CrRLJ 7.2 - Sentencing

• Proposed Changes to CrRLJ 7.2 - Sentencing (in Word Format)
• No comments are available at this time.

Purpose: The current formulation of the CrRLJ 7.2 does not require the court to advise a criminal defendant of his or her right to appeal or right to collateral attack a judgment when the defendant has pled guilty. However, a criminal defendant may appeal or collaterally attack a judgment and sentence based on a guilty plea. While the right to appeal may be limited after a guilty plea, it is not foreclosed, and nothing about a guilty plea prevents the defendant from collaterally attacking the judgment and sentence, particularly where the defendant claims he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel, that he or she was not properly advised on the direct consequences of the plea, or that the plea was involuntary. RCW 10.73.110 provides, “At the time judgment and sentence is pronounced in a criminal case, the court shall advise the defendant of the time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.” In In re Becker, 143 Wn.2d 491 (2000), the Washington Supreme Court questioned the wisdom of the current wording of the rule and the fact that it directly conflicts with RCW 10.73.110. The Supreme Court stated:

The Court of Appeals relied upon RCW 10.73.090's time bar and held notifications or time limits required by RCW 10.73.110 are superseded by CrRLJ 7.2(b) because defendants who plead guilty are exempted from the notification requirements of RCW 10.73.090. However, we do not reach this issue because, procedurally, this case is governed by our interpretation of RCW 10.73.140. Although we decide this case on the basis of prohibited successive collateral attacks, the facts of this case call into question the wisdom of CrRLJ 7.2(b). The statute makes no distinction for requiring notification on the time limits for collateral attacks. While we do not decide the issue of whether this is procedural or substantive, little basis exists for the difference between the court rule and the statute. The better practice is to provide the statutory notification in all cases.

Id. at 495 n.3. There is no principled basis for not advising all misdemeanor defendants of their rights to appeal and their statutory right to collaterally attack their convictions, and the time limit that applies to such attacks.

The proposed rule is not intended to expand the right to appeal. Courts should therefore advise defendants who have pled guilty that their right to appeal is limited. A parallel change is proposed to CrR 7.2, so that CrR 7.2 and CrRLJ 7.2 are consistent with each other.