Issue A |
Rule does not say what it means. (Example: rule says time spent in custody in another state is excluded from the time periods, but case law dismissed charges based upon an implied duty of due diligence to produce the defendant from the other state.) |
Issue B |
Striker/Greenwood. The time for trial should not begin until the actual arraignment. The filing of the information or complaint should not begin the running of the rule. |
Issue C |
Dismissal with prejudice is too harsh a sanction that gives a windfall to a defendant whose ability to obtain a fair trial is not compromised. Dismissal with prejudice should be limited to:
_____ only those occasions where the defendant can show actual prejudice
_____ only misdemeanors and/or gross misdemeanor offenses |
Issue D |
The 30/60 for juveniles and 60/90 for adults are too short and unrealistic. Better time periods would be: |
Issue E |
A cure period should be built into the rule. Such a period would prohibit dismissal of charges with prejudice to those cases in which the state could not get the defendant to trial within a set period of time from a hearing on the defendants claim that the rule has been violated. Suggested cure periods are:
_____ 10 judicial days
_____ 30 judicial days |
Issue F |
Delays sought by the defense should be excluded, regardless of the reason for the request. Dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct should be limited to cases where the misconduct is serious enough to warrant that sanction. Minor misconduct should not become a basis for dismissal simply because it leads to a short delay in the trial. Defendants choose between opposing rights all the time. If they prefer better preparation to a prompter trial, they should be held to that choice. |
Issue G |
Court congestion should be considered good cause for delay. |
Issue H |
There should be an exclusion of time for time consumed by defense pre-trial motions such as 3.5/3.6 hearings, Frye hearings, etc. Under current practice, pre-trial hearings are regularly postponed with no corresponding postponement of the trial date. This prevents orderly scheduling and forces courts to rush their consideration of the defendant's claims. |
Issue I |
The exclusion for preliminary proceedings and trial on another charge should be extended through sentencing. (State v. Huffmeyer, 145 Wn.2d 52 (2001) issue). |
Issue J |
Special time limits for defendants in custody should only apply to those who are in custody on the current charge. |
Issue K |
Special time limits for defendants in custody should only apply to those who are in custody continuously on the current charge. If the defendant was released at any point during the pre-trial period, the longer out of custody time should be the standard. (This is to address the recent Division I opinion in State v. Logan, 102 Wn. App. 907 (2001), where a defendant who was detained after felony assault were refilled in superior court following the dismissal of the charges in municipal court was released because the time elapsed in municipal court while released exceeded 60 days, and since the municipal court release was not "revoked" the speedy trial period lapsed prior to the superior court trial setting. ) |
Issue L |
RCW 10.05 requires that petitions for deferred prosecutions be filed at least 7 days before the date set for trial, but the trial court can excuse late filings for good cause. A petition tolls the time left on the speedy trial clock. This means, if the court accepts a petition on the 89th day and then the defendant either withdraws the petition or the court denies the request, the State must then bring the defendant to trial in 1 day. The rule should be amended to provide that the State shall have the greater of 30 days or the time left on the original speedy trial clock to bring a defendant to trial whose petition for deferred prosecution is denied or who withdraws his or her request for a deferred prosecution. |
Issue M |
Intra state detainer provision governing individuals who are charged in multiple counties with misdemeanors. Something along the line that the jail must notify the defendant at time of conviction/sentencing of all out-standing warrants. The court rule would then exclude the time while the defendant is in custody within the State on different charges, unless, after conviction the Defendant requests, in writing that the detaining prosecuting authority bring him/her to trial and trial is not set within 90 days of receipt of the notification. Possible remedies would be:
_____ dismissal of charges
_____ credit for time served on prior charges against untried charges |
Issue N |
Adjust how time in district court is calculated in superior court.
Example of a recent problem: A defendant ran all but 3 days of his speedy trial in District court. Charges were dismissed in District Court. Charges were refiled in Superior court. Defendant failed to appear for arraignment. Defendant was picked up a year later, arraigned and set for trial within 60 days.However, 3 days later, speedy trial had run. The time period did not reset upon the defendants failure to appear at arraignment. Reason: CrR 3.3(c)(2) only starts the time period over again if the defendant fails to appear AFTER he is arraigned in Superior Court. Solution: remove the language who has already been arraigned from the rule.
Speedy trial clock starts for a defendant who is in custody in one county for a felony filed initially in district court in another county. The appropriate time for trial is the Ain custody@ period. See State v. Hardesty, COA No. 19677-1-III (March 13, 2002). |
Issue O |
Clarify when crimes arise out of the same incident for speedy trial purposes.
_____ Some crimes filed in juvenile court with traffic offenses in district court.
_____ Some misdemeanors filed in municipal court with felonies filed in superior court.
_____ Seemingly unrelated crimes discovered at the same time with misdemeanor filed in district court and felony in superior court. See, e.g., State v. Kindsvogel, No. 20213-5-III (April 2, 2002) (manufacturing marijuana charge's time for trial started at same time as DV 4th degree assault as the marijuana grow operation was discovered when the police responded to the DV incident). |
Issue P |
Held to answer. Bail posted prior to preliminary appearance or at preliminary appearance, with charges not filed until sometime later. See State v. Fulps, 141 Wn.2d 663 (2000). |