Prior to 1973, time-for-trial issues in our state were governed by statutes rather than court rules. The following is a brief history of the evolution of these statutes and court rules, as well as the state constitution's speedy-trial provision.

1. History of Speedy Trial Statutes in Washington.

   Early Territorial Days (prior to 1877): Section 7, Criminal Practice Act: The statute provided that the accused shall be tried:

   next term after the time he was imprisoned if he require it * or shall be bailed upon his own recognizance * unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses on part of the Territory have been enticed or kept away, or are detained and prevented from attending the court by sickness or some inevitable accident.

   (As quoted in Thompson v. Washington Terr., 1 Wash Terr. 547 (1877).)

   Code of 1881. The following statutes governed speedy trial decisions from Washington's territorial days through 1909. The remedy was dismissal with prejudice for misdemeanors, and without prejudice for felonies.

   1. Section 772: If a defendant is indicted for an offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the next regular term of the court in which the indictment is triable after the same is found, the court must order it to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.

   2. Section 777: An order for dismissal [including dismissal under Section 772] is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, if it be a misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense charged be a felony.

   1909 Amendments. The statutes were amended in 1909. The changes included adopting a 60-day time period instead of a limitation by the term of court. The remedy was essentially still the same: dismissal with prejudice for misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors, and without prejudice for felonies. After 1909, the speedy trial standards were:

   1. RRS § 2312 (later recodified as RCW 10.43.010):

      Trial within sixty days. If a defendant indicted or informed against for an offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his own application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found or the information filed, the court shall order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary is shown. (Laws 1909, p. 908, § 60.)

   2. RRS § 2315 (later recodified as RCW 10.46.010):

      Dismissal, when a bar. An order dismissing a prosecution under [§ 2312 or two other sections] shall bar another prosecution for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor where the prosecution dismissed charged the same misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, but in no other case shall such order of dismissal bar another prosecution. (Laws 1909, p. 909, § 63.)

   These two statutes thus governed speedy trial issues from 1909 through 1973, when the Supreme Court passed CrR 3.3. These two statutes were repealed in 1984, with the Legislature noting in its final bill report that the repealer was because the statutes had been superseded by the court rules.

2. History of CrR 3.3 and Its Amendments.

   1973: Original adoption of CrR 3.3. The rule created a remedy of dismissal with prejudice for any superior court criminal charge not brought to trial in a timely manner. The rule placed responsibility on the courts to ensure timely trials and gave priority to criminal cases over civil cases.

   1976: Amended two subparagraphs relating to consideration of time during which the defendant was absent.

   1978: Made numerous changes, including expanding the subparagraph on deadlines for trial, creating a new subparagraph on setting of trial date, and making changes to subparagraphs on excluded periods, continuances, and extension of time.

   1980: Made extensive changes to the rule, which resulted in the basic format that largely exists in today's rule. Changes included substantially rewriting subparagraph (c) (regarding deadlines for trial and created new deadlines for arraignment), subparagraph (d) (extensions of time for trial), subparagraph (e) (objections to arraignment date), subparagraph (f) (setting of trial date), subparagraph (g) (excluded periods of time).

   1986: Amended subparagraph (d)(4) (regarding retrials after appellate review) and subparagraph (h) (removing gender-specific language).

   1991: Amended subparagraph (d)(4) (addressing appellate court stays of proceedings).

   1995: Amended subparagraphs (f)(1) (regarding setting date for trial) and (g)(5) (deleting provision on delay due to appellate court stays of proceedings).

   2000: Amended subparagraph (f)(1) regarding noting motions objecting to trial dates.

   2001: Added subparagraph (j) on waiver.

3. History of Washington Constitution Article I, § 22.

   Article I, § 22 guarantees the accused the right "to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed." This language has not changed since the original adoption of Article I, § 22.

   The constitutional provision, however, was amended in 1922 in other regards. The texts of both the current and the original provisions are set forth below.

   Current Version (after 1922 amendment):

   In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed and the right to appeal in all cases: Provided, The route traversed by any railway coach, train or public conveyance, and the water traversed by any boat shall be criminal districts; and the jurisdiction of all public offenses committed on any such railway car, coach, train, boat or other public conveyance, or at any station or depot upon such route, shall be in any county through which the said car, coach, train, boat or other public conveyance may pass during the trip or voyage, or in which the trip or voyage may begin or terminate. In no instance shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.

   (Emphasis added.)

   Original Version (as adopted in 1889):

   In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases; and, in no instance, shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.

   (Emphasis added.)

   History: The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention (1889) does not reveal any significant historical information relating to the speedy-trial provision. Article I,
   § 22 is worded consistently with similar provisions in several other state constitutions.