment" means:
 - (A) Any permanently installed equipment, parts, or accessories which were purchased as standard or optional equipment from the manufacturer of the vehicle.
 - (B) Any permanently installed device designed for the recording or reproduction of sound, provided the device is installed in the opening of the dash or console normally used by the manufacturer for the installation of a radio. The maximum we will pay for loss to the device and its accessories is \$500.
- (4) "Rental Vehicle" means a car you rent or hire, only from an entity licensed to conduct such business under applicable state law, while such car is in your custody or is being operated by you or a relative.
- (5) "Your insured car" also includes a rental vehicle while it is being used as a temporary substitute for a car described on the Declarations Page because of its withdrawal from normal use due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

A **rental vehicle**, under this part, shall be provided the same coverage as the vehicle it temporarily replaces.

Your Deductible

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The deductible amount shown on the Declarations Page will be subtracted from payment of any **loss** covered under this Part.

No deductible will apply to a **loss** to window glass when the glass is repaired instead of replaced.

We will waive the collision deductible if your insured car and another motor vehicle insured by us collide. This provision applies only if the other motor vehicle is not owned by you.

Settlement of Loss

We may pay the loss in money or repair or replace damaged or stolen property. We may, at any time before the loss is paid or the property is replaced, return, at our expense, any stolen property either to you or to the address shown on the Declarations Page, with payment for the resulting damage. If we repair or replace the damaged or stolen property, we reserve the right to use parts of like kind and quality. We may keep all or part of the property salvage upon payment to you of its agreed or appraised value. You may not abandon the damaged property to us.

<u>Appraisal</u>

You or we may demand appraisal of the loss. Each will appoint and pay a competent and impartial qualified appraiser. Other appraisal expenses will be shared equally. The appraisers, or a judge or a court having jurisdiction, will select an umpire to decide any differences. Each appraiser will state separately the actual cash value and the amount of loss. An award in writing by the two appraisers, or either of the appraisers and the umpire, will determine the amount payable.

We do not waive any of our rights under this policy by agreeing to an appraisal.

Transportation Expenses

We will pay you for reasonable actual incurred alternative transportation expenses if your insured car covered by this Part is stolen. Transportation expenses covered shall not exceed \$20 per day. The payment period begins forty-eight (48) hours after you have told us of the theft and have notified the police. The period ends:

- Seventy-two (72) hours after we make an offer to pay the actual cash value of your insured car;
- (2) When your insured car is returned to use; or
- (3) When we have paid \$600 in alternative transportation costs,

whichever occurs first.

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Exclusions

This coverage does not apply to loss:

- (1) To your insured car while used to carry persons or property for compensation or a fee, including, but not limited to, delivery of newspapers, magazines, food, or any other products. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools.
- (2) Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, riot, nuclear reaction, radiation, or radioactive contamination, or any consequence of any of these.
- (3) To television antennas, awnings, cabanas or any equipment designed to provide additional living or transportation facilities.
- (4) To tapes, records, compact discs or other devices for use with equipment designed for the reproduction of sound including any cases or other containers used in storing or carrying such items.
- (5) To equipment designed or used for the detection or location of radar or laser.
- (6) To equipment used to either mechanically or structurally modify your insured car resulting in an increase in performance or change in appearance.
- (7) To any closed container designed to fit in the bed of a pickup truck, plow, winches and lift kits whether or not permanently attached.
- (8) To any facilities used for cooking.
- (9) To equipment, parts and accessories which are not defined as covered equipment unless items are declared as permanently installed in or on your car and a specific premium is paid.
- (10)Resulting from wear and tear, freezing, or other temperature changes, mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure, manufacturers defect, road damage to tires or other prior loss damage. This exclusion does not apply if the loss results from theft covered by this insurance.
- (11)While your insured car is being used in or preparing for any racing, speeding, stunt, performance or demolition activity, regardless of whether such activity is prearranged or organized.
- (12)Sustained while occupying any vehicle while the vehicle is being used in the business or occupation of an insured person. This exclusion does not apply while occupying your insured car if business use is infrequent or is disclosed to and accepted by us.
- (13)To any car not owned by you that is not your insured car.
- (14)To your insured car, if at the time of the loss, your insured car was driven by a regular operator who was not reported to us on the original application for

insurance or otherwise disclosed to us and listed on the declarations page before the car accident.

(15)To your insured car:

- (A) While being used in any illegal trade or transportation, or to commit a felony or for any other purpose which is legally recognized to be criminal.
- (B) Caused intentionally by or at the direction of you or any other person using your insured car with your permission.
- (C) Due to the destruction or confiscation by governmental or civil authorities. This exclusion 15 (C) does not apply to the interests of the Loss Payees in your insured car.
- (D) Due to theft or conversion of your car, or a nonowned car, or any optional equipment we insure, which occurs prior to its delivery to you, or which occurs after you have delivered your car or non-owned car to a third party to whom you have authorized to sell, trade or otherwise dispose of it.
- (E) Due to diminution of value, meaning the actual or perceived loss in market or resale value which results from a direct and accidental loss to a car and any optional equipment we insure.
- (F) Due to acquisition of a stolen vehicle.
- (16) To **your insured car** due to mold damage or mold remediation costs, regardless of the source.

Limits of Liability

Our limits of liability for loss shall not exceed the lesser of:

- (1) The actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property at the time of **loss**, reduced by the applicable deductible; or
- (2) The amount necessary to repair or replace the property with parts or property of like kind and quality, reduced by the applicable deductible.

In determining the actual cash value of the property or damaged part of the property at the time of the loss, an adjustment for depreciation and physical condition will be made in relation to the physical condition and wear and tear. If new parts are used to replace parts subject to wear and tear, depreciation will be taken to the extent of the wear and tear.

No Benefit to Bailee

This coverage shall not in any way benefit any person or organization caring for or handling **your insured car** for a fee.

Other Insurance

If there is other applicable coverage on a loss covered by this Part, we will pay only our proportionate share of the damages. However, any insurance we may be required to provide with respect to any non-owned vehicle used as a temporary substitute for a vehicle you own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.

PART V - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Territory

This policy applies only to car accidents and losses within the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or between their ports.

Changes

This policy, your application (which is made a part of this policy as if attached), and the Declarations Page include all the agreements between you and us relating to this insurance.

We will automatically give you the benefits of any extension or broadening of this policy if the change does not require additional premium.

The only other way this policy can be changed is by endorsement. Any necessary adjustment of premium will be made at that time. We will accept certain changes to your policy that you request. However, some changes you request require your signature. These will be effective only after the proper signature is obtained. Any change will be confirmed by our issuance of a declarations page.

The premium for each of your cars is based on information we received from you or other sources. Changes in this information, such as but not limited to, addition or deletion of cars, coverages or operators of

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your cars, or a new place of principal garaging of your car, made during the policy period, may result in a premium increase or decrease. We will make such changes based on the rates in effect at the time of the change and in accordance with our manual rules and/or rate filings.

If you move to a state in which this policy is unavailable, we will continue this policy only for the current policy term, at the end of which time all coverages will cease. You must notify us within fourteen (14) days of a new address.

Two or More Cars Insured

With respect to any car accident or loss to which this and any other auto policy issued to **you** by us applies, the total limit of our liability under all the policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy.

Lawsuit Against Us

We may not be sued unless there has been full compliance with all the terms of this policy. We may not be sued under the Liability Coverage until the obligation of an **insured person** to pay is finally determined either by judgment against that person at the actual trial or by written agreement of that person, the claimant and **us**. No one has any right under this policy to make **us** a Page 10 of 12 party to a lawsuit to determine the liability of an **insured** person.

No person who is not an **insured person** under the terms of this policy shall have any interest in this policy, either as:

- (1) a third party beneficiary; or
- (2) otherwise;

unless there first is a rendering of a verdict against a person who is an **insured person** under the terms of this policy for a claim which is covered by this policy.

Our Recovery Rights

In the event of any payment by **us** under this policy, we are entitled to all the rights of recovery that any person or organization we have paid may have against another who might be held responsible. You and anyone we protect must sign any papers and do whatever else is necessary to enable us to exercise our rights. You and anyone we protect will do nothing to prejudice our rights.

If we ask, any person that we have paid must take appropriate action, in that person's own name, to recover any payment we have made from any responsible party or insurer. We will select the attorney and pay all related costs and fees.

When a person has been paid damages by us under this policy and also recovers from another, the amount recovered from the other shall be held by that person in trust for us and reimburse us to the extent of our payment plus any costs or attorney fees we have to pay.

If we make payment under any Part, we shall be entitled, to the extent of such payment, to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment recovered from, or on behalf of, any responsible party. In the event of recovery from the responsible party, to the extent of such recovery, any rights to payment under such Part no longer exists.

Assignment

Interest in this policy may not be assigned without **our** written consent. If the policyholder named on the Declarations Page or the spouse of the policyholder who lives in the same household dies, the policy will cover:

- (1) The surviving spouse.
- (2) The legal representative of the deceased while acting within the scope of the duties as a legal representative.
- (3) Any person having proper custody of **your insured** car until a legal representative is appointed.

However, if any person is an excluded driver under this policy, there would be no coverage while any person is driving an **insured car**.

Bankruptcy

We are not relieved of any obligation under this policy because of the bankruptcy or insolvency of any **insured** person.

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Out-of-State Insurance

If this policy provides liability insurance and if you are traveling in a state which has compulsory **motor vehicle** insurance requirements for nonresidents, we will automatically provide the required insurance. However, _____ this amendment will provide only excess insurance.

Renewal of This Policy

Subject to **our** consent, **you** have the right to renew this policy. When **we** consent to renewal, **you** must pay the renewal premium before the renewal date. This policy will automatically expire if **we** do not receive the required premium before the renewal date of the policy.

If we offer to renew the policy or bill for a balance due from a policy change and you or your representative fail to pay the required premium when due, you have not accepted our offer and this policy will automatically terminate on the date noted on the renewal or balance due notice.

If we decide not to renew this policy, we will mail to the person named on the Declarations Page at the address shown on the Declarations page notice of nonrenewal not less than twenty (20) days before the end of the policy period.

Cancellation or Nonrenewal of This Policy

You may cancel this policy by returning it to us or by advising us in writing when at a future date the cancellation is to be effective.

We may cancel by mailing notice of cancellation to the person named on the Declarations Page at the address shown on the Declarations Page:

- (1) Not less than ten (10) days prior to the effective date of cancellation:
 - (A) For nonpayment of premium; or
 - (B) If the policy has been in effect less than sixty (60) days and is not a continuation or renewal policy.
- (2) Not less than twenty (20) days prior to the effective date of cancellation for any other reason.
- (3) If this policy has been in effect for sixty (60) days we may cancel only:
 - (A) For nonpayment of premium; and
 - (B) For suspension or revocation of your driver's license or that of any other operator who either lives in your household or customarily operates your insured car. The suspension or revocation must have taken place during the policy period, or, if a renewal policy, within one year of the original effective date of the policy.

If different requirements for cancellation and nonrenewal or termination of policies are applicable because of the laws of **your** state, **we** will comply with those requirements. Proof of mailing a notice of cancellation or nonrenewal shall be sufficient proof of notice of cancellation or nonrenewal.

Upon cancellation **you** may be entitled to a premium refund. If so, we will send it to **you** or **your** agent, but a refund is not a condition of cancellation. If we cancel, the refund will be computed on a pro-rata basis. If **you** cancel, the refund will be computed in accordance with the customary short-rate table and procedure. The effective date of cancellation stated in a notice is the end of the policy period.

Misrepresentations

If you misrepresent any fact or circumstance that affects the eligibility of a risk, contributes to a loss, or results in a premium lower than that which would have been charged if true and complete representations had been made, we reserve the right to rescind the policy and/or deny coverage..

In Witness Whereof, we have caused this policy to be signed by its President and Secretary, and, if required by state law, this policy shall not be valid unless countersigned by our authorized representative.

W. O'T(u --Secretary

N. MS --President

NOTICE OF OUR INFORMATION PRACTICES

As required by Public Law 91-508, Fair Credit Reporting Act, this is to inform you that as part of our procedure for processing and reviewing applications, new policies, renewal policies and policies currently in effect, a credit report, motor vehicle report or an investigative report may be obtained through personal interviews with third parties, such as family members, business associates, financial sources, friends, neighbors, or others with whom you are acquainted. This inquiry includes information as to your character, general reputation, personal characteristics, mode of living or driving history, whichever may be applicable. You have the right to make a written request to this company within a reasonable period of time for a complete and accurate disclosure of additional information concerning the nature and scope of the investigation and/or to dispute such information which you believe to be erroneous.

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PERSONAL AUTO POLICY AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT – WASHINGTON

It is agreed that the policy is amended as follows:

PART I - LIABILITY COVERAGE

The fourth opening paragraph is replaced in its entirety by the following:

Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been paid; and:

- (1) Judgment or settlement has been reached with the insured person; or
- (2) The insured person relieves us of our duty to defend.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

The following definition is added:

"Domestic abuse" means:

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- Physical harm, bodily injury, assault or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault between family or household members;
- (2) Sexual assault of one family or household member by another;
- (3) Stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member; or
- (4) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing damage to property so as to intimidate or attempt to control the behavior of another family or household member.

Exclusions

Exclusion (2) does not apply to property damage caused by an act of domestic abuse by another insured person, if the insured person claiming property damage:

- (A) Files a police report and cooperates with any law enforcement investigation relating to the act of domestic abuse; and
- (B) Did not cooperate in or contribute to the creation of the property damage.

Limits of Liability

The following provision is added:

Our limit of liability for loss paid as a result of domestic abuse shall be limited to the insured person's insurable interest in the property less payments made to a loss payee or other party with a legal secured interest in the property. We reserve all rights to subrogation to recover any payments made to the insured person under this provision, to the extent of such payment, from the perpetrator of the act that caused the loss.

The following paragraph is deleted in its entirety:

If this policy provides coverage that exceeds the limits required by the applicable Financial Responsibility laws, then such excess coverage shall not apply to

PPA-WA (11/08) 12 3,535 10223 the operation, maintenance or use of **your insured car** by any person other than **you**, but this limitation shall not apply to liability incurred by **you**.

PART II – MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE

The third opening paragraph is replaced in its entirety by the following:

We will pay the usual and customary charge for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred within three (3) years from the date of car accident for medical and funeral services because of bodily injury sustained by an insured person and caused by a car accident.

Reasonable medical expenses do not include expenses:

(1) For treatment, services, products or procedures that are experimental in nature, for research, or not primarily designed to serve a medical purpose; or are not commonly recognized throughout the medical profession and within the United States as appropriate treatment of bodily injury;

(2) Incurred for the use of thermography or other related procedures of similar nature;

(3) Incurred for the use of acupuncture or other related procedures of a similar nature; or(4) Incurred for the purchase or rental of equipment not primarily designed to serve a medical purpose.

Exclusions (10) and (11) are deleted in their entirety.

PART III - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE

This Part is deleted in its entirety.

PART IV – CAR DAMAGE COVERAGE

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

The following definitions (6), (7) and (8) are added:

- (6) "Actual cash value" means the lesser of:
 - (A) The amount required to replace the damaged property with similar property in like-condition; or
 - (B) The amount to restore the property by repairs to its pre-damaged condition, at current market value.
- (7) "Domestic abuse" means:
 - (A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault between family or household members;
 - (B) Sexual assault of one family or household member by another;
 - (C) Stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member; or
 - (D) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing damage to property so as to intimidate or

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attempt to control the behavior of another family or household member.

(8) "Diminution of value" or "diminished value" means the actual or perceived loss in market or resale value, which results from a loss.

Appraisal

The last sentence is replaced by the following:

Neither we nor you waive any rights under this policy by agreeing to an appraisal.

Exclusions

Exclusion (15) (B) is replaced in its entirety by the following:

(15)To your insured car:

- (B) Caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured person. This Exclusion (15)(B) does not apply to loss to your insured car caused by an act of domestic abuse, if the person claiming loss:
 - (i) Files a police report and cooperates with any law enforcement investigation relating to the act of domestic abuse; and
 - (ii) Did not cooperate in or contribute to the creation of the loss.

Limits of Liability

The following provisions are added:

We may deduct for betterment and depreciation for parts normally subject to repair and replacement during the useful life of **your insured car**. Deductions for betterment and depreciation shall be limited to the lesser of:

- (1) An amount equal to the proportion that the expired life of the part to be repaired or replaced bears to the normal useful life of that part; or
- (2) The amount which the resale value of the car is increased by the repair or replacement.

Our limit of liability for loss paid as a result of domestic abuse shall be limited to your insurable interest in the property less payments made to a loss payee or other party with a legal secured interest in the property. We reserve all rights of subrogation to recover any payments made to the insured person under this provision from the perpetrator of the act that caused the loss.

No payment will be made for **loss** paid under Part III – Underinsured Motorists Coverage.

PART V – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Lawsuit Against Us

The following provision is added:

If an action is brought against us under the Insurance Fair Conduct Act, then twenty (20) days prior to filing such an action, we and the Office of the Insurance Commissioner must be provided written notice of the

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basis for the cause of action. Such notice may be sent by regular mail, registered mail or certified mail with return receipt requested.

Our Recovery Rights

The first paragraph is replaced in its entirety by the following:

In the event of any payment by us under this policy, we are entitled, to the extent of such payment to all the rights of recovery that any person or organization we have paid may have against another who might be held responsible. You and anyone we protect must sign any papers and do whatever else is necessary to enable us to exercise our rights. You and anyone we protect will do nothing to prejudice our rights.

The third paragraph is replaced in its entirety by the following:

When an **insured person** has been paid damages by us under this policy and also recovers from another, the **insured person** shall hold the amount recovered in trust for us and shall reimburse us to the extent of our payment.

The following provision is added:

We shall be entitled to a recovery of damages sustained from the person or organization legally responsible only after the person has been fully compensated for damages by the responsible party or insurer.

Cancellation or Nonrenewal of This Policy

Provision (1) is replaced in its entirety by the following:

- (1) Not less than ten 10 days prior to the effective date of cancellation:
 - (A) For nonpayment of premium; or
 - (B) If the policy has been in effect less than thirty 30 days and is not a continuation or renewal policy.

Provision (3) is replaced in its entirety by the following:

- (3) If this policy has been in effect for sixty 60 days we may cancel only:
 - (A) For nonpayment of premium; and
 - (B) For suspension or revocation of your driver's license or that of any other operator who customarily operates your insured car. The suspension or revocation must have taken place during the policy period or the one hundred and eighty 180 days immediately preceding the effective date of the renewal policy.

The last paragraph is replaced in its entirety by the following:

Upon cancellation **you** may be entitled to a premium refund. If so, **we** will send it to **you** or **your** agent, but a refund is not a condition of cancellation. The refund will be computed on a pro-rata basis. The effective date of the cancellation stated in a notice is the end of the policy period.

If the payment received is less than the minimum premium tolerance no coverage will be afforded and Page 2 of 3

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your policy will cancel for nonpayment of premium. Your payment will then be refunded within eleven 11 days of when it was received.

The following paragraph is added:

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Notice of cancellation or nonrenewal will include the reason for such notice. We will mail a copy of the notice to **your** agent or broker and like-notice of cancellation or nonrenewal to any loss payee or additional insured shown on this policy, if applicable.

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IMPORTANT NOTICE

What You Should Know About Our Protection of Your Privacy

Protecting the personal information of the individuals we serve is a priority for Sentry Insurance. We collect, retain and use personal information about individuals for the purpose of serving their insurance needs and providing services to them.

This notice describes how we handle personal information of the individuals we serve. It is only for your information. No action on your part is needed.

If you have questions regarding this notice, please write to Corporate Compliance/Privacy, 1800 North Point Drive, Stevens Point, WI 54481

What kinds of information are collected and disclosed?

The types of information we may collect about you include:

- Information you provide on applications or other forms, or in your verbal responses to our questions. This may include identifying information such as name, address and information about your assets and income.
- Information about your transactions with us including policies purchased and premium payment history.
- Information we receive from a consumer reporting agency that indicates your credit worthiness and credit history.

We do not sell customer lists or any personal information regarding our customers.

We do not disclose nonpublic personal financial information about customers or former customers to nonaffiliated third parties, except as permitted by law.

We may share personal financial information about you between companies within the Sentry Insurance Group in order to make additional services available to you. For example, auto insurance customers may receive information about life insurance products, and vice versa.

How do we safeguard your privacy?

We maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards to protect your personal information.

We restrict access to nonpublic personal financial data to those employees who need to know that information in order to provide products or services to you.

We communicate to employees in writing the importance of protecting confidential information.

We may amend our privacy policies at any time. If we do, we will inform you in writing.

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This notice applies to each of the following companies. Companies may not be licensed in all states.

Sentry Insurance a Mutual Company

Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Company of Texas

Dairyland Insurance Company

Middlesex Insurance Company

Parker Assurance, Ltd

Parker Centennial Assurance Company

Parker Services, L.L.C.

Parker Stevens Agency, L.L.C.

Parker Stevens Insurance Agency of Massachusetts

Patriot General Insurance Company

Peak Property and Casualty Insurance Corporation

Sentry Casualty Company

Sentry Equity Services

Sentry Life Insurance Company

Sentry Life Insurance Company of New York

Sentry Lloyds of Texas

Sentry Select Insurance Company

Viking County Mutual Insurance Company

Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin



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DRIVER RESTRICTION ENDORSEMENT - WASHINGTON

We agree with you, subject to all the provisions of the policy, except as changed by this endorsement, as follows:

PART V – GENERAL PROVISIONS

The following provision is added:

Driver Restriction

We will not provide coverage under Part I – Liability Coverage or Part IV – Car Damage Coverage while **your insured car** is being driven by any person under the age of 25 years old, unless that person is listed as an insured driver on the Declarations Page. This restriction does not apply to:

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- (1) Part I Liability Coverage while your insured car is being driven on a military base or reservation.
- (2) The protection of a loss payee's interest under Part IV Car Damage Coverage.

This restriction does not apply to Underinsured Motorists coverage or Personal Injury Protection coverage if a premium is shown for the coverages on the Declarations Page.

You must reimburse us if we make a payment to a loss payee for a loss incurred while your insured car is being driven by any person under the age of 25 years old, unless that person is listed as an insured driver on the Declarations Page.

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UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT - WASHINGTON

This coverage applies only if there is premium shown for the coverage on the Declarations Page.

It is agreed that the policy is amended as follows:

WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF A CAR ACCIDENT OR LOSS

Other Duties

The unnumbered paragraph after paragraph (7) is replaced in its entirety by the following:

Any person claiming Underinsured Motorists Coverage must also notify the police within 72 hours of a "phantom" vehicle accident and shall file with us within 30 days a sworn proof of loss containing the facts and any other information pertinent to the **car accident**.

PART III - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE

This Part is replaced in its entirety by the following:

PART III – UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE

This coverage applies only if there is a premium shown for Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage, Underinsured Motorists Property Damage Coverage, or both on the Declarations Page and only for such coverages as are shown.

We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury or property damage must be caused by a car accident and result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.

Determination as to whether an **insured person** is legally entitled to recover damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement between the **insured person** and **us**. If no agreement is reached, the decision will be made by arbitration.

If a lawsuit is brought by any **insured person** against an owner or operator of an **underinsured motor vehicle** to determine legal liability or damages, the **insured person** must provide **us** a copy of the summons and complaint as soon as practicable.

Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought without **our** consent is not binding on **us**.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

As used in this Part:

- (1) "Insured Person" means:
 - (A) You.
 - (B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.

(C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of **bodily injury** to **you** or another occupant of **your car**.

No person shall be considered an **insured person** if that person uses a **motor vehicle** without permission of the owner.

- (2) "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor _____ vehicle which is:
 - (A) Not insured by a bodily injury or property damage liability bond or policy at the time of the car accident;
 - (B) Insured by one or more bodily injury or property damage liability bonds or policies at the time of the car accident of which the sum of the limits of liability is less than the applicable damages an insured person is entitled to recover; or
 - (C) A hit-and-run or "phantom" vehicle whose operator or owner is unknown which strikes, or causes a car accident resulting in bodily injury or property damage without striking:
 - (i) You.
 - (ii) A vehicle which you are occupying.
 - (iii) Your insured car.

When there is no physical contact with the hitand-run or "phantom" vehicle, the facts of the car accident must be corroborated by competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured person or any other person having an underinsured motorists claim resulting from the car accident.

(D) Insured by a bodily injury or property damage liability bond or policy at the time of the car accident but the insurer denies coverage or is or becomes insolvent within three years of the date of the car accident.

"Underinsured motor vehicle" does not mean a vehicle or its equipment:

- (A) To which Part I Liability Coverage applies at the time of the car accident, for the claim of any insured person other than you.
- (B) Owned by a governmental unit or agency unless the unit or agency is unable to satisfy a claim because of financial inability or insolvency.
- (C) Designed mainly for use off public roads, while not on public roads.
- (D) Operated on rails or crawler treads.
- (E) While used as a residence or premises
- (3) "Property damage" means damage to or destruction of your insured car caused by a car accident. However, property damage does not include:
 - (A) Loss of use of your insured car; or
 - (B) Damage to or destruction of any property while contained in your insured car.

(4) **"Bodily injury**" means bodily harm to, or sickness or disease, and includes death resulting from the bodily harm, sickness or disease.

Exclusions

This coverage does not apply:

- (1) To bodily injury sustained by an insured person or a relative while occupying or when struck by a motor vehicle, other than your insured car, which is owned by or available for the regular use of you or a relative.
- (2) To **bodily injury** while occupying a vehicle with less than four wheels.
- (3) To bodily injury or property damage while occupying your insured car when used to carry persons or property for a charge. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools.
- (4) For the benefit, directly or indirectly, of any insurer or self-insurer under any workers' compensation law, disability benefits law or other similar laws or any insurer of property.
- (5) While occupying or when struck by a motor vehicle owned by you for which no premium is shown for coverage on the Declarations Page.
- (6) While occupying your insured car when used to carry persons or property for compensation or a fee, including, but not limited to delivery of newspapers, magazines, food, or any other products. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools.
- (7) While occupying any vehicle while the vehicle is being used in the business or occupation of an insured person. This exclusion does not apply while occupying your insured car if the business use is infrequent or is disclosed to and accepted by us.
- (8) While any vehicle is being used in or to prepare for any racing, speed, stunt, performance or demolition activity, regardless of whether such activity is prearranged or organized.
- (9) While your insured car is being operated by a regular operator who was not reported to us on the original application for insurance or otherwise disclosed to us and listed on the declarations page before the car accident.

This coverage shall not apply to punitive or exemplary damages.

Limits of Liability

Subject to all the provisions below, the limits of underinsured motorists insurance shown on the Declarations Page are the maximum amounts we will pay in damages for any one car accident, further defined as follows:

(1) The bodily injury limit for "each person" is the maximum limit for all claims by all persons for

damages from **bodily injury** to any one person in any one **car accident**.

- (2) Subject to the bodily injury limit for "each person", the bodily injury liability limit for "each accident" is the total limit for all claims for all damages from bodily injury to two or more persons in any one car accident.
- (3) Subject to the property damage liability limit, the property damage liability limit for "each accident" is the maximum amount we will pay for property damage in any one car accident. We will pay for the property damage less a \$100 deductible. If your property damage is caused by a hit-and-run or "phantom" vehicle, we will pay for the property damage less a \$300 deductible.

We will pay no more than these maximums regardless of:

- (1) The number of vehicles described or premiums shown on the Declarations Page.
- (2) The number of insured persons.
- (3) The number of claims made or lawsuits filed.
- (4) The number of claimants making a claim.
- (5) The number of vehicles involved in the car accident.

No payment will be made for loss paid to an **insured person** under Part IV – Car Damage Coverage of this policy.

Other Insurance

If there is other similar insurance available to the **insured person** under another policy or policies, the total limits of all coverages shall be the highest of the limits applicable to any one policy. We will pay only our share of the damages. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. But, when an **insured person** is occupying a car or utility trailer you do not own, this coverage is excess over any other applicable insurance and this coverage shall then apply only in the amount by which the limits of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limits for such other insurance.

Arbitration

If we and an insured person claiming coverage under this Part do not agree:

- (1) Whether that **insured person** is legally entitled to recover damages under this Part; or
- (2) As to the amount of such damages;

Either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator unless the parties agree in writing on the use of a single arbitrator. If two arbitrators are used, they will select a third; if the two arbitrators cannot agree on the third within thirty days, either party may request selection be made by a judge or court having jurisdiction.

UM4-WA (11/08)

We will pay all arbitration expenses, not including an insured person's attorney's fees or any expenses incurred in producing evidence or witnesses.

Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the **insured person** resides. Local rules of procedure and evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators, or the single arbitrator, shall be binding as to:

- (1) Whether the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages; and/or
- (2) The amount of said damages, subject to our limits of liability, and excluding punitive or exemplary damages. Any award which exceeds the limits of liability or which includes punitive or exemplary

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damages shall be beyond the arbitrator's scope of authority.

If an award does exceed **our** limits of liability, either party may demand the right to trial. Such demand must be made within 60 days of the arbitrator's decision, or such lesser time as provided by the rules of civil procedure for the jurisdiction where the arbitration occurs.

We will not pay punitive or exemplary damages which the insured person may be legally entitled to collect. No valid arbitration award shall include amounts for punitive or exemplary damages.

> Page 3 of 3 WA2460 (11/08) c

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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T	
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF TOMAS MIRANDA
10	ν.	
11 12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
13	Defendants.	
14	I, Tomas Miranda, declare as follows:	
15		
16		nd I have personal knowledge of the matters set
17	forth herein. I own and operate the Tomas Mirand	
18	2. On August 11, 2010, Jorge Gutierr	ez completed an application for a motor vehicle
19	insurance policy with Patriot General Insurance	Company. Attached as exhibit 1 is a true and
20	correct copy of the application completed by Jorg	e Gutierrez.
21	3. The upper right-hand corner of	each page of the application shows that the
22	application consists of 10 pages. The attached app	lication includes only pages 1 through 6. Pages
23	7 and 8 were receipts for payment of a portion of	f the premium. Pages 9 and 10 were proof-of-
24	insurance cards for the two listed drivers, Jorge	Gutierrez and Maria Recarmona. Those four
25	pages were given to Mr. Gutierrez after the applic	ation was completed. My office does not retain
26	DECLARATION OF TOMAS MIRANDA- 1 C:\Users\mmunson\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internat Files\Content.Outlook\T8084Z8H\Declaration of Tomas Miranda.docx	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (1000 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 POURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (204) 386-7755

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copies of the receipts or the cards.

4. The application does not mention any insureds or drivers other than Jorge Gutierrez and Maria Recarmona.

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5. I gave a Mr. Gutierrez a copy of his application along with the policy issued to him by Patriot General Insurance Company.

6. After completing the application, Jorge Gutierrez never requested that his son, Javier Gutierrez, be added to the policy.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Walla Walla, Washington on this 21^{37} day of March, 2013.

Tomas Miranda

L1 L

ь.

26 DECLARATION OF TOMAS MIRANDA-2 C:\Users\mmunson\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\T808428H\Declaration of Tomas Miranda.docx THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SURVICE CORPORATION 1200 PUG(ET SOUND PLAZA 1323 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

EXHIBIT 1

WASHINGTON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE APPLICATION

PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY Program: Dairyland

DAIRYLAND

Policy Number 475814919	Policy Effective Date 08/11/2010	Time 10:21 AM	Policy Type Auto Policy	Policy Term 6 Months	Pay Plan Selected Continuous	
Named Insured I	nformation		Agent Informa	tion		
Gulierrez, Jorge			Agency Code: 470	5135		
1201 Umatilla St			Agency Sub-Code:			
Walia Walia, WA-9936	2		Tomas Miranda Ins	Agency		
Business Phone:			P O Box 391			
Home Phone: (509) 3	01-9298		Walla Walla, WA-9	9362		
Residency:			Phone: (509) 529-9	600		
Years@Residence:						
Occupation:						
Prior Carrier / # Yrs:			Employer/Years@E	Employer:		

Prior Policy #/Exp Dt;

BROAD FORM NAMED DRIVER POLICY: If this policy type is indicated above, this policy provides coverage for only the named insured while driving either owned or non-owned cars. Owned cars will not be listed. LIMITED LIABILITY POLICY: If this policy type is indicated above, this policy does not provide coverage for anyone not listed on the policy.

Coverage Information

Vehicle	Limits	Veh 1	Ded 1	Veh 2	Ded 2	Veh 3	Ded 3	Veh 4	Ded 4
Rated Driver		1				يبيل ي الأربيل التحاقية.	11		1
BI-PD	25/50/25	\$161.70					1		1
VIM-BI	25/50	\$53.10			}	<u> </u>			1
UIM-PD	10,000	\$6.00		**************************************			1		1
Medical Payments		\$0.00			1				1
Personal Injury Protection *	Reject	\$0.00			1		11		
Comprehensive	1	\$0.00			1	,	1		1
Collision		\$0,00			1		1		T
Car Loan Protection		\$0.00							1
Lienholder Deductible		\$0.00							1
Rental Reimbursement		\$0.00				_			1
Special Equipment		\$0.00							1
Towing And Labor		\$0.00							1
Premium Subtotals		\$220.80							1

Policy Fee: \$8.00 Policy Premium: \$228.80

* Please sign corresponding rejection on application.

Total Premium Submitted: \$52.16 **4 Additional Payments of: \$52.16** Refer to agent guide for down payment requirements.

Discounts Applied

Surcharges Applied

Page 1

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..... • • • • • • Lienholder / Additional insured Lessor information Veh# Type Name Address **City State Zip** Vehicle Information — Vehicle 1 Vehicle 2 Vehicle 3 Vehicle 4 Vin Number 1FDEE14N7RHA98392 Year 1994 Make FORD Mode! ECONOLINE E-150 Vehicle Specifics VN.TR,08 Cyls Symbol DGF/DDC/// Cost Vehicle Use Pleasure 99362 / 27 Garage Zip/Terr Existing Damage (Please complete vehicle No inspection form)

Driver information n--------List all persons in household (including non-driving children/persons age 14 and over) and all operators. (If more than 4 persons, please contact Customer Care) Driver 2 Driver Driver Driver 1 Name Gutierrez, Jorge Recarmona, Marie DOB 08/07/1956 03/15/1960 Gender Male Marital Status Married License # GUTIEJ"447NG Date Lic./Years Lic. 08/07/1972 D.L. State WA Non Driver No Yes **Excluded Driver** No No SR-22

Page 2

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Driver # Date of Occurrence	Sustomer Care.)	le, unless a poi	convictions for all operators. Please Note: It is assur LICE REPORT OR PROOF OF OTHER CARRIE and as of the effective date of the policy. (If more that
	Туре	Points	Description of Occurrence
			•
م میں ہونے ہے۔ یہ بار ہی ایک ایک ایک کر کی ہے۔ ایک میں ایک ایک کر ایک ہے۔ ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک م ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک ایک	Α	dditional Inform	ation
1. Is the NAMED INSURED the	-		
If NO, who is?		Relationshi	p
2. Are any owned vehicles not	insured with Patriot G	eneral? 🗆 Y 🗆 N	
	Sp	ecial Equipmen	t =
This policy covers the following (A) Any permanently is equipment from the	g equipment. Everythin nstalled equipment, pe e manufacturer of the	ints, or accessories w	"Special Equipment". hich ware purchased as standard or optional
(B) Up to the maximum provided the devic installation of a rad	ce is installed in the o	nently installed devic pening of the dash o	e designed for the recording or reproduction of sour r console normally used by the manufacturer for ti
this coverage when it is issued in the physical data	ued or renewed unle amage deductibles fo	ss I have purchase	stand it. I understand that my policy will not contain d the Special Equipment Endorsement. If I have ision will apply. I understand that I may edd this
coverage to my policy at any fi			- Date
coverage to my policy at any fi Signature of Insured/Applicant			
		Раде 3	L1102 WA (5
		Раде 3	L1102 WA (5

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121005 Page 4 of 10

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Washington Acceptance or Rejection of UIM-BI, UIM-PD, and

Underinsured Motorists Bodlly Injury (UIM-BI) Coverage, Underinsured Motorists Property Damage (UIM-PD) Coverage, and Personal Injury protection (PIP) Coverage have been explained to me and I fully understand them.

If accepted, the Underinsured Motorists Bodlly Injury (UIM-BI), Underinsured Motorists Property Damage (UIM-PD), and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Coverage limits I have requested are shown on the Personal Auto Application or change request, I understand that \$10,000 UIM-PD will be added to my policy unless rejected.

Please initial for rejection:

Rejected:

Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury (UIM-BI) Coverage

Underinsured Motorists Property Damage (UIM-PD) Coverage

Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Coverage

A120BWA

Named Driver Exclusion Endorsement - Washington

This policy will not provide any insurance coverage when a vehicle is being driven, either with or without any insured's permission, by the following excluded drivers. However, this exclusion does not apply to Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage, Underinsured Motorists Property Damage Coverage, or Personal Injury Protection if a premium is shown for such coverage(s) on the Declarations Page.

Excluded Driver

_

Date of Birth

Relationship

This endorsement applies to this policy and any continuation, renewal, change or reinstatement of this policy by the named insured, or the reissuance of the policy by the Company.

By signing this Driver Exclusion Endorsement form you agree to this change in your policy. All other terms and conditions of your policy remain in full force and effect.

Named insured's Signature

Date

NDE1-WA

Page 4

L1102 WA (5/10)

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Applicant Initials

I hereby apply to the Company for a policy of insurance as set forth in this application on the basis of statements contained herein. I understand and agree that a routine inquiry may be made which will provide applicable information concerning character, general reputation, personal characteristics, mode of living and credit history. Upon written request, additional information as to the nature and scope of the report, if one is made, will be provided. I understand and agree that such policy shall be cancelled and the benefits available under such policy may be denied if such information is known to be faise and would affect acceptance of the risk or would in any way affect the rating of the tisk by the Company. Further:

Applicant _ _

1 also certify that all persons age 14 or over who live with me temporarily or permanently and all persons who are regular operators of any vehicle to be insured have been listed on this application and reported to the Company. I declare that there are no operators of the vehicle(s) described in this application unless their names and ages are shown above or are provided in writing to the Company within 14 days of when they begin driving the vehicle(s) described in this application.



I also certify that the garaging address listed on this application is my current full-time vehicle garaging location. I understand and agree that it is my responsibility to report any change of garaging location to the Company within 14 days of the change.

I fully understand and agree that no coverage can be bound unless a premium deposit accompanies this application. If such deposit does accompany this application, coverage is bound no earlier than the time and date the application is signed by both the applicant and agent, as shown below, provided the application is , postmarked within 72 hours of that time and date.

understand that driving records of all persons listed on this application may be checked. If the record for the



rated driver differs from the information provided by me, my premium will be adjusted. I will receive written notice showing the adjusted premium term or a billing for the required premium.



Company on any date specified by the Company, any rewrite of such coverage will reflect the coverages, limits and deductibles in force at the time of lepse of coverage.

DRIVER RESTRICTION - READ CAREFULLY: I understand and agree that the insurance policy I am requesting will not apply for Liability and Car Damage coverages while the insured vehicle is being driven by any person under the age of twenty-five unless that person is listed as a driver on this application and on the policy at the time of the loss.



It is a crime to knowingly provide false, incomplete, or misleading information to an insurance company for the purpose of defrauding the company. Penalties include imprisonment, fines, and denial of insurance benefits.

I understand and agree that when I have purchased physical damage coverage, damages to stereo and sound producing equipment is limited to a maximum of \$500, I understand that I must purchase special equipment coverage in order to obtain a higher limit of coverage for stereo and sound producing equipment. I also understand that no coverage will exist for equipment that has not been factory installed unless Special Equipment coverage has been purchased.

L1102 WA (5/10)

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Applicant and Agent Signatures

THE ABOVE FACTS ARE TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND THE INSURANCE IS TO BE ISSUED IN RELIANCE UPON THEM. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THE INSURANCE PREMIUMS FOR THE ABOVE COVERAGES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE BASED ON THE DRIVING RECORDS OF ALL OPERATORS.

08-//-/0	3:10	PM	Oby Q.L. Sufiery 5-2
Date Signed	Time Signed	PM	
			•

Signature of Parent/Legal Guardian (if applicant is a minor)

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE ASKED THE APPLICANT ALL OF THE QUESTIONS LISTED ON THE APPLICATION AND HAVE RECORDED THEIR ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS.

Agents have the authority to bind coverage no earlier than the time and date the application is signed by the applicant and the agent and a premium deposit accompanies the application.

	3.10		.7	
Date Signed	Time Signed	<u></u> , _, _, _, _, _, _, _, _, _, _, _, _, _,	Signature of Agent	

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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T FOR WALLA WA	
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF KYLE MOSBRUCKER IN SUPPORT OF
10	v.	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
13	Defendants.	
14	I, Kyle Mosbrucker, declare as follows:	
15	1. I am more than 18 years of age, and	nd I have personal knowledge of the matters set
16	forth herein. I am an employee of Viking Insurar	ace Company of Wisconsin.
17	2. Patriot General Insurance Compar	ny issued a personal automobile policy to Jorge
18	Gutierrez with a policy period of October 29,	2010, to April 29, 2011 under policy number
19	471327125.	
20	3. Jorge Gutierrez filed a UIM clain	n under that policy on behalf of his son, Javier
21	Gutierrez, regarding a motor-vehicle accident that	
22		ny denied the claim because Javier was not an
23		
24	insured under that policy. Attached as exhibit 1 i	
25	DECLARATION OF KYLE MOSBRUCKER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERA	L
26	INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker.docx	A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101
		(206) 386-7755

1	insured under that policy. Attached as exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of May 22, 2012 letter			
2	I sent to Jorge Gutierrez regarding the denial of his claim.			
3	I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Washington that the			
4	foregoing is true and correct.			
5	Executed at Stevens Point, Wisconsin on this 10th day of June, 2013.			
6	ALL MALL			
7	Kyle Mostaluce			
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24	DECLARATION OF KYLE MOSBRUCKER IN			
25	SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR			
26	SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 C:\Users\075503\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\J3D118HQ\Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker (2).docx THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PL 627 1325 FOULDTI A VEXUE SEAT ILL, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755			
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EXHIBIT 1

Patriot General Insurance Company P.O. Box 8039 Stevens Point, WI 54481



May 22, 2012

Claim Number:92A330071-487Insured:JORGE GUTIERREZRegarding:JORGE GUTIERREZDate of Loss:01/09/2011

JORGE GUTIERREZ 146 W TIETAN ST WALLA WALLA WA 99362-4343 •[lipui]qidid][iqlq]dilib][i]dilib]

Mr. Gutierrez:

With respect to the accident your son was involved in on 1/9/11 in Walla Walla, Washington Patriot General Insurance Company disclaims and denies any and all liability or obligation to you and to others under its policies numbered 471327125.

This disclaimer is made because your son is over the age of 14 and is not listed on your policy with us. Our investigation shows that on 1/9/11 Javier Gutierrez was a passenger in a 1988 Ford Bronco which was involved in an accident. Our investigation also shows that Javier Gutierrez's date of birth is 1/17/1991. Based on this information, Javier Gutierrez does not qualify as a "You" under the policy, therefore, there is no coverage for this loss.

Please refer to your policy which states:

AGREEMENT

In return for **your** premium payment and subject to the terms and conditions of this policy, **we** will insure **you** for the coverages up to the limits of liability for which a premium is shown on the Declarations Page of this policy. This insurance applies only to **car accidents** and losses which happen while this policy is in force. This policy is issued by **us** in reliance upon the statements which **you** made in **your** application for insurance. If **you** have made any false statement in **your** application, this policy may not provide any coverage.

DEFINITIONS USED THROUGHOUT THIS POLICY

(2) "You" and "your" mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your also means any relative of that person if they reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a motor vehicle.

(3) "Relative" means a person living in **your** household related to **you** by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor under **your** guardianship who lives in **your** household. Any **relative** who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.

PART III – UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE

This coverage applies only if a premium is shown for this coverage on the Declarations Page.

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92A330071-487

We will pay damages for **bodily injury** which an **insured person** is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an **uninsured motor vehicle**. The **bodily injury** must be caused by a **car accident** and result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an **uninsured motor vehicle**.

Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought without our consent is not binding on us.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

As used in this Part:

(1) "Insured Person" means:

(A) You.

(B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.

(C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of **bodily injury** to **you** or another occupant of **your car**.

No person shall be considered an **insured person** if that person uses a **motor vehicle** without permission of the owner.

Patriot General Insurance Company's listing of the foregoing basis for its coverage position does not limit any other grounds for denial of coverage if the facts or developing law warrant it. In that connection, please be advised that Patriot General Insurance Company's reference to the foregoing coverage provisions and exclusions should not be interpreted as a waiver or as an estoppel on the part of Patriot General Insurance Company to assert any other terms, conditions, exclusions or limits of liability contained in the policies.

The foregoing analysis is based upon the materials that have been provided to us. As Patriot General Insurance Company wants its insureds to receive all benefits to which they are entitled under policies of insurance which it issues, if you have any information that Patriot General Insurance Company should consider, please provide same to the undersigned as soon as possible. Additionally, if the allegations change or suit papers are received, please contact us to reconsider our position in light of any new claims presented.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 1-800-547-7830 ext.5664242.

High Modenter

Kyle Mosbrucker, Claims Representative II Patriot General Insurance Company A Member of the Sentry Insurance Group 800-547-7830 ext. 5664242 or 503-566-4242 888-729-2225 Fax Kyle.Mosbrucker@Sentry.Com

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5	ν.
6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR WALLA WALLA COUNTY
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF MATTHEW MUNSON IN SUPPORT OF
10	v. PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,
13	Defendants.
14	I, Matthew Munson, declare as follows:
15	1. I am more than 18 years of age, and I have personal knowledge of the matters set
16	forth herein. I am one of the attorneys representing Patriot General Insurance Company of in this
17	lawsuit.
18	2. Attached as exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of Javier Gutierrez's Responses to
19	Patriot General Insurance Company's Requests for Admission.
20	3. Attached as exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Jorge Gutierrez's Responses to
21	Patriot General Insurance Company's Requests for Admission.
22	4. Attached as exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of chapter 242 of the Washington
23	State Legislature's 1993 Session Law. This document is available at
24	
25	DECLARATION OF MATTHEW MUNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL
26	INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Matthew Munson.docx 52

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http://www.leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/Pages/session_laws.aspx.

5. Attached as exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the House Bill Report for Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1233 of the 1993 legislative session. This document is available at http://search.leg.wa.gov/search in the database for the 1993–1994 biennium.

 Attached as exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of chapter 115 of the Washington
 State Legislature's 2003 Session Law. This document is available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/Pages/session_laws.aspx.

7. Attached as exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the House Bill Report for House Bill 1084 of the 2003 legislative session. This document is available at http://search.leg.wa.gov/search in the database for the 2003–2004 biennium.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

14 E

Executed at Seattle, Washington on this $\frac{1/\frac{1}{2}}{2}$ day of June, 2013.

then nlunson

Matthew Munson

 DECLARATION OF MATTHEW MUNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL
 INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH

A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

EXHIBIT 1 54

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	5	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF I	THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
	6	FOR WALLA WA	
	7		,
	8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
	9	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S FIRST
	10	v .	SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANT
	11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	JAVIER GUTIERREZ
	12	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
	13	Defendants.	
	14	TO: DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ;	· · · · ·
•	15		any hereby requests pursuant to Civil Rule 36
	16	that you admit or deny in writing the following	Requests for Admission within THIRTY (30)
	17	days of the date of service of these requests upon	
	18		you. If you object to a Request for Aumission,
	19	the reasons for your objections shall be stated.	
	20	The answer to each Request for Admissio	n shall specifically deny the matter or set forth
	21	in detail the reason why you cannot truthfully a	dmit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly
	22	meet the substance of the requested admission. I	If you qualify an answer or deny only a part of
	23	the matter of which an admission is request, you s	shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify
	24	or deny the remainder.	
	25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR	
	26	ADMISSION TO DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\DISCOVERY\First set of RFAs to Javier Gutierrez.docx	COP WORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101

1	You may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or
2	deny, unless you state that you have made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or
3	readily obtainable by you is insufficient to enable you to admit or deny. If you consider that a
_4	
5	matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial, you may not,
6	on that ground alone, object to the request.
7	REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
8	REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:
9	Admit that defendant Javier Gutierrez's date of birth is January 17, 1991.
10	RESPONSE:
11	
12	
13	· ·
14	DEQUEST FOR A DAMESION NO. 2.
	REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2:
15	Admit that on January 9, 2011, defendant Javier Gutierrez was 19 years of age.
16	RESPONSE:
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18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:
24	Admit that on or around January 9, 2011, Javier Gutierrez was a passenger in an automobile that
25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
26	ADMISSION TO DEFENDANT JAVIER THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH
	GUTIERREZ - 2 G:\Docs\255\2479\DISCOVERY\First set of RFAs to Javier Gutierrez.docx 56 G:\Docs\255\2479\DISCOVERY\First set of RFAs to Javier Gutierrez.docx

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1 24 1 . . .

1 was involved in a motor vehicle accident in or near Walla Walla, Washington. 2 **RESPONSE:** 3 4 5 6 7 8 DATED this 22^k day of March, 2013. 9 Matthe Uluman 10 PATRICK M. PAULICH, WSBA #10951 11 MATTHEW MUNSON, WSBA #32019 Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company 12 **THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH** 1325 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1300 13 Seattle, WA 98101 (206) 389-7755 14 ppaulich@tcplaw.com 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE 25 COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR **THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH** ADMISSION TO DEFENDANT JAVIER 26 A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION **GUTIERREZ - 3** 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755 G:\Docs\255\2479\DISCOVERY\First set of RFAs to Javier Gutierrez.docx 57

		1
1	STATE OF WASHINGTON)	
	2 COUNTY OF) ss:	
3	Javier Gutierrez, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:	
4		
5		
6		
7	Javier Gutierrez	
. 8	SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of, 2013.	
9		
10	NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State	
11	of Washington, residing at	
12	My Commission expires on: Printed Name:	
13		
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25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR	
26	ADMISSION TO DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ - 4 G:\Docs\255\2479\DISCOVERY\First set of RFAs to Javier Gutierrez.docx 58 THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (7061 38,7755	

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1	COPY RECEIVED
2	APR 2 2 2013
3	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH
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7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WALLA WALLA
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, NO: 12 2 00908 3
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs. DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ' ANSWER TO
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ, ADMISSION
14	Defendants.
15	
16	ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit
17	ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit
18	ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit
19	The undersigned attorney certifies pursuant to Civil Rule 26(g) that
20	he or she has read each response and objection to these Requests for Admission, and that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after a
21	reasonable inquiry, each is (1) consistent with the Civil Rules and warranted by
22	existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
	existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
23	cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of litigation; and (3)
24 25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ' ANSWER TO Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walla Walla, WA 99382 Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977
26	PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION/ 1 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. 1.3 day of April, 2013. DATED this Hess Law Office, PLLC By: Peter J. Hess, WSBA #39721 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walla Walla, WA 99362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ' ANSWER TO Fax (509) 525-4977 PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION/ 2 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
6	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of April, 2013, I caused to be
7	served the original of DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ' ANSWER TO
8	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF
9	REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION by the method indicated below, and addressed to
10	the following:
11	Mr. Patrick M. Paulich U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Thorsrud Cane & Paulich Hand Delivered
12	1300 Puget Sound Plaza Overnight Mail 1325 Fourth Avenue Facsimile
13	Seattle, WA 98101
14	
15	Adrienne King,
16	Assistant to PETER J. HESS
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	Hess Law Office, PLLC
25	415 N. Second Avenue Walla Walla, WA 99362
26	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ' ANSWER TO Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION/ 3 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com
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2		ICAN HORNED
3		APR 26 2013
4		THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH
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7		
8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3
10	Plaintiff	PATRIOT GENERAL'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO
11	VS.	JORGE GUTIERREZ AND RESPONSES
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	NEOT ONOLO
13	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
14	Defendants	
15		
16	REQUESTS FO	RADMISSION
17	REQUESTION FOR ADMISSION NO. 1.	
18	Admit that defendant Javier Gutierrez's date of	of birth is January 17, 1991.
19	RESPONSE:	
20	Admit.	
21		
22		Klipatrick Law Group, P.C.
23	PATRIOT GENERAL'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO JORGE GUTIERREZ AND RESPONSES Page 1 of 3	1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161
24	n:\/bkcases\gutlemez adv. patriot general\discovery\patriot general's 1st req admission and enswers.doc	Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com
25		

1	REQUESTION FOR ADMISSION NO. 2.
2	Admit that on January 9, 2011, defendant Javier Gutierrez was 19 years of age.
3	RESPONSE:
4	Admit.
5	
6	
7	
8	REQUESTION FOR ADMISSION NO. 3.
9	Admit that on or around January 9, 2011, Javier Gutierrez was a passenger in an
10	automobile hat was involved in a motor vehicle accident in or near Walla Walla,
11	Washington.
12	RESPONSE:
13	Admit.
14	
15	DATED: April 26, 2013
16	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.
17	
18	Snon the the Dick Kilpatrick, WSBA #7058
19	Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495 Attorneys for Jorge Gutierrez
20	
21	
22	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. PATRIOT GENERAL'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155
23	TO JORGE GUTIERREZ AND RESPONSES Bellevue, WA 98004 Page 2 of 3 Fax: (425) 605-9540
24	FaX: (425) 605-9540 n:\tbkcases\gutterrez adv. patriot general\discovery\patriot generals 1st req admission dick@triallawyerSnw.com and answers.doc shannon@triallawyerSnw.com
25	

1	DECLARATION	OF SERVICE
2		
3	The undersigned hereby declares I	am over the age of 18 and under the
4	penalty of perjury under the laws of the Sta	ate of Washington that on this date I
5	caused to be served in a manner noted be	low a true and correct copy of the
6	foregoing on the parties mentioned below	as indicated:
7		
8	Patrick Paulich	[XXX] Fax
9	Thorsrud Cane & Paulich 1300 Puget Sound Plaza	[] U.S. Mail
10	1325 Fouth Ave Seattle, WA 98101	[] Electronic Filing
11	ppaulich@tcplaw.com F:206-386-7795	[] Legal Messenger
12	Peter Hess	[]FedEx
13	Hess Law Office 312 N. Second Ave	
14	Walla Walla, WA 99362 <u>peter@hesslawoffice.com</u> E-500 525 4077	
15	F:509-525-4977	
16	Dated this 26th day of April, 2013 a	at Bellevue, Washington.
17		
18		Kinscrasher
19	ĸ	endra Short, Legal Assistant
20		
21		
22		Klipatrick Law Group, P.C.
23	PATRIOT GENERAL'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO JORGE GUTIERREZ AND RESPONSES Page 3 of 3	
24	n:\rbkcases\gutierrez adv. patriot general\discovery\patriot general's 1st req edm\asi and answers.doc	Fax: (425) 605-9540
25		Shannon & Bhannon & Bhanna & Bhanno & Bhannon & Bhannon & Bhannon & Bhannon & Bhannon

CHAPTER 242

[Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1233]

MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE—PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS Effective Date: 7/25/93 - Except Sections 1 through 5 which become effective on 7/1/94

AN ACT Relating to mandatory offering of personal injury protection insurance; adding new sections to chapter 48.22 RCW; creating a new section; and providing an effective date.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 1. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.

(1) "Automobile" means a passenger car as defined in RCW 46.04.382 registered or principally garaged in this state other than:

(a) A farm-type tractor or other self-propelled equipment designed for use principally off public roads;

(b) A vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads;

(c) A vehicle located for use as a residence;

(d) A motor home as defined in RCW 46.04.305; or

(e) A moped as defined in RCW 46.04.304.

(2) "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death at any time resulting from the injury, sickness, or disease.

(3) "Income continuation benefits" means payments of at least eighty-five percent of the insured's loss of income from work, because of bodily injury sustained by him or her in the accident, less income earned during the benefit payment period. The benefit payment period begins fourteen days after the date of the accident and ends at the earliest of the following:

(a) The date on which the insured is reasonably able to perform the duties of his or her usual occupation;

(b) The expiration of not more than fifty-two weeks from the fourteenth day; or

(c) The date of the insured's death.

(4) "Insured automobile" means an automobile described on the declarations page of the policy.

(5) "Insured" means:

(a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is either related to the named insured by blood, marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild; or

(b) A person who sustains bodily injury caused by accident while: (i) Occupying or using the insured automobile with the permission of the named insured; or (ii) a pedestrian accidentally struck by the insured automobile.

(6) "Loss of services benefits" means reimbursement for payment to others, not members of the insured's household, for expenses reasonably incurred for services in lieu of those the insured would usually have performed for his or her household without compensation, provided the services are actually rendered, and ending the earliest of the following:

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(a) The date on which the insured person is reasonably able to perform those services;

(b) The expiration of fifty-two weeks; or

(c) The date of the insured's death.

(7) "Medical and hospital benefits" means payments for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the insured for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident for health care services provided by persons licensed under Title 18 RCW, including pharmaceuticals, prosthetic devices and eye glasses, and necessary ambulance, hospital, and professional nursing service.

(8) "Automobile liability insurance policy" means a policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death, or property damage suffered by any person and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an insured automobile.

(9) "Named insured" means the individual named in the declarations of the policy and includes his or her spouse if a resident of the same household.

(10) "Occupying" means in or upon or entering into or alighting from.

(11) "Pedestrian" means a natural person not occupying a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.320.

(12) "Personal injury protection" means the benefits described in sections 1 through 5 of this act.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 2. (1) No new automobile liability insurance policy or renewal of such an existing policy may be issued unless personal injury protection coverage benefits at limits established in this chapter for medical and hospital expenses, funeral expenses, income continuation, and loss of services sustained by an insured because of bodily injury caused by an automobile accident are offered as an optional coverage.

(2) A named insured may reject, in writing, personal injury protection coverage and the requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply. If a named insured has rejected personal injury protection coverage, that rejection shall be valid and binding as to all levels of coverage and on all persons who might have otherwise been insured under such coverage. If a named insured has rejected personal injury protection coverage, such coverage shall not be included in any supplemental, renewal, or replacement policy unless a named insured subsequently requests such coverage in writing.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 3. (1) Personal injury protection coverage need not be provided for vendor's single interest policies, general liability policies, or other policies, commonly known as umbrella policies, that apply only as excess to the automobile liability policy directly applicable to the insured motor vehicle.

(2) Personal injury protection coverage need not be provided to or on behalf of:

(a) A person who intentionally causes injury to himself or herself;

(b) A person who is injured while participating in a prearranged or organized racing or speed contest or in practice or preparation for such a contest;

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(c) A person whose bodily injury is due to war, whether or not declared, or to an act or condition incident to such circumstances;

(d) A person whose bodily injury results from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear material;

(e) The named insured or a relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the named insured or furnished for the named insured's regular use, if such motor vehicle is not described on the declaration page of the policy under which a claim is made;

(f) A relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the relative or furnished for the relative's regular use, if such motor vehicle is not described on the declaration page of the policy under which a claim is made; or

(g) An insured whose bodily injury results or arises from the insured's use of an automobile in the commission of a felony.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 4. Insurers providing automobile insurance policies must offer minimum personal injury protection coverage for each insured with maximum benefit limits as follows:

(1) Medical and hospital benefits of ten thousand dollars for expenses incurred within three years of the automobile accident;

(2) Benefits for funeral expenses in an amount of two thousand dollars;

(3) Income continuation benefits covering income losses incurred within one year after the date of the insured's injury in an amount of ten thousand dollars, subject to a limit of the lesser of two hundred dollars per week or eighty-five percent of the weekly income. The combined weekly payment receivable by the insured under any workers' compensation or other disability insurance benefits or other income continuation benefit and this insurance may not exceed eightyfive percent of the insured's weekly income;

(4) Loss of services benefits in an amount of five thousand dollars, subject to a limit of forty dollars per day not to exceed two hundred dollars per week; and

(5) Payments made under personal injury protection coverage are limited to the amount of actual loss or expense incurred.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 5. In lieu of minimum coverage required under section 4 of this act, an insurer providing automobile liability insurance policies shall offer and provide, upon request, personal injury protection coverage with benefit limits for each insured of:

(1) Up to thirty-five thousand dollars for medical and hospital benefits incurred within three years of the automobile accident;

(2) Up to two thousand dollars for funeral expenses incurred;

(3) Up to thirty-five thousand dollars for one year's income continuation benefits, subject to a limit of the lesser of seven hundred dollars per week or eighty-five percent of the weekly income; and

(4) Up to forty dollars per day for loss of services benefits, for up to one year from the date of the automobile accident.

Payments made under personal injury protection coverage are limited to the amount of actual loss or expense incurred.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 6. Sections 1 through 5 of this act are each added to chapter 48.22 RCW.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 7. If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 8. Sections 1 through 5 of this act shall take effect July 1, 1994.

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 9. The commissioner may adopt such rules as are necessary to implement sections 1 through 5 of this act.

Passed the House April 20, 1993. Passed the Senate April 16, 1993. Approved by the Governor May 7, 1993. Filed in Office of Secretary of State May 7, 1993.

CHAPTER 243

[Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1259]

FORFEITED FIREARMS---DESTRUCTION, SALE, OR TRADE OF Effective Date: 5/7/93

AN ACT Relating to forfeiture of firearms; amending RCW 9.41.098; and declaring an emergency.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

Sec. 1. RCW 9.41.098 and 1989 c 222 s 8 are each amended to read as follows:

(1) The superior courts and the courts of limited jurisdiction of the state may order forfeiture of a firearm which is proven to be:

(a) Found concealed on a person not authorized by RCW 9.41.060 or 9.41.070 to carry a concealed pistol: PROVIDED, That it is an absolute defense to forfeiture if the person possessed a valid Washington concealed pistol license within the preceding two years and has not become ineligible for a concealed pistol license in the interim. Before the firearm may be returned, the person must pay the past due renewal fee and the current renewal fee;

(b) Commercially sold to any person without an application as required by RCW 9.41.090;

(c) Found in the possession or under the control of a person at the time the person committed or was arrested for committing a crime of violence or a crime in which a firearm was used or displayed or a felony violation of the uniform controlled substances act, chapter 69.50 RCW;

(d) Found concealed on a person who is in any place in which a concealed pistol license is required, and who is under the influence of any drug or under

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HOUSE BILL REPORT

HB 1233

As Reported By House Committee On:

Financial Institutions & Insurance

Title: An act relating to mandatory offering of personal injury protection insurance.

Brief Description: Regulating the mandatory offering of personal injury protection insurance.

Sponsors: Representatives R. Meyers, Zellinsky, Dellwo, R. Johnson, Scott, Riley, Kessler, Dunshee, Dorn, Foreman, Grant, Kremen and Johanson.

Brief History:

Reported by House Committee on:

Financial Institutions & Insurance, February 4, 1993, DPS.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INSURANCE

Majority Report: The substitute bill be substituted therefor and the substitute bill do pass. Signed by 16 members: Representatives Zellinsky, Chair; Scott, Vice Chair; Mielke, Ranking Minority Member; Dyer, Assistant Ranking Minority Member; Anderson; Dellwo; Dorn; Grant; R. Johnson; Kessler; Kremen; Lemmon; R. Meyers; Reams; Schmidt; and Tate.

Staff: John Conniff (786-7119).

- **Background:** Most automobile insurance companies offer medical coverage, also referred to as personal injury protection (PIP) coverage, as part of a comprehensive auto insurance policy. PIP coverage includes disability, wage loss, and death benefit coverage. The Insurance Commissioner has adopted limited rules setting basic standards for the amount of coverage to be offered by insurers who market PIP coverage.
- Summary of Substitute Bill: Automobile liability insurance companies must provide PIP coverage under nonbusiness auto insurance policies unless the named insured rejects PIP coverage in writing. Insurers need not provide PIP coverage for motor homes or motorcycles, for intentional injuries, for injuries arising from war, from toxic waste exposure or from

accidents while the insured is occupying an owned but uninsured auto, or from accidents to the insured's relatives while occupying an auto owned by the relative.

Coverage must extend to reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses incurred within three years from the date of the insured's injury up to \$10,000. Funeral expenses must be covered up to \$2,000. Loss of income benefits must be provided up to \$10,000 subject to certain limits. Loss of services benefits must be provided up to \$40 per day and not exceeding a total of \$5,000. Insurers must offer higher limits for all such benefits as provided.

Insurers and policyholders must adhere to the claim procedures outlined.

- Insurance companies may not settle subrogation claims through intercompany arbitration until the policyholder's claim has been settled.
- An insurer may not incorporate any exclusion, condition, or other provision in a policy that limits the PIP benefits required without the approval of the Insurance Commissioner.
- Substitute Bill Compared to Original Bill: Many technical changes are made to clarify requirements for offering PIP coverage and several substantive changes are made to satisfy insurance company objections. Among these substantive changes: the deletion of rules requiring insurance companies to pay for plaintiff's attorney's recovery of amounts owed to the company; further limitations on the required PIP benefits including a weekly limit on loss of services coverage; and authority to condition or limit coverage as permitted by the Insurance Commissioner.

Fiscal Note: Requested January 28, 1993.

Effective Date of Substitute Bill: The bill takes effect July 1, 1994.

Testimony For: None.

- **Testimony Against:** (Original Bill): Insurers should not be required to pay the policyholder's attorney a share of amounts owed to the insurer simply because such amounts were included in the settlement of the policyholder's claim. Required PIP benefits should be clarified in several sections to prevent benefit payments and limit benefit payments for persons not intended as beneficiaries of PIP coverage. (No testimony on substitute bill).
- Witnesses: Craig McGee, PEMCO (Con); Jean Leonard and Paul Danner, State Farm Insurance Company (Con); Clark Sitzes, Independent Agents (Con); Mike Kupphahn, Farmers Insurance (neither pro nor con but amend); and Melodie Bankers, Insurance Commissioner's Office (with some concerns).



Sec. 1. RCW 48.22.005 and 1993 c 242 s 1 are each amended to read as follows:

Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.

(1) "Automobile" means a passenger car as defined in RCW 46.04.382 registered or principally garaged in this state other than:

(a) A farm-type tractor or other self-propelled equipment designed for use principally off public roads;

(b) A vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads;

(c) A vehicle located for use as a residence;

(d) A motor home as defined in RCW 46.04.305; or

(e) A moped as defined in RCW 46.04.304.

(2) "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death at any time resulting from the injury, sickness, or disease.

(3) "Income continuation benefits" means payments ((of at least eighty five percent of)) for the insured's loss of income from work, because of bodily injury sustained by ((him or her)) the insured in ((the)) an automobile accident, less income earned during the benefit payment period. The combined weekly payment an insured may receive under personal injury protection coverage, worker's compensation, disability insurance, or other income continuation benefits may not exceed eighty-five percent of the insured's weekly income from work. The benefit payment period begins fourteen days after the date of the automobile accident and ends at the earliest of the following:

(a) The date on which the insured is reasonably able to perform the duties of his or her usual occupation;

(b) ((The expiration of not-more than fifty two weeks from the fourteenth day)) Fifty-four weeks from the date of the automobile accident; or

(c) The date of the insured's death.

(4) "Insured automobile" means an automobile described on the declarations page of the policy.

(5) "Insured" means:

(a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is either related to the named insured by blood, marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild; or

(b) A person who sustains bodily injury caused by accident while: (i) Occupying or using the insured automobile with the permission of the named insured; or (ii) a pedestrian accidentally struck by the insured automobile.

(6) "Loss of services benefits" means reimbursement for payment to others, not members of the insured's household, for expenses reasonably incurred for services in lieu of those the insured would usually have performed for his or her household without compensation, provided the services are actually rendered(($\frac{1}{7}$ and ending)). The maximum benefit is forty dollars per day. Reimbursement for loss of services ends the earliest of the following:

(a) The date on which the insured person is reasonably able to perform those services;

(b) ((The expiration of fifty-two weeks)) Fifty-two weeks from the date of the automobile accident; or

(c) The date of the insured's death.

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(7) "Medical and hospital benefits" means payments for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the insured for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident for health care services provided by persons licensed under Title 18 RCW, including pharmaceuticals, prosthetic devices and eye glasses, and necessary ambulance, hospital, and professional nursing service. Medical and hospital benefits are payable for expenses incurred within three years from the date of the automobile accident.

(8) "Automobile liability insurance policy" means a policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death, or property damage suffered by any person and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an insured automobile. <u>An automobile liability policy does not</u> include:

(a) Vendors single interest or collateral protection coverage;

(b) General liability insurance; or

(c) Excess liability insurance, commonly known as an umbrella policy, where coverage applies only as excess to an underlying automobile policy.

(9) "Named insured" means the individual named in the declarations of the policy and includes his or her spouse if a resident of the same household.

(10) "Occupying" means in or upon or entering into or alighting from.

(11) "Pedestrian" means a natural person not occupying a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.320.

(12) "Personal injury protection" means the benefits described in this section and RCW 48.22.085 through 48.22.100. <u>Payments made under personal</u> injury protection coverage are limited to the actual amount of loss or expense incurred.

Sec. 2. RCW 48.22.085 and 1993 c 242 s 2 are each amended to read as follows:

(1) No new automobile liability insurance policy or renewal of such an existing policy may be issued unless personal injury protection coverage ((benefits at limits established in this chapter for medical and hospital expenses, funeral expenses, income continuation, and loss of services sustained by an insured because of bodily injury caused by an automobile accident are)) is offered as an optional coverage.

(2) A named insured may reject, in writing, personal injury protection coverage and the requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply. If a named insured ((has rejected)) rejects personal injury protection $coverage((_{7}))$:

(a) That rejection ((shall be)) is valid and binding as to all levels of coverage and on all persons who might have otherwise been insured under such coverage((. If a named insured has rejected personal injury protection coverage, such coverage shall not be included)); and

(b) The insurer is not required to include personal injury protection coverage in any supplemental, renewal, or replacement policy unless a named insured subsequently requests such coverage in writing.

Sec. 3. RCW 48.22.090 and 1993 c 242 s 3 are each amended to read as follows:

(((1) Personal injury protection coverage need not be provided for vendor's single interest policies, general liability policies, or other policies, commonly

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known as umbrella policies, that apply only as excess to the automobile liability policy directly applicable to the insured motor vehicle.

(2) Personal-injury protection coverage need not be provided)) An insurer is not required to provide personal injury protection coverage to or on behalf of:

(((a))) (1) A person who intentionally causes injury to himself or herself;

(((b))) (2) A person who is injured while participating in a prearranged or organized racing or speed contest or in practice or preparation for such a contest;

(((c))) (3) A person whose bodily injury is due to war, whether or not declared, or to an act or condition incident to such circumstances;

((((d))) (<u>4</u>) A person whose bodily injury results from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear material;

(((e))) (5) The named insured or a relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the named insured or furnished for the named insured's regular use, if such motor vehicle is not described on the declaration page of the policy under which a claim is made;

(((f))) (6) A relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the relative or furnished for the relative's regular use, if such motor vehicle is not described on the declaration page of the policy under which a claim is made; or

 $((\frac{g}))$ (7) An insured whose bodily injury results or arises from the insured's use of an automobile in the commission of a felony.

Sec. 4. RCW 48.22.095 and 1993 c 242 s 4 are each amended to read as follows:

Insurers providing automobile insurance policies must offer minimum personal injury protection coverage for each insured with ((maximum)) benefit limits as follows:

(1) Medical and hospital benefits of ten thousand dollars ((for expenses incurred within three years of the automobile accident));

(2) ((Benefits for funeral expenses in an amount)) <u>A funeral expense benefit</u> of two thousand dollars;

(3) Income continuation benefits ((eovering income losses incurred within one year after the date of the insured's injury in an amount)) of ten thousand dollars, subject to a limit of ((the lesser of)) two hundred dollars per week ((or eighty five percent of the weekly income. The combined weekly payment receivable by the insured under any workers' compensation or other disability insurance benefits or other income continuation benefit and this insurance may not exceed eighty five percent of the insured's weekly income)); and

(4) Loss of services benefits ((in-an-amount)) of five thousand dollars, subject to a limit of ((forty-dollars per day not to exceed)) two hundred dollars per week((; and

(5) Payments made under personal injury protection coverage are limited to the amount of actual loss or expense incurred)).

Sec. 5. RCW 48.22.100 and 1993 c 242 s 5 are each amended to read as follows:

((In lieu of minimum coverage required under RCW 48.22.095)) If requested by a named insured, an insurer providing automobile liability insurance policies ((shall)) <u>must</u> offer ((and provide, upon request;)) personal injury protection coverage for each insured with benefit limits ((for each insured of)) as follows: (1) ((Up to)) <u>Medical and hospital benefits of</u> thirty-five thousand dollars ((for medical and hospital benefits incurred within three years of the automobile accident));

(2) ((Up to)) <u>A funeral expense benefit of</u> two thousand dollars ((for funeral expenses incurred));

(3) ((Up-to)) Income continuation benefits of thirty-five thousand dollars ((for one year's income continuation benefits)), subject to a limit of ((the lesser of)) seven hundred dollars per week ((or eighty-five percent of the weekly income)); and

(4) ((Up to forty dollars per day for loss of services benefits, for up to one year from the date of the automobile accident.

Payments made under personal injury protection coverage are limited to the amount of actual loss or expense incurred)) Loss of services benefits of fourteen thousand six hundred dollars.

Passed by the House February 10, 2003. Passed by the Senate April 17, 2003. Approved by the Governor May 7, 2003. Filed in Office of Secretary of State May 7, 2003.

CHAPTER 116

[House Bill 1150]

INSURANCE—SINGLE PREMIUM CREDIT

AN ACT Relating to the sale of single premium credit insurance; and adding a new section to chapter 48.18 RCW.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

<u>NEW SECTION.</u> Sec. 1. A new section is added to chapter 48.18 RCW to read as follows:

(1) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Licensee" means every insurance agent, broker, or solicitor licensed under chapter 48.17 RCW.

(b) "Residential mortgage loan" means any loan primarily for personal, family, or household use secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on residential real estate upon which is constructed or intended to be constructed a singlefamily dwelling or multiple family dwelling of four or less units.

(c) "Single premium credit insurance" means credit insurance purchased with a single premium payment at inception of coverage.

(2) An insurer or licensee may not issue or sell any single premium credit insurance product in connection with a residential mortgage loan unless:

(a) The term of the single premium credit insurance policy is the same as the term of the loan;

(b) The debtor is given the option to buy credit insurance paid with monthly premiums; and

(c) The single premium credit insurance policy provides for a full refund of premiums to the debtor if the credit insurance is canceled within sixty days of the date of the loan.

(3) This section does not apply to residential mortgage loans if:

(a) The loan amount does not exceed ten thousand dollars, exclusive of fees;

[880]

HOUSE BILL REPORT

HB 1084

As Passed Legislature

Title: An act relating to regulating automobile insurance.

Brief Description: Regulating automobile insurance.

Sponsors: By Representatives Hunter, Benson and Schual-Berke; by request of Insurance Commissioner.

Brief History:

Committee Activity:

Financial Institutions & Insurance: 1/22/03, 1/28/03 [DP].

Floor Activity:

Passed House: 2/10/03, 93-0.

Passed Senate: 4/17/03, 48-0.

Passed Legislature.

Brief Summary of Bill

•Makes technical amendments to the insurance code involving the clarification of existing statutory language pertinent to personal injury protection coverage.

•Clarifies coverage provisions regarding personal injury protection benefits that insurers must offer with automobile insurance policies.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INSURANCE

Majority Report: Do pass. Signed by 10 members: Representatives Schual-Berke, Chair; Simpson, Vice Chair; Benson, Ranking Minority Member; Newhouse, Assistant Ranking Minority Member; Cairnes, Carrell, Cooper, Hatfield, Hunter and Roach.

Staff: Thamas Osborn (786-7129).

Background:

<u>Personal injury protection coverage</u>: "Personal injury protection" (PIP) is a type of automobile insurance coverage obtained by most drivers as part of their comprehensive automobile insurance policy. The PIP insurance provides immediate benefits to an insured on a no-fault basis if he or she is injured in an automobile accident. The coverage generally provides limited financial compensation for injury, death, disability, wage loss, and other expenses incurred as the result of an accident. Automobile liability insurance companies must provide PIP coverage under non-business auto insurance policies unless the named insured rejects PIP coverage in writing. Insurers need not provide PIP coverage for motor homes or motorcycles.

<u>Mandatory minimum PIP coverage</u>: At minimum, an insurer must offer PIP benefits that cover medical and hospital expenses incurred within three years of the date of the insured's injury, up to a maximum of \$10,000. Funeral expenses must be covered up to \$2,000. A maximum of \$5,000 in coverage must be provided for loss of services, subject to a limitation of \$40 per day and \$200 per week. Loss of income benefits must also be provided, subject to the following conditions:

- Income losses must be incurred within one year of injury;
- •A total of \$10,000 in coverage must be offered, subject to a limit of \$200 per week or 85 percent of average weekly income, whichever is less; and
- •Weekly payments are limited to 85 percent of the insured's weekly income, and the calculation of the amount of the weekly payment must include the combined total of the insurance benefits and all other income loss benefits received by the insured.

<u>Optional extended PIP coverage</u>: When explicitly requested by an insured, insurers are required to offer PIP benefits that are much more extensive than the mandatory minimums discussed above. Under the optional coverage provisions, the coverage limit for medical and hospital expenses is raised to \$35,000. Coverage for loss of services is set at \$40 per day for up to one year, and is not subject to a specified yearly limit. The limit on loss of income benefits is raised to \$35,000, subject to a limit of the lesser of \$700 per week or 85 percent of the insured's average weekly income prior to the injury.

The Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC) requested this legislation in order to reorganize various sections of the PIP statutes and to clarify some of the statutory language.

Summary of Bill:

<u>Technical revisions</u>: The bill is – in essence – technical in nature, insofar as it focuses on rearranging the existing statutory provisions, clarifying some confusing statutory language, and eliminating redundant passages. Overall, the bill does not substantively change existing law, except to the extent that the reorganization and clarification may allow some subtle reinterpretation of the PIP statutes.

<u>Substantive changes</u>: Under current law, the language of the coverage provisions in the PIP statutes is confusing, as it can be misinterpreted as imposing maximum limits on the amount of PIP benefits that an insurer can offer. The technical revisions in the bill eliminate the potential for such confusion by clarifying that the specified coverages represent the minimum coverages that must be offered by an insurer, thus allowing insurers to offer more extensive PIP benefits should they so choose.

Appropriation: None.

Fiscal Note: Not Requested.

Effective Date: Ninety days after adjournment of session in which bill is passed.

Testimony For: The language of the statutes pertaining to personal injury protection insurance coverage is very confusing. This bill is needed in order to clarify the problematic language and to make other purely technical changes.

Testimony Against: None.

Testified: Bill Daley, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.

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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T FOR WALLA WA	
7	FOR WALLA WA	ALLA COUNT I
8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff,	NOTE FOR MOTION DOCKET
10	v.	
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	
12	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
13	Defendants.	
14		
15	TO: THE CLERK OF THE COURT	
16	AND TO: All Counsel of Record	
17 18	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned Judgment	will bring on for hearing: Motion for Summary
	The hearing is to be held:	
19	DATE: July 15, 2013	
20	TIME: 9:30 AM	
21	DATED this day of June, 2013.	
22		
23		Matthew Ulunson
24		PATRICK M. PAULICH, WSBA #10951 MATTHEW MUNSON, WSBA #32019
25		THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General
26		Insurance Company
	NOTE FOR MOTION DOCKET - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Note for Motion Docket.docx 83	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T FOR WALLA WA	
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff,	[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL
10	ν.	INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
13	Defendants.	
14	THIS MATTER came on regularly before	ore the Court for hearing on plaintiff Patriot
15	General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having considered the	
6	arguments of counsel and reviewed the records and files herein, including:	
17	1. Patriot General Insurance Compan	y's Motion for Summary Judgment;
8	2. The Declaration of Tomas Miranda	a and the exhibit to that declaration;
9	3. The Declaration of Amy Brunner a	
20		
21		ker and the exhibit to that declaration;
22		on and the exhibits to that declaration;
23	6.	;
24	7	;
25	[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIF	3
26	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPAN MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Proposed order on MSJ.docx	Y'S THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 2000 DVC
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1	8; and
2	9;
3	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff Patriot General
4	Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that Patriot General
5	Insurance Company has no duty to pay any benefits under the UIM coverage under Policy No.
6	471327125 arising from a motor vehicle accident involving Javier Gutierrez that occurred in
7	Walla Walla on or around January 9, 2011.
8	
9	
10	DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of, 2013.
11	
12	The Honorable
13	Presented by:
14	
15	
16	Patrick M. Paulich, WSBA #10951 Matthew Munson, WSBA #32019
17	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General
18	Insurance Company
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25 26	[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Proposed order on MSJ.docx 85

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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR WALLA WALLA COUNTY		
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, No. 12-2-00908-3		
9	Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF SERVICE		
10	v .		
11 12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,		
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,		
14	Defendants.		
15	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I caused to		
16	be served the listed documents on the following counsel in the manner described below:		
17			
18	1. Note for Motion Docket;		
19	2. Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment;		
20	3. Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker in Support of Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance		
21	Company's Motion for Summary Judgment;		
22	4. Declaration of Matthew Munson in Support of Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance		
23	Company's Motion for Summary Judgment;		
24	5. Declaration of Amy Brunner in Support of Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance		
25	Company's Motion for Summary Judgment;		
26	6. Declaration of Tomas Miranda;		
	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH		
	DECLARATION OF SERVICE-1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx		

1	7. [Proposed] Order Granting Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion
2	for Summary Judgment; and
3	8. this Declaration of Service.
4	Peter J. Hess
5	Hess Law Office, PLLC
6	415 N. Second Walla Walla, WA 99362
7	Via U.S. Mail
8	Dick Kilpatrick Shannon M. Kilpatrick
9	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.
10	1750 112 th Avenue NE, Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004
11	Via Messenger
12	Executed at Seattle, Washington this 2 day of June, 2013.
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14	M. A. Hadrey
15	Mary Lou Nanshaw
16	\bigvee
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	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH
	DECLARATION OF SERVICE-2 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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~ 7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
, 8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WALLA WALLA
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
10	NO: 12 2 00908 3 Plaintiff,
11	vs. DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital INSURANCE COMPANY'S community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ, MOTION FOR SUMMARY
14	JUDGMENT Defendants.
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16	ISSUES
17	1. Whether RCW 48.22.005 Requires Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance
18	Company ("Patriot") to Insure Defendant Javier Gutierrez ("Javier").
19	a. Whether the Family Members Listed Under RCW 48.22.005(5)(a)'s
20	b. Definition of "Insured" are People Whom Patriot Must Insure. b. Whether The RCW 48.22.005(5)(a)'s Definition of "Insured" Applies
21	to RCW 48.22.030 ("The UIM Statute").
22	2. Whether Patriot can Contract Around the Statutes and Exclude Javier
23	from Coverage.
24	
25	Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walle Walle, WA 09362
26	TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION For SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 1

1	3. Whether the Actual Language of the Policy Excludes Javier from
2	Coverage.
3	STATEMENT OF FACTS
4	Javier basically agrees with Patriot's Statement of Facts. Additionally, at the
5	time of 1/9/11 collision, Javier was a resident of Defendant Jorge Gutierrez's
6	("Jorge") household and is his natural son. (Declaration of Javier Gutierrez p. 1,
7	In. 19-21)
8	ARGUMENT
9	Standard for Summary Judgment
10	Summary judgment shall only be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
11	answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
12	any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
13	moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56
14	1. RCW 48.22.005 Requires Patriot to Insure Javier
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16	a. RCW 48.22.005(5)(a) is a law that defines the people whom casualty insurance policies MUST insure. Javier meets that definition; thus,
17	Patriot MUST insure him.
18	(5) "Insured" means:
19	(a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is either related to the named insured by blood,
20	marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild" RCW 48.22.005(5)(a).
21	Patriot contends that "[b]y using the disjunctive "or", the statute does not
22	mandate that the insured always include residents of the named insured's
23	household; instead, the term may refer only to the named insured and certain
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25	Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walla Walla, WA 99362 414
26	TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Telephone (509) 525-4744 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 2 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

1 relatives, as with the Patriot policy." (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2 8, In. 15-17). In other words, Patriot contends that it can exclude people from the 3 statute's list because the statute merely provides a list of people whom it may 4 insure. This sort of wordplay to sidestep the actual meaning of the statute is akin to the old joke about the insurance company that refuses to cover fire damage under "fire and theft" coverage because the insured wasn't victim to both a fire and a theft.

8 The word "or" in RCW 48.22.005(5)(a), when read literally, could be either 9 disjunctive (expressing alternative meanings) or conjunctive (synonymous with 10 "and"). As discussed below, in the context of RCW 48.22.005(5)(a), the word "or" 11 is clearly conjunctive because the disjunctive interpretation leads to absurd 12 results. Therefore, Patriot must insure every person listed in the statute.

13 "There has been, however, so great laxity in the use of these ["and" and 14 "or"] terms that courts have generally said that the words are interchangeable and 15 that one may be substituted for the other, if to do so is consistent with the 16 legislative intent, (Footnote omitted.)" State v. Keller, 98 Wn.2d 725, 729 17 (1983)(quoting 1A C. Sands, Statutory Construction § 21.14, at 91 (4th ed. 1972). 18 See also State v. Tiffany, 44 Wash. 602, 604, 87 P. 932 (1906)). Further, the 19 "court's primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to 20 the intent of the Legislature. Although courts may not read into a statute that 21 which the Legislature has omitted, [courts] may construe a statute so as to avoid 22 strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal reading." Id. at 23 728.

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Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walls Walls, WA 99362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Fax (509) 525-4977 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 3 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

1 Although Patriots interpretation (that RCW 48.22.005(5)(a) uses the 2 disjunctive "or") is one of the feasible literal readings of the words of the statute. 3 this interpretation leads to absurd results. Did the Legislature really intend to 4 make a list of people whom insurance companies could insure, but did not have to 5 insure? If so, is that list exhaustive, or could they choose insure others? If the 6 Legislature intended for this to be an exhaustive list, then it would be illegal for a 7 mother put her twenty-year-old son, living out of the house, on her policy. It is 8 absurd to think that the Legislature would restrict the right of such a parent to 9 contract to insure her son. Thus, there is no way that the Legislature intended to 10 create an exhaustive list. If the list is not exhaustive, then why would the 11 Legislature bother to make a list permissible insureds? The answer is that it 12 wouldn't. The only logical conclusion is that the Legislature created the list 13 because it intended that all of the people on the list must be defined as "insured". 14 Finally, RCW 48.22.050(5)(a) states that insured means "[t]he named 15 insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's household..." 16 (emphasis added). If the "or" was disjunctive (presenting alternative 17 meanings), the statute would allow Patrlot to issue a policy that didn't 18 actually insure the named insured. This is, of course, absurd. Therefore, the 19 Legislature intended that insurance carriers, such as Patriot, must insure all of the 20 people listed in RCW 48.22.050(5)(a). Javier was a resident of the named 21 insured's household and is related to the named insured by blood. By 22 Washington State law, Patriot must insure him.

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415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walla Walla, WA 99362 Telephone (609) 525-4744 TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 4 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

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Hess Law Office, PLLC

Fax (609) 525-4977

b. RCW 48.22.005 expressly states that it applies to the UIM Statute.

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The very first sentence of RCW 48.22.005 states that, "[u]nless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter." If the meaning of the statute is plain, the court discerns legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the words. *Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. State, Dep't of Revenue*, 164 Wn.2d 310, 317 (2008).

Patriot's extensive briefing on the legislative history of RCW 48.22.005 puts the cart before the horse. The legislative history is only relevant to statutory interpretation if the statute is ambiguous. *Id.* RCW 48.22.005 clearly states that the definitions apply throughout the chapter, and the UIM Statute (48.22.030) is in the same chapter. Therefore, the plain meaning dictates that RCW 48.22.005 applies to the UIM Statute.

Patriot claims that RCW 48.22.005's definition of "insured" is not 14 incorporated into the UIM Statute because the UIM Statute "does not use the term 15 'insured' standing alone" but rather "uses the terms 'persons insured thereunder'. 16 Patriot relies on Whatcom Cnty. v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537 (1996) to 17 support the proposition. The Whatcom Cnty, case is about ambiguity and does 18 not require statutes to use the exact same words. The plain and ordinary meaning 19 of "insured" and "persons insured thereunder" are exactly the same. In other 20 words, they are unambiguous. In fact, "persons insured" is simply a plural form of 21 "insured".

The Legislature needed to use the term "persons insured thereunder" to avoid ambiguity. As Patriot points out, the UIM Statute discusses the "named 24

 Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walls Walls, WA 99362 TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Telephone (509) 525-407 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 5

insured" later in the statute. RCW 48.22,005 defines the "named insured" as an
"insured". The UIM Statute needed to make it clear that the "named insured" is a
subset of "insured". If the Legislature had used the term "insured" early in the
statute and "named insured" later, there is a risk that a reader (whom was
unfamiliar with RCW 48.22.050) may interpret the terms as distinct. To avoid this
confusion, the term "persons insured thereunder" clearly encompasses both the
"named insured" and the rest of the people "insured" under the policy.

8 Finally, RCW 48.22.005 explicitly states that its definitions "apply 9 throughout this chapter." If Patriot's contention (that "persons insured thereunder" 10 are different from "insured") were true, then there would be a conflict between 11 RCW 48.22,005 and The UIM Statute (48.22.030). "When two statutes apparently 12 conflict, the rules of statutory construction direct the court to, if possible, reconcile 13 them so as to give effect to each provision." State v, Landrum, 66 Wn. App. 791, -14 796 (1992). The way to reconcile these two statutes is to give the same meaning 15 to "insureds" and "persons insured thereunder". Also, "when two statutory 16 provisions dealing with the same subject matter are in conflict, the latest enacted 17 provision prevails when it is more specific than its predecessor." Id. RCW 18 48.22.005 is more recent, it specifically defines "insured" and specifically applies 19 the definition throughout the chapter. There is no way that the Legislature could 20 have intended for the UIM Statute to modify RCW 48.22.005 because RCW 21 48.22.005 was enacted long after the UIM Statute. 22 11

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Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Wella Wella, WA 99362 TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 6 Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Wella Wella, WA 99362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4774 For SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 6 Email petr@hesslawoffca.com

2. Patriot Cannot Contract Around the Statutes Because the Statutes Become Part of the Policy.

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Deep within the language of the policy. Patriot has attempted to contract around the statute. The policy states that it insures "any relative of [the named insured] if they reside in the same household "Thus, at first glance, it appears that the policy language complies with the governing statutes (RCW 4.22.005 and RCW 4.22.030). However, Patriot attempts to introduce a tricky exclusion with its definition of the word "relative". The policy defines "relative" as follows:

9 (3) "Relative" means a person living in [the named insured's] 10 household related to [the named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor 11 under [the named insured's] guardianship who lives in [the named 12 insured's) household. Any relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a 13 car accident or loss. 14

15 Because Javier is older than 14 and not on the application, Patriot contends that 16 he is excluded from coverage. This is sneaky attempt to contract around RCW 17 4.22.030 (which incorporates RCW 4.22.005). However, as discussed below, 18 these statutes cannot be sidestepped by crafty policy trickery.

19 There is no longer any judicial doubt that the state may regulate insurance, so closely is that industry affected with the public interest 20 (43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance s 60 (1969)), and regulatory statutes become a part of the policy of insurance. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wn. 475 (1937).

Hess Law Office, PLLC 25 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walla Walla, WA 99362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 26 Fax (509) 525-4977 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 7 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

1	Thus, a valid statute becomes a part of and should be read into
2	the insurance pollcy. Dowell, Inc. v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 191
-3	Wn. 666 (1937); Williams v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass'n,
	Ltd., 45 Wh.2d 209 (1954); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. V. Hinkel,
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5	205 Cal.App.2d 133, 22 Cal.Rptr. 682 (1962). Read into the
6	insurance contract as a public policy designed to expand uninsured
7	motorist coverage to a significantly greater proportion of the population, the statute should receive from the courts a construction
	that will effectuate its manifest purpose. This principle, variously
8	stated in other jurisdictions, was so declared in <i>First Nat. Ins. Co. of</i>
9	America v. Devine, 211 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla.App.1968):
10	Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 332-33 (1972)(emphasis
11	added).
12	Patriot takes the position that it is free to contract around RCW 48.22.005's
13	definition of "insured" because "the UIM statute 'does not mandate any particular
14	scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance
15	policy." The original source for this contention is the concurring opinion in the
16	1976 Touchette case (main opinion quoted above). In his concurring opinion,
17	Justice Neill stated:
18	
19	The policy of RCW 48.22.030 requires that insurers make available uninsured motorist coverage to a class of 'insureds' that is at least as
20	broad as the class in the primary liability sections of the policy. It
21	does not preclude the parties from reaching agreement as to the
	scope of that class in the first instance. The majority correctly
22	removes the exclusionary clause in the contract before us, as a void
23	attempt to sidestep the statutory policy. The additional conclusion,
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25	Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue
26	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 8 Email peter@hesstawoffice.com

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that plaintiff is an 'insured' for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, results from the terms of this contract rather than any statutory policy.

Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 337 (1972).

There are two things that are particularly noteworthy about Justice Neill's statement. First, this opinion was published in 1976 and, as Patriot points out, RCW 48.22.005 was not enacted until 1993. So, at the time of the *Touchette* opinion, RCW 48.22.005 did not exist and there was no statutory definition of "insured".

Second, Justice Neill makes it clear that any "attempt to sidestep statutory policy" is "void". This is consistent with *Touchette*'s main opinion (quoted on page 7-8 above) that the statute becomes part of any insurance policy issued in this state. Since 1993, the term "insured" has been defined by statute. Therefore, it is clear that Justice Neill's contention that the policy can limit the scope of insured is abrogated because (since 1993) the policy definition of "insured" must be at least as broad as the definition of "Insured" in RCW 48.22.005.

Patriot has cited several other cases (all based on *Touchette*) which purportedly support its contention that it is free to limit the scope of the definition of "insured". The following addresses each of those cases and explains why each is inapplicable to the case at hand:

 Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70 (1976) states that the UIM Statute (48.22.030) "does not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular

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1		automobile insurance policy." - This case is from 1976. As
2		discussed above, this is pre-RCW 48.22.005 and this contention is
3		abrogated by RCW 48.22.005, which is read into post-1993 policies.
4	2.	Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83 (1995)(quoting Miller) -
5		This case involved the coverage of an employee on a UIM policy
6		insuring a business. RCW 48.22.005 is not applicable to this
7		situation as it speaks about family members not employees. In the
8		case of the business policy the insurance company free to mandate
9		the scope of the definition of insured. This has no bearing on the
10		case at hand
11	3.	Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wn.2d 439, 443 (1977) - Pre- 🤉 🖡
12		1993 case quoting Touchette. Abrogated by RCW 48.22.005.
13.	4.	Vasquez v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co.,Wn.App, 298 P.3d 94, 98
14		(2013) - The named insured was a business, which does not have
15		family members. RCW 48.22.005 did not apply to the policy in
16		Vasquez and, therefore, the insurer in that case was free to limit the
17		definition of insured. This has no bearing on the case at hand.
18	5.	Fin. Indem. Co. v. Keomaneethong, 85 Wn. App. 350, 353 (1997) -
19		The policy definition of "insured" matched the RCW 48.22.005(5)(a)
20		definition, thus, it was never discussed. The issue involved coverage
21		for guest passengers. This case is not applicable.
22	6.	Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Uhls, 41 Wn. App. 49, 54 (1985)(quoting
23		Raynes, 88 Wn.2d at 444) - Another pre-1993 case quoting Raynes
24		
25	DEFENDANT	Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Wella Walla, WA 99362
26		F PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Fax (509) 525-4977 RY JUDGMENT/ 10 Email peter@hessiswoffice.com

1	(see #3 above). Like Raynes this case is abrogated by RCW
2	48.22.005, which created an inescapable definition of "insured".
3	7. Wheeler v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 124 Wn. App. 868, 874
4	(2004) - The policy definition of "insured" in this case complied with
5	the law and defined "insured" according to RCW 48.22.005.
6	Wheeler was not covered by her foster mother's policy because she
7	had turned 18 and was no longer met the definition of "foster
8	daughter". This has no bearing on the case at hand.
9	As Patriot points out, there are only four published Washington opinions
10	citing RCW 48.22.005. Of those four opinions, one reads RCW 48.22.005's
11	definition of "insured" directly in to the UIM statute and another implies that RCW
12	48.22.005(2)'s definition of "bodily injury" applies to UIM. Cherry v. Truck Ins.
13	Exch., 77 Wn. App. 557, 563 n.3 (1995); Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Wn. App.
14	346, 355 (1997) <i>rev'd</i> , 135 Wn.2d 777 (1998). Thus, it is clear that when courts
15	consider the language of RCW 48.22.005, they realize that it must be read into
16	the UIM statute.
17	Finally;
18	The UIM statute does not contain a "legislative intent" section, but
19	this court has consistently stated that the Legislature enacted the
20	UIM statute to increase and broaden the protection of members of the public who are involved in automobile accidents. This
21	legislative purpose "is not to be eroded by a myriad of legal
22	niceties arising from exclusionary clauses. RCW 48.22.030
23	should be read, therefore, to declare a public policy overriding the
	exclusionary language so that the intendments of the statute are
24 25	Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walla Walla, WA 99382
26	TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4744 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 11 Email peter@hesslewoffice.com
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read into and become part of the contract of insurance." The UIM statute "is to be liberally construed in order to provide broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists." This interpretation of legislative purpose has generally resulted in this court's voiding any provision in an insurance policy which is inconsistent with the statute, which is not authorized by the statute, or which thwarts the broad purpose of the statute. The public policy of protecting the innocent victim of an uninsured motorist is applied to the underinsured motorist to the extent that it is compatible. *Clements v. Travelers Indem.* Co., 121 Wn.2d 243, 251-52 (1993) (emphasis added)(citations omitted).

Because, RCW 48.22.005(5)(a)'s definition of "insured" was explicitly incorporated into The UIM Statute in 1993, The UIM statute now mandates a particular scope for the definition of who is "insured". Patriot, in its attempt to "erode" the coverage required by The UIM Statute, is engaging in the exact same "legal niceties" that the *Clements* Court condemned. Patriot is attempting to insure fewer people than the statute requires. This type of erosion creates a slippery slope.

16 Patriot seeks to decrease and narrow "the protection of members of the 17 public who are involved in automobile accidents." Not only is this contrary to the 18 intent of the Legislature, it also produces draconian and absurd results. Under 19 Patriot's interpretation of its policy, Jorge's 14-year-old children are not covered. 20 Patriot attempts to exclude vulnerable 14-year-olds, whom are not even old 21 enough to drive, let alone purchase their own UIM coverage. If the Court allows 22 such erosion of The UIM Statute, vulnerable members of the public will be endangered. Under Patriot's interpretation, exclusion of 2-year-olds is perfectly 23

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DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 12

1 legal. There is simply no way that the Legislature intended such a result. It is 2 both absurd and dangerous.

3 The law is clear, RCW 48.22.005(5)(a)'s definition of "insured" must be 4 read into all Washington UIM policies and this sets the minimum amount of 5 coverage permissible in Washington. Javier meets the statutory definition of 6 "insured". Consequently, Patriot must insure him. This cannot be sidestepped. 7 eroded, or contracted around.

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3. The Language of the Policy Does Not Exclude Javier from Coverage.

10 "A term is ambiguous if it is fairly susceptible to two different but 11 reasonable interpretations by an average insurance purchaser. We construe 12 ambiguous insurance contract language in favor of the insured." Wheeler v. 13 Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 124 Wn. App. 868, 872 (2004).

14 Patriot's policy states that it insures "any relative of [the named insured] if 15 they reside in the same household Javier resided with his father, who was the 16 named insured; however, Patriot contends that Javier is not covered by the policy 17 because "he is over the age of 14 and not listed on the application or any 18 endorsement," Patriot contends that the policy clearly and unambiguously 19 excludes Javier from coverage. However, the policy actually is ambiguous 20 because it doesn't state the punishment for failure to list relatives over the age of 21 14.

The policy defines "relative" as follows:

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 13

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Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walla Walla, WA 99362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Fax (509) 525-4977 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com (3) "Relative" means a person living in [the named insured's] household related to [the named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption, including a word or foster child. Relative includes a minor under [the named insured's] guardianship who lives in [the named insured's] household. Any relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.

The language of the policy requires relatives over the age of 14 to be listed on the application or endorsement. Patriot contends that such unlisted relatives are no longer defined as "relatives" and, therefore, are not "insured". The policy language provides no such punishment. In fact, the purported exclusionary sentence itself implies that unlisted family members over 14 are still considered to be "relatives"; and "relatives", as defined by the policy itself, are "insured".

The purported exclusionary sentence states, "[a]ny relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed." If such unlisted people are not considered to be "relatives", the policy should say something like, "any household members who are 14 or older must be listed or they will no longer be considered to be "relatives" and will be excluded by the policy."

If the Patriot wishes to enforce such drastic policy exclusions upon its insureds, it ought to at least inform the policyholder of the exclusion. Here, the consequences for not listing a 14-year-old are not defined. Patriot claims that the punishment is exclusion from coverage. But, another reasonable interpretation is that there is no punishment at all. There are two reasonable ways to interpret this clause, therefore, it is ambiguous. Ambiguity is construed against Patriot. Thus, Javier is insured under the very terms of the policy.

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DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 14

Hess Law Office, PLLC

CONCLUSION
Patriot's contention that it may pick and choose whom it wishes to insure
from the list of people in RCW 48.22.005(5)(a) is both absurd and dangerous.
The only realistic reading of the statute is that it requires all listed relatives to be
"insured" by any policy issued in the State of Washington. Javier was a member
of his father's (the named insured) household. Thus, he meets the statutory
definition of insured and must be insured by his father's policy.
RCW 48.22.005(5)(a)'s definition of "insured" applies throughout chapter
48.22. RCW 48.22.003 (The UIM Statute) is within the chapter and, therefore, the
definition of insured is expressly incorporated into The UIM Statute. Patriot may
not contract around the statutory definition of "insured" because a valid statute
becomes part of, and is read into, all Washington insurance policies. Therefore,
Washington State law requires Patriot to insure Javier and there is no way around
it.
Even if Washington law allowed Patriot to contract around the statutory
definition of "insured" (which it does not), Patriot's policy language is ambiguous
regarding the punishment for failure to list relatives 14 and older on the
application. A literal reading of the policy implies that there is no punishment at
all. Any ambiguity is construed against the insurance company. Thus, even the
policy insures Javier.
Javier is in agreement with Patriot's recitation of the facts. The issues
raised have to do with the interpretation of Washington law. Therefore, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the Court should rule that, as a matter of law,
Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION Walls Walls, WA 99362
TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Fax (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 15 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com

1	Javier is insured under Jorge's policy with Patriot.
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3	DATED this 1 st Day of July, 2013
4	Hess Law Office
5	Ву:
6	Peter J. Hess, WSBA #39721 Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs
7	CLAROMEYS IOF Flammers
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25	Hess Law Office, PLLC DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 415 N. Second Walla Walla, WA 99362
26	TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Walla Walla, WA 99362 To PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Telephone (509)525-4744 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 16

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 st day of July, 2013, I caused to be
3	served a true and correct copy of the DECLARATION OF JAVIER GUTIERREZ,
4	and DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
5	OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S
6	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
7	addressed to the following.
8	Mr. Patrick M. Paulich <u>X</u> U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
9	Thorsrud Cane & Paulich Hand Delivered
10	1300 Puget Sound Plaza Overnight Mail 1325 Fourth Avenue X Facsimile
11	Seattle, WA 98101
12	Ms. Shannon Kilpatrick
13	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.S. 1750 - 112th Ave. N.E., Suite D-155
14	Bellevue, WA 98004
15	
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17	Adrienne King,
18	Assistant to PETER J. HESS
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25	Hess Law Office, PLLC
26	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 415 N. Second TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 17 Takephone (509)525-4744 FAX (509)525-4977

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that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated this 1st day of July, 2013, at Walla Walla, Washington. Javier Gutlerrez Presented by: Hess Law Office, PLLC By: Peter J. Hess, WSBA #39721 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff ·12 Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N, Second Walla Walla, WA 99382 Telephone (509)525-4744 FAX (509)525-4977 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 2

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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	·····
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3
10	Plaintiff	DEFENDANT JORGE
11	VS.	GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
14	Defendants	
15	I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUEST	TED
16	Patriot General asks this Court to be re	lieved from paying out a UIM claim to
17	Javier Gutierrez, who was insured under his fa	ather, Jorge Gutierrez's policy. It relies
18	on a breach of the section of the policy that re	equires disclosure of all relatives of the
19	named insured age 14 or older. To support its	motion, Patriot General misinterprets
20	its own policy language and misinterprets the	UIM statute and its companion
21	definitions. It also erroneously claims that Jorg	ge agreed none of his children would be
22	covered when Jorge never intended to agree	to that. In reality, the plain language of
23		Klipatrick Law Group, P.C.
24	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 of 20	1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540
25	n./rbkcases/gutierrez.adv. patriot general/drafts/draft pleadings/gutierrez opposition to patriot general sj.draft.doc	dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com

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its policy insures Javier. While the defendants may have breached the disclosure
 requirement, to avoid liability because of any breach Patriot General is required to
 show actual prejudice. It made no effort to do so.

4 If this Court finds there is no coverage for Javier or finds Javier is excluded, it will have to confront an issue that does not appear to be addressed in any published 5 6 case: does Washington law allow Patriot General to limit UIM coverage to only those 7 relatives of the named insured under the age of 14? Defendant asserts the provision 8 violates the UIM statute which requires UIM coverage for all relatives living with the 9 named insured without regard to age. Further, the provision violates public policy 10 because it excludes coverage for (1) parties who were passengers and had no 11 control over the vehicle, and (2) parties who had no other UIM insurance available to 12 them, including children. Patriot General's motion should be denied.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jorge Gutierrez went to Tomas Miranda for insurance in 2010 in part because 14 he does not speak or read English. Jorge Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 4. He always intended for 15 16 his entire family to be covered by the insurance, including his son, Javier. Id. ¶ 5. The 17 application was all in English and Jorge provided the information to Mr. Miranda. Id. ¶ 4 It is clear that Mr. Miranda typed in the information and printed out the form for 18 Jorge to sign because the only handwritten portion is the initials and signatures. 19 Miranda Decl., Ex. 1. Jorge elected UIM coverage. Id. He then signed and initialed 20 where Mr. Miranda told him to. Jorge Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 4. 21

Jorge had no understanding the insurer required disclosure of all his children 22 age 14 and over. Id. ¶ 5 He certainly never intended to agree that his children would 23 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. **DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO** 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com n:/rbkcases/gutierrez.adv..patriot general/drafts/draft pleadings/gutierrez.opposition to patriot general sj.draft.doc 25 shannon@triallawyersnw.com

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not be covered. Jorge believed all his children had coverage, including Javier.

2 In January 2011 Javier was riding as a passenger in a friend's vehicle and injured in a collision. Javier did not have any other automobile insurance. Id. ¶ 8. He lived at home with his parents and did not own his own vehicle. Id.

5 Javier and Jorge made a claim with Patriot General, which it denied. The first 6 time Jorge found out the policy required disclosure of any relatives was when Javier's 7 claim was denied. Patriot General then sued both Jorge and his son Javier.

8 **III. ISSUES PRESENTED**

Does the policy at issue, which covers relatives living with the named insured, 9 cover Javier, Jorge's son and who lived with him at the time of the collision? Does a 10 breach of the provision requiring disclosure of family members age 14 and over 11 preclude coverage absent any showing of actual prejudice by the insurer? 12

If the policy language excludes Javier, is an insured allowed to define who is 13 an insured more narrowly than the UIM statute does? 14

If not, does public policy, which calls for broad UIM coverage to protect 15 innocent injured parties, prohibit an insurer from excluding coverage for Javier, who 16 has no other way to get his own UIM insurance? 17

IV. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON 18

In addition to the court files and the documents filed by defendant Javier 19 Gutierrez in opposition to plaintiff's summary judgment motion, this opposition relies 20 on the declaration of Jorge Gutierrez. 21

V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 22

Summary judgment is appropriate only when two factors are met: (1) when 23 DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 of 20

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1 there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to 2 judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of 3 establishing both requirements. Karl A. Tegland, 14A Washington Practice: Civil 4 Procedure, ¶ 25:12 (2d ed. 2012). All facts and reasonable inferences therefrom must 5 be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Riley v. Andres, 107 Wn. App. 391, 395, 27 P.3d 618 (2001). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue 6 of material fact should be resolved against the moving party, and the case should be 7 8 allowed to go to trial. Tegland, 14A Washington Practice: Civil Procedure, § 25:14.

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The Factual Basis For Patriot General's Motion Is Incorrect – Jorge **Gutierrez Did Not Agree To Patriot General's Insured Exclusion**

The strong assertion underlying Patriot General's motion for summary judgment is that Jorge Gutierrez agreed that none of his children, including Javier, would be covered. Setting aside the issue of whether parties are free to contract around provisions in the UIM statute (which is addressed below in Section C), this assertion could not be further from the truth.

As Jorge makes clear in his declaration, Jorge wanted full coverage for his 16 whole family, including Javier and Viviana, and thought he was getting it. Jorge Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 5. Because he does not speak or read English, he could not 18 understand the insurance application, which was written entirely in English. He gave 19 Mr. Miranda the information he asked for. Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Miranda showed Jorge where to initial and sign. Id.

As a result, Jorge did not understand that the Patriot General required 22 disclosure of his relatives age 14 and over that lived with him. Id. ¶ 5. He never 23 Kllpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4 of 20

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1 intended to tell the insurer that none of his children would be driving. Id. ¶ 6. He never understood that there would be any reason for his children, including Javier, to be 2 3 denied coverage until Patriot General denied Javier's claim. Id.

4 Given these facts, it is clear that Jorge never intended to agree that his 5 children living with him would not be covered. So to the extent Patriot General is 6 arguing there was agreement that his children would not be covered, its motion 7 should be denied. There is a genuine issue of material fact about whether the parties 8 actually agreed on anything.

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B.

The Plain Language Of The Policy Does Not Actually Exclude Jorge From Coverage, As The Insurer Claims

The factual question would be moot, however, if this Court decided that the 11 policy actually covers Javier (addressed in this Section) or if the provision violated the 12 UIM statute or its public policy (addressed in Section C below). The construction of 13 an insurance policy is a question of law, State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 14 Wn.2d 477, 480, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984). Patriot General correctly noted the proper 15 framework for the analysis of whether there is coverage: (1) the insured must first 16 establish that the loss falls within the scope of the policy, and (2) then the insurer 17 must show that the loss is excluded by specific policy language. Diamaco, Inc. v. 18 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 97 Wn, App. 335, 337, 983 P.2d 707 (1999). 19 Insurance policies are construed as contracts. Austl. Unlimited, Inc. v. Hartford 20 Cas. Ins. Co., 147 Wn. App. 758, 765, 198 P.3d 514 (2008). The purpose of 21 insurance is to insure, so courts should use the construction that provides coverage, 22 rather than no coverage. Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wn.2d 65, 23 Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTTERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540

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dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com 69, 659 P.2d 509 (1983), modified on other grounds, 101 Wn.2d 830, 683 P.2d 186
 (1984). The policy should be interpreted as it would be understood by the average
 person purchasing insurance. *McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 119 Wn.2d
 724, 733, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992). If there is ambiguity, it should be strictly construed
 against the insurance company and in favor of the insured. *George v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 106 Wn. App. 430, 439, 23 P.3d 552 (2001).

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Patriot General misinterprets the policy language¹ and its legal effect, and it
confuses the issue of who is an insured with the duties imposed on the policyholders
by the policy. Further, it provided no evidence it suffered actual prejudice from any
breach of the duty to disclose family members. Thus, Patriot General cannot meet its
burden on summary judgment and its motion fails.

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1. Javier fits the definition of "relative" in the policy, and his insured status is not negated by the late notice to plaintiff that he was driving

The insurer argues that the Javier was never an insured to begin with because

15 || he was not disclosed to the insurer prior to the collision; therefore, it argues,

16 defendants cannot meet prong one of the two-step analysis and the burden does not

17 || shift to the insurer to prove an exclusion applies. Plaintiff's argument rests on a

18 I fundamentally faulty reading of the policy language and the legal effect of that

19 anguage. The provision requiring disclosure of all relatives age 14 and older has no

20 || bearing on whether Javier is actually insured, as a careful reading of the policy

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Perhaps not surprisingly, Patriot General interpreted the policy language to its own benefit and not to the benefit of its insureds. This and other problems in the adjustment of Javier's claim may be the basis of a later bad faith action.

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1	language demonstrates.
2	The insuring language is found on page 1 of the policy, which is Exhibit 1 to
3	the Declaration of Amy Brunner. There the policy states (bold in the original):
4	In return for your premium payment and subject to the terms and conditions of this policy, we will insure you for the coverages up to the
5	limits of liability for which a premium is shown on the Declarations Page of this policy.
6	
7	So if Javier fits under the definition of "you," he becomes an insured, and then the
8	burden shifts to the insurer to show an exclusion applies.
9	"You" is defined on page 2 of the policy (bold in original) (emphasis added):
10	"You" and "your" mean the person shown as the named insured on the
(Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your also means any relative of that person if they
11	reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a motor vehicle .
12	Relative is then defined as (bold in original) (emphasis added):
13	"Relative" means a person living in your household related to you by
14	blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor under your guardianship who lives in your household.
15	Any relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.
16	The first two sentences of the definition of relative cover who is an insured.
17	The third sentence simply imposes a duty of disclosure on the insureds. This
18	language, by its plain terms, brings Javier under the umbrella (no pun intended) of
19	
20	being an insured. ² He is Jorge's son, living with Jorge. While the policy requires
21	disclosure of relatives 14 years and older, that provision has no effect on Javier's
22	
23	² Plaintiff makes no allegation that Javier owned a vehicle as a reason for why coverage should be denied.
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1 insured status. It is presumably a mechanism for the insurer to keep tabs on 2 everyone who might be an insured. And it is no different than any other policy provision requiring the insureds to do something, such as notifying the insurer of an 3 4 accident or cooperating with the insurer's investigation. While any alleged breach of 5 the notice provision can ultimately affect whether there is coverage for Javier's loss, it 6 does not affect whether he was ever an insured in the first place.

7

2. To avoid coverage for the breach of the duty of disclosure. Patriot General was required – and falled – to show actual prejudice

8 Because Javier is an insured, the burden shifts to the insurer to point to some 9 reason why Javier is not covered. Patriot General raise just one - the disclosure 10 requirement for Jorge's family age 14 and older. Thus the question becomes, what is 11 the legal affect of any alleged breach of disclosure requirement? Implicitly, Patriot 12 General argues that because defendants failed to timely disclose, there is no 13 coverage for Javier's injuries, period. In other words, Patriot General is implicitly 14 arguing that the disclosure of relatives age 14 and older is a condition precedent to 15 recovering under the policy. But this kind of argument has been rejected by 16 Washington courts for almost 40 years.

17 In situations involving disputes about whether a policy provision has been 18 breached, Washington courts require insurers to prove they were actually prejudiced 19 by some alleged breach of an insured's duty before an insurer can escape liability. 20 See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wn.2d 372, 377, 535 P.2d 816 (1975). in 21 Salzberg, the insurer claimed the policyholder breached the cooperation clause, 22 which according to the policy language was a condition precedent to receiving 23 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 8 of 20

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1 benefits. By failing to cooperate, the insurer argued the insured was not entitled to 2 recover anything. The court rejected that approach and instead required the insurer 3 to prove it was prejudiced by a breach before being relieved of liability. Id. at 376. 4 In refusing to impose traditional contract principles on insurance policies, the 5 court reasoned: 6 insurance policies, in fact, are simply unlike traditional contracts, i.e., they are not purely private affairs but abound with public policy considerations. 7 one of which is that the risk-spreading theory of such policies should operate to afford to affected members of the public - frequently innocent 8 third persons - the maximum protection possible consonant with fairness to the insurer. It is manifest that this public policy consideration would be 9 diminished, discounted, or denied if the insurer were relieved of its responsibilities although it is not prejudiced by the insured's actions or 10 conduct 11 Such relief, absent a showing of prejudice, would be tantamount to a questionable windfall for the insurer at the expense of the public. 12 Id. at 376-77. 13 This prejudice analysis has been applied to virtually every kind of policy 14 provision. See. e.g., Canron, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 82 Wn. App. 480, 485, 918 P.2d 15 937 (1996) (late notice of the claim): Tran v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 136 16 Wn.2d 214, 961 P.2d 358 (1998) (breach of the cooperation clause); Pub. Util. Dist. 17 No. 1 of Klickitat Cnty. V. Int'l Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 803-04, 881 P.2d 1020 (1994) 18 (cooperation, notice and no-settlement clauses); Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 97 Wn. 19 App. 417, 427, 983 P.2d 1155 (1999) (late tender). 20 The actual prejudice requirement was very recently reaffirmed by our Supreme 21 Court when it was applied to the policy provision requiring insureds to submit to 22 examinations under oath. Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Wn.2d 404, 417-18, 295 23 Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com n:/rbkcases/gutierrez.adv. patriot general/drafts/draft pisadings/gutierrez.opposition to 25 shannon@triallawyersnw.com patriot general si,draft.doo

P.3d 201 (2013). The court stated:

We have required a showing of prejudice in nearly all other contexts to prevent insurers from receiving windfalls at the expense of the public and to avoid hinging relief on a discredited legalistic distinction. The same concerns apply equally to the [examination under oath] requirement.

Id. at 418.

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6	Just as prejudice must be shown with other policy provisions, Patriot
	General must demonstrate prejudice with any breach of the provision requiring
7	disclosure of any relative age 14 and over. It has asserted no good reason not to
8	apply the actual prejudice rule in this situation.
9	Patriot General has also made no attempt to put forth any evidence of
10	prejudice from the breach, so its motion fails. ³ The party claiming prejudice has the
11	
12	burden of proof on that issue:
13	A claim of actual prejudice requires "affirmative proof of an advantage lost or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present
14	defenses to coverage or liability.
15	Id. at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot
16	rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
17	It is highly unlikely Patriot General has suffered any specific harm the courts
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	are mentioned about from not frequence levies was driving the insured vehicles. As the
1	are worried about from not knowing Javier was driving the insured vehicles. As the
2	Staples Court noted, the harm it is concerned with is something affecting "the
3	insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability." Id. Here, no
4	such harm of this type could exist because there have been no allegations that Jorge
5	and Javier have done anything to impede the plaintiff's coverage investigation or
6	liability investigation, to the extent any investigation occurred. There has been no
7	allegation that the policyholders refused to turn over documents and other information
8	and refused to answer questions, such as in Tran v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 136
9	Wn.2d 214, 218-21, 961 P.2d 358 (1998). Nor has there been any allegation that
10	defendants did anything to delay the claim and that delay somehow caused evidence
11	to be lost, as in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50
12	Wn.2d 443, 453, 313 P.2d 347 (1957).
13	C. Neither The UIM Statute Nor Public Policy Permit Patriot General To
14	Contract Around The Definition of Insured in RCW 48.22.005
15	To the extent the policy provision calling for disclosure of relatives age 14 and
16	over affects coverage, it is void because its terms are inconsistent with the UIM
17	statute and its public policy. As courts have noted, our state has a comprehensive
18	
19	³ Because Patriot General failed to provide any proof of or make any argument about
20	prejudice in its moving papers, its motion must fail. According to CR 56, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating in its moving papers – and not in its rebuttal – why it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. White v. Kent Medical
21	<i>Center, Inc., PS</i> , 61 Wn. App. 163, 168, 810 P.2d 4 (1991). "Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the nonmoving party has no
22	opportunity to respond." White v. Kent Medical Center, Inc., PS, 61 Wn. App. 163, 168, 810 P.2d 4 (1991). Thus, any attempt by Patriot General to argue prejudice or put forth
23	evidence of prejudice in its rebuttal documents would be impermissible and should be rejected.
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1 UIM scheme, Jain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Wn.2d 688, 694, 926 P.2d 923 (1996). The UIM statute has been around in some form since 1967. When the 2 3 Legislature first enacted it, it was just the UNinsured motorist statute. Its purpose was 4 to be a financial security measure to cut down on the risk to innocent victims of 5 careless and insolvent drivers. Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 6 327, 332, 494 P.2d 479 (1972); Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 92 Wn.2d 748, 7 751, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979). In order to effectuate its purposes, the statute was to be 8 liberally and broadly construed. Id.

When the Legislature amended the statute in 1980 to include UNDERinsured 9 10 motorists, nothing about those underlying policies changed. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. 11 Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wn.2d. 203, 208, 643 P.2d 441 (1982). Our courts continue to 12 liberally construe the UIM statute to uphold the legislative mandate of broad UIM 13 coverage to protect innocent injured parties. Greengo v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 135 Wn.2d 799, 806, 959 P.2d 657 (1998). The Legislature was so concerned 14 15 with ensuring UIM coverage to protect innocent injured people, it requires insurers to 16 offer UIM insurance unless the insured "specifically and unequivocally" rejects the 17 coverage in writing. RCW 48.22.030(4); First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Perala, 32 Wn. App. 527, 531, 648 P.2d 472 (1982). 18

An insurance regulatory statute automatically becomes part of the insurance
policy. *Blackburn v. Safeco Ins.* Co., 115 Wn.2d 82, 85-86, 794 P.2d 1259 (1990). To
fulfill the mandate of broad UIM coverage, the courts routinely void any provision in a
policy which is (1) inconsistent with the UIM statute, (2) is not authorized by the

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statute, or (3) that thwarts the broad purpose of the statute. Clements v. Travelers 1 2 Indem. Co., 121 Wn.2d 243, 251, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993). Thus, any UIM policy 3 provision that provides fewer benefits or protects a smaller class of insureds than 4 those mandated by the UIM statute are automatically void.

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1. The UIM statute requires coverage for "insureds" as defined in RCW 48.22.005 - and not just "named insureds" - which encompasses Javier

Patriot General's strained reading of the definition of "insured" in RCW 7 48.22.005(5) renders certain parts of that statute superfluous and leads to absurd 8 results. In construing statutes, courts must carry out the intent of the legislature, State 9 v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 11, 904 P.2d 754 (1995). If the language of a statute is clear 10 on its face, then that plain meaning must be given effect and courts are to assume 11 the Legislature meant exactly what it said. State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d 463, 470, 98 12 13 P.3d 795 (2004). Where definitions are provided by the legislature, courts are bound to apply those. Schrom v. Bd. for Volunteer Fire Fighters, 153 Wn.2d 19, 27, 100 14 P.3d 814 (2004). 15

In interpreting statutes, words must not be read in isolation. State v. Lilyblad, 16 163 Wn.2d 1, 9, 177 P.3d 686 (2008). Courts must attempt to give effect to every 17 word, clause and sentence of a statute, so that no portion is rendered meaningless or 18 superfluous. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wn.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). In addition, 19 courts must avoid unlikely or absurd results. Id. It is only if a statute is susceptible to 20 more than one reasonable interpretation legislative history may be consulted. Id. 21 Patriot General makes several arguments why Javier, as Jorge's son, is not 22 covered by the UIM statute. All of them fail. The more reasonable reading is the 23 Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO

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1	definitions contained in RCW 48.22.005 plainly apply to the UIM statute and therefore
2	Patriot General's policy. To the extent the provision requiring notice of relatives age
3	14 and over is an exclusion barring coverage for Javier, it is void.
4	Patriot General argues that section 2 of RCW 48.22.030 uses the term "named
5	insured" and not "insured," so it is only required to cover the named insured (Jorge)
6	and his wife and not any family members. This is incorrect. Section 2 uses more than
7	just the term "named insured."
8	While Section 2 of the UIM statute is not artfully worded, Patriot General
9	focuses on the wrong portion of it. The operative portion is:
10	No new policy shall be issued unless coverage is provided <u>for the</u> protection of persons_insured_thereunder_who_are_legally_entitled_to
11	recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles
12	RCW 48.22.030(2). In other words, coverage has to be provided for all persons
13	insured in the policy. That is a broader class of people than just the "named insured"
14	
15	and implicates the definition of "insured."
16	The portion of the UIM statute Patriot General focuses on – and which
17	contains the "named insured" reference - is the exception to the rule:
18	except while operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned or available for the regular use by the named insured or any family member,
19	and which is not insured under the liability coverage of the policy.
	Id. In other words, UIM insurers do not need to provide coverage for injuries received
20	in vehicles not insured in the policy but are owned by or available for the regular use
21	of the named insured or a family member. This clause does not address when UIM
22	coverage must be provided, so it is inappropriate to focus on it.
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1 Patriot General also reads section 2 in isolation, ignoring the other 12 sections 2 of the UIM statute some of which use the term "insured" in addition to "named 3 insured." A guick review of the other parts of the UIM statute make it clear UIM 4 insurance was intended to apply to more than just the named insured. For example, 5 Section 3 sets the parameters for the amount of UIM insurance to be offered: ... coverage required under subsection (2) of this section shall be in the 6 same amount as the insured's third party liability coverage unless the 7 insured rejects all or part of the coverage as provided in subsection (4) of this section. 8 RCW 48.22.030(3) (emphasis added). It would not make sense for the UIM statute to 9 apply to only a "named insured," but then use "insured" in other portions of the statute 10 when setting the rules for how much coverage must be provided. Because all 11 sections of a statute must be read in conjunction with one another and harmonized, 12 Patriot General's analysis is fatally flawed. 13 Next, Patriot General argues the Legislature intended RCW 48.22.005 to apply 14 to only the PIP statutes, citing legislative history. But in making this argument, Patriot 15 General ignores the plain language of RCW 48.22.005 and an important rule of 16 statutory interpretation: legislative history is only considered if there is an ambiguity. 17 Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). 18 The Legislature made its intentions clear by the opening language of RCW 19 48.22.005: "the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter," unless the 20 context "clearly requires otherwise." RCW 48.22.005. By making the definitions 21 applicable to the entire chapter, the Legislature plainly intended the definitions to 22 apply to the entirety of Title 48, Chapter 22, including the UIM statute at RCW 23 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 15 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawversnw.com n:\rbkcases\gutierrez adv. patriot general\drafts\draft.pleadings\gutierrez opposition to 25 atriot general sj.draft.doo shannon@triallawyersnw.com

1 48.22.030. If it intended the definitions to apply to only the PIP statutes, it would have 2 said so specifically. But it did not. 3 Patriot General then turns to the definition of "insured" to argue it is not required to cover anyone other than the named insured. Because the definition of 4 5 "insured" contains multiple "or" clauses, its argument goes, the definitions should be 6 read disjunctively, such that it was permissible for it to cover just the named insured. 7 Yet this would produce an absurd result. Taken to its logical conclusion, the insurer is 8 arguing the Legislature intended only to require insurers to pick any single one of the 9 groups listed in the definition of insured in RCW 48.22.005(5): 10 The named insured: 11 A person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is related to the named insured; 12 The named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild; 13 A person who gets injured in an accident while using or occupying the 14 insured automobile; or 15 A pedestrian accidentally struck by the insured automobile. 16 Under this interpretation, it would be allowed to pick one of the above - say, 17 the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild – and insure only that group to 18 the exclusion of the others, including the named insured. This is ridiculous. 19 Nor is plaintiff's legal analysis of the word "or" correct. While use of the word 20 "or" is often meant disjunctively, there are also cases where "or" means the 21 conjunctive: "[C]ourts need not mechanically interpret every 'or' as disjunctive, but 22 rather ... courts should interpret the word 'or' according to context." Black v. Nat'l 23 Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- Page 16 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com n://bkcases/gutierrez.edv. patriot general/drafts/draft pleadings/gutierrez opposition to 25 atriot general aj.draft.doc shannon@triallawyersnw.com

Merit Ins. Co., 154 Wn. App. 674, 688, 226 P.3d 175 (2010) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). As a result, the disjunctive "or" and the conjunctive "and" can often
be used interchangeably. *Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 101 Wn. App. 777, 790, 6
P.3d 583 (2000). "Or" should not be given the disjunctive meaning where, as here, it
would lead to absurd results and where the context supports the conjunctive
meaning. *Id.* The more reasonable interpretation is that the Legislature intended the
"ors" to be "ands" to set the floor for which people must be insured for UIM purposes.

8 Plaintiff cites many cases that it claims stand for the proposition that it is 9 allowed to provide UIM insurance to whomever it wants. But those cases are 10 inapposite. Many were decided before the Legislature implemented the definition of 11 "insured" in 1993. None of the cases appear to deal with the issue of whether the 12 definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 can be contracted around because none of 13 the parties ever raised the issue. In fact, there do not appear to be any published 14 cases analyzing whether an insurer can provide UIM insurance to a lesser class of 15 insureds than provided in the definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005.

In addition, the factual settings of some of the cases relied upon by plaintiff are
very different than here. For example, the policy in *Vasquez* v. *American Fire* & *Casualy Co.*, ___ Wn. App. ___, 298 P.3d 94 (2013) was a commercial policy. That
case involved the issue of whether an employee who was running a personal errand
and was hit in a crosswalk was an insured under the commercial policy. The court
held he was not and part of its reasoning was that to adopt the plaintiff's interpretation
would turn a business auto policy into a personal policy. *Id.* at 98. The policy at issue

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1 here is a personal policy and does not involve employees or a commercial setting. 2 In addition, unlike Javier, the passenger injured in Financial Indemnity Co. v. 3 Keomaneethong was not related to the named insured and was not living with the 4 named insured. 85 Wn. App. 350, 351, 931 P.2d 168 (1997). The plaintiff also 5 apparently never raised the argument that the policy conflicts with the definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 and the Court of Appeals never addressed it. 6 7 2. In addition, public policy prohibits the exclusion of relatives age 14 and over from UIM coverage 8 Our Supreme Court has invalidated provisions that exclude UIM coverage for 9 family members who are injured as passengers. Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115 10 Wn.2d 107, 111-112, 795 P.2d 126 (1990). In *Tissell*, the insurer excluded coverage 11 for family members who were passengers while the named insured was driving. 12 The court invalidated both provisions and focused on public policy of broad 13 UIM coverage and full compensation for innocent injured parties. Id. at 111. The court 14 was particularly troubled by the fact that the exclusion barred coverage for family 15 members who had no other way to procure UIM insurance. Id. 16 The same concern underlies the decision in *Wiscomb*. That case involved the 17 family or household exclusion. In invalidating that exclusion the court reasoned: 18 The family or household exclusion ... is directed at a class of innocent victims who have no control over the vehicle's operation and who cannot 19 be said to increase the nature of the insurer's risk. An exclusion which denies coverage when certain victims are injured is violative of public 20 policy. 21 Wiscomb, 97 Wn.2d at 209. The court went on to explain that the exclusion affects 22 third parties who are in no position to contract for their own insurance coverage. Id. at 23 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 18 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com n:Vokcases/gutlerrez edv. petriol general/drafts/draft pleadings/gutlerrez opposition to 25 shannon@triallawyersnw.com patriot general si.draft.doc

211. For example, the exclusion applies to both children of the named insured as well
 as adults who cannot have their own insurance. *Id.* at 211-12. This inappropriately
 undermines the important public policy of our state's comprehensive UIM scheme.

4 Similarly, the case here involves a provision that under Patriot General's 5 version excludes coverage for Javier, who as a passenger in a vehicle he had no 6 control over and who had no other UIM insurance available to him. Under Patriot 7 General's theory, the exclusion applies to everyone 14 or older, regardless of 8 whether they represent any increased risk⁴ and regardless of whether they have 9 the ability to get UIM insurance elsewhere. This provision is against public policy. 10 especially considering Patriot General's policy amounted to a "take it or leave it" 11 adhesion contract in an area - UIM insurance - imbued with the public interest. 12

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VI. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons discussed above, Patriot General's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

15

Respectfully submitted July 5, 2013.

Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.

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Dick Kilpatrick, WSBA #7058 Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495 Attorneys for Jorge Gutierrez

Patriot General has made no allegation nor presented any evidence to show that Javier presented some kind of increased risk. Nor did it seek any additional premiums for Javier
 once it found out Javier was driving. Jorge Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 7.

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1	DECLARATION OF SERVICE	
2		
3	The undersigned hereby declares I am over the age of 18 and under the	
4	penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on this date I	
5	caused to be served in a manner noted below a true and correct copy of the	
6	foregoing on the parties mentioned below as indicated:	
7		
8	Patrick Paulich	[] E-Mail
9	Matthew Munson Thorsrud Cane & Paulich 1200 Dugot Sound Plaza	[] U.S. Mail
10	1300 Puget Sound Plaza 1325 Fouth Ave Scotte WA 98101	[] Electronic Filing
11	Seattle, WA 98101 ppaulich@tcplaw.com	[火] Legal Messenger
12	Peter Hess Hess Law Office	[]FedEx
13	312 N. Second Ave	[x] Fix
14	Walla Walla, WA 99362 peter@hesslawoffice.com	
15	Dated this 5^{th} day of J_{k} , 20 <u>13</u> at Bellevue, Washington.	
16	Dated this day of	, 20 <u>10</u> at Believue, washington.
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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WALLA WALLA	
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE	
10	COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3
11	Plaintiff	DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT
12		GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	•
14	Defendants	
15	I am a defendant in this matter. I am over the age of 18, and testify to the	
16	matters in this Declaration from first-hand personal knowledge.	
17	1. My name is Jorge Gutierrez. I speak and read almost no English.	
18	This declaration was translated to me by an interpreter.	
19	2. I am the father of Javier Gutierrez. Javier was seriously injured in	
20	a collision on January 9, 2011. At that time, Javier lived with his mother and	
21	me.	
22.	DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155
23 24	GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of 4	Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 805-9540
24 25	c:\unantiwerenilarisppdatatiocastanicrosofficienciastaniparary internet. filestcontent.cutioot/05yd0crofjorge gulieresz declaration finel.doo	diok@trieliewyerznw.com shannon@trieliewyerznw.com
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| [.]

3. 1 After Javier was injured, we let the insurance company know 2 about the collision. Patriot General would not pay any benefits and denied the 3 claim. Javier and I were sued by Patriot General,

4 4 I first went to Tomas Miranda to purchase automobile insurance 5 for my vehicles in part because he spoke Spanish and could explain the 6 process to me in my own language. Because I could not understand the insurance application which was all in English, Tomas Miranda helped me fill 8 out the form. He asked me questions and I gave him the information which he 9 put into the form. He showed me where to initial and sign but I had no 10 understanding that I was telling the insurance company my children would not 11 be covered.

5. I wanted full coverage for my family and it was my understanding 13 that they would be covered. I recall telling Mr. Miranda that my son Javier, and 14 my daughter, Viviana, would also be drivers. I did not understand that the 15 application asked me to certify my children would not be using the vehicles. I 18 did not understand that the application asked me to certify all my children age 17 14 and over had been disclosed. 18

6. Had I known any of this information, I would not have submitted 19 the application the way I did and would have told the insurance company about 20 my children, including Javier. Nobody ever told me that my children were not 21 covered under the Patriot General policy until after Javier's accident and 22 Klipstrick Law Group, P.C. DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 23 Page 2 of 4 24

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1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 96004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallewyersnw.com shannon@trialtawyersnw.com

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2 7. Since the insurance company found out about Javier driving our 3 vehicles, it has not asked for any additional money from me to cover premiums 4 for him.

5 At the time he was injured in the accident, Javier did not own any 8. 6 vehicles of his own and had no other automobile insurance policy.

7 I declare under penalty of perjury, of the laws of the State of Washington, 8 that the foregoing as translated to me is true and correct.

DATED 7-5-13 at Walla Walla, Washington.

orge <u>Autierrez</u>

)eclarant

DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 of 4

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Kilpetrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Believue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fact (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyeranw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com

1	DECLARATIO	N OF SERVICE			
2		•			
3	The undersigned hereby declares I am over the age of 18 and under the				
4	penalty of perjury under the laws of the St	tate of Washington that on this date I			
5	caused to be served in a manner noted b	elow a true and correct copy of the			
6	foregoing on the parties mentioned below	as indicated:			
7					
8	Patrick Paulich Matthew Munson	[]E-Mail			
9	Thorsrud Cane & Paulich 1300 Puget Sound Plaza	[] U.S. Mail			
10	1325 Fouth Ave Seattle, WA 98101	[] Electronic Filing			
11	ppaulich@tcplaw.com	[X] Legal Messenger			
12	Peter Hess Hess Law Office	[] FedEx			
13	312 N. Second Ave Walla Walla, WA 99362	CXI Fax			
14	peter@hesslawoffice.com				
15	Dated this _5th day of July, 201	13 at Bellevue, Washington.			
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17	_	Sum Wep-			
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22 23	DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATE GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4 of 4	Kiipatrick Law Group, P.C. 30T 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Believue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161			
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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T FOR WALLA WA			
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3		
9	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S REPLY		
10	v.	ON ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT		
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	JODOMLINI		
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,			
13	Defendants.			
14	1. The definition of "insured" in RCW	48.22.005 does not apply to RCW 48.22.030		
15		te phrase "persons insured thereunder."		
16	Javier Gutierrez maintains that "insured"	and "persons insured thereunder" are essentially		
17	the same term and therefore have the same meaning. ¹ But giving both terms the same meaning			
18	would deviate from the fundamental rules that	t statutes must be interpreted so that all the		
19	language used is given effect, with no portion r	rendered meaningless or superfluous, ² and that		
20	legislative definitions provided by the statute are controlling. ³ If the legislature had intended			
21				
22	¹ The arguments advanced by defendants herein we Appeals Division II in <i>Helgeson v. Viking Insurance</i>			
23	Appeals, Division II in <i>Helgeson v. Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin</i> , No. 41371-0-II (2011), a copy of which is attached. Although this unpublished decision does not have precedential value under			
24	GR 14.1(a), the court's analysis is nonetheless persuasive. ² Whatcom Cnty. v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). ³ State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 175, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001).			
25				
26	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Reply on MSJ.docx	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH APROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101		
1		(206) 386-7755		

those terms to have the same meaning, it would have used precisely the same term. It did not. The legislature therefore intended to convey different meanings. As the courts have said many times, the intent of RCW 48.22.030 is to make each person who is an insured for liability coverage also an insured for UIM coverage.⁴

Jorge⁵ argues that Patriot failed to focus on the phrase, "for the protection of persons insured thereunder." In fact, the motion did exactly that; it argues that "insured," as defined in RCW 48.22.005(5), is not the same term as "persons insured thereunder" and therefore the terms should not be defined in the same way.⁶

Javier also maintains that "insured" is used in subsections of RCW 48.22.030 other than subsection (2), and that therefore RCW 48.22.005(5)'s definition of "insured" must apply to RCW 48.22.030. Subsection (2) is the critical portion of RCW 48.22.030 because it imposes on insurers the duty to offer UIM coverage to the same extent as liability coverage. Other subsections, including subsection (3), flesh out other aspects of that coverage. Subsection (3), for instance, defines the amount of that coverage. Those subsections implicitly refer to subsection (2).

To the extent the terms "insured" and "persons insured thereunder" create ambiguity, we must turn to the statutory history. As demonstrated in the motion, that history leaves no doubt that RCW 48.22.005 was intended to apply to the PIP statute, and not to the UIM statute.

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⁵ For clarity, this brief uses the defendants' first names. No disrespect is intended. ⁶ See Motion at 5:1–7, 9:9–10:5.

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⁴ E.g., Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wn.2d 439, 444, 563 P.2d 815 (1977) ("The policy of RCW 48.22.030 requires that insurers make available uninsured motorist coverage to a class of 'insureds' that is at least as broad as the class in the primary liability sections of the policy."), abrogated in other part by statute as stated in Vadheim v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 836, 844, 734 P.2d 17 (1987).

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All case law supports Patriot's position.

As noted in Patriot's motion, the Washington courts have stated in at least seven separate cases that an insurer and an insured are free to determine the scope of UIM coverage, so long as it is congruent with the scope of liability coverage.⁷

The defendants' attempts to distinguish this case law fail. First, they claim that the pre-1993 cases are inapposite because they were abrogated by RCW 48.22.005(5). As shown above, RCW 4.22.005(5) does not modify the UIM statute, and the pre-1993 cases are therefore still binding. Moreover, the defendants cite not one case to support their position. If RCW 48.22.005 actually abrogated this line of cases, surely the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have made that clear in the 20 years since the statute's passage.

The defendants mistakenly claim that no post-1993 case addressed RCW 48.22.005's 12 definition of "insured" because the statute would have made no difference in those cases. It 13 would have affected the outcome in at least one of them, Financial Indemnity Co. v. 14 Keomaneethong.⁸ There, a passenger in the insured's vehicle was denied UIM coverage because 15 16 the policy only covered the named insured's relatives who lived in the same household. RCW 17 48.22.005(b) would include the claimant within the definition of "insured" because he was 18 "occupying . . . the insured vehicle with the permission of the named insured . . ." Yet the court 19 did not hold that this statute mandated coverage of the injured party. Rather, the court reiterated 20

 ⁷ Raynes, 88 Wn.2d at 443; Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83, 904 P.2d 749 (1995); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 75, 549 P.2d 9 (1976); Vasquez v. American Fire & Cas. Co., Wn.
 App. ____, 298 P.3d 94, 98 (2013); Wheeler v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 124 Wn. App. 868, 103 P.3d 240 (2004); Fin. Indem. Co. v. Keomaneethong, 85 Wn. App. 350, 353, 931 P.2d 168 (1997); see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Uhls, 41 Wn. App. 49, 53, 702 P.2d 1214 (1985) (""[T]he parties may agree to a narrow definition of insured so long as that definition is applied consistently throughout the policy[.]"")

²⁴ ⁸ 85 Wn. App. 350, 353, 931 P.2d 168 (1997).

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the Washington courts' longstanding position: "[W]hen the question revolves around the initial extension of coverage, that is, the definition of who is and is not an insured, public policy is not violated so long as insured persons are defined the same in the primary liability and UIM sections of the policy."⁹

Jorge also argues that *Cherry v. Truck Insurance Exchange*¹⁰ "reads RCW 48.22.005's definition of 'insured' directly in to the UIM statute[.]" The cited portion of *Cherry* carries little or no weight because it is dicta that appears in a footnote. The other case he cites, *Daley v. Allstate Insurance Company*,¹¹ also has no precedential value because it was reversed by the Supreme Court.

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3. The policy language unambiguously defines who is and is not insured.

The defendants argue the final sentence of the definition of "relative" is ambiguous 12 because it does not set forth the penalty for not listing a relative age 14 or older. But there is no 13 ambiguity in this sentence. Policy language is ambiguous if it is susceptible to at least two 14 reasonable interpretations.¹² A reasonable person would interpret the sentence to mean that a 15 16 person otherwise qualifying as a relative who is 14 or over is not an insured unless listed on the 17 application or endorsed on the policy. The only alternative meaning the defendants suggest is 18 that there is no consequence to not listing such persons age 14 or older. That would read the 19 entire sentence out of the policy, which courts will not do.¹³

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^{21 &}lt;sup>9</sup> Id. at 353.

¹⁰ 77 Wn. App. 557, 563 n.3, 892 P.2d 768 (1995).

²² ¹¹ 86 Wn. App. 346, 355, 936 P.2d 1185 (1997), rev'd, 135 Wn.2d 777, 958 P.2d 990 (1998).

^{23 &}lt;sup>12</sup> Alaska Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 125 Wn. App. 24, 30-31, 104 P.3d 1 (2004).

 ²³ ¹³ New Hampshire Indem. Co., Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 148 Wn.2d 929, 933, 64 P.3d
 ²⁴ ¹²³⁹ (2003) ("We interpret insurance contracts . . . in a manner that gives effect to each provision of the policy.").

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4. Patriot can decline to provide coverage to persons who are not insured by the policy without a showing of prejudice.

Jorge argues that the final sentence of the definition of "relative" is akin to a cooperation or notice clause, and that, like those clauses, it should be enforceable only if the breach of the clause prejudices the insurer. The language is not, however, akin to a cooperation or notice clause. Rather, it defines who is insured by the policy. Washington courts have never imposed a prejudice requirement on such a term. The prejudice requirement has only been applied to procedures for handling a claim after a loss: the duty to notify the insurer of a claim,¹⁴ the duty to cooperate with the insurer's investigation and defense of the claim,¹⁵ and the duty not to settle a claim without authorization.¹⁶

11 An insurer is not required to establish that it would be prejudiced by including someone 12 within the definition of insured who is not in fact an insured. In West Coast Pizza Co., Inc. v. 13 United National Insurance Co.,¹⁷ the plaintiff completed an insurance application with National 14 Continental Insurance Company, listing various restaurants and pizza-delivery drivers. West 15 Coast did not disclose that it wanted coverage for a related business, Mad Pizza, which employed 16 some of the listed drivers and owned some of the listed restaurants. After a Mad Pizza employee 17 caused an auto accident, West Coast tendered to National Continental, which denied the claim. 18 In West Coast's suit against the insurer, the Court of Appeals held that Mad Pizza was not 19 covered because it was not a named insured in the policy and there was no evidence that the 20 parties had mutually intended to include Mad Pizza as an insured. The court did not inquire 21

²⁴ ¹⁷ 166 Wn. App. 33, 41, 271 P.3d 894 (2011).

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PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
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^{22 &}lt;sup>14</sup> Canron, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 82 Wn. App. 480, 485, 918 P.2d 937 (1996).

¹⁵ Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wn.2d 372, 377, 35 P.2d 816 (1975).

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 ¹⁶ Pub. Util Dist. No. 1 of Klickitat Cnty. v. International Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 803–04, 881 P.2d 1020 (1994).
 ¹⁷ 166 Wr. Apr. 22, 41, 271 P.2d 804 (2011).

whether the carrier was prejudiced by West Coast's failure to list Mad Pizza on its application. Rather, the court focused on whether Mad Pizza was a covered entity under the terms of the policy. The court should use the same analysis here.

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Cases involving the household or family exclusion are inapposite.

Jorge argues that the Patriot policy violates the public policy expressed in the UIM statute because it does not provide coverage to Javier. That argument blurs the critical distinction between a grant of coverage and an exclusion from coverage. Jorge cites a case invalidating family-member exclusions, but neglects case law stating that the UIM statute and public policy do not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured. Under the latter cases, the policy is valid because Javier, rather than being subject to an exclusion, is not an insured in the first instance.

Washington courts have long held that the UIM statute "does not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy."¹⁸ The distinction between grants of coverage and exclusions is not merely semantic; Washington courts treat the two very differently. For instance, an insured has the initial burden of showing that the loss falls within the scope of the policy's insured losses. If that burden is met, the insurer then has the burden to show that the loss is excluded by specific policy language.¹⁹

The case on which Jorge relies struck down exclusions, and did not mandate a particular definition of "insured." In *Tissell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.*,²⁰ the Washington Supreme Court invalidated a UIM provision that excluded coverage for a family member who was a

 ¹⁸ Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83, 904 P.2d 749 (1995).
 ¹⁹ McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 731, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).
 ²⁰ 115 Wn.2d 107, 795 P.2d (1990).

 ²⁵ PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
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named insured. The policy in that case included the named insured's family as a "covered person," but excluded UIM coverage for a vehicle owned by a family member. The insurer denied UIM coverage to Tissell, a named insured, because she was injured while riding in the family car. *Tissell* invalidated this so-called "family member exclusion" as against public policy because it was directed at a class of victims, rather than conduct that affected the insurer's risk.

The distinction between the extension or grant of coverage and exclusions from coverage 7 is made clear in several Washington cases, one of which is Farmers Insurance Co. v. Miller.²¹ In 8 that case, Lane Miller obtained an auto policy, which included uninsured motorist coverage, 9 from Farmers. Miller's son was later killed while riding as a passenger in an uninsured vehicle. 10 Farmers rejected Miller's uninsured motorist claim because his son was not an insured. The 11 policy stated that Farmers would provide uninsured motorist coverage to "the insured," which 12 the policy defined to include a relative of the named insured who was a resident of the same 13 household and who did not own a motor vehicle. Miller's son owned a car, so he did not come 14 15 within the definition of insured. The trial court granted summary judgment to Farmers. On 16 appeal, Miller argued that the public policy expressed in RCW 48.22.030 prohibited this type of 17 clause. The court rejected this argument because the statute "does not mandate any particular 18 scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy." Cases 19 invalidating exclusions from the definition of insured were not on point because the issue before 20 the court was the scope of the policy's initial grant of coverage, and not an exclusionary clause, 21 and because the insured was defined consistently throughout the policy.

²¹ 87 Wn.2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976).

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PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
 COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR
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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH

A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755 Jorge Gutierrez's inability to read English does not nullify any terms in the policy or the application because he is presumed to understand those documents.

Jorge contends that Patriot cannot limit coverage to relatives over age 14 who are listed 3 in the application because he is not fluent in English and therefore did not understand the 4 application or the policy. Jorge's alleged inability to understand those documents does not nullify 5 this policy language. Policyholders have "an affirmative duty under Washington law to read their 6 policy and be on notice of the terms and conditions of the policy."²² This is true even if a party to 7 a contract does not speak the language in which the contract is written.²³ A lack of fluency in 8 9 English does not exempt a policyholder from a policy's terms, including those defining who is 10 and is not insured by the policy.

7. Conclusion.

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For the foregoing reasons, Patriot respectfully submits that the court should grant its motion for summary judgment and order that Patriot has no duty to pay any benefits under the UIM coverage under Policy No. 471327125 arising from the subject motor vehicle accident.

DATED this $\mathcal{G}^{+\mathcal{W}}$ day of July, 2013.

Patrick M. Paulich, WSBA #10951 Matthew Munson, WSBA #32019 THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company

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 ²² Dombrosky v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 84 Wn. App. 245, 257, 928 P.2d 1127 (1996); see also Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81 Wn.2d 886, 912, 506 P.2d 20 (1973) ("It is a general rule that a party to a contract which he has voluntarily signed will not be heard to declare that he did not read it, or was ignorant of its contents.").
 ²³ D. J. D. J

²³ See Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 152 Wn.2d 375, 385, 97 P.3d 11 (2004) (holding that party could not set aside settlement agreement on ground that party could not read English and that other party mistranslated agreement).

Westlaw.

Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2) (Cite as: 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION, SEE RCWA 2.06.040

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2. Jennifer HELGESON and Andrew Helgeson, Appellants, v.

VIKING INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCON-SIN a foreign corporation, d/b/a/ Sentry Insurance, d/b/a Dairyland Insurance, Respondent.

No. 41371–0–II. Oct. 11, 2011.

Appeal from Kitsap Superior Court; Hon. Leila Mills, J.

Natalie Kiddell Rasmussen, Gerald A. Kearney, Law Offices of Gerald A. Kearney, PLLC, Kingston, WA, for Appellants.

Patrick Michael Paulich, Herbert Matthew Munson, Thorsrud Cane & Paulich, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION VAN DEREN, J.

*1 Jennifer Helgeson and her son, Andrew Helgeson,^{FN1} appeal the trial court's order granting Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin's summary judgment motion and dismissing their claims against Viking in a dispute over whether Jennifer's underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) ^{FN2} covered injuries sustained by Andrew when he was hit by an underinsured motor vehicle while he was skateboarding. The Helgesons argue that Jennifer's policy covered Andrew's injury because (1) Viking's broad form "named" driver endorsement excludes mandatory UIM coverage and, thus, violates RCW 48.22.005; (2) public policy prohibits Viking's denial of UIM coverage to a named insured's minor child; (3) public policy prohibits family member exclusions in insurance contracts; and (4) Viking's conduct violated the Insurance Fair Conduct Act, RCW 48.30.010 -.015. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment order because Andrew was not insured under Jennifer's insurance policy and Viking's insurance policy does not violate public policy.

> FN1. Because Jennifer Helgeson and Andrew Helgeson share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. We refer to them collectively as the Helgesons.

> FN2. We note that "UIM is an acronym for either uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage." *Hamm v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 151 Wn.2d 303, 306 n. 1, 88 P.3d 395 (2004). An "[u]nderinsured motor vehicle" is defined in part as "a motor vehicle with ... either no bodily injury or property damage liability bond [in effect] at the time of an accident." RCW 48.22.030(1).

FACTS

On October 5, 2008, Jennifer Helgeson renewed her personal automobile insurance coverage through Viking for the period of October 5, 2008, to April 5, 2009. Jennifer's policy provided definitions for terms used throughout the policy. CP at 36. It stated:

"You" and "your" mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your also means any relative of that person if they reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a car.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 36. "Relative" was defined as "a person living in your household re-

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lated to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, including a ward or foster child." CP at 36.

The broad form "named" driver endorsement in Jennifer's automobile policy replaced the policy's general definition of "you" and "your," stating, " 'You' and 'your' mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page." CP at 47. Jennifer was the only named insured on the declarations page. The endorsement also amended the policy's liability coverage to state:

We will pay damages for which you are legally liable because of bodily injury and/or property damage caused by a car accident arising out of your use of your insured car. We will settle any claims or defend any lawsuit which is payable under the policy, as we deem appropriate.

CP at 47.

The endorsement further stated that the policy provided the named insured medical payment coverage while "occupying your insured car," "as a pedestrian when struck by a motor vehicle or utility trailer," or "any other person while occupying your insured car while the car is being used by you." CP at 47. The endorsement's UIM portion included coverage for

(A) You.

(B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.

(C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you or another occupant of your car.^{FN3}

> FN3. Although Viking's records indicate that Jennifer signed a UIM waiver form and she did not pay a separate premium for UIM coverage, Viking has been unable to locate the waiver. Thus, for purposes of its summary judgment motion and Jennifer's appeal, Viking concedes that Jennifer did

not waive UIM coverage.

*2 CP at 47.

On February 3, 2009, a motor vehicle struck Andrew while he was skateboarding in Kingston, Washington.^{FN4} Andrew was transferred by ambulance to a hospital and he was treated for fractures of his right leg. Andrew and the driver's insurer settled all claims Andrew had against the driver for \$50,000, the driver's policy's claim limit. When Jennifer applied for UIM coverage under her insurance policy for the remainder of Andrew's damages. Viking "disclaim [ed] and deni[ed] any and all liability or obligation" to provide UIM coverage to Andrew. CP at 81. Viking stated that "the policy of insurance covers only 'you' [Jennifer], as the named insured. Andrew ... does not meet the definition of 'you' under your policy and, therefore, there is no coverage under the [UIM] Coverage ." CP at 81.

FN4. The parties agree that a person on a skateboard is considered a pedestrian. See generally Pudmaroff v. Allen, 89 Wn.App. 928, 934, 951 P.2d 335 (1998), aff'd, 138 Wn.2d 55, 977 P.2d 574 (1999).

Andrew and Jennifer sued Viking, asserting that Viking breached its contract and violated the Insurance Fair Conduct Act. On the same day that Andrew and Jennifer filed their complaint against Viking, Viking filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asking the trial court to rule that Viking did "not have a duty to pay any benefits under the UIM coverage of [Jennifer's] [p]olicy." CP at 225. The two cases were consolidated.

Both parties filed summaryjudgment motions. The trial court granted Viking's summary judgment motion, declared that Andrew was not entitled to UIM benefits under Jennifer's policy with Viking, and dismissed with prejudice the Helgesons' claims. The Helgesons appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review

A. Summary Judgment

We review a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. *Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co.*, 154 Wn.2d 165, 171, 110 P.3d 733 (2005). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue about any material fact and, assuming facts most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Wilson v. Steinbach*, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).

B. Interpreting Insurance Policies

"Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law, which we review de novo." *Hall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 133 Wn.App. 394, 399, 135 P.3d 941 (2006). Insurance policies are contracts, and rules of contract interpretation apply. *Hall*, 133 Wn.App. at 399.

The criteria for interpreting insurance contracts in Washington are well settled. We construe insurance policies as contracts. *Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.*, 142 Wn.2d 654, 665, 15 P.3d 115 (2000). We consider the policy as a whole, and we give it a ... "fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance."

[*Weyerhaeuser*, 142 Wn.2d] at 666.... Most importantly, if the policy language is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce it as written; we may not modify it or create ambiguity where none exists.

*3 ... Finally, in Washington the expectations of the insured cannot override the plain language of the contract. See Findlay [v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 129 Wn.2d 368,] 378[, 917 P.2d 116 (1996)].

Quadrant, 154 Wn.2d at 171–172 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Washington Casualty Insurance—Chapter 48.22 RCW

The Helgesons argue that RCW 48.22.005(5)'s definition of "insured" FN5 is incorporated into the underinsured motor vehicle statute, RCW 48.22.030 FN6 and, thus, RCW 48.22.030 requires Andrew, as Jennifer's seventeen year old son, to be included as an insured person under Jennifer's insurance policy even if he is not a "named" insured. They argue that Viking must pay Andrew's underinsured motorist claim under Jennifer's policy. We disagree because parties to an insurance policy are free to determine who is insured by the policy.

FN5. RCW 48.22.005(5) defines "[i]nsured" as:

(a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is either related to the named insured by blood, marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild; or

(b) A person who sustains bodily injury caused by accident while: (i) Occupying or using the insured automobile with the permission of the named insured; or (ii) a pedestrian accidentally struck by the insured automobile.

FN6. Washington's underinsured motor vehicle insurance statute, RCW 48.22.030(1), states:

"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which either no bodily injury or property damage liability bond or insurance policy applies at the time of an accident, or with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury or prop-

Page 4

Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2) (Cite as: 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2))

erty damage liability bonds and insurance policies applicable to a covered person after an accident is less than the applicable damages which the covered person is legally entitled to recover.

The issue raised by the Helgesons has long been resolved by our Supreme Court. It held that RCW 48.22.030 "does not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured in a particular automobile insurance policy." *Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. v. Miller,* 87 Wn.2d 70, 75, 549 P.2d 9 (1976). Furthermore, it explained that

[t]he policy of RCW 48.22.030 requires that insurers make available uninsured motorist coverage to a class of "insureds" that is at least as broad as the class in the primary liability sections of the policy. It does not preclude the parties from reaching agreement as to the scope of that class in the first instance.

Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 337, 494 P.2d 479 (1972).

Here, the insurance policy's endorsement stated, "'You' and 'your' mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page." CP at 47. Jennifer was the only person named on the declarations page. The parties to an insurance contract are free to delineate who is covered under the policy. *Miller*, 87 Wn.2d at 75. Additionally, the endorsement's UIM portion defined "insured person" as:

(A) You.

(B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.

(C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you or another occupant of your car.

CP at 47. Andrew was not named on the declarations page, nor was he entitled to recovery under any of the policy's other provisions. Because Andrew was not insured under Jennifer's policy for his injuries sustained when an underinsured motor vehicle injured him while he was skateboarding, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the **Helgesons** were "not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under" Jennifer's policy with Viking. CP at 204.

III. Public Policy

A. UIM Coverage

The Helgesons also assert a public policy argument that "[t]he Endorsement [wa]s contrary to the public policy behind Washington State's UIM statu[t]e because the Endorsement forclose[d] Andrew's only source of UIM coverage." ^{FN7} Br. of Appellant at 14 (italics and boldface omitted). The Helgesons rely on *Tissell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.*, 115 Wn.2d 107, 109, 795 P.2d 126 (1990) to support this argument. But the Helgesons misconstrue the reach of the *Tissell* decision, and its rule is inapplicable here because Andrew was not an insured under Jennifer's policy and he was not a purchaser of UIM insurance.

> FN7. We note that Andrew did have access to other insurance coverage for his injuries since the motorist's insurer paid policy limits to Andrew.

*4 In *Tissell*, the court held "that certain victim exclusions in [UIM] policies are invalid as against public policy when asserted against the purchaser of a UIM policy." 115 Wn.2d at 108. Ada Tissell was seriously injured in a vehicle accident and died five years after the accident as a result of the injuries she sustained "when her husband accidentally drove the car off the road and into the Green River." *Tissell*, 115 Wn.2d at 109. Tissell was the named insured on the automobile policy providing \$300,000 liability coverage and \$300,000 UIM coverage. *Tissell*, 115 Wn.2d at 109. The UIM portion of her policy defined "covered person" as "the named insured or a family member" but excluded (1) any vehicle owned by "you or any family mem-

Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2) (Cite as: 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2))

ber unless the covered person was neither operating nor occupying such vehicle at the time of the accident" and (2) if liability coverage of the policy applied. Tissell, 115 Wn.2d at 109. Liberty Insurance paid Tissell the full amount due under the liability portion of the policy but denied UIM coverage because her husband was operating the family vehicle at the time of the accident and because she recovered under the liability coverage of the policy. Tissell, 115 Wn.2d at 109-10. The Tissell court explained that, although an insurance company may exclude persons from their status as "insured," once an insurance company has decided to insure a driver, it cannot deny coverage based on the identity of a victim injured by its insured driver. 115 Wn.2d at 108.

Here, Andrew was not an insured under his mother's insurance policy under either the insurance policy's liability portion or under the UIM portion. *Tissell* does not suggest that public policy requires that Andrew be entitled to UIM coverage under his mother's policy because he does not have another source of UIM coverage. Here, Jennifer and Viking were free to determine who was covered under Jennifer's policy, Andrew was not included in that definition, and the circumstances of his vehicle/ skateboard accident with an underinsured driver did not bring him under the UIM coverage of his mother's policy.

B. Family Member Exclusions

The Helgesons also contend that "[f]amily member exclusions in insurance contracts are invalid in Washington State because such exclusions contravene the public policy behind Washington State's statutory scheme of insurance legislation." Br. of Appellant at 19. To support their argument, the Helegsons rely on *Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb*, 97 Wn.2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982).

"Maura McGahan Wiscomb was seriously injured in a collision between the motorcycle she was operating and an automobile driven by her husband." *Wiscomb*, 97 Wn.2d at 204. The issue before the court was "to determine the validity and effect of family or household exclusion clauses in automobile insurance policies." *Wiscomb*, 97 Wn.2d at 205. The clause at issue prevented "those persons related to and living with the negligent driver, from receiving financial protection under [the] insurance policy." *Wiscomb*, 97 Wn.2d at 208. The court held that the insurer who agrees to indemnify the insured against damages caused by the insured's negligence may not exclude "an entire class of innocent victims." *Wiscomb*, 97 Wn.2d at 208.

*5 Wiscomb is inapplicable here and the Helgesons do not cite any other authority that supports the proposition that minors must always be insured under a parent's or guardian's policy.^{FN8} Insurance policies, as contracts, allow the parties to define the scope of that class of insured, and we will not rewrite that contract. Viking's denial of UIM coverage for Andrew did not involve applying a policy exclusion but, rather, interpreting who was insured under the policy.

> FN8. Moreover, in *Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jester*, 102 Wn.2d 78, 78–79, 683 P.2d 180 (1984), our Supreme Court narrowed the reach of its decision in *Wiscomb*:

In ... Wiscomb ..., we reserved for another day the question of the validity of motor vehicle insurance policy exclusions consciously bargained for by the insurer and its insured. That day has arrived. We hold public policy is not violated by a motorcycle insurance policy provision which excludes liability coverage for claims made by passengers, when the insured intentionally rejected that coverage when offered.

Furthermore, "'[e]xclusion clauses do not grant coverage; rather, they subtract from it.' " Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Nw. Youth Servs., 97 Wn.App. 226, 231, 983 P.2d 1144

Page 6

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(1999) (quoting Harrison Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 37 Wn.App. 621, 627, 681 P.2d 875 (1984)). Here, Jennifer's policy covered only her as the insured under the liability portion and provided coverage for her in the UIM portion. Andrew was not insured under any portion of the policy nor did the policy state an exclusion applicable to him; thus, it did not have an exclusion clause that excluded "an entire class of innocent victims." Wiscomb, 97 Wn.2d at 208. Because Andrew was not an insured under the policy, it was not against public policy to deny him UIM coverage. We hold that the trial court did not err in granting Viking's summary judgment motion.

IV. Insurance Fair Conduct Act, RCW 48.30.010 -.015 FN9

FN9. RCW 48.30.015 states:

(1) Any first party claimant to a policy of insurance who is unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits by an insurer may bring an action in the superior court of this state to recover the actual damages sustained, together with the costs of the action, including reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs, as set forth in subsection (3) of this section.

(2) The superior court may, after finding that an insurer has acted unreasonably in denying a claim for coverage or payment of benefits or has violated a rule in subsection (5) of this section, increase the total award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual dam- ages.

(3) The superior court shall, after a finding of unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, or after a finding of a violation of a rule in subsection (5) of this section, award reasonable attorneys' fees and actual and statutory litigation costs, including expert witness fees, to the first party claimant of an insurance contract who is the prevailing party in such an action.

Finally, the Helgesons argue that Viking violated Washington's Insurance Fair Conduct Act "[b]y denying Andrew ... insurance coverage based on an Endorsement that is both against statutory language and public policy." Br. of Appellant at 22–23. As discussed above, the endorsement was not contrary to statutory language or public policy and, thus, this argument is without merit. Andrew was not "unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits by an insurer" making RCW 48.30.015 inapplicable. RCW 48.30.015(1).

V. Attorney Fees

The Helgesons request attorney fees. Because they do not prevail, we deny their request.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

We concur: HUNT and JOHANSON, JJ.

Wash.App. Div. 2,2011. Helgeson v. Viking Ins. Co. of Wisconsin Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 4790963 (Wash.App. Div. 2)

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4	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH					
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7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON					
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WALLA WALLA					
9	U COMPANY, a foreign corporation,					
[·] 10						
11	vs. DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO					
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT					
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital AND COUNTERCLAIMS community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,					
14	Defendants.					
15						
16	COMES NOW Defendent Javier Gutierrez in reply to Plaintiff's complaint					
17	and admits, denies, and alleges as follows:					
18	I .					
19	1.1 In reply to paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, Defendant Javier Gutierrez admits					
20	same.					
21	IJ.					
22	2.1 In reply to paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2, Defendant Javier Gutierrez admits					
23	same.					
24						
25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Weilie Weilie, WA 99982 Weilie Weilie, WA 99982					
2,6 ₁	AND COUNTER CLAIM Telephone (509) 525-4744					

	(SAT)JUL 13 2013 14:15/ST.14:14/No.6825098270 P 4					
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
3.1	In reply to paragraph 3.1, Defendant Javier Gutierrez admits that his name					
	is not on The Policy, but denies that The Policy doesn't cover him.					
3.2	In reply to paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3, Defendant Javier Gutlerrez admits					
	same.					
3.3	In reply to paragraph 3.4, Defendant Javier Gutierrez admits that Patriot					
	General contends that he is not insured under The Policy, however,					
	Defendant Javier contends that he is, indeed, covered under the policy.					
	IV.					
4.1	In reply to paragraphs 4.1, Defendant Javier Gutierrez admits same.					
4.2	In reply to paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3, Defendant Javier Gutierrez denies each					
and every allegation contained therein.						
	V. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES					
	FURTHER ANSWERING and by way of affirmative defenses, Defendant					
Javie	r Gutierrez alleges as follows:					
5.1	Failure to State a Claim Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against					
	defendants upon which relief may be granted, and therefore, all claims					
	against defendants should be dismissed with prejudice.					
5.2	Reservation of Right to Assert Additional Affirmative Defenses Defendant					
	Javier Gutierrez hereby reserves his right to assert further and additional					
affirmative defenses as additional discovery and circumstances require or						
permit during the course of litigation.						
	Hess Law Office, PLLC					
COM	PLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 416 N. Second Avenua Walka Walka, WA \$9382					
AND COUNTER CLAIM Telephone (609) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 Ernall peter@hessiawotifice.com						
	3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 Javie 5.1 5.2					

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	1 VI .	VI. COUNTERCLAIM FOR BAD FAITH AND VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMER				
	2	PROTECTION ACT				
	3	BY WAY OF FURTHER ANSWER AND AS A COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST				
4		INTIFF, Defendant Javier Gutierrez alleges as follows:				
ŧ	5 Part	ies. Jurisdiction & Venue				
e	6.1	At all times relevant herein, Defendant Jorge Gutierrez and Defendant				
7	•	Javier Gutierrez resided in Walla Walla County, Washington.				
8	6.2	At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company				
.9		("Patriot General") was licensed and was doing business (i.e. selling				
10		insurance) In Walla Walla County, Washington.				
11	Fact	Facts				
12	6.3	6.3 Plaintiff Patriot General sold a policy of insurance to Defendant Jorge				
13		Gutierrez with a policy number of 471327125, which was in full force and				
14		effect on January 9, 2011 and which contained uninsured motorist ("UIM")				
15		benefits of \$25,000.00 per person/\$50,000.00 per accident.				
16	6.4	6.4 Defendant Javier Gutierrez is related by blood to Defendant Jorge				
17		Gutierrez and resided with him at all times relevant herein.				
18	6.5	On or about January 9, 2011, Defendant Javier Gutierrez was a passenger				
19		in an automobile that was driven by Matthew Vincent Lanier and was				
20		involved in a single-vehicle-rollover collision on Middle Waitsburg Road in				
21		Walla Walla County, Washington.				
22	6.6	Driver Matthew Vincent Lanler was an uninsured motorist.				
23						
24		Hess Law Office, PLLC				
25	COM	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTTERREZ'S ANSWER TO 415 N. Second Avenue COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Walls Weile, WA 90362				
2,6 ₃	AND	AND COUNTER CLAIM Fax (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 Email peter@hessiawoffice.com				
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- 6.7 Driver Matthew Vincent Lanier was cited for driving under the influence,
 reckless endangerment of emergency zone workers, and driving without
 insurance.
- 4 UIM Claim against Patriot General
- 5 6.8 Defendant Javier Gutierrez re-alleges and incorporates by reference the
 allegations set forth in paragraphs 6.3 through 6.7.
- 6.9 This is a contractual claim for UIM benefits based on Defendant Gutierrez's
 8 coverage under the Insurance contract with Plaintiff Patriot General.
- 9 6.10 Driver Matthew Vincent Lanier was 100% "at fault" as that term is defined
 by RCW 4.22.015 for the automobile collision that gives rise to this lawsuit,
 and is, thus, 100% responsible for the injuries and damages suffered by
 Defendant Javier Gutierrez which proximately resulted from this collision.
- 6.11 Plaintiff Patriot General, which (as Defendant Javier Gutierrez's UIM
 carrier) "steps into the shoes" of the uninsured negligent driver, is thus
 100% responsible for Defendant Javier Gutierrez's injuries and damages
 herein, subject to its UIM limits.
- 17 6.12 There are no non-party individuals or entities which are, in any way or
 18 percentage, at fault for this collision, or for Defendant Javier Gutierrez's
 19 injuries and damages resulting from the collision.
- 6.13 Plaintiff Patriot General has a duty under the terms of the UIM provision of
 its policy to pay the amount of compensatory damages that the insureds
 are legally entitled to recover from the owner or the driver of the uninsured
 vehicle.

DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

AND COUNTER CLAIM

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Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Wella Wella, WA 99362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 Email peter@hessiswotfice.com

1	6.14	6.14 As a direct and proximate result of said collision, Defendant Javier			
2		Gutierrez was injured, suffered and continues to suffer physical disability			
3	and pain, emotional trauma, medical expenses, loss of earnings and				
4	earning capacity, and other damages, in an amount now unknown, but to				
5		be proven at the time of trial.			
6	6.15	Defendant Javier Gutierrez made a timely claim for benefits under Plaintiff			
7		Patriot General's UIM policy and fully complied with any and all duties on			
8		his part to entitle him to recover and receive the first-party benefits that			
9		were due and owed to Defendant Javier Gutlerrez for the covered losses			
10		under Plaintiff Patriot General's policy.			
11	6.16	Defendant Javier Gutierrez submitted a \$25,000.00-policy-limit demand to			
12		Plaintiff Patriot General on May 15, 2012.			
13	6.17	6.17 On May 22, 2012, Plaintiff Patriot responded that it had determined that			
14	Defendant Javier Gutierrez does not qualify for benefits and indicated that it				
15		was forwarding an explanation of the disclaimer to Defendant Jorge			
16	•	Gutierrez but it refused to send Defendant Javier Gutierrez an actual			
17	explanation of the reason for its denial of coverage until February 13, 2013.				
18	Breach of Contract				
19	6.18 Defendant Javier Gutierrez re-alleges and incorporates by reference the				
20		allegations set forth in paragraphs 6.3 through 6.17.			
21	6.19 Plaintiff Patriot General's actions are in violation of the express and implied				
22		terms and conditions of the insurance contract and/or reasonable			
23					
24	Hess Law Office, PLLC				
25	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 415 N. Second Avenue waila Walla, WA 99382				
2,65	AND COUNTER CLAIM Fax (509) 525-4747 Fax (509) 525-4747 Fax (509) 525-4777 Emeil peter@hestalawoffice.com				

	1	expectations of its insureds as to the terms and conditions of the insurance		
2	2	policy.		
3	6.20 Plaintiff Patriot General breached its duty to provide coverage for			
4		Defendant Javier Gutierrez under the terms of the policy and under the		
5	5	definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005(5)(a) which is automatically "read		
6		into" the policy.		
7	6.20	Plaintiff Patriot General breached its duty, under the terms of the UIM		
. 8		provisions of the policy, to pay the amount of compensatory damages that		
9		the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of the		
10		uninsured vehicle.		
11	6.21	Plaintiff Patriot General is liable for all damages that have resulted from its		
12	breach of the policy of insurance, including but not limited to payment of full			
13	compensation for injures sustained by Defendant Javier Gutierrez, loss of			
14		use of funds which should have been promptly paid as part of the claims		
15		process, damage to credit, general damages for the wrongful handling of		
16		the UIM claim, and for having to institute litigation to obtain the benefits to		
17		which Defendant Javier Gutierrez is entitled under the policy.		
18	Bad F	Faith and Consumer Protection Act Violation		
19	6.22	Defendant Javier Gutierrez re-alleges and incorporates by reference the		
20		allegations set forth in paragraphs 6.3 through 6.21.		
21	6.23	Plaintiff Patriot General's actions are in violation of RCW 48.30.010 and its		
22		duty of good faith requiring that all its actions be actuated by good faith, to		
23		abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all matters		
24		Hess Law Office, PLLC		
25	COM	ENDANT JAVIER GUTTERREZ'S ANSWER TO 415 N. Second Avenue PLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Walla Walla, WA 99362		
2,68	AND	COUNTER CLAIM Fax (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 Email peter@hessiawoffice.com		

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	1	related to the business of insurance. Plaintiff Patriot General's actions			
2	2	were negligent and in violation of its duty to exercise reasonable care			
3	towards its insureds.				
4	6.24	Plaintiff Patriot General's actions are in violation of Specific Unfair			
5	;]	Settlement Practices as set forth in WAC 284-30 et. seq. As well as in			
6		violation of other statutes or regulations governing UIM coverage, see RCW			
7		48.22 et. seq.			
8	6.25	Plaintiff Patriot General has unreasonably delayed payment in full to			
9		Defendant Javier Gutierrez and has forced him to resort to litigation to			
10		obtain the benefits he is entitled to under the terms of the policy, which			
11		constitutes an unreasonable claims settlement practice.			
12	6.26	Plaintiff Patriot General's actions are in violation of the Consumer			
13		Protection Act, RCW 19.86 et. seq.			
14	6.27	Plaintiff Patriot General is liable for all damages to Defendant Javier			
15		Gutierrez that have resulted from the violation of the Consumer Protection			
16		Act and implied common law duty of good faith.			
17	6.28	Defendant Javier Gutierrez intends to amend this counterclaim to include			
18		violations of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act (RCW 48.30.015) after he has			
19		complied with the twenty day notice requirement set forth in RCW			
20		48.30.015(8)(a), provided that Plaintiff Patriot General continues to refuse			
21		cure its violations.			
22	///				
23	///				
24		Hess Law Office, PLLC			
25	COM	NDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO 415 N. Second Avenue PLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Walls, WA 99382			
2,67	AND (COUNTER CLAIM Fax (509) 525-474 Fax (509) 525-4977 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com			

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	VII. LIMITED PHYSICIAN/PATIENT WAIVER				
2	Defendant Javier Gutierrez hereby waives the physician-patient privilege				
3	ONLY to the extent required by RCW 5.60.060, as limited by Defendant Javier				
4	Gutierrez's constitutional rights of privacy, contractual rights of privacy, and the				
5	ethical obligations of physiclans and attorneys not to engage in ex parte contact				
6	between a treating physician and the patient's legal adversaries.				
7	VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF				
8	WHEREFORE, having fully stated the foregoing claims against Plaintiff,				
9	Defendant Javier Gutierrez prays for relief as follows:				
10	1. For an award of general damages in an amount proven at trial;				
11	2. For an award of special damages including, but not limited to, past				
12	and future medical expenses, out-of-pocket costs, loss of earnings				
13	and earning capacity, and others, in an amount to be proven at trial;				
14	3. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all liquidated special				
15	damages as provided by law;				
16	4. For an award of Defendant Javier Gutierrez's attorney fees and				
17	costs incurred in this action, as permitted by court rules, contract,				
18	statute, equitable doctrine, or case authority, including but not limited				
19	to Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co.				
20	5. For leave to amend Defendant Javier Gutierrez's pleadings				
21	(including, but not limited to, adding an IFCA claim under RCW				
22	48.30.015 per paragraph 6.28 above) as additional discovery and				
23	circumstances require or permit during the course of litigation, or to				
24					
25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO 415 N. Second Avenue COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Wella Wella, WA 99362				
2/68	AND COUNTER CLAIM Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4747 Email peter@hesslawoffice.com				

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. 1	conform to the evidence presented at trial or other hearings herein;
2	and
3	6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
4	equitable.
5	DATED this 13 th day of July, 2013
6	
7	Hess Law Office, PLLC
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9	By: Peter J. Hess, WSBA #39721
10	Of Attorneys for Defendants
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24	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO 415 N. Second Avenue Walle Walle
25	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMEN 1 Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fex (509) 525-4744
2,69	AND COUNTER CLAIM peter@hesslawoffice.com

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4	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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6	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER
7	TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND COUNTERCLAIMS by
8	the method(s) indicated below, and addressed to the following:
9	Mr. Patrick M, Paulich U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
10	Thorsrud Cane & Paulich Hand Delivered Hand Delivered Overnight Mail
11	1325 Fourth Avenue X Facsimile Seattle, WA 98101
12	Fax: (206) 386-7795
13	Ms. Shannon Kilpatrick Kilpatrick Law Group, P.S.
14	1750 - 112th Ave. N.E., Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004
15	Fax: (425) 646-7769
16	
17	Bertha Clayton Assistant to PETER J. HESS
18	
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25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S ANSWER TO Hess Law Office, PLLC COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Walla Walla, WA 99362
2,610	AND COUNTER CLAIM Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 peter@hesslawoffice.com

IN THE SUPERIOR	COURT OF 7	THE STATE OF	WASHINGTON
FOR	WALLA WA	ALLA COUNTY	7

PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,

v.

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Plaintiff,

JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE
 GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,
 and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,

Defendants.

No. 12-2-00908-3

PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S ERRATA TO ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company hereby submits corrections to its Motion for Summary Judgment. Page 2, lines 3 to 4 now read, "It identifies Javier Gutierrez as the named insured, and its lists two drivers, Javier Gutierrez and Maria Recarmona." They should read, "It identifies Jorge Gutierrez as the named insured, and its lists two drivers, Jorge Gutierrez and Maria Recarmona."

Page 6, lines 5 to 8 now read, "Jorge does not qualify as 'you' because the Declarations Page does not identify him as a named insured, and he is over the age of 14 and not listed on the application or any endorsement." They should read, "Javier does not qualify as 'you' because the Declarations Page does not identify him as a named insured, and he is over the age of 14 and not listed on the application or any endorsement."

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 PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

1				
2	DATED this $\frac{74}{2}$ day of July, 2013.			
3		Malti	hen Munson	
4		Patrick M. P	aulich, WSBA #10951 inson, WSBA #32019	
5		THORSRUI	O CANE & PAULICH for Plaintiff Patriot	
6		Insurance Co		
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25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURAN	CE		
26	COMPANY'S ERRATA TO ITS MOTION FC SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Errata on summary judgment motion.docx		THORSRUD CANE & A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE COF 1300 PUGET SOUND PL 1325 FOURTH AVENI SEATTLE, WA 9810 (206) 386-7755	RPORATION AZA UE

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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T FOR WALLA WA	
7	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE	
8	COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF SERVICE
10	v .	
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
13	Defendants.	
14		1
15	I declare under penalty of perjury under the	laws of the State of Washington that I caused to
16	be served the listed documents on the following cou	insel in the manner described below:
17	1. Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance	Company's Errata to its Motion for Summary
18	Judgment, and	
19	2. this Declaration of Service.	
20	Peter J. Hess	
21	Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second	
22	Walla Walla, WA 99362	
23	Via Facsimile and Email per agreement	
24	Dick Kilpatrick Shannon M. Kilpatrick	
25	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.	
26	1750 112 th Avenue NE, Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004	
	Via Email per agreement	
		THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
	DECLARATION OF SERVICE- 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx	1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

Executed at Seattle, Washington this 17th day of July, 2013.

Instan Mary Lou Hanshaw

DECLARATION OF SERVICE- 2 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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6	With CLAD		
7		STATE OF WASHINGTON	
8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WALLA WALLA		
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3	
10	Plaintiff,	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'	
11	VSa	MOTION TO STRIKE, DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION	
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE	
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ	
14	Defendants.		
15			
16	THIS MATTER came on for heari	ng on July 15, 2013 before the	
17	undersigned Commissioner of the above-e	ntitled court, and the Court having	
18	considered the records and files herein, including:		
19	1. Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for		
20	Summary Judgment;		
21	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE,	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155	
22	DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SOMMAST	Bellavue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540	
23	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ Page 1 of 4	dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com	
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2		Declaration of Tomas Miranda and the exhibit thereto;	
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2	3,	Declaration of Amy Brunner in Support of Plainfiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and the exhibit thereto;	
4	4.	Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker in Support of Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and the exhibit thereto;	
6	5.	Declaration of Matthew Munson in Support of Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and the exhibits thereto;	
.8	e	Defendent lovier Gutierrez's Memorandum of Law in	
9	Opposition to Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company		
10	7,	Declaration of Defendant Javier Gutierrez;	
11	8.	Defendant Jorge Gutierrez's Opposition to Patriot General	
12		Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment,	
13	9.	Declaration of Jorge Gutierrez Opposing to Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;	
14 15	10.	Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Reply on Its Motion for Summary Judgment;	
16	11,	Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Citation to an Unpublished Opinion; and	
17	_		
18	12. Defendant Jorge Gutierrez's Joinder in Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Citation to Unpublished Opinion		
19			
20	and the Court ha	wing heard the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise	
21	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155		
22	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY Bellevue, WA 98004 DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY (425) 453-8161 JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UM COVERAGE FOR Fax: (425) 605-9540 DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ dick@triallawyersnw.com Page 2 of 4 shannon@triallawyersnw.com		
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1 fully advised, the Court finds there are no genuine issues of material facts. All 2 parties agreed at the hearing that (1) Javier Gutierrez is the natural-born son of the 3 named insured, Jorge Gutierrez, and (2) Javier lived with father at the time of the 4 collision on or about January 9, 2011. Based on those agreed facts, the Court 5 finds there is underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for Javier Gutierrez for the 6 January 9, 2011 collision under Jorge Gutierrez's Patriot General Insurance 7 Company policy. The definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005(5) is read into the 8 policy and replaces the policy definition. Accordingly, Javier qualifies as an 9 "insured" under Jorge Gutierrez's Patriot General policy for the purpose of UIM 10 coverage.

11 Further, pursuant to Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Wn. App. 510 (2005), 12 unpublished opinions are not to be considered by the trial court.

13 IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to 14 strike Plaintiff's citation to an unpublished opinion is hereby GRANTED and 15 Plaintiff's citation to the unpublished opinion is stricken and was not considered 16 in the Court's analysis.

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Patriot General's Motion for Summary 18 Judgment is DENIED. FURTHER, the parties agreed that, given the Court's 19 ruling above and pursuant to Impecoven v. Dep't of Revenue, 120 Wn.2d 20 357 (1992), it is not inappropriate for the Court to grant summary judgment in 21 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE. DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 22 JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ

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1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawversnw.com

favor of the non-moving party, so summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of 1 defendants solely to the extent that the Court determines that there is UIM 2 coverage for defendant Javier Gutierrez. 3 4 81 5 DONE this date: 6 MICHAEL S. MITCHEL 7 Commissioner Michael S. Mitchell :8 9 Presented by: 10 11 Hess Law Office. PLLC Kilpatrick Law Grou 12 13 Peter Hess, WSBA #39721 WSBA #7058 Richard B. Kilpatrick, Attorneys for Defendant Javier Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495 14 Gutierrez Attorneys for Jorge Gutierrez 15 JS 84 # 30,72 Approved as to Form Only and 16 Notice of Presentation Waived by: 17 Thorsrud Cane & Paulici 18 19 Patrick Paulich, WSBA #10951 Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company 20 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 21 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, Believue, WA 98004 DENVING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY (425) 453-8161 JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ 22 Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com Page 4 of 4 23 shannon@triallawyersnw.com 24 25

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR WALLA WALLA COUNTY

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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3	
9	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT	
10	v .	COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S	
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING	
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ	
13	Defendants.		
14	I. Relief Requested		
15	Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Com	pany ("Patriot General") moves under RCW	
16	2.24.050 for an order revising the Superior Court Commissioner's Order Granting Defendants'		
17	Motion to Strike, Denying Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment and Establishing		
18	UIM Coverage for Defendant Javier Gutierrez ("The Order"). The Order was signed by		
19 20	Commissioner Michael S. Mitchell on August 9	, 2013 and filed with the Walla Walla County	
21	Clerk that same day. Patriot General seeks revis	sion of the summary judgment rulings only. It	
22	does not seek revision of the Commissioner's order granting defendants' motion to strike.		
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25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION/OF COMMISSIONER'S ORDER		
26	DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION F SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Motion for revision.docx	OR THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755	

In its summary judgment motion, Patriot General sought a declaration that it does not have a duty to pay underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits to Javier Gutierrez under the automobile insurance policy it issued to Javier's father, Jorge Gutierrez. Javier Gutierrez is not entitled to UIM benefits because he is not a named insured under the policy. The policy complies with the statute governing UIM, RCW 48.22.030, because that statute does not limit the ability of insurers and insureds to define who is covered by a UIM policy. And contrary to the defendants' position, another statute, RCW 48.22.005, does not require UIM policies to cover a named insured's relatives.

II. Statement of Facts

The relevant facts are set forth in Patriot General's summary judgment motion, which was filed on June 13, 2013. The other briefs, declarations and exhibits that were filed in support of and in opposition to Patriot General's summary judgment motion are identified in The Order, a copy of which is attached.

On July 15, 2013, Commissioner Michael S. Mitchell of the Walla Walla County
 Superior Court heard oral arguments from attorneys for Patriot General, Javier Gutierrez, and
 Jorge Gutierrez on Patriot General's summary judgment motion. Commissioner Mitchell denied
 the motion. The only explanation the Commissioner provided was that RCW 48.22.005 was
 incorporated into the UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030.

III. Statement of Issue

Should this Court revise the Commissioner's order by granting Patriot General's
 summary judgment motion and vacating the Commissioner's grant of summary judgment in
 defendants favor?

 PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
 DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

1	IV. Evidence Relied Upon
2	This motion relies on Patriot General's summary judgment motion and reply, the
3	declarations of Matthew Munson, Tomas Miranda, Kyle Mosbrucker, and Amy Brunner, the
4	exhibits attached to those declarations, and the pleadings and other documents on file.
5	V. Legal Authority
6	All decisions by Commissioners are subject to revision by the Superior Court. RCW
7	2.24.050. Any interested party may file a motion to revise a Commissioner's order within ten
8	
9	days of the order's entry. Id. On a revision motion, a trial court reviews a commissioner's ruling
10	de novo based on the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner. Williams v. Williams,
11	156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010).
12	The Superior Court should revise The Order. The Commissioner erred by ruling that
13	Javier Gutierrez is entitled to UIM coverage under the Patriot General policy. For all the reasons
14	set forth in Patriot General's motion and its reply, this Court should enter summary judgment for
15	Patriot General and vacate the Commissioner's grant of summary judgment in defendants favor.
16	
17	DATED this 12 th day of August, 2013.
18	del.
19	Patrick M. Paulich, WSBA #10954 Matthew Munson, WSBA #32019
20	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General
21	Insurance Company
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25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
26	DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Motion for revision.docx THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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1		Hearing Date: November 4, 2013
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8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Plaintiff, vs. JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ, <u>Defendants.</u> I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUEST This case arises out of a dispute over u coverage. Defendant Javier Gutierrez was inju one-car motor vehicle collision. He suffered si not insured. At the time of the collision, Javier not own a vehicle. His father, defendant Jorge	underinsured motorist (UIM) ured when he was the passenger in a gnificant injuries, and the driver was ¹ was living with his parents and did e Gutierrez, had purchased an auto
23 24 25	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE Page 1 of 7 n'vbiccases/gutierrez adv. patriot general/piesdings/patriot gen.'s ms/patriot general's motion revision 8-13-13/sevier gutierrez opposition to mot revision ej order 10-24-13.doc	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com

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1 policy with Patriot General that included UIM coverage for his whole family, 2 including Javier. Javier made a claim for UIM benefits with Patriot General. Patriot 3 General denied coverage, claiming Javier was excluded because Javier had not been explicitly identified as a driver. Commissioner Mitchell disagreed, ruling that 4 5 Patriot General could not exclude from coverage a person defined as an "insured" 6 by the Legislature.

7 Defendant Jorge Gutierrez asks this Court to deny plaintiff Patriot General's motion to revise Commissioner Mitchell's order denying its motion for summary 8 9 judgment. Commissioner Mitchell correctly determined that there was 10 underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for Javier because Patriot General lacked the authority to change the Legislature's definition of "insured" in its policy. In RCW 11 12 48.22.005(5), the definition section applicable to the UIM statute, the Legislature defined as an "insured" all relatives living with the named insured. As Jorge's son 13 14 living with Jorge at the time of the collision, Javier fits the Legislature's definition of "insured." Because all insurance statutes are read into the policy, Patriot General 15 could not redefine Javier's insured status. Accordingly, Javier is entitled to UIM 16 17 coverage.

18 Alternatively, this Court could deny Patriot General's motion for summary judgment for a different reason - that the plain language of the policy does not 19 20 actually exclude Javier. It simply imposes a disclosure requirement on the

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22 ¹ This brief refers to Javier and Jorge by their first names for ease of reference. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER 1750 112th Ave 23 DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE Page 2 of 7 24 n:\thkc xcases/gutienez adv. patriot general/pleadings/patriot gen.'s ms/patriot general's ion revision 8-13-13/javier gutienez opposition to mot revision sj order 10-24-13.doc

Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Believue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com

1 insureds, and Patriot General was required -- but made no effort -- to show it was 2 actually prejudiced from any alleged breach of the disclosure requirement. Either 3 way, there is UIM coverage for Javier. This Court should deny Patriot General's 4 motion for summary judgment and find UIM coverage for Javier.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2010, Jorge Gutierrez went to Tomas Miranda for insurance, at least in 6 7 part because Mr. Miranda speaks Spanish and Jorge does not speak or read English. Jorge Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 4 (attached here for ease of reference as 8 9 Appendix A). He always intended for his entire family to be covered by the insurance, including his son, Javier. Id. ¶ 5. Because the application was all in 10 English, Jorge provided the information to Mr. Miranda, who typed in the 11 information. Mr. Miranda then printed out the form and told Jorge where to sign 12 and initial. Id. 13

Jorge had no understanding the insurer required disclosure of all his children 14 age 14 and over. Id. § 5. He never intended to agree that his children would not be 15 covered. Id. ¶ 6. Jorge believed all his children had coverage, including Javier. Id. 16 The first time anyone ever told him Javier was not covered was after Javier's 17 accident. Id. 18

On January 9, 2011, Javier was seriously injured while a passenger in a 19 collision. Id. ¶ 2. Javier did not have any other automobile insurance. Id. ¶ 8. He lived 20 21 at home with his parents and did not own a vehicle. Id.

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DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE 23 Page 3 of 7 24

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After Javier made a claim for UIM benefits, Patriot General denied coverage
 in May 2012. Patriot General then sued Javier and Jorge, asking for this Court to
 declare Javier was not insured under the policy.

4 Patriot General moved for summary judgment, which was opposed by both 5 Jorge and Javier. Commissioner Mitchell heard the argument on July 15, 2013. At 6 the hearing, Patriot General did not dispute that Javier was Jorge's natural born 7 son who lived with his father at the time of the collision. By order dated August 9, 8 2013, Commissioner Mitchell denied Patriot General's motion for summary 9 judgment. The Order is attached as Appendix C for ease of reference. Based on 10 the agreed facts, Commissioner Mitchell also found that there was UIM coverage 11 for Javier's January 9, 2011 collision. He ruled that the Legislature's definition of 12 "insured" found in RCW 48.22.005(5) must be read into the policy, and because 13 Javier met that definition, he was an insured for purposes of UIM coverage in 14 Patriot General's policy. Patriot General then moved to revise the Commissioner's 15 August 9, 2013 order. 16 **III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON** 17 In addition to the court files, this brief relies upon Defendant Jorge 18 Gutierrez's Opposition to Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Declaration of Jorge Gutierrez Opposing Patriot 19 20 General's Motion for Summary Judgment. **IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY** 21 Rather than rehash his brief in opposition to Patriot General's Motion for 22 DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 23 DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY Bellevue, WA 98004 JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE (425) 453-8161 Page 4 of 7 Fax: (425) 605-9540 24 dick@triallawyersnw.com n:\rbkcases\gutierrez adv. petriot general\pleadings\patriot gen.'s ms)\patriot general's motion revision 8-13-13\javier gutierrez opposition to mot revision s) order 10-24-13.doc shannon@triallawyersnw.com

Summary Judgment, defendant Jorge Gutierrez will simply outline the reasons
 why Patriot General's motion should be denied and refer the Court to his brief
 opposing summary judgment attached as Appendix B.

4 Commissioner Mitchell did not err when he denied Patriot General's motion 5 for summary judgment and ruled Javier was covered under Patriot General's policy 6 for purposes of UIM insurance. Commissioner Mitchell correctly recognized that 7 Patriot General had no authority to change the definition of "insured" provided by 8 the Legislature in RCW 48.22.005(5) - a definition which explicitly applies to UIM 9 insurance. All insurance regulatory statutes are read into insurance policies, 10 including the definitions contained in RCW 48.22.005. Patriot General cannot 11 contract around this. For more detail and explanation, see Appendix B, Section 12 V(C), at 11-19.

13 Alternatively, this Court could still deny Patriot General's Motion for 14 Summary Judgment on the basis that the language of the policy does not actually 15 exclude Javier, as Patriot General claims it does. In defining who is an insured, the 16 policy plainly covers relatives of the named insured (here, Jorge) who live with the 17 named insured. The policy then goes on to impose a disclosure obligation for 18 those relatives age 14 or older. But the policy contains no language stating that 19 non-disclosed relatives are excluded. To reach the conclusion that Javier was 20 excluded, the Court would be required to infer language into the policy that isn't 21 actually there.

DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE Page 5 of 7

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in:Vokcases/gutterrez.edv. patriot general/pleadings/patriot gen.'s ms/patriot general's motion revision 8-13-13/javier gutterrez opposition to mot revision sj order 10-24-13.doc

Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com

1	Because the language imposes a duty on the insureds – to disclose family
2	members age 14 and over – different rules apply. Before an insurer can avoid
3	coverage for an insured's breach of a duty imposed in the policy, long-standing
4	Washington law requires an insurer to prove actual prejudice from the breach.
5	Patriot General made no attempt to show any kind of prejudice. Thus, there is UIM
6	coverage for Javier's injuries. This argument is explained in greater detail in
7	Appendix B, Section V(B), at 5-11. Under this reasoning, the Court would still deny
8	Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment, but for a different reason than
9	Commissioner Mitchell.
10	V. CONCLUSION
11	Defendant Jorge Gutierrez respectfully requests that this Court deny Patriot
12	General's summary judgment and find UIM coverage for Javier, either for the
13	same reason as Commissioner Mitchell or for the reason that the plain language of
14	the policy did not exclude Javier.
15	Respectfully submitted October 24, 2013.
16	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.
17	0
18	Dick Kilpatrick, WSBA #7058
19	Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495 Attorneys for Jorge Gutierrez
20	
21	
22	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.
23	PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY Believue, WA 98004 JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE (425) 453-8161
24	Page 6 of 7 Fax: (425) 605-9540 n:Vbkcasse/gutierrez edv. petrict general/pleedings/petrict gen.'s msj/petrict general's dick@triallawyersnw.com motion revision 8-13-13/jevier gutierrez opposition to mot revision s) order 10-24-13.doc shannon@triallawyersnw.com
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1	DECLARATION	OF SERVICE
2		
3	The undersigned hereby declares I	am over the age of 18 and under the
4	penalty of perjury under the laws of the Sta	ate of Washington that on this date I
5	caused to be served in a manner noted be	low a true and correct copy of the
6	foregoing on the parties mentioned below	as indicated:
7		
8	Patrick Paulich Thorsrud Cane & Paulich	[XXX] E-Mail
9	1300 Puget Sound Plaza 1325 Fouth Ave	[] U.S. Mail
10	Seattle, WA 98101 ppaulich@tcplaw.com	[] Electronic Filing
11	Peter Hess	[] Legal Messenger
12	Hess Law Office 415 N. Second Ave	[] FedEx
13	Walla Walla, WA 99362 peter@hesslawoffice.com	
14		
15	Dated this 24 th day of October, 201	3 at Bellevue, Washington.
16		_
17		Mindragnor
18		endra Short, Legal)Assistant
19		
20		
21		
22	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S BRIEF OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER	Klipatrick Law Group, P.C.
23	DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE Page 7 of 7	Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161
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Appendix A

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5	KATHY MARTIN WALLA WALLA COUNT	N Y CLERIK
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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	
, . 9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE	
·	COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3
10	Plaintiff	DECLARATION OF JORGE
11	, incontaint	GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT
12	VS.	GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
14		
15	Defendants	
	I am a defendant in this matter. I am	over the age of 18, and testify to the
16	matters in this Declaration from first-hand p	ersonai knowledge.
17	1. My name is Jorge Gutierrez. I	speak and read almost no English.
18	· ·	·
	This declaration was translated to me by an	interpreter.
19	2. I am the father of Javier Gutie	rrez. Javier was seriously injured in
20	a collision on January 9, 2011. At that tim	ne lavier lived with his mother and
21	a composition on candary 5, 2011. At that the	
	me.	
-22	DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155
23	GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of 4	Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161
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25	Nextcontent outlook/60yd8crcijorge guterrez declaration final.doc	shannon@triallawyersnw.com
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3. After Javier was injured, we let the insurance company know
 about the collision. Patriot General would not pay any benefits and denied the
 claim. Javier and I were sued by Patriot General.

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4. I first went to Tomas Miranda to purchase automobile insurance for my vehicles in part because he spoke Spanish and could explain the process to me in my own language. Because I could not understand the insurance application which was all in English, Tomas Miranda helped me fill out the form. He asked me questions and I gave him the information which he put into the form. He showed me where to initial and sign but I had no understanding that I was telling the insurance company my children would not be covered.

5. I wanted full coverage for my family and it was my understanding that they would be covered. I recall telling Mr. Miranda that my son Javier, and my daughter, Viviana, would also be drivers. I did not understand that the application asked me to certify my children would not be using the vehicles. I did not understand that the application asked me to certify all my children age 14 and over had been disclosed.

Had I known any of this information, I would not have submitted 6. 19 the application the way I did and would have told the insurance company about 20 my children, including Javier, Nobody ever told me that my children were not 21 covered under the Patriot General policy until after Javier's accident and 22 Kilpetrick Law Group, P.C. DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 23 GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Believue, WA 98004 Page 2 of 4 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 24 dick@triallawyersnw.com raweronicatepodetatiocationicrosoftwindowatemporary man onient.outlookt05yd8crctjorge gutierrez declaration final.doc emporary internel shannon@triallawyersnw.com

injuries. 1

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Since the insurance company found out about Javier driving our 2 7. vehicles, it has not asked for any additional money from me to cover premiums 3 4 for him.

5 At the time he was injured in the accident, Javier did not own any 8. 6 vehicles of his own and had no other automobile insurance policy.

I declare under penalty of perjury, of the laws of the State of Washington, that the foregoing as translated to me is true and correct.

DATED 7-5-13 at Walla Walla, Washington.

Sutisrvez errez

19 20 21 22 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 23 Page 3 of 4 24 dick@triallawyersnw.com ry internet wildoc tent.outlook/80yd8ordjorge gutierrez declaration fit shannon@triallawyersnw.com 25

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1	DECLARATIO	N OF SERVICE
2		· · ·
3	The undersigned hereby declares	i am over the age of 18 and under the
4	penalty of perjury under the laws of the S	tate of Washington that on this date I
5	caused to be served in a manner noted b	elow a true and correct copy of the
6	foregoing on the parties mentioned below	v as indicated:
7	•	
8	Patrick Paulich	[]E-Mail
9	Matthew Munson Thorsrud Cane & Paulich	[]U.S. Mail
10	1300 Puget Sound Plaza 1325 Fouth Ave	[] Electronic Filing
11	Seattle, WA 98101 ppsulich@tcplaw.com	[X] Legal Messenger
12.		[] FedEx
13	Hess Law Office 312 N. Second Ave	CXI Fix
14	Walls Walls, WA 99362 peter@hesslawoffice.com	
15	File	
16	Dated this _5 ¹⁰ day of July, 20	13 at Believue, Washington,
17		Sum uter
18		<u> </u>
19		
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22		Million and all a low plan was the second
23	DECLARATION OF JORGE GUTIERREZ OPPOSING PAT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4 of 4	Bollevue, WA: 98004
24		(425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 608-8640 click@trialiawyoranw.com
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Appendix B

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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TH IN AND FOR THE COUNT		
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE		•
10	COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3	
11	Plaintiff	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO	
12	VS.	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR	•
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	SUMMARY JUDGMENT	• •
14	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,		•
15	Defendants I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUES	TED	
16	Patriot General asks this Court to be re		
17			••••
18	Javier Gutierrez, who was insured under his f		
19		equires disclosure of all relatives of the	
·	named insured age 14 or older. To support its		
20	its own policy language and misinterprets the	UIM statute and its companion	
21	definitions. It also erroneously claims that Jor	ge agreed none of his children would be	
22	covered when Jorge never intended to agree	to that. In reality, the plain language of	
23		Kilpetrick Law Group, P.C.	-
24	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of 20	1730 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Believue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ⁺⁺ Fac: (425) 605-9540	•
25	ndvokcassesigutiernez, adv., patriot generalidratiskoralt piesongingutiernez, oppoelion to patriot general sj.drait.doc	dick@tialawyerarw.com shannon@tialawyerarw.com	

lits policy insures Javier. While the defendants may have breached the disclosure
 requirement, to avoid liability because of any breach Patriot General is required to
 show actual prejudice. It made no effort to do so.

4 If this Court finds there is no coverage for Javier or finds Javier is excluded, it 5 will have to confront an issue that does not appear to be addressed in any published 6 case: does Washington law allow Patriot General to limit UIM coverage to only those 7 relatives of the named insured under the age of 14? Defendant asserts the provision violates the UIM statute which requires UIM coverage for all relatives living with the 8 9 named insured without regard to age. Further, the provision violates public policy because it excludes coverage for (1) parties who were passengers and had no 10 11 control over the vehicle, and (2) parties who had no other UIM insurance available to 12 them, including children. Patriot General's motion should be denied.

13 III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jorge Gutierrez went to Tomas Miranda for insurance in 2010 in part because 14 he does not speak or read English. Jorge Gutlerrez Decl. ¶ 4. He always intended for 15 his entire family to be covered by the insurance, including his son, Javier. Id. § 5. The 16 application was all in English and Jorge provided the information to Mr. Miranda. Id. ¶ 17 4 It is clear that Mr. Miranda typed in the information and printed out the form for 18 Jorge to sign because the only handwritten portion is the initials and signatures. 19 Miranda Decl., Ex. 1. Jorge elected UIM coverage. Id. He then signed and initialed 20 where Mr. Miranda told him to. Jorge Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 4. 21 Jorge had no understanding the insurer required disclosure of all his children 22

 23
 age 14 and over. /d. ¶ 5 He certainly never intended to agree that his children would Klipstrick Law Group, P.C.

 24
 DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 of 20
 1750 112th Ave. NE Sube D-155 Believue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-8540 dick@intended.general/statistics.com/wors.ww.com shannon@triallawyers.ww.com

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1	not be covered. Jorge believed all his children had coverage, including Javier.
2 [.]	In January 2011 Javier was riding as a passenger in a friend's vehicle and
3	injured in a collision. Javier did not have any other automobile insurance. Id. \P 8. He
4	lived at home with his parents and did not own his own vehicle. Id.
.5	Javier and Jorge made a claim with Patrict General, which it denied. The first
6	time Jorge found out the policy required disclosure of any relatives was when Javier's
7 ·	claim was denied. Patriot General then sued both Jorge and his son Javier.
·8	III. ISSUES PRESENTED
9	Does the policy at issue, which covers relatives living with the named insured,
10	cover Javier, Jorge's son and who lived with him at the time of the collision? Does a
11	breach of the provision requiring disclosure of family members age 14 and over
12	preclude coverage absent any showing of actual prejudice by the insurer?
13	If the policy language excludes Javier, is an insured allowed to define who is
14	an insured more narrowly than the UIM statute does?
15	If not, does public policy, which calls for broad UIM coverage to protect
16	innocent injured parties, prohibit an insurer from excluding coverage for Javier, who
17	has no other way to get his own UIM insurance?
18	IV. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
19	In addition to the court files and the documents filed by defendant Javier
20	Gutierrez in opposition to plaintiff's summary judgment motion, this opposition relies
21	on the declaration of Jorge Gutierrez.
22	V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
. 23	Summary judgment is appropriate only when two factors are met: (1) when
24	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Believue, WA 99004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 of 20 Ph: (426) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540
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1	there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to	
2	judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of	
3	establishing both requirements. Karl A. Tegland, 14A Washington Practice: Civil	
4	Procedure, \P 25:12 (2d ed. 2012). All facts and reasonable inferences therefrom must	
5	be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Riley v. Andres, 107 Wn.	
6	App. 391, 395, 27 P.3d 618 (2001). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue	
7	of material fact should be resolved against the moving party, and the case should be	
8	allowed to go to triai. Tegland, 14A Washington Practice: Civil Procedure, § 25:14.	
9	A. The Factual Basis For Patriot General's Motion is Incorrect - Jorge	
10	Gutierrez Did Not Agree To Patriot General's insured Exclusion	
11	The strong assertion underlying Patriot General's motion for summary	
12	Judgment is that Jorge Gutierrez agreed that none of his children, including Javier,	
13	would be covered. Setting aside the issue of whether parties are free to contract	
14	around provisions in the UIM statute (which is addressed below in Section C), this	
15	assertion could not be further from the truth.	ļ
16	As Jorge makes clear in his declaration, Jorge wanted full coverage for his	
17	whole family, including Javier and Viviana, and thought he was getting it. Jorge	
18	Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 5. Because he does not speak or read English, he could not	
19	understand the insurance application, which was written entirely in English. He gave	
	Mr. Miranda the information he asked for. Id. ¶4. Mr. Miranda showed Jorge where to	
20	initial and sign. <i>Id.</i>	
21	As a result, Jorge did not understand that the Patriot General required	
22	disclosure of his relatives age 14 and over that lived with him. Id. ¶ 5. He never	
· 23	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155	
24	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540	
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Intended to tell the insurer that none of his children would be driving. *Id.* § 6. He never
 understood that there would be any reason for his children, including Javier, to be
 denied coverage until Patriot General denied Javier's claim. *Id.*

Given these facts, it is clear that Jorge never intended to agree that his
children living with him would not be covered. So to the extent Patriot General is
arguing there was agreement that his children would not be covered, its motion
should be denied. There is a genuine issue of material fact about whether the parties
actually agreed on anything.

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B.

The Plain Language Of The Policy Does Not Actually Exclude Jorge From Coverage, As The Insurer Claims

The factual question would be moot, however, if this Court decided that the 11 policy actually covers Javier (addressed in this Section) or if the provision violated the 12 UIM statute or its public policy (addressed in Section C below). The construction of 13 an insurance policy is a question of law. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 14 Wn.2d 477, 480, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984). Patriot General correctly noted the proper 15 framework for the analysis of whether there is coverage: (1) the insured must first 16 establish that the loss fails within the scope of the policy, and (2) then the insurer 17 must show that the loss is excluded by specific policy language. Diamaco, Inc. v. 18 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 97 Wn. App. 335, 337, 983 P.2d 707 (1999). 19 Insurance policies are construed as contracts. Austl. Unlimited, Inc. v. Hartford 20 Cas. Ins. Co., 147 Wn. App. 758, 765, 198 P.3d 514 (2008). The purpose of 21 insurance is to insure, so courts should use the construction that provides coverage. 22 rather than no coverage. Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wn.2d 65, 23

24 DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 of 20

> bicasesiguilierrez adv. patriot generalitiraria riot general aj.draft.dog

Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Believue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@trialawyersnw.com shannon@trialawyersnw.com 69, 659 P.2d 509 (1983), modified on other grounds, 101 Wn.2d 830, 683 P.2d 186
 (1984). The policy should be interpreted as it would be understood by the average
 person purchasing insurance. *McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 119 Wn.2d
 724, 733, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992). If there is ambiguity, it should be strictly construed
 against the insurance company and in favor of the insured. *George v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 106 Wn. App. 430, 439, 23 P.3d 552 (2001).

Patriot General misinterprets the policy language¹ and its legal effect, and it
confuses the issue of who is an insured with the duties imposed on the policyholders
by the policy. Further, it provided no evidence it suffered actual prejudice from any
breach of the duty to disclose family members. Thus, Patriot General cannot meet its
burden on summary judgment and its motion fails.

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1. Javier fits the definition of "relative" in the policy, and his insured status is not negated by the late notice to plaintiff that he was driving

The insurer argues that the Javier was never an insured to begin with because he was not disclosed to the insurer prior to the collision; therefore, it argues,

16 defendants cannot meet prong one of the two-step analysis and the burden does not

17 shift to the insurer to prove an exclusion applies. Plaintiff's argument rests on a

18 || fundamentally faulty reading of the policy language and the legal effect of that

19 || language. The provision requiring disclosure of all relatives age 14 and older has no

20 bearing on whether Javier is actually insured, as a careful reading of the policy

22 ¹ Perhaps not surprisingly, Patriot General interpreted the policy language to its own benefit and not to the benefit of its insureds. This and other problems in the adjustment of 23 Javier's claim may be the basis of a later bad faith action.

24 DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6 of 20 Kilpetrick Lew Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave, NE Suite D-155 Believue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8181 ** Fac: (425) 605-9540 dick@trialiawyersnw.com shannon@trialiawyersnw.com

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1	language demonstrates.
2	The insuring language is found on page 1 of the policy, which is Exhibit 1 to
3.	the Declaration of Amy Brunner. There the policy states (bold in the original):
4	In return for your premium payment and subject to the terms and
5	conditions of this policy, we will insure you for the coverages up to the limits of liability for which a premium is shown on the Declarations Page of this policy.
6	
7	So if Javier fits under the definition of "you," he becomes an insured, and then the
3	burden shifts to the insurer to show an exclusion applies.
	"You" is defined on page 2 of the policy (bold in original) (emphasis added):
)	"You" and "your" mean the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your one means any relative of that person if they
	household. <u>You and your also means any relative of that person if they</u> reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a motor vehicle.
:	Relative is then defined as (bold in original) (emphasis added):
3	"Relative" means a person living in your household related to you by
5	blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor under your guardianship who lives in your household. Any relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the
3	application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.
,	The first two sentences of the definition of relative cover who is an insured.
	The third sentence simply imposes a duty of disclosure on the insureds. This
5	language, by its plain terms, brings Javier under the umbrelia (no pun intended) of
	being an insured. ² He is Jorge's son, living with Jorge. While the policy requires
)	disclosure of relatives 14 years and older, that provision has no effect on Javier's
2	² Plaintiff makes no allegation that Javier owned a vehicle as a reason for why coverage
3	should be denied.
4	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. Nº Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Believue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540
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1 insured status. It is presumably a mechanism for the insurer to keep tabs on 2 everyone who might be an insured. And it is no different than any other policy 3 provision requiring the insureds to do something, such as notifying the insurer of an accident or cooperating with the insurer's investigation. While any alleged breach of 4 the notice provision can ultimately affect whether there is coverage for Javier's loss, it 5 does not affect whether he was ever an insured in the first place. 6 2. To avoid coverage for the breach of the duty of disclosure. Patriot 7. General was required - and failed - to show actual prejudice 8 Because Javier is an insured, the burden shifts to the insurer to point to some 9 reason why Javier is not covered. Patriot General raise just one - the disclosure 10 requirement for Jorge's family age 14 and older. Thus the question becomes, what is 11 the legal affect of any alleged breach of disclosure requirement? implicitly, Patriot 12 General argues that because defendants failed to timely disclose, there is no 13 coverage for Javier's injuries, period. In other words, Patriot General is implicitly 14 arguing that the disclosure of relatives age 14 and older is a condition precedent to 15 recovering under the policy. But this kind of argument has been rejected by 16 Washington courts for almost 40 years. 17 In situations involving disputes about whether a policy provision has been 18 breached, Washington courts require insurers to prove they were actually prejudiced 19 by some alleged breach of an insured's duty before an insurer can escape liability. 20 See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wn.2d 372, 377, 535 P.2d 816 (1975). in 21 Salzberg, the insurer claimed the policyholder breached the cooperation clause, 22 which according to the policy language was a condition precedent to receiving 23 Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 8 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-6540 dick@triallawyersnw.com 25 shannon@triallawyersnw.com

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1	benefits. By falling to cooperate, the insurer argued the insured was not entitled to
2	recover anything. The court rejected that approach and instead required the insurer
3	to prove it was prejudiced by a breach before being relieved of ilability. Id. at 376.
4	In refusing to impose traditional contract principles on insurance policies, the
5	court reasoned:
6	insurance policies, in fact, are simply unlike traditional contracts, i.e., they are not purely private affairs but abound with public policy considerations,
7 8	one of which is that the risk-spreading theory of such policies should operate to afford to affected members of the public – frequently innocent third persons – the maximum protection possible consonant with fairness
9	to the insurer. It is manifest that this public policy consideration would be diminished, discounted, or denied if the insurer were relieved of its
0	responsibilities although it is not prejudiced by the insured's actions or conduct
1	Such relief, absent a showing of prejudice, would be tantamount to a questionable windfail for the insurer at the expense of the public.
2	ld. at 376-77.
3	This prejudice analysis has been applied to virtually every kind of policy
4	provision. See, e.g., Canron, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 82 Wn. App. 480, 485, 918 P.2d
5	937 (1996) (late notice of the claim); Tran v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 136
6	Wn.2d 214, 961 P.2d 358 (1998) (breach of the cooperation clause); Pub. Util. Dist.
7	No. 1 of Klickitat Cnty. V. Int'l Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 803-04, 881 P.2d 1020 (1994)
8	(cooperation, notice and no-settlement clauses); Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 97 Wn.
9	App. 417, 427, 983 P.2d 1155 (1999) (late tender).
20.	The actual prejudice requirement was very recently reaffirmed by our Supreme
21	Court when it was applied to the policy provision requiring insureds to submit to
22	examinations under oath. Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Wn.2d 404, 417-18, 295
23 24	Klipstrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Believue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 of 20 Ph: (#25) 453-8161 ** Fax: (#25) 805-8540
25	SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fac: (425) 605-9540 n,Vikiceeex/gutemez adv. patrict general-drafts/draft pleadings/gutemez opposition to cick@triallawyersnw.com patrict general eldata.doc shannon@triallawyersnw.com

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1	P.3d 201 (2013). The court stated:
2	We have required a showing of prejudice in nearly all other contexts to prevent insurers from receiving windfalls at the expense of the public and
3	to avoid hinging relief on a discredited legalistic distinction. The same concerns apply equally to the [examination under oath] requirement.
4	Id. at 418.
5	
6	Just as prejudice must be shown with other policy provisions, Patriot
7	General must demonstrate prejudice with any breach of the provision requiring
8	disclosure of any relative age 14 and over. It has asserted no good reason not to
9	apply the actual prejudice rule in this situation.
10	Patriot General has also made no attempt to put forth any evidence of
11	prejudice from the breach, so its motion falls. ³ The party claiming prejudice has the
	burden of proof on that issue:
12	A claim of actual prejudice requires "affirmative proof of an advantage lost
13 14	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability.
	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present
14	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability.
14 15	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. Id. at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot
14 15 16	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
14 15 16 17	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
14 15 16 17 18	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
14 15 16 17 18 19	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	or disadvantage suffered as a result of the [breach], which has an identifiable detrimental effect on the insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability. <i>Id.</i> at 419. In other words, a party needs to put forth particularized proof and cannot rely on general or vague allegations of harm.

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1	are worried about from not knowing Javier was driving the insured vehicles. As the			
2	Staples Court noted, the harm it is concerned with is something affecting "the			
3	insurer's ability to evaluate or present defenses to coverage or liability." Id. Here, no			
4	such harm of this type could exist because there have been no allegations that Jorge			
5	and Javier have done anything to impede the plaintiff's coverage investigation or			
6 [.]	liability investigation, to the extent any investigation occurred. There has been no			
7	allegation that the policyholders refused to turn over documents and other information			
8	and refused to answer questions, such as in Tran v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 136			
9	Wn.2d 214, 218-21, 961 P.2d 358 (1998). Nor has there been any allegation that			
10	defendants did anything to delay the claim and that delay somehow caused evidence			
11	to be lost, as in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50			
12	Wn.2d 443, 453, 313 P.2d 347 (1957).			
13	C. Neither The UIM Statute Nor Public Policy Permit Patriot General To Contract Around The Definition of Insured in RCW 48.22.005			
14	To the extent the policy provision calling for disclosure of relatives age 14 and			
15	over affects coverage, it is void because its terms are inconsistent with the UIM			
16	statute and its public policy. As courts have noted, our state has a comprehensive			
17				
18				
19	³ Because Patriot General failed to provide any proof of or make any argument about prejudice in its moving papers, its motion must fail. According to CR 56, the party moving			
20	for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating in its moving papers - and not in its rebuttal - why it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. White v. Kent Medical			
21	Center, Inc., PS, 61 Wn. App. 163, 168, 810 P.2d 4 (1991). "Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond." White v. Kent Medical Center, Inc., PS, 61 Wn. App. 163, 168,			
22	810 P.2d 4 (1991). Thus, any attempt by Patriot General to argue prejudice or put forth evidence of prejudice in its rebuttal documents would be impermissible and should be			
23	rejected. Klipstrick Law Group, P.C.			
24	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Believue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 11 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540			
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1 UIM scheme. Jain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Wn.2d 688, 694, 926 P.2d 2 923 (1996). The UIM statute has been around in some form since 1967. When the 3 Legislature first enacted it, it was just the <u>UN</u>insured motorist statute. Its purpose was to be a financial security measure to cut down on the risk to innocent victims of 4 5 careless and insolvent drivers. Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 332, 494 P.2d 479 (1972); Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 92 Wn.2d 748. 6 7 751, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979). In order to effectuate its purposes, the statute was to be 8 liberally and broadly construed. Id.

9 When the Legislature amended the statute in 1980 to Include UNDERinsured 10 motorists, nothing about those underlying policies changed. Mut. of Enumciaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wn.2d. 203, 208, 643 P.2d 441 (1982). Our courts continue to 11 12 liberally construe the UIM statute to uphold the legislative mandate of broad UIM 13 coverage to protect innocent injured parties. Greengo v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. 14 Co., 135 Wn.2d 799, 806, 959 P.2d 657 (1998). The Legislature was so concerned 15 with ensuring UIM coverage to protect innocent injured people; it requires insurers to 16 offer UIM insurance unless the insured "specifically and unequivocally" rejects the coverage in writing. RCW 48.22.030(4); First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Perala, 32 Wn. 17 App. 527, 531, 648 P.2d 472 (1982). 18

An insurance regulatory statute automatically becomes part of the insurance policy. *Blackburn v. Safeco Ins. Co.*, 115 Wn.2d 82, 85-86, 794 P.2d 1259 (1990). To fulfill the mandate of broad UIM coverage, the courts routinely void any provision in a policy which is (1) inconsistent with the UIM statute, (2) is not authorized by the

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24 DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 12 of 20 Klipstrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suits D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fac: (425) 605-9540 dick@trialiswyersnw.com shannon@trialiswyersnw.com

statute, or (3) that thwarts the broad purpose of the statute. *Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co.*, 121 Wn.2d 243, 251, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993). Thus, any UIM policy
 provision that provides fewer benefits or protects a smaller class of insureds than
 those mandated by the UIM statute are automatically void.

5 6 1. The UIM statute requires coverage for "insureds" as defined in RCW 48.22.005 – and not just "named insureds" – which encompasses Javier

Patriot General's strained reading of the definition of "insured" in RCW 7 8 48.22.005(5) renders certain parts of that statute superfluous and leads to absurd results. In construing statutes, courts must carry out the intent of the legislature. State 9 v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 11, 904 P.2d 754 (1995). If the language of a statute is clear 10 on its face, then that plain meaning must be given effect and courts are to assume 11 the Legislature meant exactly what It said. State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d 463, 470, 98 12 P.3d 795 (2004). Where definitions are provided by the legislature, courts are bound 13 to apply those. Schrom v. Bd. for Volunteer Fire Fighters, 153 Wn.2d 19, 27, 100 14 P.3d 814 (2004). 15

in interpreting statutes, words must not be read in Isolation. State v. Lilyblad, 16 163 Wn.2d 1, 9, 177 P.3d 686 (2008). Courts must attempt to give effect to every 17 word, clause and sentence of a statute, so that no portion is rendered meaningless or 18 superfluous. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wn.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). In addition, 19 20 courts must avoid unlikely or absurd results. Id. It is only if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation legislative history may be consulted. Id. 21 Patriot General makes several arguments why Javier, as Jorge's son, is not 22 covered by the UIM statute. All of them fall. The more reasonable reading is the 23 Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 24 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 13 of 20 Bellevue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540

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1 definitions contained in RCW 48.22.005 plainly apply to the UIM statute and therefore 2 Patriot General's policy. To the extent the provision requiring notice of relatives age 3 14 and over is an exclusion barring coverage for Javier, it is void. 4 Patriot General argues that section 2 of RCW 48.22.030 uses the term "named 5 insured" and not "insured," so it is only required to cover the named insured (Jorge) 6 and his wife and not any family members. This is incorrect. Section 2 uses more than 7 lust the term "named insured." 8 While Section 2 of the UIM statute is not artfully worded. Patriot General 9 focuses on the wrong portion of it. The operative portion is: 10 No new policy ... shall be issued ... unless coverage is provided ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor 11 vehicles 12 RCW 48.22.030(2). In other words, coverage has to be provided for all persons 13 insured in the policy. That is a broader class of people than just the "named insured" 14 and implicates the definition of "insured." 15 The portion of the UIM statute Patriot General focuses on - and which 16 contains the "named insured" reference - is the exception to the rule: 17 ... except ... while operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned or 18 available for the regular use by the named insured or any family member, and which is not insured under the liability coverage of the policy. 19 Id. In other words, UIM insurers do not need to provide coverage for injuries received 20 in vehicles not insured in the policy but are owned by or available for the regular use 21 of the named insured or a family member. This clause does not address when UIM 22 coverage must be provided, so it is inappropriate to focus on it. 23 Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 24 Believue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 14 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyeranw.com 25 shannon@trialiawyaranw.com

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	Patriot General also reads section 2 in isolation, ignoring the other 12 sections	
	of the UIM statute some of which use the term "insured" in addition to "named	
	insured." A quick review of the other parts of the UIM statute make it clear UIM	
	insurance was intended to apply to more than just the named insured. For example, Section 3 sets the parameters for the amount of UIM insurance to be offered: coverage required under subsection (2) of this section shall be in the same amount as <u>the insured's</u> third party liability coverage unless <u>the</u> <u>insured</u> rejects all or part of the coverage as provided in subsection (4) of	
·	this section. RCW 48.22.030(3) (emphasis added). It would not make sense for the UIM statute to	
	apply to only a "named insured," but then use "insured" in other portions of the statute when setting the rules for how much coverage must be provided. Because all sections of a statute must be read in conjunction with one another and harmonized, Patriot General's analysis is fatally flawed. Next, Patriot General argues the Legislature intended RCW 48.22.005 to apply	
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	to only the PIP statutes, citing legislative history. But in making this argument, Patriot	
	General ignores the plain language of RCW 48.22.005 and an important rule of	
	statutory interpretation: legislative history is only considered if there is an ambiguity.	
	Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).	
	The Legislature made its intentions clear by the opening language of RCW	
	48.22.005: "the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter," unless the context "clearly requires otherwise." RCW 48.22.005. By making the definitions applicable to the entire chapter, the Legislature plainly intended the definitions to apply to the entirety of Title 48, Chapter 22, <u>including</u> the UIM statute at RCW	
	Klipskirlck Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 15 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fac: (425) 605-9540	
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48.22.030. If it intended the definitions to apply to only the PIP statutes, it would have
 said so specifically. But it did not.

Patriot General then turns to the definition of "insured" to argue it is not 3 4 required to cover anyone other than the named insured. Because the definition of 5 "insured" contains multiple "or" clauses, its argument goes, the definitions should be 6 read disjunctively, such that it was permissible for it to cover just the named insured. 7 Yet this would produce an absurd result. Taken to its logical conclusion, the insurer is 8 arguing the Legislature intended only to require insurers to pick any single one of the 9 groups listed in the definition of insured in RCW 48.22.005(5): 10 The named insured: 11 A person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is

related to the named insured;

The named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild;

• A person who gets injured in an accident while using or occupying the insured automobile; or

• A pedestrian accidentally struck by the insured automobile.

¹⁶ Under this interpretation, it would be allowed to pick one of the above -- say,

17 the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild - and insure only that group to

¹⁸ the exclusion of the others, including the named insured. This is ridiculous.

Nor is plaintiff's legal analysis of the word "or" correct. While use of the word

"or" is often meant disjunctively, there are also cases where "or" means the

21 || conjunctive: "[C]ourts need not mechanically interpret every 'or' as disjunctive, but

22 || rather ... courts should interpret the word 'or' according to context." Black v. Nat'l

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DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 16 of 20

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Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 96004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@trialiawyersrw.com shannon@trialiawyersrw.com

1	Merit Ins. Co., 154 Wn. App. 674, 688, 226 P.3d 175 (2010) (internal quotations and		
2	citation omitted). As a result, the disjunctive "or" and the conjunctive "and" can often		
· 3	be used interchangeably. Guljosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 101 Wn. App. 777, 790, 6		
4	P.3d 583 (2000). "Or" should not be given the disjunctive meaning where, as here, it		
5	would lead to absurd results and where the context supports the conjunctive		
6	meaning. Id. The more reasonable interpretation is that the Legislature intended the		
7	"ors" to be "ands" to set the floor for which people must be insured for UIM purposes.		
.8	Plaintiff cites many cases that it claims stand for the proposition that it is		
9	allowed to provide UIM insurance to whomever it wants. But those cases are		
- 10_	inapposite. Many were decided before the Legislature implemented the definition of		
11	"insured" in 1993. None of the cases appear to deal with the issue of whether the		
12	definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 can be contracted around because none of		
13	the parties ever raised the issue. In fact, there do not appear to be any published		
[`] 14	cases analyzing whether an insurer can provide UIM insurance to a lesser class of		
15	insureds than provided in the definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005.		
16	In addition, the factual settings of some of the cases relied upon by plaintiff are		
17	very different than here. For example, the policy in Vasquez v. American Fire &		
18	Casualy Co., Wn. App, 298 P.3d 94 (2013) was a commercial policy. That		
19	case involved the issue of whether an employee who was running a personal errand		
20	and was hit in a crosswalk was an insured under the commercial policy. The court		
21	heid he was not and part of its reasoning was that to adopt the plaintiff's interpretation		
22	would turn a business auto policy into a personal policy. Id. at 98. The policy at issue		
23		·	
24	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 98004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 17 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 405-9540		
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1	here is a personal policy and does not involve employees or a commercial setting.			
2 [.]	In addition, unlike Javier, the passenger injured in Financial Indemnity Co. v.			
3	Keomaneethong was not related to the named insured and was not living with the			
4	named insured. 85 Wn. App. 350, 351, 931 P.2d 168 (1997). The plaintiff also			
5	apparently never raised the argument that the policy conflicts with the definition of			
6	"insured" in RCW 48.22.005 and the Court of Appeals never addressed it.			
7	 In addition, public policy prohibits the exclusion of relatives age 14 and over from UIM coverage 			
8	Our Supreme Court has invalidated provisions that exclude UIM coverage for			
-9	family members who are injured as passengers. Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115			
10	Wn.2d 107, 111-112, 795 P.2d 126 (1990). In <i>Tissell</i> , the insurer excluded coverage			
11	for family members who were passengers while the named insured was driving.			
12	The court invalidated both provisions and focused on public policy of broad			
13	UIM coverage and full compensation for innocent injured parties. <i>Id.</i> at 111. The court			
14	was particularly troubled by the fact that the exclusion barred coverage for family			
15	members who had no other way to procure UIM insurance. Id.			
16	The same concern underlies the decision in Wiscomb. That case involved the			
17	family or household exclusion. In invalidating that exclusion the court reasoned:			
18	The family or household exclusion is directed at a class of innocent			
19	victims who have no control over the vehicle's operation and who cannot be said to increase the nature of the insurer's risk. An exclusion which			
20	denies coverage when certain victims are injured is violative of public policy.			
21	Wiscomb, 97 Wn.2d at 209. The court went on to explain that the exclusion affects			
22	third parties who are in no position to contract for their own insurance coverage. Id. at			
23	niro parties who are in no position to contract for their own insurance coverage. <i>Id</i> , at Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.			
24	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 18 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540			
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1	211. For example, the exclusion applies to both children of the named insured as well			
2	as adults who cannot have their own insurance. Id. at 211-12. This inappropriately			
3	undermines the important public policy of our state's comprehensive UIM scheme.			
4	Similarly, the case here involves a provision that under Patriot General's			
5	version excludes coverage for Javier, who as a passenger in a vehicle he had no			
6	control over and who had no other UIM insurance available to him. Under Patriot			
7	General's theory, the exclusion applies to everyone 14 or older, regardless of			
8	whether they represent any increased risk ⁴ and regardless of whether they have			
9	the ability to get UIM insurance elsewhere. This provision is against public policy,			
10	especially considering Patriot General's policy amounted to a "take it or leave it"			
11	adhesion contract in an area - UIM insurance - imbued with the public interest.			
12	VI. CONCLUSION			
13	For all the reasons discussed above, Patriot General's motion for summary			
14	judgment should be denied.			
15	Respectfully submitted July 5, 2013.			
16	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.			
17	Enm My Min			
18	Dick Kilpatrick, WSBA #7058 Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495			
19	Attorneys for Jorge Gutierrez			
20				
21				
22	⁴ Patriot General has made no allegation nor presented any evidence to show that Javier presented some kind of increased risk. Nor did it seek any additional premiums for Javier	Patriot General has made no allegation nor presented any evidence to show that Javier		
23	once it found out Javier was driving. Jorge Gutierrez Deci. ¶ 7.			
24	DEFENDANT JORGE GUTTERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Bellevue, WA 96004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 19 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540			
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1	DECLARATION OF SERVICE		
2			
3	The undersigned hereby declares I am over the age of 18 and under the		
4	penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on this date I		
5	caused to be served in a manner noted below a true and correct copy of the		
6	foregoing on the parties mentioned below as indicated:		
7	· · ·		
8		[] E-Mail	
9		[] U.S. Mali	
10		[] Electronic Filing	
11	Seattle, WA 98101 ppaulich@tcplaw.com	[x] Legal Messenger	
12		[]FedEx	
13		[x] Fxx	
- 14	Walia Walia, WA 99362 peter@hesslawoffice.com		
15	Dated this <u>5</u> th day of <u>July</u> , 20 <u>13</u> at Bellevue, Washington.		
16	Dated this <u>5</u> day of <u>Jum</u>	, 200 at Believue, Washington.	
17		from this =	
18		your confice	
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24	Klipstrick Law Group, P.C. DEFENDANT JORGE GUTIERREZ'S OPPOSITION TO 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR Believus, WA 58004 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 20 of 20 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Env (425) 805-0560		
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Appendix C

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	8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	STATE OF WASHINGTON
	9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3
	10	Plaintiff,	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
	11	VS.	MOTION TO STRIKE, DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION
	12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE
~	13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ
	14	Defendants,	
	15		
	16	THIS MATTER came on for hear	ing on July 15, 2013 before the
	17	undersigned Commissioner of the above-e	entitled court, and the Court having
	18	considered the records and files herein, incl	uding:
	19		I Insurance Company's Motion for
	20	Summary Judgment;	
	21	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE,	Kilpetrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave, NE Suite D-165
	22	DENVING PATRIOT GEMERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ	Believue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540
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1	2.	Declaration of Tomas Miranda and the exhibit thereto;
2 3	3.	Declaration of Amy Brunner in Support of Plainfiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and the exhibit thereto;
4 5	4.	Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker in Support of Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and the exhibit thereto;
.6	5.	Declaration of Matthew Munson in Support of Patriot
7	0.	General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and the exhibits thereto;
8	6.	Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Memorandum of Law in
9	U.	Opposition to Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment;
10	7,	Declaration of Defendant Javier Gutierrez;
11	8.	Defendant Jorge Gutierrez's Opposition to Patriot General
12	0.	Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment;
13	9.	Declaration of Jorge Gutierrez Opposing to Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
14 15	10.	Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company's Reply on Its Motion for Summary Judgment;
18	11.	Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Citation to an Unpublished Opinion; and
17	12.	Defendant Jorge Gutierrez's Joinder in Defendant Javier
18	14,	Gutierrez's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Chation to
19		Unpublished Opinion
20	and the Court ha	wing heard the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise
21		Kilostrick Law Group, P.C.
22	DENVINO DATENT OFM	ENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, 1750 112th Ave. NE Suits D-155 ERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY Believue, WA 98004 BLISHING UM COVERAGE FOR (425)-453-5161
23	Page 2 of 4	dick@trialiswyersrw.com shannon@trialiswyersrw.com
24	Citate Constant of An Andrew Constant of C	entruchatovalumophary. kristyts. order denytyn netriol agrietti met ar st. Miestiaartoder Genytrig sawi lot general met -
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1 fully advised, the Court finds there are no genuine issues of material facts. All 2 parties agreed at the hearing that (1) Javier Gutierrez is the natural-born son of the 3 named insured, Jorge Gutlerrez, and (2) Javier lived with father at the time of the 4 collision on or about January 9, 2011, Based on those agreed facts, the Court 5 finds there is underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for Javier Gutierrez for the 6 January 9, 2011 collision under Jorge Gutierrez's Patriot General Insurance 7 Company policy. The definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005(5) is read into the 8 policy and replaces the policy definition. Accordingly, Javier qualifies as an ĝ "insured" under Jorge Gutierrez's Patriot General policy for the purpose of UIM 10 coverage.

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DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ

Page 3 of 4

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Further, pursuant to Johnson v. Allstate ins. Co., 128 Wn. App. 510 (2005). unpublished opinions are not to be considered by the trial court.

13 IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to 14 strike Plaintiff's citation to an unpublished opinion is hereby GRANTED and 15 Plaintiff's citation to the unpublished opinion is stricken and was not considered 16 in the Court's analysis,

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Patriot General's Motion for Summary 18 Judgment is DENIED. FURTHER, the parties agreed that, given the Court's 19 ruling above and pursuant to impecoven v. Dep't of Revenue, 120 Wn.2d 20 357 (1992), it is not inappropriate for the Court to grant summary judgment in 21 Klipstrick Law Group, P.C. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 DENVING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR 22

Bellevue, WA 98004 (425) 453-8161 Fax; (425) 605-9540 dick@tristawyeranw.com shennon@tristlawyeranw.com

favor of the non-moving party, so summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of 1 defendants solely to the extent that the Court determines that there is UIM 2 3 coverage for defendant Javier Gutierrez. 4 84 5 DONE this date: 6 MICHAELS, MITCHET 7 N. · K.m Commissioner Michael S. Mitchell 8 9 Presented by: 10 11 Hess Law Office, PLLC Klipatrick Law Group, 12 9 13 Peter Hess, WSBA #39721 Richard B. Kilpatrick, WSBA #7058 Attomeys for Defendant Javier Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495 14 Gutierrez Attorneys for Jorge Gutierrez 115 A # 39,721 15 16 Approved as to Form Only and Notice of Presentation Waived by: 17 Thorsaud Cane & Paulici 18 19 Patrick Paulich, WSBA #10951 Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company 20 21 Klipetrick Law Group, P.C. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING UM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 WVUE, WA 98004 22 (425) 453-8161 Fax: (425) 605-9540 wyererw.com Otrial 23 .4.0/4 nonditria moo.vintenie 24 25

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7		THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
8	IN AND FOR THE COU	NTY OF WALLA WALLA
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	· ·
10	Plaintiff,	NO: 12 2 00908 3
11	VS.	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM
12	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF
14	Defendants.	COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
15		MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
16		ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT
17	/	JAVIER GUTIERREZ
18 ·		
19		UES
20		05 ("the Definition Statute") and RCW
21	48.22.030 ("the UIM Statute") become a p	
22	Gutierrez's insurance policy with Patriot G	Seneral. I neretore, there are only two
23	issues before the court:	
24		
25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPA	NY'S MOTION Walls Walls, WA 99362
26	FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER D PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAV	Fax (509) 525-4977

1	1. Whether Commissioner Mitchell Correctly Ruled That the Definition
2	Statute's Definition Requires Patriot General to Insure Javier; and,
3	2. Whether Commissioner Mitchell Correctly Ruled That the Definition
4	Statute's Definition of "Insured" Applies to the UIM Statute.
5	STATEMENT OF FACTS
6	Javier basically agrees with Patriot General's Statement of Facts.
7	Additionally, during the July 15, 2013, hearing, Commissioner Mitchell ruled that
8	the Definition Statute and the UIM Statute require Patriot General to insure Javier
9	Gutierrez. Accordingly, Commissioner Mitchell granted summary judgment in
10	favor of Defendants Javier and Jorge Gutierrez.
11	ARGUMENT
12	1. Commissioner Mitchell Correctly Ruled That the Definition Statute
13	<u>Defines Javier as an "insured".</u>
14	"The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and implement the
15	legislature's intent. In interpreting a statute, this court looks first to its plain
16	language. If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then this court's
17	inquiry is at an end." State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110 (2007)(citations
18	omitted).
19	RCW 48.22.005 ("the Definition Statute") states that:
20	(5) "Insured" means:
21	(a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured by
22	blood, marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild" RCW 48.22.005(5)(a). (emphasis added).
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25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walla Walla, WA 99362 Teleptone (509) 525-4744
26	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND Fax (509) 525-4977 ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 2 Email poter@hessiawoffice.com

Jorge Gutierrez was the named insured in the policy with Patriot General. It is 2 undisputed that Javier was a resident of Jorge's household and is related to Jorge 3 by blood. Therefore, Javier meets the definition of "insured" based on the plain 4 language of the Definition Statute.

5 Patriot General contends that "Ibly using the disjunctive "or", the statute 6 does not mandate that the insured always include residents of the named 7 insured's household; instead, the term may refer only to the named insured and 8 certain relatives, as with the Patriot policy." (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 9 Judgment, p. 8, In. 15-17). In other words, Patriot General contends that the 10 Definition Statute merely provides a list of people whom it may insure and it can 11 pick and choose from the list.

12 In a literal reading of the Definition Statute, it is conceivable that the word 13 "or" could be either disjunctive or conjunctive. However, "the mere fact that two 14 interpretations are conceivable does not make a statute ambiguous." Tesoro Ref. 15 & Mktg. Co. v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 164 Wn.2d 310 (2008). If the "or" in the 16 Definition Statute were disjunctive, it would lead to absolutely absurd results. For 17 example, under such an interpretation, the Definition Statute would not require the 18 policy to insure the named insured.

19 It is undisputed that the Definition Statute is read into every single auto 20 insurance policy issued in the State of Washington. If Patriot General's contention 21 (that the term "or" allows insurers to pick and choose whom they want to insure) were true, every single insurance claim in the State of Washington could be 22 denied. For example, if a named insured and his spouse were both injured by an 23

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DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 3 Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walla Walla, WA 99382 ephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 Email neter@hesslawoffice.com

uninsured driver, the insurance company could simply say, "our policy insures the
 named insured, or his spouse, or his resident children. This company chooses to
 insure the children only, therefore, you have no UIM coverage for this collision."
 This is, of course, ridiculous. However, because the Definition Statute is
 automatically read into the policy, this is precisely the same argument that Patriot
 General is making.

7 The bottom line is that Definition Statute is not ambiguous - it clearly
8 requires that all Washington State auto policies insure the named insured and his
9 resident family members.

2. Commissioner Mitchell Correctly Ruled That the Definition Statute's Definition of "insured" Applies to the UIM Statute.

12 The very first sentence of the Definition Statute states that, "[u]nless the 13 context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply 14 throughout this chapter." RCW 48.22.005 (emphasis added). The UIM Statute (RCW 48.22.030) is in the same chapter as the Definition Statute. Therefore, the 15 16 Definition Statute's definition of "insured" explicitly applies to the UIM Statute. 17 Patriot General has crafted creative arguments in its attempt to exclude 18 coverage for children. However, all of Patriot General's arguments are predicated 19 on its contention that the term "persons insured thereunder" from the UIM Statute 20 "clearly" requires a different meaning than the term "insured" used in the Definition 21 Statute. Because these two terms are not clearly different, all of Patriot General's 22 arguments fail and the Definition Statute explicitly applies to the UIM Statute.

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DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 4 Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walls Walls, WA 93362 Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4977 Email peter@hesslawofilec.com Again, the term "persons insured thereunder" and the term "insured" are not
 clearly different. In fact, the two terms have the exact same ordinary meaning.
 The term "insured" implies the words "persons" and "thereunder" (meaning "under
 an insurance policy").

5 The Definition Statute defines that term "insured" as "(a) The named 6 insured [who is a **person**] or a **person** who is a resident of the named insured's 7 household...(b) A **person** who sustains bodily injury caused by accident..." 8 (emphasis added). Because the Definition Statute defines "insured" as a list of 9 persons, there is no way that "persons insured" is clearly different than the term 10 "insured".

Further, the term "persons insured thereunder" in the UIM Statute refers to persons insured under a "new policy or renewal of an existing policy". RCW 48.22.030(2). Thus, the word "thereunder" simply means "under a policy of insurance" and the term "insured" impliedly means "insured under a policy of insurance". Therefore, the term "persons insured thereunder" simply adds the words that are implied by the term "insured". Patriot General's contention that the two terms are "clearly" different is simply wrong.

CONCLUSION

As discussed above, Commissioner Mitchell was correct when he ruled that the plain language of the Definition Statute and the UIM Statute unambiguously require Patriot General to provide UIM coverage to Javier, a blood relative and resident of the named insured's household. However, it is also important for the Court to take notice of how dangerous it would be to rule otherwise.

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DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 5 Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walle Wella, WA 99362 Taiephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4747 Email peter@hesslewoffice.com

1 If the Court were to agree with Patriot General's interpretation, the UIM 2 Statute could be effectively gutted by creative, sneaky and inconspicuous policy 3 language. For example, a policy may define the term "relative" as "a person living 4 in the named insured's household that is over the age of six"; and this language 5 may appear deep within a definition section on page ten of a twenty-page policy. 6 This would, of course, be devastating to little Washingtonians age six and under. 7 Nevertheless, under Patriot General's interpretation of the statutes, this would be 8 perfectly acceptable.

9 Because of this danger, the Washington State Supreme Court has held 10 that the type of exclusion that Patriot General wishes to enforce (that is, the 11 exclusion of resident relatives age fourteen or older) is void as it is against public 12 policy. In the Tissell case, the Court held that "an exclusion may be justified 13 where an insurer's risk is affected by the nature of the persons or conduct 14 excluded—such as when an unauthorized driver takes the wheel. However, where 15 the exclusion is aimed at a certain type of victim, that justification does not apply. 16 The nature of the victim has no bearing on the risk of an accident's occurring." 17 Tissell By & Through Cayce v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 107, 113 (1990). Whether Patriot General wishes to exclude children under six or children over 13, 18 19 such an exclusion is aimed at a type of victim, and not the nature of their conduct. /// 20 /// 21

DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 6

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Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Avenue Walla Walla, WA 89352 Telephone (509) 525-4744 Fax (509) 525-4747 Email peter@hessiawoffice.com

1	Therefore, Patriot General must provide UIM coverage to Javier as a matter	
2	of public policy, and also because of the explicit statutory language. Based on all	
3	of the above, the Court should affirm Commissioner Mitchell's ruling that Javier be	
4	covered under the UIM section of Jorge's policy.	
5	DATED this 24th day of October, 2013.	
6	Hess Law Office, PLLG	
7 .		
8	Ву:	
9	Peter J. Hess, WSBA #39721	
10	Of Attorneys for Defendant Javier Gutierrez	
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25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING Telephone (500) 525-4744	
26	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND Fax (509) 525-4977 ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 7 Email peter@hessiawoffice.com	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the		
3	State of Washington that: I am a competent person, eighteen (18) years of age or		
4	older, and a resident of the State of Washington; I am not a party to, nor an		
5	officer, director, or employee for any party, corporate or otherwise, in this action;		
6	and, on the below date, I caused to be served the foregoing document on:		
7	Mr. Patrick M. Paulich Ms. Shannon Kilpatrick		
8	Thorsrud Cane & Paulich Kilpatrick Law Group, P.S.		
9	1300 Puget Sound Plaza 1750 - 112th Ave. N.E., Suite D-155		
10	1325 Fourth Avenue Bellevue, WA 98004		
11	Seattle, WA 98101 () Via: U.S. Mail		
12	() Via: U.S. Mail () Via: Fax to (425) 646-7769		
13	() Via: Fax to (206) 386-7795 () Via: Hand Delivery		
14	() Via: Hand Delivery () Via: Email to		
15	() Via: Email to ppaulich@tcplaw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com		
16			
17	l certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that		
18	the foregoing is true and correct.		
19	DATED this day of,, at Walla Walla, Washington.		
20	Hess Law Office, PLLC		
21			
22	By: Adrienne King		
23	Adhenne King		
24			
25	DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION Walka Walka, WA 99382		
26	FOR REVISION OF COURT COMMISSIONER'S ORDER DENYING Telephone (509) 525-4744 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND Fax (509) 525-4774 ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE FOR DEFENDANT JAVIER GUTIERREZ/ 8 Email peter@hesslewoffice.com		

1		HEARING: November 4, 2013 at 9:30 a.m.
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6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF T FOR WALLA WA	
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8	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No. 12-2-00908-3
9	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S REPLY
10	v .	ON ITS MOTION FOR REVISION
11	JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	
12	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
13	Defendants.	
14		M statute does not mandate a definition of
15	insured that includes a named insured's	s relatives.
16	The UIM statute did not require Patriot	to include Javier among the class of persons
17	insured by the Patriot policy. Washington courts	have long held that the UIM statute "does not
18	mandate any particular scope for the definition of	of who is an insured in a particular automobile
19	insurance policy." ¹ As the Supreme Court has exp	plained,
20	The policy of RCW 48.22.030 requires	
21	motorist coverage to a class of 'insureds'	that is at least as broad as the class in
22		
23	¹ Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 83, 90	A D 2d 740 (1005), Earmore Inc. Co. y. Millor
24	87 Wn.2d 70, 75, 549 P.2d 9 (1976).	14 F.20 149 (1999), Furmers Ins. Co. V. Miller,
25	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANC	E
26	COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR REVISION - 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Reply on motion for revision.docx	THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH A VENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

1	the primary liability sections of the policy. It does not preclude the parties from reaching agreement as to the scope of the class in the first instance. ²
2	reaching agreement as to the scope of the class in the first instance.
3	The Court of Appeals reiterated this holding in March of this year:
4	Underinsured motorist coverage is limited personal accident insurance chiefly for the benefit of the named insured. Limiting the scope of the definition of who else
5	is an "insured" does not run afoul of the public policy behind Washington's UIM statute. ³
6	Other Washington cases also support this holding. ⁴
7	
8	Here, the scope of who is insured is consistent in the UIM and liability coverages because
9	each applies to "you," which is defined the same way throughout the policy. The Patriot policy
10	therefore fully complied with the UIM statute.
11	The passage of RCW 48.22.005 did not affect this line of cases. Of the many Washington
12	cases supporting Patriot's position, four, including one Supreme Court opinion, were decided
13	after the statute's passage in 1993. ⁵ If the statute actually abrogated this line of cases, the
14	Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have made that clear in the last two decades.
15	2
16	² Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wn.2d 439, 443, 563 P.2d 815 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 337, 494 P.2d 479 (1972)), abrogated in
17	other part by statute as stated in Vadheim v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 836, 844, 734 P.2d 17 (1987).
18	³ Vasquez v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 174 Wn. App. 132, 138, 298 P.3d 94 (2013), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1006, 308 P.3d 641 (2013).
19	⁴ Wheeler v. Rocky Mtn. Fire & Cas. Co., 124 Wn. App. 868, 103 P.3d 240 (2004) (stating that insurer may choose not to include certain persons in definition of "insured" in UIM policies);
20	Fin. Indem. Co. v. Keomaneethong, 85 Wn. App. 350, 353, 931 P.2d 168 (1997) ("[W]hen the question revolves around the initial extension of coverage, that is, the definition of who is and is
21	not an insured, public policy is not violated so long as insured persons are defined the same in the primary liability and UIM sections of the policy."); <i>Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Uhls</i> , 41 Wn. App.
22	49, 53, 702 P.2d 1214 (1985) ("[T]he parties may agree to a narrow definition of insured so long
23	as that definition is applied consistently throughout the policy[.]") (quoting <i>Raynes</i> , 88 Wn.2d at 444).
24	⁵ Smith, 128 Wn.2d at 83 (1995); Vasquez, 174 Wn. App. at 138 (2013); Wheeler, 124 Wn. App. 868 (2004); Keomaneethong, 85 Wn. App. at 353 (1997).
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26	PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR REVISION - 2 THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOUND PLAZA
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The defendants' interpretation of RCW 48.22.005 would have resulted in a different outcome in at least one of the post-1993 cases, Financial Indemnity Co. v. Keomaneethong.⁶ There, a passenger in the insured's vehicle was denied UIM coverage because the policy only covered the named insured's relatives who lived in the same household. RCW 48.22.005(b) would include the claimant within the definition of "insured" because he was "occupying . . . the insured vehicle with the permission of the named insured" Yet the court did not hold that this statute mandated coverage of the injured party. Rather, the court reiterated the Washington courts' longstanding position: "[W]hen the question revolves around the initial extension of coverage, that is, the definition of who is and is not an insured, public policy is not violated so long as insured persons are defined the same in the primary liability and UIM sections of the policy."7

The definition of "insured" in RCW 48.22.005 does not apply to RCW 48.22.030 because the latter statute uses the separate phrase "persons insured thereunder."

Giving the same definition to the terms "insured," which appears in RCW 48.22.005, and "persons insured thereunder," in RCW 48.22.030, would violate fundamental rules of statutory interpretation. Those rules provide that statutes must be interpreted so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.⁸ and that legislative definitions provided by the statute are controlling.⁹ By using different terms, the legislature intended to convey different meanings. As the Washington courts have said many times, the intent of RCW 48.22.030 is to make each person who is an insured for liability coverage also an

⁷ Id.

25 PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR 26 **REVISION - 3** G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Reply on motion for revision.docx

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⁶ 85 Wn. App. 350, 353, 931 P.2d 168 (1997).

⁸ Whatcom Cnty. v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996).

⁹ State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 175, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001).

insured for UIM coverage.¹⁰ To the extent the terms "insured" and "persons insured thereunder" create ambiguity, the court should turn to the statutory history. That history leaves no doubt that RCW 48.22.005 was intended to apply to the PIP statute, and not to the UIM statute.¹¹

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Cases involving the household or family exclusion are inapposite.

5 Javier argues that the Patriot policy violates the public policy expressed in the UIM 6 statute because it does not provide coverage to Javier. That argument blurs the critical distinction 7 between a grant of coverage and an exclusion from coverage. Jorge cites a case invalidating 8 family-member exclusions.¹² but neglects case law stating that the UIM statute and public policy 9 do not mandate any particular scope for the definition of who is an insured.¹³ The policy is valid 10 because Javier, rather than being subject to an exclusion, is not an insured in the first instance. 11 Moreover, the practice of limiting who comes within the definition of "insured" under a policy is 12 not "dangerous," as Jorge claims. It is precisely what the Washington courts have authorized for 13 decades. 14

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4. Patriot can decline to provide coverage to persons who are not insured by the policy without a showing of prejudice.

Jorge argues that the final sentence of the definition of "relative" is akin to a cooperation or notice clause, and that, like those clauses, it should be enforceable only if the breach of the clause prejudices the insurer. The language does not, however, require disclosure. Instead, it defines who is insured by the policy. Washington courts have never imposed a prejudice

THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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²³ ¹¹ See Patriot's Summary Judgment Motion at 10.

^{24 &}lt;sup>12</sup> Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 107, 795 P.2d (1990).

 $^{^{24}}$ ¹³ See footnotes 2–4, supra.

PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
 COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR REVISION - 4
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requirement on such a term. The prejudice requirement has been applied only to procedures for handling a claim after a loss, such as the duty to notify the insurer of a claim.¹⁴ An insurer is not required to establish that it would be prejudiced by including someone within the definition of insured who is not in fact an insured.

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The Court should disregard any new issues or arguments in Javier and Jorge's oppositions to Patriot General's motion for revision.

On a motion for revision, a Superior Court's review is limited to the evidence and issues presented to the Commissioner.¹⁵ Patriot believes that Jorge and Javier's opposition briefs raise the same issues as those before the Commissioner. But to the extent the Court interprets Jorge's and Javier's arguments to vary from those below, the Court should disregard them.

6. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, and for the reasons set forth in Patriot's motion for summary judgment and reply, this Court should revise the Commissioner's ruling and enter summary judgment for Patriot.

DATED this 30th day of October, 2013.

Patrick M. Paulich, WSBA #10951 Matthew Munson, WSBA #32019 THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Company

¹⁴ Canron, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 82 Wn. App. 480, 485, 918 P.2d 937 (1996).

24 ¹⁵ In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992–93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999); Williams v. Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010).

 PLAINTIFF PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE
 COMPANY'S REPLY ON ITS MOTION FOR REVISION - 5
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THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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6	6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE S FOR WALLA WALLA	
7	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE	
8	,	o. 12-2-00908-3
9	9 Plaintiff, D	ECLARATION OF SERVICE
10	0 v.	
11	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	
12		
13		
14	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws	of the State of Washington that I caused to
15	be served the listed documents on the following counsel	in the manner described below:
16		any's Reply on its Motion for Revision
17		
18		
19	Peter I Hess	
20	Hess Law Office, PLLC	
21	415 N. Second Walla Walla, WA 99362	
22	2 Via Facsimile and E-Mail per agreement	
23		
24	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.	
25	5 1750 112 th Avenue NE, Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004	
26		
		THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH
	DECLARATION OF SERVICE- 1 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx	A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755
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Executed at Seattle, Washington this 30th day of October, 2013.

Hunshaw Jary Lou Hanshaw

DECLARATION OF SERVICE- 2 G:\Docs\255\2479\PLD\Declaration of Service.docx THORSRUD CANE & PAULICH

A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 1300 PUGET SOUND PLAZA 1325 FOURTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WA 98101 (206) 386-7755

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2		FILED
3		NOV -4 2013
4		WALLA WALLA COUNTY CLERK
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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	
9	PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	No.: 12-2-00908-3
10	Plaintiff,	
11		ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR
12	vs. JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE	REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION
13	GUTIERREZ, and their marital community,	FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE
14	and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,	
15	Defendants.	Clerk's Action Required
16	THIS MATTER came on for hearing	on November 4, 2013 before the
17	undersigned Judge of the above-entitled co	urt and the Court having considered
18	the records and files herein, including:	
19	1. Patriot General's Note for	or Motion for Summary Judgment;
20	2. Patriot General's Motion	for Summary Judgment;
21		Miranda in Support of Patriot
22	General's Motion for Su	mmary Judgment;
23	ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004
24	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE - Page 1 of 4	Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com
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1	4.	Declaration of Amy Brunner in Support of Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
2	•• .	
3	5.	Declaration of Kyle Mosbrucker in Support of Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
4 5	6.	Declaration of Matthew Munson in Support of Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
	7.	Javier Gutierrez's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
6		Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
7	8.	Declaration of Javier Gutierrez in Support of Javier
8		Gutierrez's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
9	9.	Jorge Gutierrez's Opposition to Patriot General's Motion for
10		Summary Judgment;
11	10.	Declaration of Jorge Gutierrez in Support of Opposition to Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
12	11.	Patriot General's Reply;
13		
14	12.	Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Citation to an Unpublished Opinion; and
15 16	13.	Defendant Jorge Gutierrez's Joinder in Defendant Javier Gutierrez's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Citation to Unpublished Opinion
17		
18	14.	Order Denying Patriot General's Motion for Summary Judgment;
19	15.	Patriot General's Note for Motion for Revision;
20	16.	Patriot General's Motion for Revision of Court Commissioner's Order Denying Patriot General's Motion for
21		Summary Judgment;
22	17.	Jorge Gutierrez' Opposition to Motion for Revision;
23		Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. IT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 VYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S Bellevue, WA 98004
24		JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 of 4 dick@triallawyersnw.com
25		shannon@triallawyersnw.com patriot general mot. revision of order denying maj

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2	 Javier Gutierrez' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Revision;
3	19. Patriot General's Reply to its Motion for Revision.
4	and the Court having heard the argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully
5	advised, IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Patriot General's
6	Motion for Revision of Order Denying Patriot General's Motion for Summary
7	Judgment and Establishing UIM Coverage is DENIED. The Court finds that
8	there is no genuine issue of material fact and determines that there is UIM
9	coverage for defendants Javier Gutierrez for the January 9, 2011 collision for
10	the reasons laid out in Commissioner Mitchell's August 9, 2013 order.
11	
12	DONE IN OPEN COURT this date: 11-4-13
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14	DONE IN OPEN COURT this date:
15	
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17	Presented by:
18	
19	Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C.
20	Sum in yeip -
21	Richard B. Kilpatrick, WSBA #7058 Shannon M. Kilpatrick, WSBA #41495
22 [.]	Attorneys for DefendantJorge Gutierrez
23	Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S Bellevue, WA 98004 MOTION FOR SUMMARY, HUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING Di HUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING
24	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE - Page 3 of 4 DIM COVERAGE - Page 3 of 4
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Approved as to Form; Notice of Presentation Waived by: Hess Law Office, PLLC Peter Hess, WSBA #39721 Attorneys for Defendant Javier Gutierrez Thorsrud Cane & Paulich B Patrick Paulich, WSBA #10951 Attorneys for Plaintiff Patriot General Insurance Co. Klipatrick Law Group, P.C. ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR REVISION OF ORDER DENYING PATRIOT GENERAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ESTABLISHING UIM COVERAGE - Page 4 of 4 1750 112th Ave. NE Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 Ph: (425) 453-8161 ** Fax: (425) 605-9540 dick@triallawyersnw.com shannon@triallawyersnw.com vbkcases/gutienez.adv. patriot general/pleadings/patriot gen.'s ms/patriot general's zion revision 8-13-13/order denying patriot general mot, revision of order denying msj roposed.doc

FILED

FEB 24, 2015 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE)	
COMPANY, a foreign corporation,)	No. 32109-6-III
)	
Petitioner,	Ĵ	
)	
v .)	
)	PUBLISHED OPINION
JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE)	
GUTIERREZ, and their marital)	
community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ,)	
)	
Respondents.)	

FEARING, J. — We granted discretionary review of the trial court's summary

judgment ruling that Javier Gutierrez is an insured for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage on an automobile insurance policy purchased from Patriot General Insurance by Jorge Gutierrez, Javier's father. Patriot General insists that Javier is not an insured because Jorge failed to disclose him, on his initial insurance application, as a member of

Jorge's household over the age of 14 years. We affirm summary judgment based on policy language that qualifies Javier as an "insured person," despite his father's failure to disclose him.

FACTS

On August 11, 2010, Jorge Gutierrez applied for car insurance from Patriot

General Insurance Company, through the Tomas Miranda Insurance Agency, a local

agency in Walla Walla. The application listed Jorge as the named insured, and Jorge and

his wife, Maria Carmona, as authorized drivers. Jorge initialed a paragraph stating that

he had listed on his application everyone living with him age 14 or older. That paragraph

reads:

I also certify that all persons age 14 or over who live with me temporarily or permanently and all persons who are regular operators of any vehicle to be insured have been listed on this application and reported to the Company. I declare that there are no operators of the vehicle(s) described in this application unless their names and ages are shown above or are provided in writing to the Company within 14 days of when they begin driving the vehicle(s) described in this application.

Clerks Papers (CP) at 84. The policy application further states:

I hereby apply to the Company for a policy of insurance as set forth in this application on the basis of statements contained herein. I understand and agree that a routine inquiry may be made which will provide applicable information concerning character, general reputation, personal characteristics, mode of living and credit history. Upon written request, additional information as to the nature and scope of the report, if one is made, will be provided. I understand and agree that such policy shall be cancelled and the benefits available under such policy may be denied if

such information is known to be false and would affect acceptance of the risk or would in any way affect the rating of the risk by the Company.

CP at 84.

At the time of completing the policy application, Jorge Gutierrez's son, Javier, age 18, lived at home with his father. In a declaration opposing Patriot General Insurance Company's summary judgment motion, Jorge Gutierrez testified he desired "full coverage" for his family, and he averred that he relied on Patriot General's agent, Tomas Miranda, to translate and help him complete the application. CP at 106. Jorge is a monolingual Spanish-speaker and insists he did not understand that the application asked him to certify that his children would not be using the vehicles. Jorge Gutierrez recalls telling Tomas Miranda that his son, Javier, and his daughter, Viviana, would also be drivers. Neither party provided information to the trial court as to whether Patriot General would have charged a higher premium for the insurance policy if Jorge Gutierrez had listed his son in the application.

Patriot General issued an auto policy to Jorge Gutierrez with a coverage period running from October 29, 2010 to April 29, 2011. The policy listed only Jorge Gutierrez and Maria Carmona as authorized drivers.

The first page of the twelve-page Patriot General Insurance Company policy provides:

In return for your premium payment and subject to the terms and conditions of this policy, we will insure you for the coverages up to the

> limits of liability for which a premium is shown on the Declarations Page of this policy. This insurance applies only to **car accidents** and losses which happen while this policy is in force. This policy is issued by **us** in reliance upon the statements which **you** made in **your** application for insurance. If **you** have made any false statement in **your** application, this policy may not provide any coverage.

CP at 57. The policy includes a separate three-page amended "Underinsured Motorists

Coverage Endorsement," which covers injuries caused by an underinsured motorist. In

relevant part, the endorsement reads:

We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury or property damage must be caused by a car accident and result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.

CP at 74.

To determine who constitutes "you" and, in turn, an "insured person" under the

underinsured motorist endorsement, the reader must first journey to the beginning of the

policy and then return to the endorsement. In a policy section titled "DEFINITIONS

USED THROUGHOUT THIS POLICY," the policy defines "you" and "your" as

the person shown as the named insured on the Declarations Page and that person's spouse if residing in the same household. You and your also means any relative of that person if they reside in the same household, providing they or their spouse do not own a motor vehicle.

CP at 58. The policy defines "relative" in the paragraph directly below:

"Relative" means a person living in your household related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. Relative includes a minor under your guardianship who lives in your household.

Any **relative** who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss.

CP at 58 (italics added). Patriot General's policy does not explicitly state that

undisclosed relatives are not covered. The underinsured motorist endorsement lists

exclusions from coverage, but does not specify whether household members above the

age of 14, and not listed on the application or policy, are excluded from coverage.

Additional definitional language, on which we rely, is provided in the underinsured motorist endorsement. The language reads:

As used in this Part:

(1) "Insured Person" means:

(A) You.

(B) Any other person occupying your insured car with your permission.

 (C) Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you or another occupant of your car.
 No person shall be considered an insured person if that person uses a motor vehicle without permission of the owner.

CP at 74 (italics added).

On January 9, 2011, Javier Gutierrez suffered serious injuries as a passenger in a single-car-rollover accident. Javier was 19 at the time of the accident and living with Jorge. The car's driver, Matthew Vincent Lanier, was uninsured. Javier tendered an uninsured motorist claim under the Patriot General Insurance Company policy, which claim Patriot General denied on May 22, 2012. Patriot General denied coverage because

Javier was over the age of 14 years, living with Jorge, and not listed on Jorge's policy; and therefore did not qualify as "you."

PROCEDURE

Patriot General Insurance Company filed an action for declaratory judgment against Jorge and Javier Gutierrez, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to pay uninsured motorist benefits to Javier because he was not covered by Jorge's policy. Javier Gutierrez counterclaimed for coverage, breach of contract, bad faith, and violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW.

Patriot General filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Javier Gutierrez was covered by his father's underinsured motorist (UIM) policy at the time of the accident. Javier and Jorge Gutierrez opposed the motion. The trial court granted the nonmoving parties Gutierrezes summary judgment because it found that the undisputed facts supported their position. Javier and Jorge Gutierrez were granted judgment "solely to the extent that the Court determines that there is UIM coverage for defendant Javier Gutierrez." CP at 163. The trial court determined that the definition of "insured" provided in Washington's casualty insurance statute should be read into the policy and replace the policy's definition of "insured person." The statute provides, in relevant part:

(5) "Insured" means:

(a) The named insured or a person who is a resident of the named insured's household and is either related to the named insured by blood,

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marriage, or adoption, or is the named insured's ward, foster child, or stepchild.

RCW 48.22.005.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

On appeal, Patriot General Insurance Company complains that Jorge Gutierrez failed to list his son Javier as a member of Jorge's household above the age of 14. Patriot General contends this omission precludes coverage for Javier Gutierrez. Jorge and Javier Gutierrez argue that the Patriot General policy affords coverage, despite the omission, because the policy does not expressly exclude from coverage any family member above the age of 14 not listed in the application. According to the Gutierrezes, Jorge's failure to disclose Javier to Patriot only amounts to a breach of a duty to disclose and does not preclude coverage under the plain language of Jorge's car insurance policy.

The Gutierrezes also contend the statutory definition of "insured," under RCW 48.22.005, should be read into Jorge's policy in order to afford Javier uninsured motorist coverage. Patriot General responds that RCW 48.22.005's definition of "insured" does not require car insurance policies to provide uninsured motorist coverage to a named insured's family members. Patriot General contends RCW 48.22.005 only applies to personal injury protection coverage. We agree with Jorge and Javier Gutierrez that the language of the insurance policy, without reference to any statute, affords Javier

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underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, we do not address the application of RCW 48.22.005.

We agree with the trial court that Jorge and Javier Gutierrez should be granted summary judgment. When, as here, the relevant facts are not in dispute, we may order entry of summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving party. *Impecoven v. Dep't of Revenue*, 120 Wn.2d 357, 365, 841 P.2d 752 (1992); *Leland v. Frogge*, 71 Wn.2d 197, 201, 427 P.2d 724 (1967); *Wash. Ass 'n of Child Care Agencies v. Thompson*, 34 Wn. App. 225, 230, 660 P.2d 1124 (1983).

Familiar principles of insurance policy construction compel our ruling that Javier Gutierrez is covered under the Patriot General underinsured motorist endorsement. The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law, and summary judgment is appropriate if the contract has only one reasonable meaning when viewed in the light of the parties' objective manifestations. *Port of Seattle v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 111 Wn. App. 901, 907, 48 P.3d 334 (2002). Insurance policies are to be construed as a whole, with force and effect given to each clause. *Am. Star Ins. Co. v. Grice*, 121 Wn.2d 869, 874, 854 P.2d 622 (1993). "'An inclusionary clause in an insurance contract should be liberally construed to provide coverage whenever possible.'" *Mercer Place Condo. Ass 'n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 104 Wn. App. 597, 602, 17 P.3d 626 (2000) (*quoting Riley v. Viking, Ins. Co.*, 46 Wn. App. 828, 829, 733 P.2d 556 (1987). Insurance limitations require clear and unequivocal language. *Bordeaux, Inc. v. Am. Safety Ins.*

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Co., 145 Wn. App. 687, 694, 186 P.3d 1188 (2008). If an insurer wants exclusions upheld, it has the burden of drafting them in "clear" and "unequivocal" terms. Int'l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC, 179 Wn.2d 274, 288, 313 P.3d 395 (2013).

Patriot General argues that in order to be an "insured person" entitled to UIM coverage under the car insurance policy it sold to Jorge Gutierrez, a person must meet the definition of "you." We agree. Patriot General further argues that a "relative" can be insured only if the relative is disclosed on the policy's application or endorsement if that "relative" is over the age of 14 and living with the named insured. We disagree. The policy does not expressly state that an undisclosed relative is excluded from being an insured.

Patriot General argues that the sentence, "Any relative who is age fourteen (14) or older must be listed on the application or endorsed on the policy prior to a car accident or loss," should be read as defining who is insured under the policy. CP at 58. We agree that the sentence could be read in this light, but the Gutierrezes' contention that the sentence only imposes a duty to cooperate and does not act as an exclusion is equally plausible.

Patriot General further argues that the relevant sentence is not an exclusion, but rather a permissible limitation on the definition of "insured." Patriot General does not explain the practical difference between a limitation on coverage and an exclusion from coverage.

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When reading the Patriot General insurance policy as a whole, we side with Javier and Jorge Gutierrez. The Patriot General underinsured motorist endorsement lists nine exclusions from coverage. The list could have, but did not, exclude from coverage injury to a household member above the age of 14 who was not listed on the application.

An important comparison of insurance policy language must be mentioned. In the underinsured motorist endorsement's additional definitions, the policy reads: "No person shall be considered an **insured person** if that person uses a **motor vehicle** without permission of the owner." CP at 74. If Patriot General wished to limit the definition of "insured" to achieve the meaning it advances on appeal, it could and should have drafted language that reads: "No **relative** shall be considered an **insured person** if that person is age fourteen (14) or older and not listed on the application or policy endorsement." It did not.

In addition, the first page of the Patriot General Insurance Company auto policy provides, in part: "This policy is issued by **us** in reliance upon the statements which **you** made in **your** application for insurance. If **you** have made any false statement in **your** application, this policy *may* not provide any coverage." CP at 57 (italics added). Significantly, the language does not read: "If **you** made any false statement in **your** application, this policy *shall* not provide any coverage." The policy does not tell the insured under what circumstances a false statement may lead to loss of coverage.

Finally, Jorge Gutierrez's application read, in part:

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> I hereby apply to the Company for a policy of insurance as set forth in this application on the basis of statements contained herein. . . . I understand and agree that such policy shall be cancelled and the benefits available under such policy may be denied if such information is known to be false and would affect acceptance of the risk or would in any way affect the rating of the risk by the Company.

CP at 84.

Patriot General forwarded no evidence before the trial court that Jorge Gutierrez knew of any false statement. Nor did it provide evidence that Jorge's risk rating would change based on the fact that his two teenage children resided with him.

In short, Patriot General controlled the language in its auto policy. The Gutierrezes played no role in drafting the language. If Patriot General wished to exclude underinsured motorist coverage to a household member, above the age of 14, who was not disclosed in the application for insurance, Patriot General could have expressly so stated in the policy. We will not assist Patriot General in rewriting the policy.

Both Javier and Jorge Gutierrez seek recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal against Patriot General Insurance Company. We agree they are entitled to this recovery under *Olympic Steamship Co.* v. *Centennial Insurance Co.*, 117 Wn.2d 37, 52-53, 811 P.2d 673 (1991) since they were required to litigate to gain coverage under the Patriot General insurance policy.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's declaration of coverage for Javier Gutierrez under the Patriot General insurance policy. We direct that this court's commissioner review Javier and Jorge Gutierrez's applications for fees and costs and to award a reasonable sum to both. We thereafter remand to the superior court for further proceedings.

Fearing, J. J.

WE CONCUR:

Siddoway, C.J.

Korsmor

FILED Mar 25, 2015 Court of Appeals Division III State of Washington

No. _____

(Court of Appeals No. 321096 –III)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PATRIOT GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Petitioner

v.

JORGE GUTIERREZ and JANE DOE GUTIERREZ, and their marital community, and JAVIER GUTIERREZ, Respondents,

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

Patrick M. Paulich WSBA #10951 Matthew Munson, WSBA #32019 Thorsrud Cane & Paulich 1325 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1300 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 386-7755 Fax: (206) 386-7795 E-mail: ppaulich@tcplaw.com mmunson@tcplaw.com

Attorneys for Petitioner Patriot General Insurance Company I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I caused the below listed documents to be served on the following counsel in the manner described below:

- 1. Patriot General Insurance Company's Petition for Review;
- 2. Appendix; and
- 3. Declaration of Service.

Peter J. Hess Hess Law Office, PLLC 415 N. Second Walla Walla, WA 99362 *Via U.S. Mail and Email*

Dick Kilpatrick Kilpatrick Law Group, P.C. 1750 112th Avenue NE, Suite D-155 Bellevue, WA 98004 *Via Email*

Shannon M. Kilpatrick Dawson Brown, PS 1000 Second Avenue, Suite 1420 Seattle, WA 98104 *Via Email*

Executed at Seattle, Washington this $\underline{25}$ day of March, 2015.

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Michelle Temple, Legal Secretary Thorsrud Cane & Paulich 1325 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1300 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 386-7755 Fax: (206) 386-7795 E-mail: mtemple@tcplaw.com