CrR 3.2/CrRLJ 3.2 - Release of AccusedComments for CrR 3.2/CrRLJ 3.2 must be received no later than April 30, 2025.
GR9 COVER SHEET A. Name
of Proponent: The King County Department of
Defense, the Washington State Office of Public Defense, the Washington
Defender Association, and the Snohomish County Office of Public Defense. B. Spokesperson: Matt Sanders, Larry Jefferson,
Christie Hedman, and Jason Schwarz C. Purpose: Revise CrR/CrRLJ 3.2 to clarify the confusing
and broad language regarding “administration of justice” and replace it with
the specific and clear inquiry into whether a person may unlawfully intimidate
with or threaten a witness, victim or court participant, or tamper with
evidence. D. Public Hearing: A public hearing is not recommended. E. Expedited Consideration: Expedited consideration is not
requested. F. Supporting Material: Suggested rule amendment. Introduction The
King County Department of Public Defense, the Washington State Office of Public
Defense, the Washington Defender Association, and the Snohomish County Office
of Public Defense propose changes to CrR/CrRLJ 3.2 to bring greater clarity to
the factors that the trial court may consider when imposing pretrial conditions
of release. Instead of an unduly broad criterion of “interference with the
administration of justice”, the proposed amendment will ensure the trial court
properly considers whether a person will seek to intimidate or threaten witnesses,
victims, and court employees or seek to tamper with evidence. Background Under
CrR/CrRLJ 3.2, a court may impose conditions of release when the court finds there
is a likely danger that the accused… will seek to intimidate witnesses, or
otherwise unlawfully interfere with the administration of justice,” but the
rule does not define “administration of justice.” This lack of clarity
undermines the presumption of release, as the State has successfully argued that
factors as commonplace as past failures to appear constitute likely interference
with the administration of justice. We
have seen the state argue and the court impose bail after finding that a person
is likely to commit a nonviolent offense and thus violate release
conditions, which would undermine the “administration of justice.” In addition,
increasingly often, when examining the interference with the “administration of
justice” prong, courts consider whether a person has previously violated
conditions of release, even if the violations were unrelated to any behavior
towards witnesses, court employees, victims or evidence. While
there is little appellate caselaw interpreting the “administration of justice”
prong of CrR/CrRLJ 3.2, in State v. Rose, the Court of Appeals applied a
broad interpretation, writing that “no evidence in Wentz's case supported that
he would be likely to commit a violent crime or intimidate a witness….
Accordingly, the only remaining possibility is that the trial court found there
was a likely danger that Wentz would ‘otherwise unlawfully interfere with the
administration of justice’…. we presume that failing to attend a hearing is
an unlawful interference with the administration of justice.”
146 Wn. App. 439, 454, 191 P.3d 83, 91 (2008). By
clarifying the “administration of justice” prong to focus on whether a person will
seek to intimidate or threaten witnesses, victims or court employees, or tamper
with evidence, the Court can focus the inquiry and mitigate the risk that conditions
of release like unaffordable bail are unnecessarily imposed. This is critical
because the harms of unaffordable bail and pretrial incarceration are well
known, with research demonstrating that that short periods of incarceration
frequently upend a person’s employment, housing, child custody, and access to
health care.[1] In addition, greater clarity
regarding the “administration of justice” prong is also important because studies
demonstrate that both the imposition and effect of bail are racially
disproportionate.[2] The racial disproportionality
of the bail system has additional, far-reaching impacts due to the deleterious
impact that pretrial incarceration has on case outcomes.[3] Conclusion The “administration of justice” prong must be
clarified given the known harms of pretrial incarceration that result when
unaffordable bail is imposed. Through this proposed amendment, the trial court
will still be able to consider whether a person is likely to tamper with
evidence or intimidate or threaten witnesses, victims, or court employees. [1] See Lisa Foster, Judicial Responsibility for Justice in
Criminal Courts, 46 Hofstra L. Rev. 21 (2018). [2] See Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing
Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U.J. Legis. & Pub.
Pol’y 919 (2013). Black defendants face
higher bail amounts than white defendants charged with the same crimes. See
Shawn Bushway & Jonah Gelbach, National Science Foundation, Testing for
Racial Discrimination in Bail Setting Using Nonparametric Estimation of a
Parametric Model (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990324. [3] See Arpit Gupta, Christopher
Hansman, Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge
Randomization, 45 J. Legal Stud. 471, 472 (2016) (“We find that the assessment of money bail is a
significant, independent cause of convictions and recidivism.”). |
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